

**Child Support and Child Welfare System Interactions:
Evaluating the Effect of Cost-Recovery Arrears on the Stability of Reunification**

2024–2026 Child Support Policy Research Agreement: Task 5, Deliverable 1

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INTRODUCTION

This report is the first of three deliverables associated with Task 5 of the 2024–2026 Child Support Policy Research Agreement (CSRA): “Child support and child welfare system interactions.” It builds on research completed as part of prior research agreements estimating the impact of foster care cost-recovery child support orders on foster care outcomes.¹ This research has demonstrated that child support referrals for child welfare-involved families have significant negative consequences for children’s reunification with parents (Berger et al., 2024). Moreover, child support orders for foster care cost-recovery often are not paid in full, resulting in arrears that may persist even after children have been reunified. In this report, we document the frequency of arrears associated with foster care placement, and orders to pay these arrears, after family reunification. We consider patterns for custodial mothers who have been reunified with their children, as well as for noncustodial fathers, and estimate the effect of these arrears on the stability of reunification.

The child protective services (CPS) system serves many children and families, with over a third of children subject to a CPS investigation before the age of majority (Kim et al., 2017). In Fiscal Year 2023, about 7.8 million children were reported to CPS, over 500,000 children were substantiated as victims of child abuse and neglect, and close to 20 percent of victims (about 105,000) were removed from their homes and received foster care services (US DHHS CB, 2025). In addition, 1.4 percent of investigated nonvictims were removed from home to foster care, adding about another 40,000 children placed out of home (US DHHS CB, 2025). When children are removed from their homes, the most common permanency plan is reunification with

¹Especially in describing the policy context, prior research, and our data and methods, we draw from our prior report (Berger et al., 2024) completed as part of the 2022-2024 Child Support Research Agreement.

the custodial parent(s) of origin, and most children return home to their parent(s) though, in some cases, reunification is disrupted and the children return to foster care.

Foster care is financially costly. The federal government partially reimburses state costs for child welfare investigations and foster care placement for many children. For most counties in Wisconsin (i.e., with the exception of Milwaukee County), the state provides a Children and Families Aids (CFA) allocation, funded by state revenue, as well as federal foster care (Title IV-E) and other funding (e.g., Social Services Block Grant and Title IV-B). The remaining costs of foster care are paid by counties. By federal policy, states and counties have been permitted to try to “recover” the costs of foster care through the child support system—by establishing a cost-recovery order for either or both parents to offset foster care costs, and/or by reassigning to the state an existing order that provided for a noncustodial parent to pay support to a custodial parent if both parents were not living together with the children prior to foster care. However, these cost-recovery orders are expensive to enforce (Orange County Department of Child Support Services, 2020; Washington State Department of Social and Health Services, 2019), often go unpaid, and have been shown to lead to longer foster care spells—with the costs of additional time in care far exceeding the costs recovered. In part for this reason, recent federal guidance encourages cost-recovery efforts “only in rare circumstances” (Schomburg & Gray, 2022).

While the state Division of Milwaukee Child Protective Services, which administers CPS in the county of Milwaukee, recently eliminated referral to child support for new foster care cases, and Dane County also moved to eliminate referrals,² cost-recovery policy and practice varies substantially across Wisconsin, which is largely a state-supervised but county-operated

²For Dane County, see Dane County 2025 Adopted Budget Report (<https://admin.danecounty.gov/documents/pdf/Budget/2025/Adopted-Budget-Report.pdf>), page 376.

child welfare system. Prior analyses have used variation in cost-recovery policies across counties and over time to estimate the effects of cost-recovery orders on children’s foster care trajectories, concluding that cost-recovery orders lead to longer stays in foster care, lower rates of reunification, and a higher probability of termination of parental rights (Berger et al., 2024). As we detail below, in this report we consider potential subsequent effects of cost-recovery orders for children who are reunified, taking advantage of variation in cost-recovery order assignment propensity across court officials within counties. We address the following questions: How often do reunified children’s parents owe arrears associated with cost-recovery orders? Are they ordered to pay arrears, and do they pay? And, of particular consequence, do arrears associated with foster care cost-recovery affect the stability of reunification among children who are reunified?

DATA AND METHODS

Our analyses leverage Wisconsin administrative data contained in the Wisconsin Administrative Data Core (WADC), which include matched data from Wisconsin’s child welfare system (WiSACWIS), Child Support Enforcement system (KIDS), Client Assistance for Re-employment and Economic Support system (CARES), Unemployment Insurance system (UI), and the Department of Corrections. We draw our sample from WiSACWIS and focus on child welfare outcomes derived from these data and child support outcomes drawn from KIDS. We also use sociodemographic data, including earnings and program participation (e.g., W2/TANF, SSDI, SSI), drawn from the UI and CARES data systems. All dollar amounts are adjusted for inflation (CPI-U2021).

Our unit of analysis is Wisconsin mothers whose child(ren) entered out-of-home care (OHC) between July 2006 and June 2014, with all children having exited OHC within 36

months³ and at least one child having reunified with a parent of origin to be included in the sample. Mothers whose children (1) are all 14 years old or older at time of OHC entry; (2) died, went missing, or ran away from OHC; or (3) did not have a father identified in the WADC are excluded from the sample. The resulting sample includes 7,817 mothers, and our preferred specifications use a sample of 6,332 mothers for whom we were able to identify a valid instrument.⁴ A mother's reunification spell starts when all of her children exit OHC (and at least one reunifies) and ends when any of her children re-enters OHC.

To the best of our knowledge, post-reunification cost-recovery arrears have not been the focus of prior research. We therefore begin by documenting the frequency and level of arrears both for mothers who were previously custodial parents and were reunified with their children, and for the children's noncustodial fathers. As parents can accumulate arrears through multiple pathways, our first aim is to identify arrears that are related to child support cost-recovery orders by categorizing the source and timing of arrears for each parent. Specifically, for each mother in our sample, and the father(s) of her children in OHC, we estimate the incidence and average amount of arrears accrued prior to removal and placement in foster care, those accrued during foster care,⁵ and those accrued after reunification, in terms of owed, ordered, and paid amounts. For both the custodial mothers in our sample, and the associated noncustodial fathers, we measure arrears owed to the government for cost-recovery before and during foster care

³We also conducted robustness checks for OHC spells that ended within 12, 18, 24, and 50 months.

⁴From our original sample of 7,817, 1,485 mothers are excluded, in most cases because the judge assigned to their case had fewer than five other cases in that county. Our preferred instrument is based on the rate of cost-recovery orders assigned by the judge in the case and is estimated only for judges with at least five cases in the county, not inclusive of the mother's case, though we test a more conservative instrumental variable that excludes judges/court officials with fewer than ten cases.

⁵A mother's OHC spell starts when any of her children enter OHC and ends when all of her children who entered OHC exit (with at least one having reunified).

placement and after reunification.⁶ As parents owing arrears may be ordered to make regular payments on arrears, we also document the frequency and level of such orders. In addition, we document funds received for arrears—which may occur even in the absence of an order to pay arrears—for example when a tax refund, such as from the earned income tax credit (EITC), or Unemployment Insurance (UI) payment is intercepted. We also show patterns of variation in cost-recovery arrears across parental demographic and employment characteristics, including whether child support was ordered as part of a divorce or paternity establishment case, race/ethnicity, age, public program participation, number of children, mother’s and father’s employment and earnings (reported to the Unemployment Insurance program), and incarceration history, and by county.

Our second aim is to estimate the effect of cost-recovery arrears on the stability of reunification; our primary measure of stability is whether any of the mother’s children reenter OHC within 24 months of reunification. In our previous study, we found that child support cost-recovery orders substantially lengthen children’s time in foster care, decrease their chances of reunifying with their families, and increase their chances of having their parents’ rights terminated. Building on these findings, the overarching objective of the present study is to estimate the downstream effect of cost-recovery child support orders for families that achieved reunification by examining the role of arrears, or unpaid child support debt.

As cost-recovery arrears are correlated with having cost-recovery orders, we estimate standard ordinary least squares (OLS) models that account for selection into cost-recovery orders only on observable characteristics, as well as our preferred instrumental variable two-stage least

⁶A small fraction of mothers (2.0%) owe arrears prior to placement, presumably related to placements prior to the beginning of our data. Among fathers, 5.3% owe arrears prior to placement—the higher rate is likely due to children with other mothers. We are revising the analysis to exclude fathers’ orders and arrears associated with children of mothers other than the focal mother.

square models that better account for selection bias (similar to the strategy in our previous study). Estimating the causal effect of foster care cost-recovery arrears on the stability of reunification is challenging because there may be unmeasured characteristics of the family or county agency that bias our estimates. For example, counties might be more likely to pursue orders in more difficult cases that are expected to be in care for longer, and to be more likely to disrupt—e.g., cases involving persistent substance abuse. If that is the case, we might find that cases with arrears were more likely to have less-stable reunification—not because of the arrears, per se, but because difficult cases are both more likely to have cost-recovery orders and more likely to have unstable reunifications. Or, mothers with difficulty maintaining employment may be more likely to accumulate arrears and more likely to be unable to maintain housing and other resources required to avoid reentry. While we control for many factors—e.g., earnings prior to placement—there may be unobserved differences that are related to both arrears and stability of reunification.

To estimate the causal effect of cost-recovery arrears on the stability of reunification, we take advantage of the fact that a parent is quasi-randomly assigned to a court official (i.e., judge or court official, referenced simply as “judge” below) who vary in their use of cost-recovery orders, known as an “examiner design” (Frandsen et al., 2023; Chyn et al., 2024). We then estimate the likelihood that each mother will be assigned a cost-recovery order based only on the likelihood of the judge in the case assigning an order. Because our estimate of the mother’s likelihood of an order is based only on the quasi-randomly assigned judge, and unrelated to characteristics of the mother or the case, the estimates avoid family- or case-level bias.

We employ a two-stage least squares instrumental variables model that takes the form of equation (1) below, estimated among reunified families:

$$\begin{aligned}
(1) & \text{Arrears}_{icjt} = \theta + X_{icjt}\vartheta + \text{Arrears}_{c(t-1)}\gamma + \eta_c + \epsilon_{icjt} \\
(2) & \text{Reentry}_{icjt} = \alpha + \widehat{\text{Arrears}_{icjt}}\delta + X_{icjt}\beta + \rho_t + \tau_c + \mu_{icjt}
\end{aligned}$$

where *Arrears* is a binary indicator for mother *i* having cost-recovery arrears at any point in the first three months of reunification in county *c* with a child reunified in year *t*, instrumented with judge *j* propensity to assign cost-recovery orders. We construct the judge cost-recovery order tendency instrumental variable using a leave-one-out approach starting with all cases eligible for cost-recovery orders, dropping the focal case from the probability estimation to ensure strict exogeneity. Our preferred instrument also excludes mothers with multiple cases and judges with fewer than 5 cases total (IV-5), though results are robust to a threshold of 10 (IV-10) as well as the use of a county-level instrumental variable that reflects the share of foster care cases in the county with cost-recovery orders, similarly adopting the leave-one-out approach and lagging by one year to ensure strict exogeneity. We also control in all models for demographic characteristics (i.e., mother's race and ethnicity; number of children in the household; earnings of mother and highest earning father; and whether the mother received W2/TANF, SSI, and SSDI in the year prior to the removal) and county-level characteristics (i.e., CPS report substantiation rate and the lagged county unemployment rate). Robust standard errors are estimated in all models.

As our goal is to measure the effect of cost-recovery arrears on reentry into foster care, our coefficient of interest is that of cost-recovery arrears. It reflects the local average treatment effect of cost-recovery-arrears on reentry among compilers and is interpreted as the percentage point difference in the probability of reentry that is caused by cost-recovery child support arrears among mothers who received a cost-recovery order due to being assigned a judge with a high propensity to make such orders. That is, our strategy capitalizes on quasi-random assignment to

judges, and associated variation in judges' propensities to assign cost-recovery orders, to identify unbiased estimates of the effect of arrears. See Appendix for technical details on our strategy and information on potential advantages and threats to this approach.

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

Arrears. Table 1 shows patterns of arrears over time; Figure 1 depicts these patterns in graphical form. This summary includes results in the month prior to foster care, during any month of foster care, in the month prior to reunification, and in the first, 6th, 12th and 24th month of reunification. (For more detailed results see Appendix Tables 1A–1D). We limit our sample to mothers whose children are reunified within 36 months and follow families for 24 months after reunification. Of our initial sample of 6,332 mothers, 4,947 (or 78%) remain reunified 24 months later. (Monthly trends in mothers' and fathers' cost-recovery arrears are illustrated in Appendix Figure 1.)


For cases in each period, we show arrears owed from mother to government and from father to government. In cases where there are multiple fathers of the mother's children, figures for fathers reflect arrears across all fathers of the mother's children. We distinguish arrears balances, orders to pay arrears, and received payments on arrears. For each, we consider frequency (i.e., percent with arrears, an order for arrears, and arrears received) and the conditional mean (i.e., the mean amount conditional on any balance, order, or receipt). In each month, we include only cases that remain "at risk" for reentry. For example, the estimates for the 12th month after reunification are reported for only the 5,301 cases (84%) in which a mother's children remain reunified.

Table 1: Summary of Arrears Patterns for Main Sample

	N	Mother	Father
Panel A: Arrears Balance			
Any arrears balance:			
In month prior to OHC	6,332	2.0%	5.3%
During any month of OHC	6,332	21.4%	31.0%
1 month prior to reunification	6,332	18.6%	27.9%
1 month after reunification	6,332	16.8%	26.5%
6 months after reunification	5,731	12.5%	23.5%
12 months after reunification	5,301	10.4%	22.2%
24 months after reunification	4,947	8.6%	20.8%
Mean arrears balance (if > \$0):			
In month prior to OHC	6,332	\$8,929	\$8,828
During any month of OHC (maximum)	6,332	\$3,058	\$5,502
1 month prior to reunification	6,332	\$2,964	\$5,400
1 month after reunification	6,332	\$3,088	\$5,554
6 months after reunification	5,731	\$3,408	\$5,583
12 months after reunification	5,301	\$3,727	\$5,883
24 months after reunification	4,947	\$4,081	\$6,320
Panel B: Orders to pay Arrears			
Any arrears orders:			
In month prior to OHC	6,332	1.4%	4.1%
During any month of OHC	6,332	8.9%	14.8%
1 month prior to reunification	6,332	7.4%	13.1%
1 month after reunification	6,332	7.4%	12.7%
6 months after reunification	5,731	6.6%	12.6%
12 months after reunification	5,301	6.0%	12.5%
24 months after reunification	4,947	6.0%	12.6%
Mean arrears order (if >\$0):			
In month prior to OHC	6,332	\$86	\$44
During any month of OHC (maximum)	6,332	\$74	\$42
1 month prior to reunification	6,332	\$73	\$36
1 month after reunification	6,332	\$94	\$41
6 months after reunification	5,731	\$70	\$37
12 months after reunification	5,301	\$71	\$36
24 months after reunification	4,947	\$70	\$35
Panel C: Arrears Received			
Any arrears received:			
In month prior to OHC	6,332	0.5%	1.3%
During any month of OHC	6,332	13.4%	17.3%
1 month prior to reunification	6,332	6.6%	7.6%
1 month after reunification	6,332	7.4%	7.5%
6 months after reunification	5,731	4.6%	6.2%
12 months after reunification	5,301	2.8%	5.1%
24 months after reunification	4,947	2.0%	4.3%
Mean arrears received (if >\$0):			
In month prior to OHC	6,332	\$715	\$66
During any month of OHC (maximum)	6,332	\$667	\$416
1 month prior to reunification	6,332	\$346	\$160
1 month after reunification	6,332	\$401	\$168
6 months after reunification	5,731	\$378	\$132
12 months after reunification	5,301	\$262	\$236
24 months after reunification	4,947	\$305	\$188

Notes: The sample is restricted to mothers with non-missing judge instrument variables (IV-5). The “during any month of OHC (max.)” refers to the mean of each mother’s maximum monthly amount during the OHC spell.

Figure 1: Summary Arrears Frequencies and Amounts, by Parent and Type



Notes: The sample (N = 6,332) is restricted to mothers with non-missing judge instrument variables (IV-5). Percent and dollar amount values can be found in Table 1.

In the month prior to reunification, 18.6% of mothers and 27.9% of fathers owe cost-recovery arrears. Many mothers have all children reunified within a few months; among a consistent sample of those with children in care for 24 months (not shown in Table 1), 18.8% of mothers and 28.2% of fathers owe cost-recovery arrears in the month prior to reunification. In the first month of reunification, 16.8% of mothers owe arrears; this proportion typically falls

over time, to 8.6% of mothers owing arrears at 24 months (for a consistent sample of those remaining reunified for the full 24 months, those with arrears balances falls from 16.4% to 8.6% over the period).⁷ The proportion of fathers with arrears also falls, though not as rapidly, from 26.5% in the first month of reunification to 20.8% at 24 months (and from 26.6% to 20.8% for a consistent sample of those remaining reunified for the full 24 months).

Average arrears balances for those owing arrears in the first month of reunification were \$3,088 for mothers and \$5,554 for fathers. As noted above, the proportion of mothers with balances falls by almost half (to 8.6%) over the 24 months of reunification, but the balance for those still owing arrears averages almost \$4,100 by the 24th month (among the 78% remaining reunified for the full 24-month period, their average arrears balances were \$2,987 in the first month of reunification). The proportion of fathers with balances also falls somewhat, but average cost-recovery arrears among fathers increases to almost \$6,500 by the 24th month (among the fathers associated with the 78% of mothers who remaining reunified for the full 24-month period, average arrears balances were \$5,198 in the first month of reunification).

Panel B of Table 1 shows the proportion of cases with orders to pay arrears and average order amounts for those with arrears orders. Orders for arrears are relatively stable across time during reunification—varying between 7.4% and 6.0% for mothers, and 12.5% and 12.7% for fathers—from the 1st month through the 24th month of reunification. While orders for arrears are less common for mothers, order amounts are higher, ranging from about \$70 to about \$94 per month during reunification. Fathers’ orders average between \$35 and \$41 per month during reunification.

⁷While not our focus, it is noteworthy that the proportion of mothers with foster care arrears balances rises from 17.8% in the first month of the second spell (i.e., after reentry), to 35.2% in the 6th (see Appendix Table 1C for details).

Panel C of Table 1 shows the frequencies and amounts of arrears receipts. The proportion of cases with receipts is defined for all cases with arrears, rather than for those with arrears orders, since an order is not required for arrears to be collected (e.g., for a payment or tax or social welfare program benefit intercept for arrears). The proportion of cases with arrears receipts declined for both mothers and fathers, from 7.4% to 2.0% and 7.5% to 4.3%, respectively, between the first month after reunification and the 24th month (7.6% of mothers, and 7.6% of fathers in cases still reunified in month 24 had receipts in the first month). Average amounts received also fell for mothers, from a high of \$401 in the month after reunification to \$305 24 months after reunification. Average arrears receipts for fathers were \$168 in the month after reunification and \$188 24 months after reunification. It is noteworthy that average receipts far exceed orders on arrears; this is consistent with tax intercepts (which may be relatively large) being an important source of arrears receipt. Figure 1 illustrates the frequencies and amounts of the three different arrears types by parent.

Variation in child welfare system trajectories and family and case characteristics by cost-recovery order status. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for children's child welfare system trajectories and family and case characteristics for the full sample and by cost-recovery order (CRO) status⁸ (Appendix Table 2 reports arrears balances, orders, and payments by key family characteristics, including county of the CPS agency responsible for the OHC spell). Most mothers and fathers that had cost-recovery orders owed cost-recovery arrears (72% and 73%, respectively) and, in many cases, the other parent also owed cost-recovery arrears. We also find

⁸The "Mother CRO" column includes the 1,434 mothers who ever had a cost recovery order during their children's initial OHC spell, the "Father CRO" column includes the 2,124 mothers with at least one father of their children having a cost recovery order during their children's initial OHC spell, and the "No CRO column" includes the 3,843 mothers who never owed a cost recovery order, and no father of their children owed a cost recovery order during their children's initial OHC spell.

considerable overlap in cost-recovery order assignment to mothers and fathers. When a father was assigned a cost-recovery order, the mother was also assigned a cost-recovery order 50% of the time. Likewise, when a mother was assigned a cost-recovery order, the father was also assigned a cost-recovery order 75% of the time.

On the whole, these statistics indicate that children whose mothers or fathers have cost-recovery orders are similarly or, perhaps, slightly *less likely* than those whose parents do not have orders to reenter OHC within 24 months of reunification (with reentry rates of 21.3–21.5% versus 22.2%) and that those who eventually reenter OHC remain at home for longer before doing so (with average months to reentry of 15.5–16.2 versus 14.9). We also find that parents with cost-recovery orders were more likely to have been assigned a judge with a higher propensity to establish such orders, consistent with judge-level variation in practices.

Turning to family and case characteristics, we see that children whose parents had cost-recovery orders spent considerably more time in foster care (14–15 months versus 7 months). The unadjusted estimates further indicate that cost-recovery orders were disproportionately assigned to white non-Hispanic families, families with multiple-partner fertility, larger families, families with older children, and families with paternity- (rather than divorce-) related child support orders, as well as to those for which mothers and fathers had higher earnings, and mothers were receiving child support.

Table 2: Summary Statistics of Full Sample and by Cost-Recovery Order (CRO)

Variable	Full Sample	Mother		
		CRO	Father CRO	No CRO
CRO Arrears M 3 months post-OHC	17.1%	72.0%	37.3%	0.9%
CRO Arrears F 3 months post-OHC	27.0%	56.0%	73.4%	3.4%
Mother has CRO	22.6%	100.0%	50.3%	0.0%
Father has CRO	33.5%	74.5%	100.0%	0.0%
Spell length (months)	9.55	15.05	13.63	6.96
Reentered w/in 12 m.	17.2%	15.8%	16.1%	17.5%
Reentered w/in 18 m.	20.3%	19.2%	19.4%	20.3%
Reentered w/in 24 m.	22.2%	21.5%	21.3%	22.2%
Reentered w/in 36 m.	24.7%	24.4%	24.5%	24.3%
Months to Reentry*	15.2	15.5	16.2	14.9
Judge IV-5	30.8%	38.7%	34.5%	28.2%
White NH	60.5%	70.2%	64.8%	57.7%
Black NH	20.4%	12.8%	18.7%	21.6%
Hispanic	9.8%	8.1%	8.0%	11.0%
Other NH	8.6%	8.7%	8.2%	8.7%
Missing race/ethnicity	0.7%	0.2%	0.3%	0.9%
2 Fathers	36.9%	39.5%	41.1%	34.7%
3+ Fathers	27.3%	31.9%	32.7%	24.3%
F No SSN	5.4%	4.6%	1.6%	6.8%
F No UI reported earnings	37.6%	34.9%	32.5%	39.1%
F earnings <5k	15.0%	16.0%	16.9%	14.3%
F earnings 5–10k	7.5%	7.9%	8.1%	7.4%
F earnings 10–25k	14.8%	16.2%	18.1%	13.5%
F earnings >25k	19.8%	20.3%	22.7%	18.9%
M No SSN	8.7%	4.4%	6.4%	10.2%
M No UI reported earnings	32.8%	28.6%	32.5%	33.2%
M earnings <3k	17.4%	19.2%	18.4%	17.0%
M earnings 3–10k	15.4%	17.6%	16.1%	15.1%
M earnings >10k	25.7%	30.2%	26.6%	24.5%
County substantiation rate	17.5%	18.3%	18.0%	17.2%
Unemployment Rate	6.7%	6.6%	6.5%	6.7%
SSI lagged year	8.8%	2.7%	8.8%	9.4%
SSDI lagged year	5.2%	3.2%	5.4%	5.3%
W2/TANF lagged year	15.5%	14.0%	17.8%	14.7%
Divorced	60.8%	64.2%	69.0%	57.0%
Paternity	12.6%	13.2%	13.2%	12.4%
Missing paternity	26.7%	22.5%	17.8%	30.6%
Father's age	36.42	36.39	36.63	36.21
Mother's age	30.71	30.71	30.89	30.56
Missing oldest father's age	0.4%	0.3%	0.0%	0.6%
Missing mother's age	0.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%
Number of OHC children	1.9	2.0	2.1	1.9
Oldest OHC child age	7.8	8.2	8.5	7.4
N	6,332	1,434	2,124	3,843

Notes: Means (for continuous variables) and proportions (for dichotomous variables) reported. The sample is restricted to mothers with non-missing judge instrument variables (IV-5). Months to reentry (denoted by * above) has different Ns, restricted to only moms who have children reentering OHC, which are 1,771, 392, 595, and 1,058, respectively.

Regression Results

Table 3 presents our primary OLS and IV regression results. Column 1 reports the result of a regression of the relation between a mother having cost-recovery arrears and the probability of reentry within 24 months of reunification. Column 2 shows that this estimate is consistent when using the same sample as used in the IV analyses (mothers with a valid instrument). These estimates suggest a 5.7 to 6.0 percentage point (25.7 to 27.0% of the 22.2% baseline; statistically significant) greater likelihood of reentry associated with a mother having cost-recovery arrears, after accounting for a range of observable characteristics (e.g., spell length, race/ethnicity, number of fathers, number of children, earnings and program participation). However, as discussed above, this estimate cannot be interpreted as causal; we cannot be confident that the cost-recovery order itself is increasing reentry based on these estimates because there may be unobserved differences between mothers with and without arrears that bias our estimates.

Our primary interest is the causal impact of cost-recovery arrears on the stability of reunification. Our main estimates use the instrumental variable approach discussed above, relying on variation in judges' propensity to issue cost-recovery orders to estimate the causal impact of cost-recovery arrears on reentry. Column 3 of Table 3 shows the key result: *Mothers with cost-recovery arrears are estimated to be 22.8 percentage points more likely to have a child reenter foster care within 24 months, essentially doubling the probability of reentry relative to the overall average (22.2%).* This is both a statistically significant and large effect. The full regression results are reported in Appendix Table 3.⁹

⁹We also estimated the model without controlling for length of initial OHC episode, as reported in Appendix Table 10. The magnitude of the OLS estimates are substantially attenuated and become statistically nonsignificant, but our IV estimate is consistent with that from our primary specification.

Table 3: OLS and 2SLS Results for Reentry in 24 Months

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) 2SLS
CRO Arrears Mother	0.057*** (0.014)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.228*** (0.060)
N	7,817	6,332	6,332
Sample	OLS	IV	IV
Mean DV	0.222	0.222	0.222
F-statistic			371.88
F <i>p</i> -value			0.000
Partial R ²			0.059
Controls	Limited	Limited	Limited

Notes: Table depicts coefficients from independent OLS and 2SLS regressions with robust standard errors. The “OLS” sample refers to the full sample, while the “IV” sample refers to mothers with only non-missing judge instrument variables (IV-5). “Limited” controls refer to a set of exogenous variables, namely the number of months in the first OHC spell, mother’s race/ethnicity, number of dads, number of children, highest earning father’s lagged earnings (in categories), mother’s lagged earnings (in categories), county-level substantiation rate, lagged county-level unemployment rate, and lagged receipt of SSI, SSDI, and W2/TANF. * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

We can be more confident in these results if similar findings emerge when we use alternative measures and consider different timeframes for both time in OHC and periods of reunification. Thus, we estimated the relation between cost-recovery arrears and reentry for many different samples and over many different periods of time.¹⁰ The results are remarkably robust. Across all specifications, mothers with cost-recovery arrears are estimated to be more likely to have a child reenter foster care, though for some smaller sub-samples estimates are not statistically significant.

- Our primary sample includes mothers who initially reunified with their children within 36 months, and we examined reentry within 24 months. Table 4 shows results for mothers who initially reunified with their children within 12, 18, 24, 36, or 50 months. Note that the sample size (N) grows as we allow longer periods before reunification. All estimates are large and statistically significant. Focusing on reentry within 24 months, the period of observation for our primary specification (Panel C), for example, we find that cost-recovery arrears are estimated to increase reentry by 22.9 percentage points (column 5; about 105.0% for the sample of mothers whose children reunified after being in care for

¹⁰Additionally, we estimated the model using an alternative definition of the OHC spell, whereby the OHC spell starts when any of the mother’s children enter OHC and ends when any of the mother’s children exit OHC. These results are reported in Appendix Table 11, and are highly consistent with those from our primary specification.

50 months) and by 39.2 percentage points (column 1; about 163.3% for the sample of mothers whose children were reunified within 12 months).

- As noted above, our primary measure is reentry within 24 months of reunification. Table 4 also shows estimates of the impact of cost-recovery arrears on reentry within 12, 18, and 36 months (Panels A, B, and D, respectively) of reunification (for mothers who initially reunified with their children within 12, 18, 24, 36 or 50 months of OHC). Again, all estimates are statistically significant such that cost-recovery arrears are consistently estimated to increase reentry within 12 months by 13.1 to 23.4 percentage points, within 18 months by 20.4 to 33.0 percentage points, and 36 months by 23.2–41.7 percentage points. Full results of Table 4 are shown in Appendix Tables 4-7.
- We also estimated the effects of cost-recovery arrears on reentry for different subgroups of our main sample of mothers, who initially reunified with their children within 36 months and who were observed for the subsequent 24 months. Table 5 shows the results for subsamples defined by whether child support was established through divorce or paternity,¹¹ number of fathers with whom the mother has children, and mother's race/ethnicity. All point estimates are positive (i.e., suggesting higher rates of reentry for those with cost-recovery arrears), but many of the estimates are not statistically significant, which is not unexpected given the smaller number of cases in each subsample. OLS results for these subgroups are shown in Appendix Table 8.

¹¹Only those for whom we can identify divorce or paternity status vis-a-vis child support order establishment are included. For couples without child support orders, we cannot determine whether the children's parents were married at the time of their birth.

Table 4: Reentry by First Spell Length, Mother Cost-Recovery Order

	(1) 12 mo.	(2) 18 mo.	(3) 24 mo.	(4) 36 mo.	(5) 50 mo.
Panel A: Reentry in 12 Months					
CRO Arrears Mother	0.234* (0.092)	0.164* (0.069)	0.136* (0.059)	0.131* (0.053)	0.134* (0.054)
Mean DV	0.189	0.182	0.177	0.172	0.168
Panel B: Reentry in 18 Months					
CRO Arrears Mother	0.330*** (0.100)	0.259*** (0.075)	0.210*** (0.063)	0.204*** (0.058)	0.207*** (0.058)
Mean DV	0.221	0.212	0.207	0.203	0.199
Panel C: Reentry in 24 Months					
CRO Arrears Mother	0.392*** (0.104)	0.298*** (0.078)	0.236*** (0.066)	0.228*** (0.060)	0.229*** (0.060)
Mean DV	0.0240	0.232	0.227	0.222	0.218
Panel D: Reentry in 36 Months					
CRO Arrears Mother	0.417*** (0.107)	0.299*** (0.080)	0.247*** (0.068)	0.240*** (0.062)	0.232*** (0.062)
Mean DV	0.265	0.257	0.251	0.247	0.242
N	4,480	5,359	5,878	6,332	6,558
Controls	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited

Notes: Table depicts coefficients from independent 2SLS regressions with robust standard errors for reentry within 24 months of reunification. “Limited” controls refer to a set of exogenous variables, namely the number of months in the first OHC spell, mother’s race/ethnicity, number of dads, number of children, highest earning father’s lagged earnings (in categories), mother’s lagged earnings (in categories), county-level substantiation rate, lagged county-level unemployment rate, and lagged receipt of SSI, SSDI, and W2/TANF. * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Table 5: Reentry in 24 Months, Stratification by Demographic Characteristics

	Paternity Status			Number of Fathers			Mother’s Race / Ethnicity		
	(1) Paternity	(2) Divorced	(3) One	(4) Two	(5) Three +	(6) White	(7) Black	(8) Hispanic	(9) Other
CRO Arrears Mother	0.458 (0.294)	0.233** (0.073)	0.344* (0.136)	0.162 (0.086)	0.254* (0.105)	0.214* (0.087)	0.245 (0.126)	0.190 (0.149)	0.237 (0.197)
N	797	3,847	2,267	2,337	1,728	3,833	1,292	620	544
Mean DV	0.242	0.214	0.199	0.216	0.261	0.213	0.240	0.218	0.257
F-Statistic	18.72	242.07	81.70	162.76	120.86	168.97	82.51	66.80	41.09
F p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Partial R ²	0.021	0.063	0.040	0.067	0.067	0.041	0.084	0.111	0.065
Controls	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited

Notes: Table depicts coefficients from independent 2SLS regressions with robust standard errors. Reentry is defined as any of the mother’s children reentering OHC within 24 months of reunification. “Limited” controls refer to a set of exogenous variables, namely the number of months in the first OHC spell, mother’s race/ethnicity, number of dads, number of children, highest earning father’s lagged earnings (in categories), mother’s lagged earnings (in categories), county-level substantiation rate, lagged county-level unemployment rate, and lagged receipt of SSI, SSDI, and W2/TANF. * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

In sum, our results consistently indicate that cost-recovery arrears increase reentry into foster care. As noted above, mothers with cost-recovery arrears are estimated to be 22.8

percentage points (Table 3, Column 3) more likely to have a child reenter foster care within 24 months—essentially doubling the probability of reentry relative to the overall average (22.2%) in that period. Whereas we hypothesized that mothers owing arrears would increase the probability of reentry, due to the associated economic stress, father’s cost-recovery arrears may have a less direct effect. Nevertheless, we also estimated the effect of fathers’ cost-recovery arrears on the stability of reunification, finding that fathers’ cost-recovery arrears exhibit a similarly significant effect that is consistent across specifications, as shown in Table 6. Specifically, we find that fathers’ cost-recovery arrears have similarly large impacts on reentry as mothers’ cost recovery arrears.¹² Finally, while reentry into foster care is our preferred measure of the stability of reunification, we also analyzed screened-in (for initial assessment) re-reports to CPS, potentially as a more sensitive measure of instability than reentry. However, data limitations undercut the utility of this analysis. Re-reports are frequently screened-out and, thus, not recorded in our data when a family’s case remains open during the reunification period (as is often the case for some period after reunification). Our data include only screened-in reports. Thus, screened-in re-reports serve as an indicator of both lower risk of instability (the case is closed) and higher risk of instability (there has been a screened-in re-report). As shown in Appendix Table 9, we found that cost-recovery orders reduced screened-in re-reports by 27.0 percentage points, or about

¹²We also estimated reentry into foster care within 24 months by whether the mother only, father only, and both parents had cost recovery arrears. Notably, these results should be viewed with caution given relatively small number of mother-only and father-only arrears cases: 7% of mothers had mother-only CRO arrears, 16.8% of mothers had father-only CRO arrears, and 10.1% of mothers had both mother and father CRO arrears. Moreover, the first-stage F-statistic for the father-only arrears model is inadequate in magnitude to suggest that the instrument is valid for this model. As such, the IV models suggest that the results are driven by mother-only or both-parent arrears. Nonetheless, the OLS results and valid IV results suggest that increased reentry is mostly driven by whether mothers have such arrears. See Appendix Table 12.

46.7%, which we hypothesize reflects higher rates of open cases among mothers with cost-recovery orders.¹³

Table 6: Reentry by First Spell Length, Father Cost-Recovery Order

Variable	Full Sample	Mother CRO	Father CRO	No CRO
CRO Arrears M 3 months post-OHC	17.1%	72.0%	37.3%	0.9%
CRO Arrears F 3 months post-OHC	27.0%	56.0%	73.4%	3.4%
Mother has CRO	22.6%	100.0%	50.3%	0.0%
Father has CRO	33.5%	74.5%	100.0%	0.0%
Spell length (months)	9.55	15.05	13.63	6.96
Reentered w/in 12 m.	17.2%	15.8%	16.1%	17.5%
Reentered w/in 18 m.	20.3%	19.2%	19.4%	20.3%
Reentered w/in 24 m.	22.2%	21.5%	21.3%	22.2%
Reentered w/in 36 m.	24.7%	24.4%	24.5%	24.3%
Months to Reentry*	15.2	15.5	16.2	14.9
Judge IV-5	30.8%	38.7%	34.5%	28.2%
White NH	60.5%	70.2%	64.8%	57.7%
Black NH	20.4%	12.8%	18.7%	21.6%
Hispanic	9.8%	8.1%	8.0%	11.0%
Other NH	8.6%	8.7%	8.2%	8.7%
Missing race/ethnicity	0.7%	0.2%	0.3%	0.9%
2 Fathers	36.9%	39.5%	41.1%	34.7%
3+ Fathers	27.3%	31.9%	32.7%	24.3%
F No SSN	5.4%	4.6%	1.6%	6.8%
F No UI reported earnings	37.6%	34.9%	32.5%	39.1%
F earnings <\$5k	15.0%	16.0%	16.9%	14.3%
F earnings \$5–\$10k	7.5%	7.9%	8.1%	7.4%
F earnings \$10–\$25k	14.8%	16.2%	18.1%	13.5%
F earnings >\$25k	19.8%	20.3%	22.7%	18.9%
M No SSN	8.7%	4.4%	6.4%	10.2%
M No UI reported earnings	32.8%	28.6%	32.5%	33.2%
M earnings <\$3k	17.4%	19.2%	18.4%	17.0%
M earnings \$3–\$10k	15.4%	17.6%	16.1%	15.1%
M earnings >\$10k	25.7%	30.2%	26.6%	24.5%
County substantiation rate	17.5%	18.3%	18.0%	17.2%
Unemployment Rate	6.7%	6.6%	6.5%	6.7%
SSI lagged year	8.8%	2.7%	8.8%	9.4%
SSDI lagged year	5.2%	3.2%	5.4%	5.3%
W2/TANF lagged year	15.5%	14.0%	17.8%	14.7%
Divorced	60.8%	64.2%	69.0%	57.0%
Paternity	12.6%	13.2%	13.2%	12.4%
Missing paternity	26.7%	22.5%	17.8%	30.6%

¹³Limitations of the data currently available in the WADC prevent us from fully examining whether this is the case. However, we have confirmed that cases with cost-recovery orders stay open longer than those without cost-recovery orders. Moreover, of the 57.8% of mothers in our sample who had a recorded (screened-in) re-report after their child’s reunification, 16.8% experienced that rereport while still having an open CPS case and 83.2% experienced that rereport after their prior CPS case had been closed.

Variable	Full Sample	Mother CRO	Father CRO	No CRO
Father's age	36.42	36.39	36.63	36.21
Mother's age	30.71	30.71	30.89	30.56
Missing oldest father's age	0.4%	0.3%	0.0%	0.6%
Missing mother's age	0.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%
Number of OHC children	1.9	2.0	2.1	1.9
Oldest OHC child age	7.8	8.2	8.5	7.4
N	6,332	1,434	2,124	3,843

Notes: Table depicts coefficients from independent 2SLS regressions with robust standard errors. Reentry is defined as any of the mother's children reentering OHC. "Limited" controls refer to a set of exogenous variables, namely the number of months in the first OHC spell, mother's race/ethnicity, number of dads, number of children, highest earning father's lagged earnings (in categories), mother's lagged earnings (in categories), county-level substantiation rate, lagged county-level unemployment rate, and lagged receipt of SSI, SSDI, and W2/TANF. * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Additional Specification and Sensitivity Tests

As discussed above, we estimated the relation between cost-recovery arrears and stability of reunification, as indicated by reentry to foster care, across many different samples and timeframes. Across all samples and timeframes cost-recovery arrears increased reentry and estimated effects were both substantively and statistically significant in the vast majority of these analyses. For some smaller subgroups, however, while point estimates remained positive, the results were not statistically significant.

We also tested the robustness of estimates to alternative specifications, including redefining the instrument to exclude judges with fewer than 10 (rather than five) cases, the inclusion of additional control variables, and adding county and year fixed effects—either with or without county-clustered standard errors. The results are summarized in Table 7, which shows that, in every specification, cost-recovery arrears are estimated to increase reentry within 24 months by 22.8 percentage points (our base specification) to 37.9 percentage points. Estimates are consistently both substantively and statistically significant.

Table 7: Robustness Checks for Reentry

	(1) IV-5	(2) IV-5	(3) IV-10	(4) IV-10
Panel A: County-Clustered SE				
CRO Arrears Mother	0.228** (0.083)	0.241* (0.093)	0.233** (0.084)	0.246** (0.095)
N	6,332	6,332	6,256	6,256
Mean DV	0.222	0.222	0.223	0.223
F-statistic	148.08	146.06	140.02	138.64
F p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Partial R ²	0.059	0.060	0.056	0.057
Controls	Limited	Parental	Limited	Parental
Panel B: County and Year FE				
CRO Arrears Mother	0.355** (0.119)	0.357** (0.118)	0.377** (0.132)	0.379** (0.131)
N	6,332	6,332	6,256	6,256
Mean DV	0.222	0.222	0.223	0.223
F-statistic	85.33	87.10	70.13	71.53
F p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Partial R ²	0.016	0.016	0.013	0.013
Controls	Limited	Parental	Limited	Parental
Panel C: County-Clustered SE, County and Year FE				
CRO Arrears Mother	0.355** (0.118)	0.357** (0.118)	0.377** (0.130)	0.379** (0.131)
N	6,332	6,332	6,256	6,256
Mean DV	0.222	0.222	0.223	0.223
F-statistic	63.77	68.70	51.27	54.79
F p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Partial R ²	0.016	0.016	0.013	0.013
Controls	Limited	Parental	Limited	Parental

Notes: Table depicts coefficients from independent 2SLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the level of the county (Panels A and C) and county and year-of-removal fixed effects (Panels B and C). Reentry is defined as any of the mother's children reentering OHC within 24 months of reunification. "Limited" controls refer to a set of exogenous variables, namely the number of months in the first OHC spell, mother's race/ethnicity, number of dads, number of children, highest earning father's lagged earnings (in categories), mother's lagged earnings (in categories), county-level substantiation rate, lagged county-level unemployment rate, and lagged receipt of SSI, SSDI, and W2/TANF. * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Previous research on Wisconsin families has demonstrated that child support referrals for child welfare-involved families have significant negative consequences for children's reunification with parents. In this analysis, we document the frequency of cost-recovery arrears

for custodial and noncustodial parents after family reunification and estimate the impact of arrears for the stability of reunification.

We consider mothers whose child(ren) entered out-of-home care between July 2006 and June of 2014, with all children having left out-of-home care within 36 months. We find that cost-recovery arrears were common; in the month prior to reunification, 18.6% of mothers and 27.9% of fathers owed child support arrears for cost-recovery. Average arrears balances were substantial; at reunification they were over \$3,000 for mothers and over \$5,500 for fathers owing arrears. While receipts were fairly rare, average amounts were substantial, averaging \$401 and \$168 per month for mothers and fathers in the first month of reunification, and \$305 and \$188 in the 24th month of reunification, among those with receipts, no arrears payments were received during reunification from the vast majority of mothers (92.6 to 98.0%) and fathers (92.5 to 95.7%) with cost-recovery arrears.

Our primary interest is the causal impact of cost-recovery arrears on the stability of reunification. Because owing cost-recovery arrears may be related to unmeasured characteristics of the family or county agency, estimates of the relation between arrears and the stability of reunification for her children may be biased. For example, mothers with difficulty maintaining employment may be more likely to accumulate arrears and less likely to maintain housing and other resources required to avoid reentry. We therefore take advantage of variation in the use of cost-recovery orders by court officials across Wisconsin to estimate the likelihood that a mother will accrue cost-recovery arrears; because our estimate is unrelated to characteristics of the mother or the case, the estimates avoid family-level sources of bias.

We find that cost-recovery arrears increase reentry into foster care, essentially doubling the probability of reentry within 24 months of reunification. We estimate effects across a variety

of samples and timeframes with consistent results. This suggests that not only does cost-recovery delay reunification, but once families are reunified, associated arrears are a significant barrier to families remaining together.

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APPENDIX

Our goal is to measure the causal effect of cost-recovery arrears on reentry into foster care. There are several potential threats to the validity of our approach. First, the accumulation of arrears during the reunified period is an artifact of judge or county agency propensity to assign cost-recovery orders, as well as macroeconomic conditions correlated with the non-custodial parent's ability to pay. Quasi-random assignment of mothers to judges mitigates this concern for our preferred models, whereas using the lagged probability of cost-recovery arrears that were initiated during reunification to instrument for such orders (e.g., county IV; as in our prior work) may be more likely to violate the exclusion restriction assumption that is necessary for causal interpretation. We therefore test whether both the county and judge IV are correlated with maternal characteristics in Appendix Table 13, finding evidence of strict exogeneity.

A second concern is that the reunified sample may be subject to selection bias beyond the observable factors captured in our vector of controls, and our previous work found that cost-recovery orders are associated with a reduction in reunification. However, this concern is fully remediated by the fact that children who do not reunify (e.g., those placed in guardianship, adoption, or other permanent placements) cannot be affected by cost-recovery orders after exiting foster care and are therefore not 'at risk' for reentry. Thus, our sample is structurally defined as a function of risk and therefore less subject to concerns related to selection. Treatment in this setting is downstream from the initial cost-recovery order decision and only observed among reunified families. Moreover, we control for the length of the pre-reunification foster care spell to further account for potential bias arising if initial spell length is correlated with likelihood of reentry.


Several additional assumptions must be met to interpret estimated effects as causal. First, the relevance assumption requires that the instrumental variable predicts the endogenous variable (i.e., that a judge's propensity to issue a cost-recovery order predicts whether the parent has a cost-recovery order). As with our previous study, all models and samples exhibit a strong first stage with F-statistics uniformly exceeding 368 in our preferred specifications (Angrist & Imbens, 1994; Stock et al., 2002). Appendix Figures 1 and 2 depict temporal and individual-level variation in our instrumental variables.

Third, our approach requires that the instrument is as good-as-randomly assigned, meaning that mothers are quasi-randomly assigned to judges and that they do not systematically select into counties (i.e., exhibit endogenous migration or mobility). Such moves are highly improbable because county-level practices are not publicized, meaning that mothers cannot select into less-strict counties. Moreover, by lagging the instrumental variable and excluding the focal mother from instrument construction, we wipe out any remaining correlation between the mother and county or judge practices. Empirical support for this assertion is provided in Appendix Table 13, where we show that maternal characteristics are not predictive of judges' propensities to assign cost-recovery orders for arrears and the county level cost-recovery order rate.

Fourth, the exclusion restriction requires that the instrument only affects reentry through cost-recovery order practices. We showed in our previous work that cost-recovery orders are not related to removals and placement into foster care, assuaging this concern such that we are not concerned about selection into reunification. However, that reunified families are plausibly positively selected relative to non-reunified families suggests that our estimates are conservative.


Finally, the monotonicity assumption asserts that mothers with high-cost-recovery ordering judges, and those in high-cost-recovery counties, are more likely to receive cost-recovery orders than those with low cost-recovery order rate judges or counties. This is conceptually feasible given that our instrumental variables are strong and relevant, constructed with a lagged leave-one-out design, and exhibit a monotonic relationship with cost-recovery orders overall (see Appendix Figure 3). Moreover, that our first stage is strong and consistent across all subsamples provides empirical support for the ‘weak’ monotonicity assumption (Frandsen et al., 2023).

Appendix Figure 1: Trends in CRO Arrears, by OHC Spell Start Date




Note: Figure depicts rates of having CRO arrears according to the start date of first OHC spell.

Appendix Figure 2: Trends in IV by OHC Spell Start Date



Notes: Figure depicts trends in three instrumental variables by the date of the first OHC spell for the analytic sample. Series 1 depicts the judge IV less mothers assigned to judges with fewer than 5 cases (IV-5); Series 2 depicts the judge IV less mothers assigned to judges with fewer than 10 cases (IV-10); Series 3 depicts the county IV.

Appendix Figure 3: First Stage Results



Notes: Figure depicts mean rates of CRO Arrears assigned to mothers by bins of the three instrumental variables: Judge arrears tendency less mothers assigned to judges with fewer than 5 cases (IV-5), fewer than 10 cases (IV-10), and the county tendency to assign CRO arrears (County-IV).

Appendix Table 1A. Cost Recovery Orders and Arrears, during OHC

Time	N	% at Risk	CRO > \$0		Mean CRO (if >0)		Arrears Balance > \$0		Mean Arrears Balance (if > \$0)	
			Mother CRO	Father CRO	Mother CRO	Father CRO	Mother CRO	Father CRO	Mother CRO	Father CRO
1 month before OHC	6,332	100.0%	1.1%	2.3%	\$169	\$259	2.0%	5.3%	\$8,929	\$8,828
1st month in OHC	6,332	100.0%	3.0%	10.8%	\$151	\$192	2.2%	6.7%	\$8,408	\$8,349
2nd month in OHC	5,625	88.8%	5.4%	17.7%	\$206	\$278	3.3%	13.2%	\$6,222	\$5,969
3rd month in OHC	4,871	76.9%	8.4%	22.7%	\$225	\$286	6.1%	19.9%	\$3,866	\$5,218
4th month in OHC	4,403	69.5%	12.6%	26.7%	\$226	\$295	10.0%	24.2%	\$2,933	\$5,028
5th month in OHC	4,016	63.4%	16.8%	30.2%	\$222	\$296	14.2%	28.4%	\$2,589	\$4,892
6th month in OHC	3,676	58.1%	20.4%	32.9%	\$229	\$297	18.2%	32.5%	\$2,360	\$4,836
7th month in OHC	3,336	52.7%	23.7%	34.8%	\$229	\$291	21.6%	34.4%	\$2,329	\$5,020
8th month in OHC	3,014	47.6%	26.3%	36.5%	\$226	\$289	24.9%	36.8%	\$2,196	\$5,092
9th month in OHC	2,766	43.7%	28.3%	37.7%	\$230	\$291	27.2%	38.6%	\$2,105	\$5,262
10th month in OHC	2,526	39.9%	30.2%	39.3%	\$226	\$289	30.0%	40.3%	\$2,132	\$5,381
11th month in OHC	2,292	36.2%	31.5%	40.2%	\$227	\$293	30.5%	41.5%	\$2,310	\$5,524
12th month in OHC	2,083	32.9%	32.6%	40.5%	\$221	\$292	32.0%	41.9%	\$2,315	\$5,641
13th month in OHC	1,852	29.2%	33.7%	42.0%	\$227	\$292	33.8%	43.3%	\$2,416	\$5,766
14th month in OHC	1,662	26.2%	34.2%	41.6%	\$228	\$294	34.4%	43.9%	\$2,496	\$5,933
15th month in OHC	1,513	23.9%	34.6%	41.6%	\$227	\$290	35.0%	44.3%	\$2,553	\$5,888
16th month in OHC	1,356	21.4%	35.5%	41.7%	\$226	\$290	35.3%	45.4%	\$2,641	\$5,961
17th month in OHC	1,209	19.1%	35.7%	42.3%	\$226	\$286	37.6%	46.3%	\$2,863	\$5,964
18th month in OHC	1,081	17.1%	35.9%	41.0%	\$222	\$291	37.0%	46.3%	\$3,058	\$5,976
19th month in OHC	973	15.4%	35.8%	40.6%	\$222	\$292	37.2%	46.5%	\$3,338	\$6,431
20th month in OHC	873	13.8%	36.0%	40.9%	\$215	\$289	37.9%	46.5%	\$3,540	\$6,872
21st month in OHC	781	12.3%	36.2%	41.2%	\$208	\$282	38.4%	47.8%	\$3,473	\$7,039
22nd month in OHC	689	10.9%	35.8%	41.8%	\$204	\$285	37.4%	48.0%	\$3,329	\$7,467
23rd month in OHC	604	9.5%	34.6%	41.1%	\$200	\$275	37.7%	49.3%	\$3,472	\$7,369
24th month in OHC	532	8.4%	33.6%	41.4%	\$196	\$276	38.7%	51.5%	\$3,632	\$7,238
25th month in OHC	454	7.2%	32.4%	42.3%	\$193	\$272	39.4%	52.4%	\$3,772	\$7,342
26th month in OHC	390	6.2%	31.5%	41.3%	\$201	\$283	39.0%	51.0%	\$3,974	\$7,293
27th month in OHC	336	5.3%	31.8%	40.8%	\$205	\$279	39.6%	50.0%	\$3,802	\$7,533
28th month in OHC	291	4.6%	31.6%	41.9%	\$205	\$259	39.2%	51.9%	\$4,222	\$7,126
29th month in OHC	244	3.9%	30.3%	40.2%	\$209	\$278	38.9%	52.5%	\$4,557	\$7,789
30th month in OHC	198	3.1%	28.8%	37.4%	\$195	\$259	40.4%	55.1%	\$4,616	\$7,503
31st month in OHC	155	2.4%	29.7%	36.8%	\$191	\$264	39.4%	58.7%	\$5,206	\$7,395
32nd month in OHC	120	1.9%	30.0%	39.2%	\$190	\$256	44.2%	57.5%	\$5,620	\$7,334
33rd month in OHC	95	1.5%	29.5%	38.9%	\$179	\$254	40.0%	60.0%	\$6,765	\$7,724
34th month in OHC	71	1.1%	21.1%	31.0%	\$207	\$249	38.0%	59.2%	\$7,101	\$8,659
35th month in OHC	47	0.7%	21.3%	34.0%	\$156	\$191	40.4%	61.7%	\$8,595	\$7,162
36th month in OHC	18	0.3%	11.1%	33.3%	\$187	\$208	33.3%	50.0%	\$8,638	\$10,754
Last month of OHC	6,332	100.0%	17.7%	25.1%	\$163	\$219	18.6%	27.9%	\$2,964	\$5,400

Appendix Table 1B. Orders for Arrears and Arrears Received, during OHC

Time	N	% at Risk	Orders for Arrears > \$0		Mean Orders for Arrears (if > \$0)		Arrears Received > \$0		Mean Arrears Received (if > \$0)	
			Mother CRO	Father CRO	Mother CRO	Father CRO	Mother CRO	Father CRO	Mother CRO	Father CRO
1 month before OHC	6,332	100.0%	1.4%	4.1%	\$86	\$44	0.5%	1.3%	\$715	\$66
1st month in OHC	6,332	100.0%	1.5%	4.8%	\$82	\$42	0.5%	1.5%	\$329	\$91
2nd month in OHC	5,625	88.8%	2.0%	6.6%	\$77	\$41	0.7%	2.8%	\$158	\$175
3rd month in OHC	4,871	76.9%	3.0%	8.9%	\$64	\$37	1.2%	3.7%	\$215	\$165
4th month in OHC	4,403	69.5%	3.9%	10.3%	\$60	\$36	1.8%	4.5%	\$298	\$127
5th month in OHC	4,016	63.4%	5.2%	12.2%	\$57	\$36	2.6%	5.3%	\$296	\$185
6th month in OHC	3,676	58.1%	6.3%	13.2%	\$56	\$36	3.7%	7.0%	\$221	\$161
7th month in OHC	3,336	52.7%	7.4%	14.4%	\$58	\$35	4.5%	7.5%	\$236	\$147
8th month in OHC	3,014	47.6%	8.3%	15.9%	\$60	\$36	5.0%	8.1%	\$306	\$146
9th month in OHC	2,766	43.7%	9.1%	17.2%	\$58	\$36	4.9%	7.8%	\$216	\$203
10th month in OHC	2,526	39.9%	10.4%	18.2%	\$62	\$38	5.8%	9.5%	\$326	\$162
11th month in OHC	2,292	36.2%	11.0%	19.5%	\$57	\$38	6.6%	10.0%	\$297	\$149
12th month in OHC	2,083	32.9%	11.4%	20.3%	\$55	\$37	7.4%	9.5%	\$277	\$278
13th month in OHC	1,852	29.2%	12.2%	21.8%	\$57	\$36	7.3%	10.3%	\$187	\$167
14th month in OHC	1,662	26.2%	12.8%	22.4%	\$88	\$37	7.7%	9.9%	\$286	\$196
15th month in OHC	1,513	23.9%	13.1%	22.7%	\$59	\$37	7.9%	10.6%	\$361	\$171
16th month in OHC	1,356	21.4%	14.0%	22.9%	\$58	\$36	8.0%	10.7%	\$219	\$166
17th month in OHC	1,209	19.1%	15.3%	23.8%	\$58	\$39	8.3%	12.9%	\$190	\$141
18th month in OHC	1,081	17.1%	15.9%	24.9%	\$58	\$36	7.7%	12.0%	\$476	\$183
19th month in OHC	973	15.4%	17.1%	24.9%	\$57	\$37	9.0%	11.2%	\$315	\$176
20th month in OHC	873	13.8%	17.5%	25.0%	\$57	\$39	8.5%	11.2%	\$555	\$148
21st month in OHC	781	12.3%	17.4%	26.0%	\$53	\$38	9.6%	12.0%	\$284	\$189
22nd month in OHC	689	10.9%	16.8%	26.9%	\$55	\$36	9.7%	13.4%	\$383	\$114
23rd month in OHC	604	9.5%	17.1%	27.0%	\$55	\$37	8.8%	16.1%	\$264	\$140
24th month in OHC	532	8.4%	17.5%	28.4%	\$58	\$31	9.6%	13.2%	\$295	\$174
25th month in OHC	454	7.2%	18.7%	28.4%	\$61	\$36	8.1%	14.3%	\$319	\$229
26th month in OHC	390	6.2%	16.7%	26.4%	\$60	\$38	7.7%	13.3%	\$591	\$98
27th month in OHC	336	5.3%	18.5%	26.5%	\$62	\$35	7.1%	14.3%	\$212	\$75
28th month in OHC	291	4.6%	18.2%	27.5%	\$52	\$33	7.6%	14.8%	\$248	\$180
29th month in OHC	244	3.9%	18.9%	28.7%	\$54	\$35	7.4%	16.4%	\$243	\$102
30th month in OHC	198	3.1%	17.7%	30.8%	\$50	\$35	8.6%	15.7%	\$996	\$135
31st month in OHC	155	2.4%	15.5%	31.0%	\$51	\$32	10.3%	15.5%	\$283	\$169
32nd month in OHC	120	1.9%	17.5%	30.0%	\$53	\$38	7.5%	14.2%	\$144	\$201
33rd month in OHC	95	1.5%	17.9%	35.8%	\$92	\$42	11.6%	13.7%	\$126	\$232
34th month in OHC	71	1.1%	18.3%	38.0%	\$70	\$33	8.5%	16.9%	\$137	\$824
35th month in OHC	47	0.7%	25.5%	36.2%	\$71	\$39	10.6%	14.9%	\$105	\$102
36th month in OHC	18	0.3%	16.7%	38.9%	\$49	\$53	11.1%	5.6%	\$510	\$185
Last month of OHC	6,332	100.0%	7.4%	13.1%	\$73	\$36	6.6%	7.6%	\$346	\$160

Appendix Table 1C. Cost Recovery Orders and Arrears, during Reunification and after Reentry

Time	N	% at Risk	CRO > \$0		Mean CRO Balance (if >0)		Arrears Balance > \$0		Mean Arrears Balance (if > \$0)	
			Mother CRO	Father CRO	Mother CRO	Father CRO	Mother CRO	Father CRO	Mother CRO	Father CRO
1st month after reunification	6,332	100.0%	4.2%	6.6%	\$161	\$201	16.8%	26.5%	\$3,088	\$5,554
2nd month after reunification	6,332	100.0%	2.8%	4.5%	\$178	\$226	15.0%	25.0%	\$3,099	\$5,591
3rd month after reunification	6,159	97.3%	2.8%	4.3%	\$183	\$236	14.2%	24.6%	\$3,161	\$5,517
4th month after reunification	5,990	94.6%	2.9%	4.1%	\$186	\$239	13.5%	24.2%	\$3,230	\$5,548
5th month after reunification	5,847	92.3%	2.8%	4.0%	\$188	\$249	12.7%	23.8%	\$3,400	\$5,492
6th month after reunification	5,731	90.5%	2.8%	4.0%	\$189	\$250	12.5%	23.5%	\$3,408	\$5,583
7th month after reunification	5,641	89.1%	2.8%	4.1%	\$192	\$248	12.0%	23.3%	\$3,461	\$5,598
8th month after reunification	5,547	87.6%	2.8%	4.2%	\$200	\$245	11.7%	23.0%	\$3,519	\$5,625
9th month after reunification	5,473	86.4%	3.0%	4.3%	\$196	\$245	11.3%	22.8%	\$3,600	\$5,663
10th month after reunification	5,401	85.3%	3.0%	4.3%	\$194	\$241	11.0%	22.7%	\$3,677	\$5,682
11th month after reunification	5,349	84.5%	3.1%	4.4%	\$197	\$238	10.7%	22.5%	\$3,747	\$5,782
12th month after reunification	5,301	83.7%	3.1%	4.2%	\$195	\$236	10.4%	22.2%	\$3,727	\$5,883
13th month after reunification	5,242	82.8%	2.9%	4.2%	\$205	\$232	10.2%	22.1%	\$3,732	\$5,950
14th month after reunification	5,202	82.2%	3.0%	4.3%	\$211	\$228	10.0%	22.1%	\$3,791	\$5,978
15th month after reunification	5,170	81.6%	3.0%	4.3%	\$207	\$228	9.7%	21.9%	\$3,866	\$6,022
16th month after reunification	5,137	81.1%	3.0%	4.4%	\$203	\$226	9.7%	21.8%	\$3,826	\$6,016
17th month after reunification	5,102	80.6%	3.0%	4.3%	\$204	\$230	9.4%	21.7%	\$3,872	\$6,047
18th month after reunification	5,074	80.1%	3.1%	4.5%	\$198	\$234	9.4%	21.6%	\$3,854	\$6,067
19th month after reunification	5,047	79.7%	3.1%	4.4%	\$196	\$233	9.2%	21.5%	\$3,892	\$6,142
20th month after reunification	5,022	79.3%	3.1%	4.4%	\$197	\$236	9.1%	21.5%	\$3,914	\$6,157
21st month after reunification	5,000	79.0%	3.1%	4.3%	\$203	\$240	9.0%	21.3%	\$3,984	\$6,227
22nd month after reunification	4,981	78.7%	3.0%	4.2%	\$209	\$238	8.9%	21.1%	\$3,979	\$6,278
23rd month after reunification	4,964	78.4%	3.0%	4.2%	\$209	\$246	8.9%	21.0%	\$4,009	\$6,278
24th month after reunification	4,947	78.1%	3.0%	4.2%	\$206	\$259	8.6%	20.8%	\$4,081	\$6,320
Last month of reunification	1,385	21.9%	4.9%	8.1%	\$190	\$237	17.0%	30.6%	\$4,423	\$7,095
1st month in reentry spell	1,385	21.9%	12.7%	24.5%	\$169	\$191	17.8%	32.0%	\$4,265	\$7,234
2nd month in reentry spell	1,280	20.2%	16.9%	34.5%	\$218	\$270	20.3%	36.6%	\$4,131	\$7,416
3rd month in reentry spell	1,208	19.1%	21.9%	39.7%	\$218	\$275	23.8%	42.7%	\$3,817	\$7,130
4th month in reentry spell	1,152	18.2%	25.5%	43.1%	\$224	\$285	28.2%	46.0%	\$3,439	\$7,062
5th month in reentry spell	1,108	17.5%	29.6%	44.7%	\$224	\$284	31.7%	47.9%	\$3,162	\$7,016
6th month in reentry spell	1,050	16.6%	32.4%	46.7%	\$225	\$285	35.2%	50.0%	\$3,239	\$6,918

Appendix Table 1D. Orders for Arrears and Arrears Received, during Reunification and after Reentry

Time	N	% At Risk	Orders for Arrears > SU Arrears		Mean Orders for Arrears (if > \$0)		Arrears Received > \$0		Mean Arrears Received (if > \$0)	
			Mother CRO	Father CRO	Mother CRO	Father CRO	Mother CRO	Father CRO	Mother CRO	Father CRO
1st month after reunification	6,332	100.0%	7.4%	12.7%	\$94	\$41	7.4%	7.5%	\$401	\$168
2nd month after reunification	6,332	100.0%	7.1%	12.5%	\$94	\$39	6.0%	6.6%	\$358	\$172
3rd month after reunification	6,159	97.3%	7.0%	12.6%	\$75	\$37	5.6%	6.1%	\$319	\$160
4th month after reunification	5,990	94.6%	6.8%	12.6%	\$74	\$38	5.0%	6.5%	\$253	\$149
5th month after reunification	5,847	92.3%	6.6%	12.6%	\$73	\$38	4.6%	6.2%	\$313	\$123
6th month after reunification	5,731	90.5%	6.6%	12.6%	\$70	\$37	4.6%	6.2%	\$378	\$132
7th month after reunification	5,641	89.1%	6.4%	12.5%	\$69	\$36	3.8%	6.1%	\$357	\$124
8th month after reunification	5,547	87.6%	6.3%	12.5%	\$69	\$36	3.8%	5.8%	\$344	\$144
9th month after reunification	5,473	86.4%	6.2%	12.5%	\$69	\$36	3.6%	5.4%	\$430	\$123
10th month after reunification	5,401	85.3%	6.2%	12.4%	\$71	\$36	3.5%	5.3%	\$320	\$115
11th month after reunification	5,349	84.5%	6.1%	12.5%	\$71	\$36	3.0%	5.3%	\$288	\$202
12th month after reunification	5,301	83.7%	6.0%	12.5%	\$71	\$36	2.8%	5.1%	\$262	\$236
13th month after reunification	5,242	82.8%	6.0%	12.6%	\$72	\$36	2.6%	5.1%	\$352	\$122
14th month after reunification	5,202	82.2%	5.9%	12.6%	\$72	\$35	2.7%	5.0%	\$380	\$172
15th month after reunification	5,170	81.6%	6.0%	12.4%	\$72	\$35	2.3%	4.8%	\$244	\$131
16th month after reunification	5,137	81.1%	6.0%	12.5%	\$71	\$35	2.3%	5.2%	\$212	\$105
17th month after reunification	5,102	80.6%	5.9%	12.5%	\$70	\$35	2.4%	4.7%	\$175	\$108
18th month after reunification	5,074	80.1%	6.0%	12.6%	\$69	\$35	2.4%	4.8%	\$300	\$148
19th month after reunification	5,047	79.7%	5.8%	12.5%	\$70	\$36	2.2%	4.3%	\$313	\$130
20th month after reunification	5,022	79.3%	5.8%	12.6%	\$72	\$36	2.2%	4.6%	\$293	\$60
21st month after reunification	5,000	79.0%	6.0%	12.6%	\$71	\$36	1.9%	4.8%	\$194	\$131
22nd month after reunification	4,981	78.7%	6.0%	12.6%	\$71	\$36	2.0%	4.5%	\$216	\$166
23rd month after reunification	4,964	78.4%	6.1%	12.6%	\$70	\$35	1.9%	4.6%	\$320	\$118
24th month after reunification	4,947	78.1%	6.0%	12.6%	\$70	\$35	2.0%	4.3%	\$305	\$188
Last month of reunification	1,385	21.9%	11.8%	19.3%	\$119	\$35	4.8%	6.1%	\$366	\$69
1st month in reentry spell	1,385	21.9%	12.1%	19.6%	\$115	\$31	3.7%	6.2%	\$197	\$66
2nd month in reentry spell	1,280	20.2%	11.0%	19.7%	\$122	\$32	3.1%	6.7%	\$142	\$123
3rd month in reentry spell	1,208	19.1%	11.3%	22.3%	\$121	\$30	4.6%	7.9%	\$121	\$107
4th month in reentry spell	1,152	18.2%	12.5%	23.6%	\$118	\$33	4.9%	9.4%	\$224	\$104
5th month in reentry spell	1,108	17.5%	13.7%	25.1%	\$116	\$33	5.7%	8.9%	\$330	\$99
6th month in reentry spell	1,050	16.6%	14.2%	26.2%	\$113	\$34	6.7%	10.5%	\$131	\$173

Notes: The sample is restricted to mothers with non-missing judge instrument variables (N = 6,332). Columns “N” and “% at risk” show the number and proportion of mothers with children corresponding to each month of the OHC spell, reunification, and reentry into OHC. The N for each row is used as the denominator to calculate the proportions of arrears balance, arrears orders, and arrears received in each of the corresponding columns. It should be noted that columns showing dollar amounts of arrears balance, arrears orders, and arrears received show the mean dollar amount among only non-missing and non-zero values.

Appendix Table 2A: Variation in Arrears at Last Full Month of OHC Spell, by Characteristics

	N	%at Risk	Arrears Balance > \$0		Mean Arrears Balance (if > \$0)		Arrears Ordered > \$0		Mean Arrears Ordered (if > \$0)		Arrears Received > \$0		Mean Arrears Received (if > \$0)	
			Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father
All Mothers	6,332	100.0%	18.0%	26.7%	\$2,964	\$5,433	6.9%	12.0%	\$57	\$38	4.3%	6.3%	\$351	\$174
By incarceration in pre-year														
1+ father incarcerated	689	10.9%	19.7%	35.4%	\$3,378	\$7,270	8.6%	18.7%	\$74	\$27	4.8%	5.8%	\$335	\$148
No father incarcerated	5,643	89.1%	17.8%	25.6%	\$2,908	\$5,123	6.7%	11.2%	\$54	\$40	4.2%	6.3%	\$354	\$177
Mother incarcerated	26	0.4%	26.9%	46.2%	\$11,100	\$7,114	15.4%	15.4%	\$33	\$92	3.8%	7.7%	\$155	\$551
Mother not incarcerated	6,306	99.6%	18.0%	26.6%	\$2,914	\$5,421	6.8%	12.0%	\$57	\$37	4.3%	6.3%	\$352	\$172
By Paternity														
All children from divorce	797	12.6%	17.2%	24.7%	\$2,520	\$3,634	6.8%	8.8%	\$48	\$55	3.6%	7.0%	\$773	\$346
1+ child paternity est.	3,847	60.8%	19.0%	30.7%	\$2,668	\$5,559	7.4%	14.1%	\$55	\$35	4.7%	7.0%	\$238	\$156
Missing paternity	1,688	26.7%	16.1%	18.4%	\$3,989	\$6,094	5.7%	8.7%	\$68	\$40	3.5%	4.3%	\$493	\$106
By Highest-Earning Dad in in Pre-Year														
No SSN	339	5.4%	16.5%	10.3%	\$2,889	\$5,053	7.4%	4.1%	\$72	\$57	4.1%	0.9%	\$131	\$37
No UI reported wages	2,378	37.6%	16.5%	23.7%	\$3,066	\$6,407	6.1%	10.4%	\$61	\$36	4.4%	4.2%	\$303	\$112
< \$5,000	952	15.0%	20.2%	32.4%	\$2,749	\$5,573	7.4%	15.2%	\$42	\$38	3.7%	6.4%	\$382	\$173
\$5,001 to \$10,000	476	7.5%	20.8%	30.9%	\$2,364	\$5,672	8.4%	15.3%	\$45	\$46	4.6%	8.0%	\$110	\$409
\$10,001 to \$25,000	934	14.8%	19.6%	32.5%	\$2,460	\$4,917	7.7%	15.7%	\$58	\$31	4.1%	10.2%	\$428	\$114
> \$25,000	1,253	19.8%	17.4%	26.4%	\$3,685	\$4,051	6.7%	10.7%	\$63	\$42	4.5%	8.1%	\$519	\$206
By Mother in in Pre-Year														
No SSN	548	8.7%	9.3%	18.4%	\$3,806	\$5,600	3.3%	8.6%	\$64	\$37	2.7%	4.2%	\$247	\$118
No UI reported wages	2,075	32.8%	15.8%	27.2%	\$4,048	\$5,636	6.6%	12.1%	\$57	\$32	2.3%	6.8%	\$747	\$231
< \$3,000	1,103	17.4%	22.8%	28.6%	\$3,058	\$4,916	9.0%	14.1%	\$53	\$38	4.7%	6.3%	\$295	\$147
\$3,001 to \$10,000	978	15.4%	20.9%	28.2%	\$2,424	\$3,957	7.8%	12.7%	\$58	\$37	5.0%	5.6%	\$195	\$139
> \$10,000	1,628	25.7%	18.8%	26.5%	\$1,945	\$6,453	6.4%	11.2%	\$58	\$45	6.5%	6.7%	\$286	\$145
By Mother's Race/Ethnicity														
Non-Hispanic White	3,833	60.5%	20.4%	27.0%	\$2,561	\$5,126	7.9%	11.3%	\$55	\$43	4.8%	7.4%	\$347	\$222
Non-Hispanic Black	1,292	20.4%	11.3%	27.9%	\$4,994	\$6,607	4.0%	14.9%	\$62	\$24	2.7%	4.4%	\$537	\$33
Hispanic	620	9.8%	17.1%	24.4%	\$2,500	\$5,643	6.3%	11.8%	\$64	\$29	5.0%	4.7%	\$178	\$58
Other	544	8.6%	19.1%	25.2%	\$3,512	\$4,570	7.7%	11.4%	\$58	\$55	3.5%	5.0%	\$313	\$64
Missing	43	0.7%	4.7%	9.3%	\$8,300	\$645	0.0%	2.3%		\$13	2.3%	2.3%	\$781	\$893
By Number of Fathers														
1 father	2,267	35.8%	13.8%	18.0%	\$2,870	\$4,274	5.1%	6.7%	\$52	\$40	4.1%	4.2%	\$236	\$131
2 fathers	2,337	36.9%	18.5%	29.7%	\$2,310	\$5,031	7.4%	12.5%	\$47	\$40	4.2%	6.6%	\$363	\$186
3+ fathers	1,728	27.3%	22.8%	34.0%	\$3,757	\$6,713	8.5%	18.3%	\$72	\$34	4.6%	8.6%	\$469	\$189
By Mother's Age at Start of Spell														
<20	321	5.1%	15.3%	21.8%	\$3,057	\$2,668	5.9%	8.1%	\$49	\$37	3.1%	3.7%	\$159	\$148
20–29	2,666	42.1%	18.5%	25.6%	\$2,294	\$4,394	7.0%	11.3%	\$58	\$29	3.3%	5.6%	\$268	\$189
30–39	2,428	38.3%	18.7%	29.6%	\$3,326	\$6,392	7.0%	13.6%	\$56	\$44	5.1%	7.2%	\$461	\$184
>=40	917	14.5%	15.7%	23.7%	\$4,078	\$6,417	6.4%	11.2%	\$59	\$43	5.2%	6.9%	\$263	\$114
By Number of Children														
1	3,089	48.8%	15.8%	22.7%	\$2,805	\$4,971	5.3%	9.2%	\$57	\$42	4.2%	5.8%	\$355	\$133
2	1,671	26.4%	18.3%	27.4%	\$2,874	\$4,869	7.7%	12.4%	\$56	\$35	4.1%	5.4%	\$480	\$146
3	926	14.6%	22.0%	29.8%	\$2,597	\$6,510	8.9%	14.9%	\$60	\$39	5.0%	7.5%	\$176	\$209

			Arrears Balance > \$0		Mean Arrears Balance (if > \$0)		Arrears Ordered > \$0		Mean Arrears Ordered (if > \$0)		Arrears Received > \$0		Mean Arrears Received (if > \$0)	
	N	%at Risk	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father
4+	646	10.2%	21.8%	39.5%	\$4,239	\$6,547	9.3%	20.3%	\$55	\$31	4.0%	9.1%	\$307	\$298
By Employment Status of Mother														
Unemployed	2,764	43.7%	20.7%	28.3%	\$2,532	\$5,099	7.3%	12.7%	\$59	\$39	5.6%	6.1%	\$288	\$161
Employed	3,568	56.3%	15.9%	25.4%	\$3,399	\$5,720	6.5%	11.5%	\$55	\$37	3.2%	6.4%	\$437	\$183
By Benefit Receipt in in Pre- Year														
TANF received	979	15.5%	17.1%	31.6%	\$3,036	\$5,264	6.7%	15.8%	\$63	\$22	2.7%	6.3%	\$156	\$75
Child support received	2,594	41.0%	20.7%	37.2%	\$2,570	\$5,960	7.9%	17.4%	\$59	\$38	4.8%	9.3%	\$430	\$161
SSDI received	327	5.2%	8.9%	27.8%	\$1,667	\$5,737	2.1%	11.3%	\$70	\$30	3.4%	7.6%	\$157	\$79
SSI received	555	8.8%	5.4%	28.1%	\$9,098	\$5,260	2.0%	13.5%	\$113	\$30	1.1%	6.1%	\$111	\$73
By County														
Adams	24	0.4%	16.7%	25.0%	\$419	\$1,491	4.2%	8.3%	\$69	\$19	0.0%	8.3%		\$49
Ashland	23	0.4%	34.8%	34.8%	\$2,218	\$769	8.7%	13.0%	\$20	\$71	8.7%	4.3%	\$790	\$12
Barron	84	1.3%	2.4%	14.3%	\$2,279	\$7,172	1.2%	7.1%	\$61	\$40	2.4%	3.6%	\$77	\$34
Bayfield	15	0.2%	26.7%	13.3%	\$1,018	\$3,277	0.0%	6.7%		\$76	0.0%	6.7%		\$43
Brown	260	4.1%	11.5%	23.8%	\$2,246	\$4,284	3.5%	8.5%	\$54	\$45	3.5%	6.2%	\$140	\$281
Buffalo	13	0.2%	30.8%	46.2%	\$1,140	\$1,753	15.4%	15.4%	\$27	\$21	15.4%	7.7%	\$27	\$13
Burnett	19	0.3%	10.5%	26.3%	\$1,001	\$1,179	0.0%	10.5%		\$29	0.0%	5.3%		\$1
Calumet	19	0.3%	26.3%	36.8%	\$1,589	\$15,271	10.5%	21.1%	\$8	\$79	5.3%	15.8%	\$266	\$29
Chippewa	71	1.1%	22.5%	36.6%	\$2,107	\$8,203	12.7%	19.7%	\$35	\$44	5.6%	9.9%	\$158	\$114
Clark	32	0.5%	18.8%	40.6%	\$2,041	\$3,810	9.4%	9.4%	\$76	\$76	3.1%	9.4%	\$32	\$76
Columbia	46	0.7%	30.4%	23.9%	\$2,582	\$5,614	10.9%	19.6%	\$71	\$47	6.5%	6.5%	\$39	\$52
Crawford	17	0.3%	11.8%	11.8%	\$473	\$714	5.9%	0.0%	\$12		11.8%	5.9%	\$57	\$20
Dane	445	7.0%	18.0%	28.3%	\$4,328	\$6,742	10.1%	21.3%	\$54	\$28	3.1%	6.1%	\$215	\$128
Dodge	69	1.1%	24.6%	36.2%	\$2,471	\$5,825	23.2%	30.4%	\$79	\$40	7.2%	7.2%	\$38	\$115
Door	10	0.2%	10.0%	10.0%	\$53	\$3,322	10.0%	0.0%	\$5		0.0%	0.0%		
Douglas	32	0.5%	28.1%	31.3%	\$1,285	\$2,637	3.1%	6.3%	\$67	\$23	6.3%	9.4%	\$150	\$24
Dunn	51	0.8%	13.7%	9.8%	\$5,801	\$7,481	3.9%	7.8%	\$29	\$167	3.9%	7.8%	\$252	\$31
Eau Claire	111	1.8%	27.9%	30.6%	\$1,947	\$5,156	11.7%	19.8%	\$52	\$64	6.3%	5.4%	\$90	\$80
Florence	N/A													
Fond du Lac	122	1.9%	23.8%	36.1%	\$3,204	\$6,526	22.1%	25.4%	\$54	\$53	10.7%	10.7%	\$125	\$130
Forest	16	0.3%	31.3%	31.3%	\$3,931	\$3,334	12.5%	18.8%	\$26	\$98	6.3%	0.0%	\$211	
Grant	41	0.6%	12.2%	19.5%	\$1,644	\$10,949	4.9%	4.9%	\$9	\$9	0.0%	7.3%		\$130
Green	49	0.8%	12.2%	30.6%	\$1,326	\$3,335	4.1%	18.4%	\$48	\$32	2.0%	4.1%	\$194	\$145
Green Lake	17	0.3%	11.8%	17.6%	\$511	\$4,600	0.0%	11.8%		\$28	5.9%	5.9%	\$33	\$10
Iowa	11	0.2%	27.3%	27.3%	\$846	\$843	0.0%	9.1%		\$6	0.0%	9.1%		\$24
Iron	N/A													
Jackson	39	0.6%	28.2%	33.3%	\$3,545	\$4,702	5.1%	10.3%	\$54	\$29	5.1%	5.1%	\$50	\$28
Jefferson	86	1.4%	16.3%	25.6%	\$1,252	\$5,279	3.5%	11.6%	\$43	\$36	3.5%	4.7%	\$252	\$28
Juneau	41	0.6%	31.7%	31.7%	\$3,746	\$4,833	9.8%	9.8%	\$61	\$16	14.6%	12.2%	\$88	\$20
Kenosha	249	3.9%	28.1%	30.5%	\$2,659	\$2,894	10.8%	12.4%	\$40	\$30	10.0%	8.0%	\$219	\$94
Kewaunee	14	0.2%	28.6%	28.6%	\$9,795	\$5,000	14.3%	21.4%	\$235	\$16	0.0%	7.1%		\$43
La Crosse	170	2.7%	16.5%	27.1%	\$2,057	\$5,045	6.5%	8.2%	\$75	\$45	4.7%	5.3%	\$254	\$43
Lafayette	27	0.4%	14.8%	22.2%	\$343	\$2,831	0.0%	0.0%			3.7%	7.4%	\$288	\$483
Langlade	71	1.1%	18.3%	25.4%	\$1,750	\$2,967	7.0%	4.2%	\$27	\$29	4.2%	4.2%	\$1,418	\$123

			Arrears Balance > \$0		Mean Arrears Balance (if > \$0)		Arrears Ordered > \$0		Mean Arrears Ordered (if > \$0)		Arrears Received > \$0		Mean Arrears Received (if > \$0)	
	N	%at Risk	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father
Lincoln	40	0.6%	27.5%	22.5%	\$2,288	\$3,117	5.0%	7.5%	\$20	\$41	2.5%	2.5%	\$131	\$57
Manitowoc	68	1.1%	25.0%	33.8%	\$2,117	\$3,550	10.3%	10.3%	\$99	\$55	4.4%	5.9%	\$4,102	\$776
Marathon	163	2.6%	29.4%	23.9%	\$2,627	\$5,960	16.0%	11.7%	\$55	\$37	8.0%	9.8%	\$368	\$281
Marinette	51	0.8%	19.6%	25.5%	\$4,439	\$6,256	13.7%	13.7%	\$49	\$44	0.0%	3.9%		\$36
Marquette	31	0.5%	19.4%	22.6%	\$3,580	\$2,622	9.7%	16.1%	\$46	\$39	3.2%	16.1%	\$137	\$32
Milwaukee	1,222	19.3%	6.1%	21.9%	\$6,368	\$5,970	1.2%	12.5%	\$153	\$24	0.7%	3.8%	\$188	\$41
Monroe	63	1.0%	15.9%	20.6%	\$2,409	\$5,773	4.8%	4.8%	\$47	\$33	1.6%	4.8%	\$1,666	\$699
Oconto	31	0.5%	16.1%	25.8%	\$644	\$1,350	3.2%	6.5%	\$31	\$15	6.5%	3.2%	\$99	\$213
Oneida	64	1.0%	32.8%	26.6%	\$2,294	\$6,733	9.4%	9.4%	\$69	\$34	7.8%	6.3%	\$88	\$1,337
Outagamie	136	2.1%	36.8%	39.0%	\$2,508	\$4,922	13.2%	14.7%	\$63	\$50	5.9%	14.0%	\$590	\$254
Ozaukee	64	1.0%	14.1%	34.4%	\$1,228	\$3,597	3.1%	10.9%	\$76	\$24	6.3%	10.9%	\$56	\$110
Pepin	N/A													
Pierce	28	0.4%	14.3%	21.4%	\$2,173	\$5,555	0.0%	3.6%		\$13	0.0%	0.0%		
Polk	120	1.9%	11.7%	15.8%	\$6,054	\$5,988	2.5%	5.0%	\$24	\$41	3.3%	5.8%	\$50	\$214
Portage	52	0.8%	23.1%	30.8%	\$2,716	\$8,783	11.5%	15.4%	\$31	\$51	5.8%	5.8%	\$44	\$46
Price	22	0.3%	13.6%	22.7%	\$453	\$5,417	0.0%	9.1%		\$13	4.5%	4.5%	\$8,509	\$15
Racine	270	4.3%	32.6%	41.5%	\$2,473	\$3,444	8.1%	10.0%	\$37	\$35	7.4%	6.3%	\$638	\$136
Richland	11	0.2%	18.2%	36.4%	\$336	\$1,632	0.0%	9.1%		\$5	9.1%	27.3%	\$248	\$13
Rock	278	4.4%	20.9%	27.7%	\$3,270	\$6,111	5.0%	10.8%	\$71	\$46	4.3%	6.8%	\$101	\$196
Rusk	29	0.5%	6.9%	17.2%	\$3,297	\$7,659	3.4%	17.2%	\$32	\$87	3.4%	10.3%	\$27	\$52
St. Croix	27	0.4%	11.1%	7.4%	\$332	\$2,928	0.0%	7.4%		\$60	0.0%	3.7%		\$65
Sauk	43	0.7%	16.3%	18.6%	\$1,098	\$4,622	7.0%	7.0%	\$20	\$41	0.0%	4.7%		\$39
Sawyer	21	0.3%	33.3%	19.0%	\$3,295	\$2,613	14.3%	4.8%	\$108	\$32	4.8%	9.5%	\$9	\$576
Shawano	36	0.6%	41.7%	25.0%	\$1,872	\$6,644	19.4%	13.9%	\$127	\$39	5.6%	5.6%	\$85	\$45
Sheboygan	143	2.3%	15.4%	19.6%	\$1,848	\$6,076	5.6%	10.5%	\$32	\$53	2.1%	4.2%	\$185	\$190
Taylor	15	0.2%	6.7%	40.0%	\$3,001	\$12,356	6.7%	13.3%	\$129	\$30	0.0%	20.0%		\$150
Trempealeau	26	0.4%	26.9%	42.3%	\$1,948	\$8,323	15.4%	15.4%	\$29	\$43	7.7%	3.8%	\$53	\$51
Vernon	38	0.6%	10.5%	21.1%	\$890	\$1,630	5.3%	7.9%	\$61	\$32	0.0%	2.6%		\$23
Vilas	18	0.3%	22.2%	33.3%	\$12,315	\$5,543	5.6%	0.0%	\$16		5.6%	11.1%	\$100	\$139
Walworth	122	1.9%	22.1%	30.3%	\$3,818	\$5,361	5.7%	7.4%	\$59	\$54	5.7%	9.8%	\$34	\$929
Washburn	32	0.5%	25.0%	40.6%	\$1,775	\$5,253	9.4%	15.6%	\$14	\$87	3.1%	15.6%	\$245	\$94
Washington	103	1.6%	15.5%	20.4%	\$3,771	\$4,096	9.7%	5.8%	\$49	\$104	6.8%	4.9%	\$145	\$42
Waukesha	210	3.3%	13.3%	26.7%	\$4,485	\$6,741	6.2%	7.6%	\$25	\$13	4.8%	4.3%	\$37	\$137
Waupaca	67	1.1%	28.4%	34.3%	\$1,403	\$4,692	11.9%	13.4%	\$24	\$30	10.4%	7.5%	\$466	\$139
Waushara	25	0.4%	40.0%	40.0%	\$3,022	\$3,181	12.0%	12.0%	\$33	\$69	8.0%	16.0%	\$63	\$43
Winnebago	226	3.6%	16.4%	19.5%	\$2,650	\$10,784	6.2%	4.9%	\$48	\$31	4.0%	4.0%	\$1,142	\$188
Wood	120	1.9%	20.0%	35.0%	\$842	\$4,279	8.3%	19.2%	\$92	\$33	5.8%	10.0%	\$356	\$140
Menominee	N/A													

Note: The sample is restricted to mothers with non-missing judge instrument variables (IV-5). Cells with fewer than 10 observations are censored, and are denoted with “N/A” in the sample size (N) column.

Appendix Table 2B: Variation in Arrears at 6 Months after Reunification, by Characteristics

	N	%at Risk	Arrears Balance > \$0		Mean Arrears Balance (if > \$0)		Arrears Ordered > \$0		Mean Arrears Ordered (if > \$0)		Arrears Received > \$0		Mean Arrears Received (if > \$0)	
			Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father
All Mothers	5,731	100.0%	12.5%	23.5%	\$3,408	\$5,583	6.6%	12.6%	\$70	\$37	4.6%	6.2%	\$378	\$132
By Incarceration in Pre-Year														
1+ father incarcerated	624	12.0%	15.1%	34.9%	\$3,270	\$6,984	7.9%	20.2%	\$69	\$28	4.0%	6.6%	\$336	\$198
No father incarcerated	5,107	98.5%	12.1%	22.1%	\$3,430	\$5,313	6.4%	11.7%	\$70	\$39	4.6%	6.2%	\$383	\$123
Mother incarcerated	23	0.5%	26.1%	43.5%	\$13,057	\$9,525	17.4%	17.4%	\$36	\$119	4.3%	13.0%	\$22	\$36
Mother not incarcerated	5,708	110.0%	12.4%	23.5%	\$3,327	\$5,553	6.6%	12.6%	\$71	\$36	4.6%	6.2%	\$380	\$132
By Paternity														
All children from divorce	727	13.9%	10.3%	16.0%	\$3,450	\$4,616	6.6%	9.8%	\$60	\$70	4.4%	7.3%	\$701	\$131
1+ child paternity est.	3,495	67.1%	13.4%	28.0%	\$2,848	\$5,695	7.0%	14.6%	\$68	\$32	5.1%	6.5%	\$333	\$91
Missing paternity	1,509	29.5%	11.3%	16.9%	\$4,923	\$5,591	5.8%	9.3%	\$83	\$39	3.5%	5.1%	\$335	\$252
By Highest-Earning Dad in in Pre-Year														
No SSN	308	5.9%	11.0%	10.1%	\$3,270	\$5,381	5.5%	3.2%	\$60	\$46	3.9%	1.6%	\$310	\$395
No UI reported wages	2,133	41.5%	11.4%	22.3%	\$3,433	\$6,088	6.3%	11.4%	\$75	\$35	4.1%	4.5%	\$567	\$103
< \$5,000	851	16.6%	14.2%	30.6%	\$3,038	\$5,496	7.2%	16.5%	\$54	\$36	6.5%	6.5%	\$278	\$250
\$5,001 to \$10,000	426	8.3%	14.8%	30.8%	\$2,670	\$5,580	7.3%	17.1%	\$45	\$47	4.7%	8.9%	\$127	\$111
\$10,001 to \$25,000	861	16.3%	13.4%	27.8%	\$2,788	\$5,270	7.2%	15.3%	\$71	\$33	5.1%	9.6%	\$266	\$96
> \$25,000	1,152	21.9%	12.0%	18.5%	\$4,579	\$4,943	6.3%	10.8%	\$87	\$39	3.7%	6.9%	\$373	\$114
By Mother in in Pre-Year														
No SSN	501	9.6%	6.6%	15.0%	\$3,727	\$6,197	3.2%	9.0%	\$67	\$36	3.0%	5.4%	\$1,497	\$184
No UI reported wages	1,861	36.2%	13.2%	24.2%	\$4,506	\$5,636	6.9%	12.5%	\$76	\$39	3.8%	5.9%	\$336	\$165
< \$3,000	986	19.2%	17.8%	26.6%	\$3,295	\$4,928	8.5%	14.5%	\$56	\$35	6.1%	7.3%	\$314	\$129
\$3,001 to \$10,000	885	17.1%	13.9%	25.1%	\$3,047	\$4,517	7.5%	13.4%	\$64	\$28	5.1%	5.9%	\$207	\$82
> \$10,000	1,498	28.4%	9.1%	22.7%	\$1,840	\$6,577	5.6%	12.3%	\$81	\$42	4.7%	6.3%	\$348	\$107
By Mother's Race/Ethnicity														
Non-Hispanic White	3,481	66.9%	13.3%	22.6%	\$3,141	\$5,607	7.7%	11.7%	\$69	\$45	5.3%	7.0%	\$325	\$134
Non-Hispanic Black	1,159	22.5%	9.6%	28.2%	\$4,812	\$5,915	3.5%	16.7%	\$63	\$20	2.6%	4.6%	\$805	\$136
Hispanic	567	10.8%	11.3%	22.0%	\$3,204	\$5,440	5.1%	11.1%	\$70	\$27	4.9%	5.5%	\$159	\$79
Other	481	9.5%	15.4%	22.9%	\$3,187	\$4,679	8.5%	11.9%	\$84	\$48	3.7%	5.6%	\$558	\$171
Missing	43	0.8%	2.3%	4.7%	\$1,182	\$261	0.0%	2.3%		\$25	0.0%	7.0%		\$21
By Number of Fathers														
1 father	2,078	39.6%	8.4%	13.7%	\$3,473	\$4,856	4.1%	7.9%	\$68	\$39	3.5%	4.8%	\$434	\$162
2 fathers	2,117	40.8%	12.3%	26.4%	\$2,748	\$4,973	7.7%	13.0%	\$62	\$38	4.8%	6.2%	\$366	\$98
3+ fathers	1,536	30.15%	18.1%	32.9%	\$3,988	\$6,664	8.4%	18.4%	\$83	\$34	5.7%	8.1%	\$346	\$143
By Mother's Age at Start of Spell														
<20	284	5.6%	12.7%	18.3%	\$2,832	\$2,562	5.3%	7.0%	\$68	\$23	6.3%	3.5%	\$557	\$212
20–29	2,466	46.5%	13.6%	24.0%	\$2,683	\$4,437	6.6%	12.7%	\$70	\$29	4.8%	4.9%	\$216	\$155
30–39	2,161	42.4%	12.1%	25.7%	\$3,793	\$6,667	6.9%	14.0%	\$68	\$44	4.4%	7.7%	\$256	\$93
>=40	820	16.0%	9.8%	18.4%	\$5,453	\$7,124	6.2%	10.6%	\$76	\$46	3.7%	7.0%	\$1,302	\$181
By Number of Children														
1	2,825	53.9%	9.7%	18.1%	\$3,410	\$5,343	4.7%	9.0%	\$68	\$38	3.7%	5.6%	\$528	\$130
2	1,498	29.2%	13.5%	24.8%	\$3,142	\$4,907	7.9%	13.2%	\$71	\$36	5.5%	6.0%	\$408	\$90
3	837	16.2%	16.4%	28.9%	\$2,828	\$6,475	8.5%	16.1%	\$74	\$40	6.2%	6.0%	\$148	\$110

			Arrears Balance > \$0		Mean Arrears Balance (if > \$0)		Arrears Ordered > \$0		Mean Arrears Ordered (if > \$0)		Arrears Received > \$0		Mean Arrears Received (if > \$0)	
	N	%at Risk	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father
4+	571	11.3%	17.9%	39.1%	\$4,712	\$6,293	9.8%	23.8%	\$69	\$33	3.9%	10.2%	\$97	\$220
By Employment Status of Mother														
unemployed	2,479	48.2%	13.5%	25.4%	\$2,788	\$5,040	6.7%	13.5%	\$67	\$35	5.6%	6.2%	\$235	\$113
employed	3,252	62.3%	11.7%	22.1%	\$3,954	\$6,057	6.5%	11.9%	\$73	\$39	3.8%	6.2%	\$543	\$146
By Benefit Receipt in in Pre-Year														
TANF received	875	17.1%	13.8%	30.7%	\$3,318	\$5,506	6.9%	18.7%	\$64	\$23	4.1%	5.5%	\$532	\$84
Child support received	2,326	45.3%	13.5%	33.7%	\$3,242	\$6,129	7.2%	18.4%	\$73	\$35	5.2%	8.9%	\$313	\$98
SSDI received	289	5.7%	4.8%	27.3%	\$1,398	\$4,993	2.8%	13.5%	\$37	\$31	3.1%	6.9%	\$52	\$250
SSI received	491	9.7%	3.7%	25.3%	\$12,002	\$4,963	2.0%	13.2%	\$84	\$27	1.4%	5.1%	\$80	\$98
By County														
Adams	20	0.4%	15.0%	25.0%	\$517	\$1,852	0.0%	10.0%		\$108	0.0%	10.0%		\$31
Ashland	21	0.4%	19.0%	14.3%	\$1,756	\$1,563	14.3%	4.8%	\$75	\$4	4.8%	4.8%	\$34	\$0
Barron	82	1.5%	4.9%	14.6%	\$1,305	\$3,491	3.7%	8.5%	\$38	\$36	3.7%	3.7%	\$162	\$92
Bayfield	10	0.3%	10.0%	10.0%	\$601	\$6,679	0.0%	10.0%		\$77	0.0%	0.0%		
Brown	231	4.5%	8.7%	21.6%	\$2,373	\$5,281	3.0%	7.8%	\$42	\$50	1.7%	4.3%	\$77	\$72
Buffalo	11	0.2%	9.1%	36.4%	\$32	\$1,296	9.1%	18.2%	\$26	\$49	0.0%	9.1%		\$80
Burnett	15	0.3%	6.7%	26.7%	\$143	\$2,160	0.0%	6.7%		\$28	6.7%	0.0%	\$143	
Calumet	18	0.3%	16.7%	33.3%	\$1,258	\$14,643	11.1%	16.7%	\$9	\$73	0.0%	16.7%		\$34
Chippewa	67	1.2%	16.4%	29.9%	\$2,825	\$10,913	11.9%	22.4%	\$35	\$50	3.0%	13.4%	\$21	\$233
Clark	30	0.6%	16.7%	30.0%	\$2,066	\$4,153	20.0%	16.7%	\$77	\$134	6.7%	10.0%	\$1,072	\$79
Columbia	43	0.8%	20.9%	23.3%	\$3,868	\$5,501	9.3%	20.9%	\$106	\$35	9.3%	2.3%	\$41	\$814
Crawford	16	0.3%	12.5%	12.5%	\$70	\$747	6.3%	0.0%	\$12		6.3%	6.3%	\$176	\$48
Dane	386	7.8%	15.0%	24.9%	\$4,303	\$6,934	12.2%	21.8%	\$63	\$28	3.4%	7.0%	\$133	\$84
Dodge	67	1.2%	17.9%	31.3%	\$2,265	\$5,426	13.4%	22.4%	\$78	\$35	4.5%	10.4%	\$33	\$149
Door	N/A													
Douglas	30	0.6%	16.7%	50.0%	\$2,678	\$1,665	10.0%	13.3%	\$293	\$126	3.3%	6.7%	\$4	\$44
Dunn	43	0.9%	9.3%	11.6%	\$9,970	\$7,473	2.3%	9.3%	\$4	\$166	2.3%	7.0%	\$44	\$37
Eau Claire	99	1.9%	19.2%	28.3%	\$2,473	\$5,263	16.2%	22.2%	\$121	\$47	9.1%	5.1%	\$1,346	\$62
Florence	N/A													
Fond du Lac	111	2.1%	15.3%	30.6%	\$3,098	\$6,980	16.2%	13.5%	\$55	\$28	9.9%	8.1%	\$122	\$150
Forest	14	0.3%	21.4%	28.6%	\$3,411	\$2,894	14.3%	14.3%	\$10	\$10	14.3%	0.0%	\$165	
Grant	32	0.7%	9.4%	9.4%	\$2,892	\$2,486	3.1%	6.3%	\$3	\$6	0.0%	3.1%		\$35
Green	46	0.9%	10.9%	23.9%	\$497	\$4,242	6.5%	15.2%	\$153	\$29	4.3%	15.2%	\$900	\$31
Green Lake	14	0.3%	0.0%	7.1%		\$574	0.0%	7.1%		\$25	0.0%	0.0%		
Iowa	11	0.2%	9.1%	27.3%	\$276	\$928	0.0%	9.1%		\$5	9.1%	0.0%	\$2,120	
Iron	N/A													
Jackson	34	0.7%	11.8%	26.5%	\$2,222	\$5,318	2.9%	8.8%	\$31	\$46	5.9%	2.9%	\$2,069	\$74
Jefferson	80	1.5%	7.5%	23.8%	\$2,383	\$3,138	2.5%	15.0%	\$29	\$34	3.8%	6.3%	\$405	\$197
Juneau	40	0.7%	10.0%	25.0%	\$9,365	\$5,695	10.0%	10.0%	\$29	\$72	12.5%	10.0%	\$388	\$15
Kenosha	223	4.3%	23.8%	28.3%	\$2,619	\$3,091	11.2%	16.6%	\$30	\$32	14.3%	6.7%	\$831	\$344
Kewaunee	14	0.2%	21.4%	28.6%	\$12,850	\$5,679	21.4%	28.6%	\$150	\$25	7.1%	7.1%	\$1,144	\$105
La Crosse	157	3.0%	10.8%	27.4%	\$2,629	\$6,117	3.8%	5.7%	\$37	\$41	4.5%	8.9%	\$108	\$110
Lafayette	25	0.5%	4.0%	16.0%	\$3	\$845	0.0%	0.0%			4.0%	8.0%	\$260	\$70
Langlade	66	1.2%	18.2%	22.7%	\$1,732	\$3,235	9.1%	7.6%	\$37	\$42	6.1%	1.5%	\$45	\$116

			Arrears Balance > \$0		Mean Arrears Balance (if > \$0)		Arrears Ordered > \$0		Mean Arrears Ordered (if > \$0)		Arrears Received > \$0		Mean Arrears Received (if > \$0)	
	N	%at Risk	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father
Lincoln	38	0.7%	18.4%	21.1%	\$2,693	\$6,441	13.2%	7.9%	\$231	\$37	10.5%	0.0%	\$69	
Manitowoc	63	1.2%	22.2%	25.4%	\$1,625	\$5,012	12.7%	12.7%	\$107	\$59	7.9%	9.5%	\$192	\$67
Marathon	145	2.8%	20.0%	18.6%	\$3,313	\$4,963	15.2%	14.5%	\$85	\$47	5.5%	8.3%	\$254	\$54
Marinette	46	0.9%	17.4%	30.4%	\$4,477	\$6,330	15.2%	13.0%	\$36	\$30	6.5%	2.2%	\$27	\$15
Marquette	28	0.5%	17.9%	21.4%	\$1,666	\$1,209	10.7%	14.3%	\$54	\$42	7.1%	7.1%	\$292	\$21
Milwaukee	1,127	21.3%	4.8%	21.4%	\$7,975	\$5,763	0.9%	13.7%	\$118	\$19	1.2%	3.5%	\$469	\$141
Monroe	55	1.1%	10.9%	16.4%	\$4,489	\$9,588	3.6%	1.8%	\$25	\$21	0.0%	3.6%		\$11
Oconto	29	0.5%	3.4%	24.1%	\$2,263	\$1,421	3.4%	10.3%	\$31	\$11	0.0%	0.0%		
Oneida	52	1.1%	25.0%	17.3%	\$2,954	\$9,552	11.5%	7.7%	\$69	\$63	13.5%	9.6%	\$174	\$34
Outagamie	127	2.4%	22.0%	34.6%	\$2,484	\$5,645	11.0%	18.9%	\$65	\$35	11.8%	11.8%	\$204	\$99
Ozaukee	59	1.1%	8.5%	25.4%	\$1,275	\$4,881	5.1%	11.9%	\$85	\$36	5.1%	10.2%	\$27	\$104
Pepin	N/A													
Pierce	25	0.5%	12.0%	12.0%	\$3,292	\$5,380	4.0%	0.0%	\$318		8.0%	8.0%	\$75	\$128
Polk	103	2.1%	6.8%	13.6%	\$7,397	\$7,263	3.9%	7.8%	\$22	\$52	4.9%	6.8%	\$518	\$157
Portage	46	0.9%	10.9%	23.9%	\$4,014	\$12,972	13.0%	17.4%	\$40	\$65	4.3%	13.0%	\$2,607	\$324
Price	16	0.4%	6.3%	6.3%	\$566	\$704	0.0%	18.8%		\$139	0.0%	12.5%		\$198
Racine	252	4.7%	21.4%	36.1%	\$2,058	\$3,635	2.8%	8.7%	\$33	\$19	6.7%	7.5%	\$132	\$219
Richland	N/A													
Rock	251	4.9%	15.9%	21.9%	\$3,343	\$5,606	4.8%	10.0%	\$105	\$25	2.0%	7.6%	\$260	\$88
Rusk	27	0.5%	3.7%	11.1%	\$5,395	\$9,781	3.7%	11.1%	\$32	\$212	0.0%	14.8%		\$433
St. Croix	25	0.5%	4.0%	12.0%	\$699	\$15,551	0.0%	4.0%		\$56	0.0%	4.0%		\$99
Sauk	35	0.8%	8.6%	22.9%	\$1,840	\$4,639	2.9%	11.4%	\$25	\$37	2.9%	2.9%	\$299	\$47
Sawyer	16	0.4%	6.3%	12.5%	\$415	\$968	6.3%	6.3%	\$112	\$67	0.0%	6.3%		\$241
Shawano	30	0.6%	30.0%	23.3%	\$2,221	\$4,903	20.0%	10.0%	\$107	\$59	13.3%	3.3%	\$83	\$1,270
Sheboygan	125	2.5%	8.8%	15.2%	\$2,805	\$8,918	5.6%	12.8%	\$26	\$48	4.8%	4.8%	\$23	\$50
Taylor	15	0.3%	6.7%	33.3%	\$2,927	\$15,667	13.3%	20.0%	\$130	\$139	6.7%	6.7%	\$80	\$22
Trempealeau	26	0.5%	15.4%	38.5%	\$2,740	\$8,322	19.2%	15.4%	\$28	\$31	0.0%	11.5%		\$708
Vernon	33	0.7%	12.1%	18.2%	\$1,050	\$2,100	6.1%	9.1%	\$55	\$32	3.0%	9.1%	\$2,371	\$85
Vilas	16	0.3%	6.3%	12.5%	\$231	\$1,460	0.0%	0.0%			6.3%	6.3%	\$98	\$1
Walworth	112	2.1%	15.2%	30.4%	\$6,068	\$4,720	6.3%	11.6%	\$57	\$37	6.3%	8.0%	\$246	\$144
Washburn	29	0.6%	20.7%	34.5%	\$1,631	\$4,761	6.9%	24.1%	\$21	\$62	3.4%	6.9%	\$1,436	\$170
Washington	94	1.8%	10.6%	20.2%	\$3,166	\$4,212	9.6%	7.4%	\$58	\$97	8.5%	8.5%	\$56	\$82
Waukesha	198	3.7%	7.1%	23.2%	\$8,376	\$6,303	4.5%	8.6%	\$41	\$23	2.5%	4.5%	\$94	\$71
Waupaca	61	1.2%	14.8%	26.2%	\$1,416	\$4,400	8.2%	8.2%	\$182	\$25	6.6%	4.9%	\$496	\$24
Waushara	23	0.4%	34.8%	30.4%	\$2,694	\$2,258	8.7%	13.0%	\$28	\$74	13.0%	17.4%	\$359	\$73
Winnebago	199	3.9%	12.1%	15.1%	\$2,668	\$8,500	6.5%	6.0%	\$58	\$37	3.0%	4.5%	\$266	\$80
Wood	111	2.1%	9.9%	25.2%	\$844	\$5,758	6.3%	18.9%	\$119	\$30	3.6%	7.2%	\$186	\$34
Menominee	N/A													

Note: The sample is restricted to mothers with non-missing judge instrument variables (IV-5). Cells with fewer than 10 observations are censored, and are denoted with “N/A” in the sample size (N) column.

Appendix Table 2C: Variation in Arrears at 12 Months after Reunification

	N	%at Risk	Arrears Balance > \$0		Mean Arrears Balance (if > \$0)		Arrears Ordered > \$0		Mean Arrears Ordered (if > \$0)		Arrears Received > \$0		Mean Arrears Received (if > \$0)	
			Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father
All Mothers	5,301	83.7%	10.4%	22.2%	\$3,727	\$5,883	6.0%	12.5%	\$71	\$36	2.8%	5.1%	\$262	\$236
By Incarceration in Pre-Year														
1+ father incarcerated	556	10.5%	12.6%	36.2%	\$3,527	\$7,194	6.7%	21.0%	\$71	\$28	2.7%	5.4%	\$116	\$157
No father incarcerated	4,745	89.5%	10.2%	20.6%	\$3,756	\$5,613	5.9%	11.4%	\$70	\$37	2.8%	5.0%	\$279	\$245
Mother incarcerated	22	0.4%	22.7%	40.9%	\$6,551	\$11,353	18.2%	18.2%	\$35	\$118	4.5%	9.1%	\$218	\$51
Mother not incarcerated	5,279	99.6%	10.4%	22.1%	\$3,701	\$5,841	5.9%	12.4%	\$71	\$35	2.7%	5.1%	\$262	\$237
By paternity														
All children from divorce	661	12.5%	9.1%	15.1%	\$4,181	\$4,706	6.2%	9.5%	\$58	\$66	2.7%	5.4%	\$399	\$351
1+ child paternity est.	3,243	61.2%	11.1%	26.1%	\$3,075	\$5,988	6.4%	14.3%	\$67	\$31	2.9%	5.4%	\$201	\$245
Missing paternity	1,397	26.4%	9.4%	16.4%	\$5,302	\$6,008	4.8%	9.5%	\$89	\$40	2.4%	4.1%	\$358	\$132
By Highest-Earning Dad in in Pre-Year														
No SSN	285	5.4%	9.5%	8.8%	\$1,896	\$5,127	3.9%	2.8%	\$59	\$45	2.5%	1.1%	\$112	\$34
No UI reported wages	1,959	37.0%	9.0%	21.2%	\$4,114	\$6,248	5.5%	11.3%	\$76	\$35	2.4%	4.1%	\$307	\$172
< \$5,000	785	14.8%	12.4%	29.6%	\$3,175	\$5,597	7.3%	16.2%	\$52	\$32	3.9%	4.8%	\$77	\$665
\$5,001 to \$10,000	400	7.5%	11.8%	30.5%	\$2,576	\$5,789	6.0%	17.3%	\$35	\$47	2.8%	6.0%	\$314	\$311
\$10,001 to \$25,000	802	15.1%	10.8%	25.9%	\$3,028	\$5,513	6.7%	15.6%	\$74	\$31	2.6%	7.7%	\$332	\$100
> \$25,000	1,070	20.2%	11.1%	16.3%	\$4,984	\$6,008	5.9%	10.3%	\$90	\$39	2.7%	5.7%	\$352	\$170
By Mother in in Pre-Year														
No SSN	470	8.9%	4.7%	15.1%	\$5,828	\$6,325	2.6%	8.5%	\$65	\$36	1.3%	4.5%	\$88	\$134
No UI reported wages	1,711	32.3%	11.4%	23.3%	\$4,729	\$6,018	6.3%	12.6%	\$77	\$38	2.3%	5.7%	\$379	\$418
< \$3,000	895	16.9%	15.1%	24.2%	\$3,589	\$5,103	7.8%	14.5%	\$61	\$32	4.2%	5.0%	\$182	\$166
\$3,001 to \$10,000	827	15.6%	11.1%	23.8%	\$3,520	\$4,629	6.9%	12.9%	\$69	\$32	2.9%	5.3%	\$479	\$122
> \$10,000	1,398	26.4%	7.8%	21.0%	\$1,854	\$7,008	4.9%	12.0%	\$73	\$38	2.7%	4.4%	\$108	\$115
By Mother's Race/Ethnicity														
Non-Hispanic White	3,227	60.9%	11.2%	20.9%	\$3,539	\$5,883	7.1%	11.5%	\$70	\$43	3.0%	5.5%	\$178	\$308
Non-Hispanic Black	1,066	20.1%	8.2%	27.8%	\$5,323	\$6,151	3.0%	16.5%	\$52	\$20	1.6%	3.8%	\$576	\$50
Hispanic	524	9.9%	10.5%	21.4%	\$2,481	\$5,968	5.7%	11.6%	\$71	\$26	3.8%	4.8%	\$370	\$117
Other	443	8.4%	11.5%	21.2%	\$3,668	\$4,991	5.9%	12.0%	\$99	\$47	2.7%	5.6%	\$312	\$107
Missing	41	0.8%	0.0%	2.4%		\$495	0.0%	0.0%			0.0%	2.4%		\$886
By Number of Fathers														
1 father	1,932	36.4%	6.9%	12.3%	\$3,654	\$4,938	3.6%	7.8%	\$67	\$35	2.4%	3.1%	\$206	\$108
2 fathers	1,968	37.1%	10.0%	25.2%	\$2,897	\$5,452	7.0%	13.3%	\$63	\$37	2.3%	5.8%	\$163	\$133
3+ fathers	1,401	26.4%	15.9%	31.6%	\$4,499	\$6,872	7.8%	17.6%	\$82	\$35	3.9%	6.9%	\$393	\$436
By Mother's Age at Start of Spell														
<20	264	5.0%	9.1%	16.3%	\$2,444	\$2,955	4.9%	6.8%	\$61	\$25	1.5%	3.0%	\$946	\$41
20–29	2,337	44.1%	11.3%	22.4%	\$2,832	\$4,793	6.2%	12.4%	\$72	\$29	2.7%	3.9%	\$190	\$424
30–39	1,961	37.0%	10.7%	24.6%	\$4,022	\$6,801	6.2%	14.1%	\$72	\$43	3.1%	6.3%	\$325	\$165
>=40	739	13.9%	7.6%	17.5%	\$7,369	\$7,845	5.0%	10.3%	\$65	\$39	2.3%	6.1%	\$142	\$79
By Number of Children														
1	2,642	49.8%	8.2%	16.8%	\$3,713	\$5,604	4.1%	8.6%	\$65	\$37	2.5%	4.4%	\$319	\$156
2	1,374	25.9%	11.3%	23.9%	\$3,573	\$5,146	7.5%	13.0%	\$68	\$33	3.3%	4.9%	\$246	\$430
3	770	14.5%	13.0%	27.8%	\$2,725	\$6,610	7.1%	16.5%	\$76	\$39	3.0%	5.5%	\$151	\$164

			Arrears Balance > \$0		Mean Arrears Balance (if > \$0)		Arrears Ordered > \$0		Mean Arrears Ordered (if > \$0)		Arrears Received > \$0		Mean Arrears Received (if > \$0)	
	N	%at Risk	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father
4+	515	9.7%	15.7%	36.7%	\$5,291	\$6,999	9.5%	24.5%	\$80	\$34	2.5%	8.3%	\$225	\$211
By Employment Status of Mother														
Unemployed	2,260	42.6%	11.0%	23.3%	\$2,999	\$5,242	5.9%	13.1%	\$66	\$33	3.3%	4.8%	\$285	\$156
Employed	3,041	57.4%	10.0%	21.4%	\$4,318	\$6,402	6.0%	12.0%	\$74	\$38	2.4%	5.3%	\$238	\$289
By Benefit Receipt in in Pre-Year														
TANF received	817	15.4%	11.6%	30.4%	\$3,330	\$5,433	7.1%	19.6%	\$60	\$23	2.9%	5.8%	\$97	\$634
Child support received	2,132	40.2%	11.2%	32.6%	\$3,807	\$6,313	6.6%	18.4%	\$69	\$33	2.5%	7.6%	\$313	\$144
SSDI received	259	4.9%	3.9%	27.4%	\$2,092	\$5,165	2.3%	13.9%	\$42	\$33	0.8%	6.2%	\$84	\$88
SSI received	448	8.5%	3.6%	25.0%	\$13,326	\$5,658	1.8%	12.7%	\$97	\$28	0.2%	6.9%	\$155	\$48
By County														
Adams	18	0.3%	16.7%	27.8%	\$776	\$2,062	0.0%	16.7%		\$72	16.7%	5.6%	\$216	\$101
Ashland	20	0.4%	20.0%	15.0%	\$1,766	\$1,605	10.0%	5.0%	\$105	\$4	0.0%	5.0%		\$33
Barron	79	1.5%	7.6%	15.2%	\$1,203	\$4,169	6.3%	7.6%	\$44	\$39	3.8%	2.5%	\$90	\$30
Bayfield	N/A													
Brown	211	4.0%	7.1%	20.4%	\$2,941	\$4,181	0.5%	7.1%	\$59	\$43	0.0%	3.8%		\$65
Buffalo	N/A													
Burnett	15	0.3%	0.0%	26.7%		\$1,706	0.0%	6.7%		\$14	0.0%	13.3%		\$23
Calumet	16	0.3%	12.5%	37.5%	\$1,430	\$14,919	6.3%	25.0%	\$3	\$60	0.0%	12.5%		\$236
Chippewa	62	1.2%	14.5%	27.4%	\$3,095	\$12,793	9.7%	21.0%	\$25	\$51	1.6%	14.5%	\$13	\$33
Clark	29	0.5%	13.8%	24.1%	\$2,740	\$5,201	13.8%	17.2%	\$75	\$132	6.9%	10.3%	\$21	\$70
Columbia	39	0.7%	17.9%	30.8%	\$4,682	\$4,761	10.3%	23.1%	\$105	\$34	5.1%	5.1%	\$48	\$34
Crawford	14	0.3%	14.3%	14.3%	\$353	\$1,071	7.1%	0.0%	\$12		7.1%	7.1%	\$54	\$47
Dane	344	6.5%	13.4%	26.2%	\$4,927	\$7,517	13.4%	22.7%	\$58	\$29	2.6%	5.8%	\$64	\$59
Dodge	61	1.2%	8.2%	27.9%	\$4,455	\$6,082	9.8%	23.0%	\$88	\$37	0.0%	9.8%		\$93
Door	N/A													
Douglas	30	0.6%	13.3%	43.3%	\$3,180	\$1,700	6.7%	13.3%	\$354	\$123	0.0%	10.0%		\$37
Dunn	40	0.8%	10.0%	12.5%	\$9,271	\$7,405	2.5%	7.5%	\$4	\$195	2.5%	2.5%	\$33	\$66
Eau Claire	94	1.8%	16.0%	26.6%	\$2,549	\$6,600	12.8%	19.1%	\$126	\$30	3.2%	8.5%	\$146	\$77
Florence	N/A													
Fond du Lac	106	2.0%	15.1%	26.4%	\$3,108	\$8,026	15.1%	12.3%	\$45	\$25	3.8%	6.6%	\$93	\$51
Forest	11	0.2%	9.1%	18.2%	\$304	\$1,499	0.0%	0.0%			9.1%	0.0%	\$155	
Grant	30	0.6%	10.0%	6.7%	\$2,506	\$2,562	3.3%	6.7%	\$3	\$5	3.3%	3.3%	\$1,309	\$5
Green	41	0.8%	9.8%	19.5%	\$242	\$5,566	4.9%	17.1%	\$64	\$15	0.0%	9.8%		\$212
Green Lake	14	0.3%	0.0%	7.1%		\$613	0.0%	7.1%		\$25	0.0%	0.0%		
Iowa	11	0.2%	9.1%	18.2%	\$283	\$1,369	0.0%	9.1%		\$5	0.0%	0.0%		
Iron	N/A													
Jackson	30	0.6%	3.3%	23.3%	\$7,289	\$6,344	3.3%	10.0%	\$30	\$46	3.3%	3.3%	\$110	\$1,972
Jefferson	74	1.4%	6.8%	23.0%	\$2,284	\$3,500	1.4%	13.5%	\$33	\$32	0.0%	4.1%		\$24
Juneau	35	0.7%	5.7%	28.6%	\$18,189	\$5,735	11.4%	11.4%	\$30	\$71	2.9%	5.7%	\$60	\$22
Kenosha	203	3.8%	15.8%	28.1%	\$2,774	\$3,357	8.9%	15.8%	\$36	\$31	8.9%	8.4%	\$73	\$121
Kewaunee	12	0.2%	25.0%	33.3%	\$13,377	\$6,269	16.7%	33.3%	\$72	\$25	0.0%	0.0%		
La Crosse	147	2.8%	6.8%	23.1%	\$3,512	\$6,217	3.4%	4.8%	\$43	\$50	3.4%	7.5%	\$209	\$570
Lafayette	23	0.4%	4.3%	13.0%	\$2	\$1,086	0.0%	0.0%			0.0%	0.0%		
Langlade	63	1.2%	15.9%	20.6%	\$1,915	\$3,963	7.9%	9.5%	\$30	\$57	6.3%	7.9%	\$46	\$96

			Arrears Balance > \$0		Mean Arrears Balance (if > \$0)		Arrears Ordered > \$0		Mean Arrears Ordered (if > \$0)		Arrears Received > \$0		Mean Arrears Received (if > \$0)	
	N	%at Risk	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father
Lincoln	36	0.7%	13.9%	22.2%	\$3,580	\$6,658	11.1%	5.6%	\$240	\$20	0.0%	5.6%		\$0
Manitowoc	57	1.1%	21.1%	24.6%	\$1,828	\$5,516	14.0%	12.3%	\$98	\$73	8.8%	5.3%	\$64	\$91
Marathon	136	2.6%	14.7%	18.4%	\$3,559	\$5,176	11.8%	14.0%	\$67	\$25	3.7%	8.1%	\$119	\$33
Marinette	43	0.8%	14.0%	30.2%	\$4,961	\$6,865	11.6%	9.3%	\$41	\$107	4.7%	4.7%	\$46	\$228
Marquette	26	0.5%	11.5%	15.4%	\$2,423	\$901	7.7%	11.5%	\$73	\$47	3.8%	3.8%	\$109	\$31
Milwaukee	1,061	20.0%	4.3%	20.7%	\$7,509	\$5,872	1.0%	13.6%	\$132	\$20	0.8%	2.8%	\$1,039	\$114
Monroe	45	0.8%	13.3%	13.3%	\$3,955	\$13,362	4.4%	4.4%	\$25	\$4	4.4%	6.7%	\$24	\$66
Oconto	26	0.5%	3.8%	19.2%	\$2,340	\$1,742	3.8%	7.7%	\$30	\$21	0.0%	0.0%		
Oneida	42	0.8%	21.4%	16.7%	\$2,986	\$10,046	9.5%	7.1%	\$83	\$40	11.9%	2.4%	\$628	\$4,186
Outagamie	119	2.2%	16.0%	32.8%	\$3,036	\$6,124	12.6%	18.5%	\$76	\$36	6.7%	9.2%	\$98	\$450
Ozaukee	57	1.1%	7.0%	22.8%	\$1,350	\$5,633	3.5%	12.3%	\$95	\$36	0.0%	5.3%		\$277
Pepin	N/A													
Pierce	22	0.4%	9.1%	9.1%	\$4,655	\$6,911	4.5%	0.0%	\$308		9.1%	9.1%	\$56	\$126
Polk	93	1.8%	5.4%	10.8%	\$10,115	\$5,816	3.2%	7.5%	\$14	\$57	2.2%	4.3%	\$17	\$122
Portage	43	0.8%	11.6%	16.3%	\$2,947	\$11,719	11.6%	11.6%	\$42	\$35	2.3%	4.7%	\$11	\$50
Price	15	0.3%	6.7%	6.7%	\$541	\$91	0.0%	26.7%		\$120	6.7%	6.7%	\$12	\$453
Racine	235	4.4%	20.0%	31.1%	\$2,022	\$3,605	3.0%	7.2%	\$31	\$15	3.0%	5.1%	\$75	\$100
Richland	N/A													
Rock	237	4.5%	13.9%	21.1%	\$3,442	\$6,029	4.6%	10.5%	\$107	\$23	1.7%	5.9%	\$1,130	\$140
Rusk	27	0.5%	0.0%	7.4%		\$5,520	3.7%	11.1%	\$32	\$111	0.0%	7.4%		\$70
St. Croix	23	0.4%	4.3%	8.7%	\$729	\$22,770	0.0%	4.3%		\$54	0.0%	4.3%		\$54
Sauk	32	0.6%	9.4%	28.1%	\$1,289	\$4,258	3.1%	15.6%	\$25	\$43	3.1%	6.3%	\$18	\$179
Sawyer	14	0.3%	0.0%	21.4%		\$698	0.0%	7.1%		\$65	0.0%	7.1%		\$44
Shawano	30	0.6%	20.0%	20.0%	\$2,684	\$6,332	20.0%	10.0%	\$115	\$59	3.3%	0.0%	\$11	
Sheboygan	109	2.1%	8.3%	13.8%	\$3,055	\$11,418	7.3%	12.8%	\$18	\$38	3.7%	1.8%	\$60	\$133
Taylor	14	0.3%	7.1%	28.6%	\$2,922	\$19,892	14.3%	28.6%	\$133	\$109	0.0%	0.0%		
Trempealeau	25	0.5%	12.0%	36.0%	\$2,285	\$6,639	16.0%	16.0%	\$20	\$23	0.0%	12.0%		\$7,904
Vernon	30	0.6%	10.0%	16.7%	\$794	\$1,953	3.3%	10.0%	\$60	\$32	0.0%	10.0%		\$105
Vilas	15	0.3%	0.0%	13.3%		\$1,498	0.0%	0.0%			0.0%	6.7%		\$1
Walworth	107	2.0%	14.0%	30.8%	\$4,869	\$4,789	5.6%	13.1%	\$54	\$44	5.6%	3.7%	\$1,044	\$88
Washburn	28	0.5%	14.3%	32.1%	\$2,308	\$5,350	7.1%	25.0%	\$21	\$62	7.1%	10.7%	\$66	\$51
Washington	80	1.5%	6.3%	17.5%	\$5,018	\$4,424	10.0%	8.8%	\$59	\$101	2.5%	3.8%	\$93	\$43
Waukesha	187	3.5%	8.0%	21.9%	\$8,417	\$6,584	5.3%	8.0%	\$45	\$24	2.1%	2.7%	\$227	\$160
Waupaca	55	1.0%	10.9%	25.5%	\$1,956	\$4,664	5.5%	9.1%	\$286	\$22	0.0%	5.5%		\$32
Waushara	22	0.4%	31.8%	22.7%	\$2,897	\$2,504	9.1%	13.6%	\$27	\$73	13.6%	4.5%	\$571	\$779
Winnebago	180	3.4%	11.1%	11.1%	\$2,752	\$10,532	5.0%	4.4%	\$69	\$38	3.9%	3.3%	\$472	\$50
Wood	106	2.0%	7.5%	22.6%	\$1,848	\$5,959	2.8%	18.9%	\$219	\$29	2.8%	3.8%	\$39	\$35
Menominee	N/A													

Note: The sample is restricted to mothers with non-missing judge instrument variables (IV-5). Cells with fewer than 10 observations are censored, and are denoted with “N/A” in the sample size (N) column.

Appendix Table 2D: Variation in Arrears at 24 Months After Reunification

	N	%at Risk	Arrears Balance > \$0		Mean Arrears Balance (if > \$0)		Arrears Ordered > \$0		Mean Arrears Ordered (if > \$0)		Arrears Received > \$0		Mean Arrears Received (if > \$0)	
			Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father
All Mothers	4,947	78.1%	8.6%	20.8%	\$4,081	\$6,320	6.0%	12.6%	\$70	\$35	2.0%	4.3%	\$305	\$188
By Incarceration in Pre-Year														
1+ father incarcerated	510	10.3%	11.2%	37.1%	\$4,068	\$7,103	7.3%	21.4%	\$84	\$32	2.0%	5.9%	\$591	\$414
No father incarcerated	4,437	89.7%	8.3%	19.0%	\$4,083	\$6,144	5.9%	11.6%	\$69	\$35	2.0%	4.1%	\$272	\$151
Mother incarcerated	18	0.4%	22.2%	38.9%	\$8,618	\$15,856	16.7%	16.7%	\$11	\$129	5.6%	11.1%	\$5	\$50
Mother not incarcerated	4,929	99.6%	8.5%	20.8%	\$4,038	\$6,255	6.0%	12.6%	\$71	\$34	1.9%	4.3%	\$308	\$189
By Paternity														
All children from divorce	610	12.3%	6.9%	12.8%	\$4,340	\$5,319	6.1%	9.7%	\$61	\$55	2.1%	4.1%	\$275	\$124
1+ child paternity est.	3,032	61.3%	9.3%	25.0%	\$3,145	\$6,311	6.3%	14.6%	\$68	\$32	2.1%	4.8%	\$362	\$192
Missing paternity	1,305	26.4%	7.7%	14.9%	\$6,579	\$6,758	5.3%	9.3%	\$83	\$36	1.5%	3.1%	\$143	\$213
By Highest-Earning Dad in in Pre-Year														
No SSN	271	5.5%	9.6%	8.9%	\$1,885	\$5,811	4.8%	3.0%	\$50	\$44	3.0%	1.1%	\$284	\$126
No UI reported wages	1,830	37.0%	7.4%	20.4%	\$4,267	\$6,633	5.7%	11.9%	\$80	\$35	1.4%	3.4%	\$153	\$68
< \$5,000	740	15.0%	10.5%	27.8%	\$3,937	\$6,246	7.2%	16.4%	\$58	\$30	2.2%	3.5%	\$92	\$96
\$5,001 to \$10,000	373	7.5%	9.9%	30.6%	\$2,510	\$5,782	7.0%	18.8%	\$28	\$42	4.3%	7.2%	\$362	\$160
\$10,001 to \$25,000	737	14.9%	8.7%	22.4%	\$3,223	\$6,060	6.2%	14.0%	\$67	\$31	2.4%	7.2%	\$820	\$259
> \$25,000	996	20.1%	8.3%	14.8%	\$5,962	\$6,421	5.5%	10.3%	\$93	\$38	1.4%	4.1%	\$105	\$360
By Mother in in Pre-Year														
No SSN	431	8.7%	3.7%	11.4%	\$6,829	\$7,477	2.3%	8.1%	\$62	\$36	1.6%	3.0%	\$51	\$33
No UI reported wages	1,600	32.3%	9.6%	22.8%	\$5,138	\$6,312	6.2%	13.1%	\$75	\$34	1.8%	4.4%	\$180	\$218
< \$3,000	834	16.9%	12.6%	23.0%	\$3,717	\$5,232	7.9%	14.4%	\$55	\$34	2.6%	4.4%	\$133	\$180
\$3,001 to \$10,000	773	15.6%	10.0%	22.3%	\$4,024	\$5,209	7.5%	11.9%	\$76	\$29	2.7%	4.7%	\$142	\$71
> \$10,000	1,309	26.5%	5.6%	19.3%	\$1,848	\$7,695	4.9%	12.6%	\$75	\$38	1.4%	4.2%	\$1,007	\$267
By Mother's Race/Ethnicity														
Non-Hispanic White	3,032	61.3%	9.3%	19.4%	\$3,759	\$6,495	7.0%	11.5%	\$71	\$42	2.5%	4.8%	\$283	\$200
Non-Hispanic Black	986	19.9%	6.2%	27.3%	\$6,616	\$6,058	3.2%	16.7%	\$53	\$20	0.8%	4.6%	\$819	\$161
Hispanic	485	9.8%	8.9%	20.8%	\$2,817	\$6,401	6.0%	12.0%	\$73	\$28	1.6%	2.3%	\$106	\$294
Other	405	8.2%	9.4%	17.8%	\$3,834	\$5,848	6.2%	12.1%	\$88	\$40	1.2%	2.5%	\$141	\$21
Missing	39	0.8%	0.0%	2.6%		\$149	0.0%	0.0%			0.0%	0.0%		
By Number of Fathers														
1 father	1,824	36.9%	6.0%	10.8%	\$3,734	\$5,487	3.9%	8.1%	\$74	\$36	1.5%	2.6%	\$500	\$174
2 fathers	1,841	37.2%	8.2%	23.2%	\$2,965	\$5,836	6.9%	13.1%	\$58	\$35	2.1%	4.3%	\$170	\$185
3+ fathers	1,282	25.9%	12.7%	31.7%	\$5,350	\$7,234	7.7%	18.2%	\$83	\$33	2.4%	6.7%	\$295	\$198
By Mother's Age at Start of Spell														
<20	250	5.1%	4.8%	14.8%	\$2,484	\$3,597	4.0%	7.2%	\$56	\$26	2.4%	2.8%	\$230	\$22
20–29	2,203	44.5%	9.7%	21.3%	\$3,098	\$5,050	6.2%	12.4%	\$71	\$28	1.9%	4.3%	\$352	\$216
30–39	1,816	36.7%	8.4%	23.2%	\$4,428	\$7,362	6.3%	14.3%	\$70	\$41	1.7%	4.4%	\$246	\$209
>=40	678	13.7%	6.9%	15.0%	\$7,824	\$8,842	5.2%	10.6%	\$75	\$40	2.7%	4.6%	\$323	\$88
By Number of Children														
1	2,487	50.3%	6.5%	15.0%	\$4,139	\$6,216	4.1%	8.9%	\$65	\$36	1.7%	3.0%	\$223	\$153
2	1,295	26.2%	9.0%	22.6%	\$4,007	\$5,848	7.3%	13.0%	\$71	\$35	2.4%	4.9%	\$409	\$183
3	702	14.2%	11.3%	27.6%	\$2,412	\$6,304	7.7%	17.1%	\$70	\$38	2.1%	6.4%	\$456	\$197

			Arrears Balance > \$0		Mean Arrears Balance (if > \$0)		Arrears Ordered > \$0		Mean Arrears Ordered (if > \$0)		Arrears Received > \$0		Mean Arrears Received (if > \$0)	
	N	%at Risk	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father
4+	463	9.4%	14.5%	36.5%	\$6,040	\$7,388	9.9%	24.4%	\$83	\$29	1.9%	6.3%	\$84	\$274
By Employment Status of Mother														
Unemployed	2,069	41.8%	8.5%	21.5%	\$3,319	\$5,525	5.7%	12.4%	\$67	\$32	2.0%	4.5%	\$465	\$239
Employed	2,878	58.2%	8.6%	20.4%	\$4,622	\$6,923	6.3%	12.7%	\$73	\$37	1.9%	4.1%	\$184	\$148
By Benefit Receipt in in Pre- Year														
TANF received	758	15.3%	10.3%	32.1%	\$3,738	\$5,936	8.2%	20.8%	\$65	\$22	2.5%	6.3%	\$323	\$90
Child support received	1,973	39.9%	9.0%	30.8%	\$4,166	\$7,087	6.7%	18.4%	\$72	\$32	2.3%	7.0%	\$424	\$173
SSDI received	241	4.9%	3.7%	24.9%	\$2,328	\$5,223	2.9%	14.5%	\$36	\$29	2.1%	5.8%	\$79	\$105
SSI received	412	8.3%	2.9%	22.6%	\$18,198	\$5,559	2.2%	12.6%	\$93	\$25	1.0%	6.3%	\$96	\$104
By County														
Adams	18	0.4%	0.0%	22.2%		\$2,616	0.0%	16.7%		\$71	0.0%	5.6%		\$112
Ashland	19	0.4%	15.8%	21.1%	\$2,515	\$1,331	10.5%	5.3%	\$103	\$4	0.0%	10.5%		\$27
Barron	73	1.5%	8.2%	15.1%	\$2,954	\$5,043	5.5%	5.5%	\$40	\$31	4.1%	4.1%	\$127	\$10
Bayfield	N/A													
Brown	190	3.8%	7.4%	18.9%	\$1,796	\$3,884	0.5%	8.4%	\$58	\$45	0.5%	2.6%	\$81	\$83
Buffalo	N/A													
Burnett	14	0.3%	14.3%	14.3%	\$1,158	\$2,717	7.1%	7.1%	\$58	\$14	7.1%	0.0%	\$27	
Calumet	15	0.3%	6.7%	33.3%	\$2,908	\$16,455	6.7%	20.0%	\$36	\$60	0.0%	0.0%		
Chippewa	58	1.2%	8.6%	27.6%	\$4,209	\$13,255	8.6%	22.4%	\$30	\$50	5.2%	12.1%	\$105	\$16
Clark	29	0.6%	13.8%	20.7%	\$1,955	\$6,377	13.8%	13.8%	\$78	\$130	3.4%	3.4%	\$28	\$29
Columbia	38	0.8%	7.9%	28.9%	\$9,209	\$5,835	10.5%	23.7%	\$102	\$34	2.6%	7.9%	\$30	\$13
Crawford	11	0.2%	0.0%	9.1%		\$782	9.1%	0.0%	\$12		0.0%	0.0%		
Dane	311	6.3%	11.9%	25.4%	\$5,686	\$8,294	14.5%	23.5%	\$54	\$30	2.3%	6.1%	\$117	\$103
Dodge	54	1.1%	7.4%	24.1%	\$4,760	\$8,097	9.3%	20.4%	\$65	\$34	1.9%	5.6%	\$28	\$161
Door	N/A													
Douglas	27	0.5%	14.8%	37.0%	\$4,214	\$1,279	7.4%	11.1%	\$307	\$122	0.0%	3.7%		\$35
Dunn	33	0.7%	9.1%	12.1%	\$11,465	\$8,754	6.1%	9.1%	\$8	\$174	3.0%	3.0%	\$23	\$56
Eau Claire	85	1.7%	12.9%	23.5%	\$1,959	\$8,149	11.8%	18.8%	\$112	\$45	2.4%	7.1%	\$9	\$75
Florence	N/A													
Fond du Lac	101	2.0%	14.9%	23.8%	\$3,147	\$11,201	14.9%	13.9%	\$46	\$25	1.0%	4.0%	\$8,827	\$26
Forest	10	0.2%	0.0%	20.0%		\$1,604	0.0%	0.0%			0.0%	0.0%		
Grant	27	0.5%	7.4%	7.4%	\$3,654	\$2,746	0.0%	3.7%		\$5	0.0%	3.7%		\$5
Green	40	0.8%	5.0%	17.5%	\$507	\$6,387	5.0%	20.0%	\$64	\$16	0.0%	2.5%		\$1
Green Lake	13	0.3%	0.0%	7.7%		\$664	0.0%	7.7%		\$25	0.0%	0.0%		
Iowa	10	0.2%	10.0%	20.0%	\$204	\$1,465	0.0%	10.0%		\$5	0.0%	0.0%		
Iron	N/A													
Jackson	22	0.4%	4.5%	27.3%	\$6,931	\$7,585	4.5%	13.6%	\$30	\$45	4.5%	4.5%	\$105	\$39
Jefferson	67	1.4%	7.5%	19.4%	\$2,436	\$4,207	0.0%	13.4%		\$34	1.5%	6.0%	\$45	\$47
Juneau	35	0.7%	11.4%	31.4%	\$9,813	\$4,999	17.1%	11.4%	\$22	\$56	2.9%	11.4%	\$0	\$573
Kenosha	191	3.9%	13.6%	26.2%	\$2,978	\$3,163	10.5%	16.2%	\$38	\$31	3.1%	5.8%	\$245	\$94
Kewaunee	12	0.2%	25.0%	25.0%	\$14,807	\$9,857	16.7%	25.0%	\$71	\$16	0.0%	0.0%		
La Crosse	138	2.8%	5.8%	18.1%	\$3,746	\$7,659	2.9%	5.1%	\$48	\$45	1.4%	4.3%	\$52	\$114
Lafayette	23	0.5%	0.0%	13.0%		\$1,169	0.0%	0.0%			0.0%	0.0%		
Langlade	58	1.2%	8.6%	17.2%	\$1,946	\$3,742	8.6%	10.3%	\$29	\$45	3.4%	1.7%	\$892	\$46

			Arrears Balance > \$0		Mean Arrears Balance (if > \$0)		Arrears Ordered > \$0		Mean Arrears Ordered (if > \$0)		Arrears Received > \$0		Mean Arrears Received (if > \$0)	
	N	%at Risk	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father
Lincoln	34	0.7%	8.8%	23.5%	\$4,085	\$6,210	11.8%	5.9%	\$233	\$21	0.0%	2.9%		\$31
Manitowoc	54	1.1%	18.5%	18.5%	\$1,905	\$8,350	13.0%	13.0%	\$97	\$71	5.6%	7.4%	\$321	\$27
Marathon	126	2.5%	14.3%	16.7%	\$4,187	\$6,100	10.3%	12.7%	\$57	\$22	4.0%	7.1%	\$179	\$43
Marinette	42	0.8%	16.7%	28.6%	\$4,429	\$8,008	9.5%	7.1%	\$51	\$11	2.4%	2.4%	\$27	\$420
Marquette	25	0.5%	8.0%	8.0%	\$588	\$2,540	8.0%	4.0%	\$72	\$10	4.0%	0.0%	\$12	
Milwaukee	1,003	20.3%	3.3%	20.8%	\$9,872	\$5,874	0.9%	13.5%	\$176	\$20	0.2%	3.1%	\$2,339	\$59
Monroe	42	0.8%	14.3%	14.3%	\$2,239	\$14,588	4.8%	7.1%	\$24	\$12	4.8%	4.8%	\$266	\$116
Oconto	25	0.5%	0.0%	16.0%		\$2,097	0.0%	8.0%		\$65	0.0%	0.0%		
Oneida	40	0.8%	20.0%	17.5%	\$3,370	\$10,482	12.5%	7.5%	\$78	\$39	2.5%	7.5%	\$8	\$88
Outagamie	108	2.2%	13.9%	26.9%	\$1,380	\$6,731	12.0%	17.6%	\$48	\$38	4.6%	5.6%	\$139	\$694
Ozaukee	53	1.1%	5.7%	22.6%	\$1,786	\$6,242	7.5%	15.1%	\$56	\$33	1.9%	5.7%	\$18	\$53
Pepin	N/A													
Pierce	21	0.4%	4.8%	14.3%	\$7,333	\$1,228	4.8%	0.0%	\$303		4.8%	0.0%	\$70	
Polk	90	1.8%	4.4%	10.0%	\$10,942	\$5,579	5.6%	7.8%	\$36	\$56	3.3%	3.3%	\$870	\$29
Portage	35	0.7%	17.1%	25.7%	\$2,656	\$13,376	14.3%	20.0%	\$122	\$57	2.9%	2.9%	\$32	\$30
Price	15	0.3%	6.7%	6.7%	\$476	\$77	0.0%	13.3%		\$12	0.0%	0.0%		
Racine	225	4.5%	15.1%	28.4%	\$1,458	\$3,674	2.2%	7.1%	\$25	\$15	3.6%	4.4%	\$95	\$410
Richland	N/A													
Rock	229	4.6%	10.5%	19.2%	\$2,646	\$6,345	3.9%	10.9%	\$120	\$23	2.2%	3.5%	\$174	\$1,002
Rusk	26	0.5%	0.0%	7.7%		\$4,430	3.8%	11.5%	\$31	\$110	0.0%	7.7%		\$22
St. Croix	23	0.5%	0.0%	8.7%		\$23,580	0.0%	0.0%			4.3%	0.0%	\$157	
Sauk	29	0.6%	10.3%	24.1%	\$207	\$2,462	3.4%	13.8%	\$25	\$42	0.0%	3.4%		\$46
Sawyer	13	0.3%	0.0%	15.4%		\$1,494	0.0%	15.4%		\$61	0.0%	0.0%		
Shawano	28	0.6%	10.7%	17.9%	\$3,895	\$4,540	17.9%	7.1%	\$109	\$20	3.6%	3.6%	\$37	\$1,154
Sheboygan	98	2.0%	7.1%	15.3%	\$2,234	\$11,615	7.1%	14.3%	\$59	\$52	4.1%	3.1%	\$204	\$17
Taylor	12	0.2%	8.3%	25.0%	\$2,993	\$3,552	0.0%	16.7%		\$43	0.0%	16.7%		\$127
Trempealeau	22	0.4%	13.6%	22.7%	\$2,367	\$6,826	13.6%	13.6%	\$17	\$10	0.0%	9.1%		\$159
Vernon	28	0.6%	7.1%	17.9%	\$736	\$1,438	3.6%	10.7%	\$60	\$31	3.6%	10.7%	\$221	\$106
Vilas	14	0.3%	7.1%	21.4%	\$2,581	\$1,732	7.1%	7.1%	\$23	\$29	0.0%	7.1%		\$1
Walworth	105	2.1%	10.5%	25.7%	\$4,965	\$5,657	5.7%	13.3%	\$51	\$42	2.9%	3.8%	\$178	\$41
Washburn	27	0.5%	7.4%	25.9%	\$5,336	\$7,333	7.4%	14.8%	\$20	\$94	7.4%	3.7%	\$62	\$6
Washington	74	1.5%	6.8%	17.6%	\$4,704	\$4,792	9.5%	9.5%	\$65	\$100	0.0%	1.4%		\$65
Waukesha	176	3.6%	6.8%	22.2%	\$10,912	\$6,702	5.7%	9.1%	\$44	\$26	1.1%	3.4%	\$212	\$265
Waupaca	53	1.1%	5.7%	22.6%	\$4,023	\$4,545	5.7%	9.4%	\$277	\$20	3.8%	5.7%	\$122	\$129
Waushara	20	0.4%	20.0%	10.0%	\$4,358	\$5,624	10.0%	15.0%	\$25	\$68	5.0%	5.0%	\$460	\$3,017
Winnebago	170	3.4%	7.6%	12.9%	\$2,402	\$9,931	6.5%	7.1%	\$67	\$49	2.4%	2.9%	\$51	\$28
Wood	92	1.9%	4.3%	18.5%	\$1,407	\$8,189	3.3%	17.4%	\$279	\$30	1.1%	7.6%	\$116	\$69
Menominee	N/A													

Note: The sample is restricted to mothers with non-missing judge instrument variables (IV-5). Cells with fewer than 10 observations are censored, and are denoted with “N/A” in the sample size (N) column.

Appendix Table 3: Full 2SLS Results for Reentry in 24 Months

	(1) Reentry in 24 mo.
CRO Arrears mother	0.228*** (0.060)
Spell length (months)	-0.008*** (0.001)
Black NH	0.024 (0.015)
Hispanic	0.000 (0.019)
Other NH	0.034 (0.020)
Missing race/ethnicity	-0.054
2 Fathers	0.014 (0.012)
3+ Fathers	0.037* (0.015)
Number of OHC children	0.023*** (0.005)
F wage less than 5k	-0.039* (0.019)
F wage 5–10k	-0.041 (0.023)
F wage 10–25k	-0.047* (0.020)
F wage more than 25k	-0.050** (0.019)
M wage less than 3k	-0.094*** (0.018)
M wage 3–10k	-0.118*** (0.018)
M wage more than 10k	-0.129*** (0.016)
Cty subst. rate	0.028 (0.080)
Unempl. rate	-1.106*** (0.257)
M unempl.	0.134*** (0.013)
M no UI	-0.006 (0.021)
F no UI	0.021 (0.024)
F unempl.	0.018 (0.016)
SSI lagged year	0.042 (0.023)
SSDI lagged year	0.041 (0.027)
W2/TANF lagged year	0.005 (0.015)
N	6,332
Mean DV	0.222

	(1) Reentry in 24 mo.
F-statistic	371.88
F p-value	0.000
Partial R ²	0.059
Controls	Limited

Notes: Table depicts coefficients from independent 2SLS regressions (with robust standard errors). Re-report is defined as any screened-in report to CPS on behalf of any of the mother's children within 24 months reunification. Reentry is defined as any of the mother's children reentering OHC within 24 months of reunification. Reentry if re-report is reentry into OHC among those with a re-report. * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Appendix Table 4: Reentry in 24 Months by First Spell Length

	(1) 12 mo.	(2) 18 mo.	(3) 24 mo.	(4) 36 mo.	(5) 50 mo.
CRO Arrears Mother	0.392*** (0.104)	0.289*** (0.078)	0.236*** (0.066)	0.228*** (0.060)	0.229*** (0.060)
N	4,480	5,359	5,878	6,332	6,558
Mean DV	0.240	0.232	0.227	0.222	0.218
F-statistic	166.05	249.78	321.28	371.88	349.15
F p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Partial R ²	0.041	0.049	0.056	0.059	0.054
Kleibergen-Paap F	166.05	249.78	321.28	371.88	349.15
Anderson-Rubin F	15.07	14.36	13.28	15.04	14.97
AR p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Kleibergen-Paap LM	153.03	225.54	282.08	323.71	305.65
Kleibergen-Paap LM p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
SW LM	15.31	14.58	13.48	15.27	15.20
SW LM p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Controls	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited

Notes: Table depicts coefficients from independent 2SLS regressions (with robust standard errors) for reentry within 24 months of reunification. “Limited” controls refer to a set of exogenous variables, namely the number of months in the first OHC spell, mother’s race/ethnicity, number of dads, number of children, highest earning father’s lagged earnings (in categories), mother’s lagged earnings (in categories), county-level substantiation rate, lagged county-level unemployment rate, and lagged receipt of SSI, SSDI, and W2/TANF. * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Appendix Table 5: Reentry in 12 Months by First Spell Length

	(1) 12 mo.	(2) 18 mo.	(3) 24 mo.	(4) 36 mo.	(5) 50 mo.
CRO Arrears Mother	0.234* (0.092)	0.164* (0.069)	0.136* (0.059)	0.131* (0.053)	0.134* (0.054)
N	4,480	5,359	5,878	6,332	6,558
Mean DV	0.189	0.182	0.177	0.172	0.168
F-statistic	166.05	249.78	321.28	371.88	349.15
F p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Partial R ²	0.041	0.049	0.056	0.059	0.054
Kleibergen-Paap F	166.05	249.78	321.28	371.88	349.15
Anderson-Rubin F	6.53	5.66	5.43	6.07	6.32
AR p-value	0.011	0.017	0.020	0.014	0.012
Kleibergen-Paap LM	153.03	225.54	282.08	323.71	305.65
Kleibergen-Paap LM p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
SW LM	6.68	5.75	5.52	6.17	6.41
SW LM p-value	0.010	0.016	0.019	0.013	0.011
Controls	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited

Notes: Table depicts coefficients from independent 2SLS regressions (with robust standard errors) for reentry within 12 months of reunification. “Limited” controls refer to a set of exogenous variables, namely the number of months in the first OHC spell, mother’s race/ethnicity, number of dads, number of children, highest earning father’s lagged earnings (in categories), mother’s lagged earnings (in categories), county-level substantiation rate, lagged county-level unemployment rate, and lagged receipt of SSI, SSDI, and W2/TANF. * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Appendix Table 6: Reentry in 18 Months by First Spell Length

	(1) 12 mo.	(2) 18 mo.	(3) 24 mo.	(4) 36 mo.	(5) 50 mo.
CRO Arrears Mother	0.330*** (0.100)	0.259*** (0.075)	0.210*** (0.063)	0.204*** (0.058)	0.207*** (0.058)
N	4,480	5,359	5,878	6,332	6,558
Mean DV	0.221	0.212	0.207	0.203	0.199
F-statistic	166.05	249.78	321.28	371.88	349.15
F p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Partial R ²	0.041	0.049	0.056	0.059	0.054
Kleibergen-Paap F	166.05	249.78	321.28	371.88	349.15
Anderson-Rubin F	11.29	12.32	11.21	12.76	12.91
AR p-value	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000
Kleibergen-Paap LM	153.03	225.54	282.08	323.71	305.65
Kleibergen-Paap LM p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
SW LM	11.51	12.54	11.41	12.99	13.14
SW LM p-value	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000
Controls	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited

Notes: Table depicts coefficients from independent 2SLS regressions (with robust standard errors) for reentry within 18 months of reunification. “Limited” controls refer to a set of exogenous variables, namely the number of months in the first OHC spell, mother’s race/ethnicity, number of dads, number of children, highest earning father’s lagged earnings (in categories), mother’s lagged earnings (in categories), county-level substantiation rate, lagged county-level unemployment rate, and lagged receipt of SSI, SSDI, and W2/TANF. * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Appendix Table 7: Reentry in 36 months by first spell length

	(1) 12 mo.	(2) 18 mo.	(3) 24 mo.	(4) 36 mo.	(5) 50 mo.
CRO Arrears Mother	0.417*** (0.107)	0.299*** (0.080)	0.247*** (0.068)	0.240*** (0.062)	0.232*** (0.062)
N	4,480	5,359	5,878	6,332	6,558
Mean DV	0.265	0.257	0.251	0.247	0.242
F-statistic	166.05	249.78	321.28	371.88	349.15
F p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Partial R ²	0.041	0.049	0.056	0.059	0.054
Kleibergen-Paap F	166.05	249.78	321.28	371.88	349.15
Anderson-Rubin F	16.07	14.28	13.52	15.41	14.19
AR p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Kleibergen-Paap LM	153.03	225.54	282.08	323.71	305.65
Kleibergen-Paap LM p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
SW LM	16.26	14.46	13.68	15.58	14.35
SW LM p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Controls	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited

Notes: Table depicts coefficients from independent 2SLS regressions (with robust standard errors) for reentry within 36 months of reunification. “Limited” controls refer to a set of exogenous variables, namely the number of months in the first OHC spell, mother’s race/ethnicity, number of dads, number of children, highest earning father’s lagged earnings (in categories), mother’s lagged earnings (in categories), county-level substantiation rate, lagged county-level unemployment rate, and lagged receipt of SSI, SSDI, and W2/TANF. * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Appendix Table 8: OLS Results for Reentry in 24 Months, Stratification by Demographic Characteristics

	Paternity Status			Number of Fathers			Mother's Race/Ethnicity		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Paternity	Divorced	One	Two	Three+	White	Black	Hispanic	Other
Panel A: OLS Sample									
CRO Arrears mother	0.078 (0.045)	0.043* (0.018)	0.051 (0.027)	0.060** (0.023)	0.063* (0.026)	0.051** (0.018)	0.091* (0.039)	0.035 (0.050)	0.042 (0.046)
N	994	4,691	2,817	2,829	2,171	4,632	1,626	770	735
Mean DV	0.246	0.212	0.198	0.216	0.262	0.217	0.232	0.214	0.246
Controls	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited
Panel B: IV Sample									
CRO Arrears mother	0.093* (0.046)	0.043* (0.018)	0.057* (0.027)	0.060* (0.023)	0.068* (0.027)	0.058** (0.018)	0.083* (0.039)	0.035 (0.051)	0.026 (0.049)
N	797	3,847	2,267	2,337	1,728	3,833	1,292	620	544
Mean DV	0.242	0.214	0.199	0.216	0.261	0.213	0.240	0.218	0.257
Controls	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited

Notes: Table depicts coefficients from independent OLS regressions (with robust standard errors). Reentry is defined as any of the mother's children reentering OHC within 24 months of reunification. "Limited" controls refer to a set of exogenous variables, namely the number of months in the first OHC spell, mother's race/ethnicity, number of dads, number of children, highest earning father's lagged earnings (in categories), mother's lagged earnings (in categories), county-level substantiation rate, lagged county-level unemployment rate, and lagged receipt of SSI, SSDI, and W2/TANF. * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Appendix Table 9: 2SLS Re-Reports

	(1) Later CPS reports
CRO Arrears Mother	-0.270*** (0.068)
N	6,332
Sample	IV
Mean DV	0.578
F-statistic	371.88
F p-value	0.000
Partial R ²	0.059
Controls	Limited

Notes: Table depicts coefficients from independent 2SLS regressions (with robust standard errors). Re-report is defined as any screened-in report to CPS on behalf of any of the mother's children that occur after the OHC spell. The sample uses the IV sample. * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Appendix Table 10: Reentry in 24 Months, without Spell Length Control

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) 2SLS
CRO Arrears Mother	0.022 (0.014)	0.022 (0.014)	0.252*** (0.063)
N	7,817	6,332	6,332
Sample	OLS	IV	IV
Mean DV	0.222	0.222	0.222
F-statistic			321.47
F p-value			0.000
Partial R ²			0.050
Controls	Limited	Limited	Limited

Notes: Table depicts coefficients from independent OLS and 2SLS regressions (with robust standard errors). The "OLS" sample refers to the full sample, while the "IV" sample refers to mothers with only non-missing judge instrument variables (IV-5). "Limited" controls refer to a set of exogenous variables, namely mother's race/ethnicity, number of dads, number of children, highest earning father's lagged earnings (in categories), mother's lagged earnings (in categories), county-level substantiation rate, lagged county-level unemployment rate, and lagged receipt of SSI, SSDI, and W2/TANF. Note that this table excludes the length of first OHC spell from the list of control variables. * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Appendix Table 11: OLS and 2SLS Results for Reentry, Alternative OHC Spell Definition

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) 2SLS
CRO Arrears Mother	0.051*** (0.015)	0.040* (0.016)	0.246*** (0.063)
N	8,174	6,574	6,574
Sample	OLS	IV	IV
Mean DV	0.267	0.267	0.267
F-statistic			406.18
F p-value			0.000
Partial R ²			0.060
Controls	Limited	Limited	Limited

Notes: Table depicts coefficients from independent OLS and 2SLS regressions (with robust standard errors). The alternate OHC spell is defined as follows: the OHC spell starts when any of the mother’s children enter OHC, and ends when any of her children exit OHC. The sample sizes of these models differ from other models, due to the alternate definition of the OHC spell (i.e., a different number of mothers now have OHC spells that last up to 36 months). The “OLS” sample refers to the full sample, while the “IV” sample refers to mothers with only non-missing judge instrument variables (IV-5). “Limited” controls refer to a set of exogenous variables, namely the number of months in the first OHC spell, mother’s race/ethnicity, number of dads, number of children, highest earning father’s lagged earnings (in categories), mother’s lagged earnings (in categories), county-level substantiation rate, lagged county-level unemployment rate, and lagged receipt of SSI, SSDI, and W2/TANF. *0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Appendix Table 12: Reentry in 24 Months, by Parent Payor

	OLS			OLS			2SLS		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
	Mother Only	Father Only	Both Parents	Mother Only	Father Only	Both Parents	Mothers Only	Fathers Only	Both Parents
CRO Arrears	0.097*** (0.022)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.016 (0.017)	0.096*** (0.022)	0.006 (0.014)	0.018 (0.018)	0.550*** (0.149)	2.512 (1.604)	0.390*** (0.105)
N	7,817	7,817	7,817	6,332	6,332	6,332	6,332	6,332	6,332
Sample	OLS	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Mean DV	0.070	0.170	0.101	0.070	0.170	0.101	0.070	0.170	0.101
F-statistic							118.09	2.96	178.78
F p-value							0.000	0.086	0.000
Partial R ²							0.020	0.000	0.030
Controls	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited

Notes: Table depicts coefficients from independent OLS and 2SLS regressions (with robust standard errors). The “OLS” sample refers to the full sample, while the “IV” sample refers to mothers with only non-missing judge instrument variables (IV-5). “Limited” controls refer to a set of exogenous variables, namely the number of months in the first OHC spell, mother’s race/ethnicity, number of dads, number of children, highest earning father’s lagged earnings (in categories), mother’s lagged earnings (in categories), county-level substantiation rate, lagged county-level unemployment rate, and lagged receipt of SSI, SSDI, and W2/TANF. * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Appendix Table 13: Test of Random Assignment

	Limited			Parental		
	(1) IV-5	(2) IV-10	(3) County IV	(4) IV-5	(5) IV-10	(6) County IV
Spell length (months)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Black NH	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.003)
Hispanic	0.000 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Other NH	0.006 (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)
Missing race/ethnicity	0.009 (0.017)	0.016 (0.016)	-0.003 (0.011)	0.009 (0.018)	0.017 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.011)
2 Fathers	0.005 (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.006 (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)
3+ Fathers	0.006* (0.003)	0.007* (0.003)	0.010* (0.004)	0.006* (0.003)	0.007* (0.003)	0.010* (0.004)
No. OHC children	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)
F wage less than 5k	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)
F wage 5–10k	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.004)
F wage 10–25k	-0.001 (0.005)	0.000 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
F wage more than 25k	0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
M wage less than 3k	0.008 (0.007)	0.005 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.009 (0.007)	0.005 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)
M wage 3–10k	0.011 (0.006)	0.008 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.012 (0.006)	0.008 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)
M wage more than 10k	0.010 (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)	0.010 (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)
County subst. rate	-0.052 (0.058)	-0.043 (0.057)	-0.051 (0.123)			
Unemployment. rate	-0.835 (0.870)	-0.763 (0.886)	-1.663 (0.989)			
M unemployed	-0.011 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.012* (0.006)	-0.009 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.006)
M no UI	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)
F no UI	0.005 (0.007)	0.004 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.004)	0.005 (0.007)	0.004 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.004)
F unemployed	0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
SSI lagged year	-0.014** (0.005)	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.013** (0.005)	-0.012** (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)
SSDI lagged year	0.015* (0.006)	0.015* (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.015* (0.006)	0.015* (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)
W2/TANF lagged year	-0.013** (0.004)	-0.012** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.013** (0.004)	-0.012** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)
N	6,332	6,256	7,817	6,332	6,256	7,817
F-statistic	4.55	4.39	1.76	4.31	4.34	1.41
F p-value	0.000	0.000	0.035	0.000	0.000	0.142
Controls	Limited	Limited	Limited	Parental	Parental	Parental

Notes: Table depicts coefficients from independent OLS regressions with county and year-of-removal fixed effects (with standard errors clustered at the level of the county). “Parental” controls namely the number of months in the first OHC spell, mother’s race/ethnicity, number of dads, number of children, highest earning father’s lagged earnings (in categories), mother’s lagged earnings (in categories), and lagged receipt of SSI, SSDI, and W2/TANF. “Limited” controls refer to a set of exogenous variables that include all parental controls and include the county-level substantiation rates and lagged county-level unemployment rates.*0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001