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Barriers to Child Support Payment

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INTRODUCTION

The lack of full payment of child support orders is a significant problem. National survey data from 2015 show that only about 70 percent of the custodial parents who were supposed to receive child support received any support, and the rate of full payment was only 43.5 percent (Grall, 2018). Similarly, program data reported by the states show only 63 percent of cases had collections in 2018 (U.S. DHHS, n.d.). The lack of full payment may result in economic difficulties for children, many of whom are economically vulnerable.[1] It also often results in enforcement actions being taken by the child support program, some of which are expensive and may not be effective (Meyer, Cancian, & Waring, 2019). Enforcement actions, especially if they are seen as punitive, may also result in less cooperation with the child support program, and could lead to even less payment in the future (e.g. Waller and Plotnick, 2001).

Full payment is not a problem for all noncustodial parents. Noncustodial parents with jobs in the formal economy have limited discretion in whether they pay support because the amount they owe is typically automatically withheld from their paycheck (Bartfeld & Meyer, 2003). A substantial part of the problem of nonpayment is therefore the lack of stable employment in the formal sector, and understanding barriers to formal employment will provide insight into the reasons for non-payment of child support orders.

This is an important issue because different barriers to employment suggest different policy responses. For example, if a problem is that noncustodial parents cannot accept a better-

[1]For example, Grall (2018) reports that even after child support is received, 49 percent of custodial parents with child support agreements had incomes below the official poverty level.

paying job because they do not have reliable transportation to get to where the jobs are, this suggests that transportation interventions could be effective. On the other hand, if mental health limitations or substance use are barriers to getting better-paying jobs, this implies that referral for mental health treatment may be effective. Despite the importance of understanding some of the barriers to employment and whether these barriers to employment then result in the lack of child support payments, little research exists that addresses these questions explicitly.

In this report, we focus on noncustodial fathers who are already behind in their child support payments.[2] We ask three questions: (a) What proportion of noncustodial fathers behind in their payments face which barriers to employment? (b) Are the employment barriers reported by noncustodial fathers associated with less subsequent employment and earnings? And, finally, (c) Do these barriers to employment result in lower child support payments and less compliance with child support orders? We are able to explore these important questions with unique data on noncustodial fathers already behind in their payments, many of whom are the most disadvantaged fathers receiving child support services. This is a population of great interest, and yet until now we have had little quantitative data on these fathers and the issues they face.

PRIOR LITERATURE

In this section, we begin with a brief review of prior research on barriers to employment, focusing on the literature on noncustodial fathers. We then examine the prior research on factors related to payment or nonpayment of child support.

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[2]We also have data on noncustodial mothers who are behind in their payments. However, there are many fewer noncustodial mothers in our data (about 90 percent are fathers) or in the national data on nonpayment (about 87 percent of the nonpayers are fathers) (Grall, 2018).

Barriers to Employment for Noncustodial Fathers

Labor market outcomes for many men in the United States have been deteriorating for generations; for example, labor force participation rates for men aged 20 and over declined steadily from 88.4 percent in June 1949, to 77.8 percent in June 1979, and to 71.5 percent in June 2019 (U.S. Census Bureau 2019b). The unemployment rate and the proportion of workers who are working full time both vary with the economic cycle, and the Great Recession of December 2007 to June 2009 led to the highest unemployment rates since the 1930s. Full-time jobs were more difficult to obtain during the Great Recession, and recovery has been slow (U.S. Census Bureau 2019c).[3] Wages for men with full-time jobs have also declined over time, and this is especially true for those with less education. Between 1979 and 2017, median usual weekly earnings declined by 26.5 percent for men without a high school degree, by 18.0 percent for high school graduates, and by 11.7 percent for those with some college. In contrast, men with at least a bachelor's degree had an increase in earnings of 18.6 percent during this period (U.S. Census Bureau 2019a). The trends in employment and earnings have been particularly stark for young men, and men of color, as well as those without a college degree (e.g. Sum, Khatiwada, McLaughlin, & Palma, 2011).

Noncustodial fathers are obviously affected by these larger societal trends. But explicit labor market information for noncustodial fathers nationwide is difficult to obtain. The official U.S. employment and earnings surveys do not identify noncustodial fathers, and attempts to identify noncustodial fathers in other national surveys have had limitations (see Garfinkel,

[3]The proportion of men employed who worked full time dropped 2.9 percentage points during the Great Recession (December 2007 to June 2009) and fell another 0.5 percentage points by April 2010 before rising again, though by June 2019 it had not yet reached the pre-recession level.

McLanahan, & Hanson, 1998; Sorensen, 1997; Stykes, Manning, & Brown, 2013). As a result, the quantitative research in this area is now dated (mostly using data from the 1980s), not national in scope, or based on small samples; it does, however, provide at least a partial picture of labor market experiences for noncustodial fathers.

At the time these studies were conducted, most nonresident fathers (86–90 percent) were employed, but these employment rates were significantly lower than that of resident fathers (Sorensen, 1997).[4] Nonresident fathers worked less than resident fathers, averaging 36–37 hours/week; however, they worked nearly as many weeks as resident fathers, and nearly the full year (48 weeks/year) (Garfinkel et al., 1998). Average wage rates of noncustodial fathers were about $14 to $15/hour (1995 dollars), below the rate for fathers of resident children (Garfinkel et al., 1998), and there is a large variation in earnings among noncustodial fathers (Meyer, 1998; Mincy & Sorensen, 1998).

Because earnings are the main component of income, labor market difficulties (unemployment and/or low earnings) result in high poverty rates. Poverty rates among all nonresident fathers from the late 1980s and 1990s have been estimated at 14–25 percent (Meyer, 1998; Sorensen, 1997), higher than the rates for the population at large at the time. More recent research has focused on the poverty rates of nonresident fathers who pay support. For example, Hakovirta and colleagues (2019) estimate the poverty rate among nonresident fathers at 15.5 percent before child support is paid, and 23.1 after it is paid. Similarly, Cuesta and Meyer (2018) estimate that the poverty rate of children living with parents who pay support to their nonresident

[4]In this report, we primarily use the term "noncustodial" parent; we use "nonresident" when we are referring to prior literature that used this term. In the literature, "noncustodial" often refers to a parent who owes child support, whereas "nonresident" is often a more general term to refer to those not living with their children, whether or not they owe formal child support.

children in other households increases from 22.1 percent to 26.8 percent after child support is paid.

Why are poverty rates so high and, employment and income fairly low, for noncustodial fathers compared to resident fathers? To begin with, many noncustodial fathers have low levels of education, which limits labor market success. For example, Stykes and colleagues (2013) estimate that up to 37 percent of nonresident fathers may lack a high school degree. Other potential barriers include high rates of disability (12–14 percent), depression (12 percent), and substance abuse 7–8 percent) (Garfinkel et al., 1998). Moreover, an estimated 20–23 percent of nonresident fathers do not own a car, much higher than the 3 percent among resident fathers (Garfinkel et al., 1998), suggesting that transportation difficulties may limit employment opportunities.

Beyond these quantitative findings, an important qualitative literature has examined the circumstances of noncustodial fathers using data, often through ethnography. In a review of these studies, Waller and Plotnick (2001) conclude that many noncustodial fathers have jobs that are part-time or temporary and provide low wages. In a study of African American noncustodial fathers of children receiving welfare in Milwaukee, Pate (2002) finds that some noncustodial fathers were unable to work because of physical disabilities and, of those who could and did work, many worked for temporary agencies, which led to irregular employment and varying earnings. He further identifies housing insecurity and interactions with the civil and criminal justice systems as important barriers to stable employment. Likewise, he finds transportation (the challenge of relying solely on public transportation to get to the suburbs where the jobs are) and the need to provide occasional child care or regular care for aging parents to be barriers to employment for these men. Consistent with the quantitative findings on depression, some of the

qualitative research highlights related feelings of powerlessness (Johnson & Doolittle, 1998), which could inhibit labor market success.

In summary, many men increasingly face a labor market where it is hard to be successful. Men of color and those with low education have a particularly difficult time. Noncustodial fathers disproportionately face these difficulties, in part because they are disproportionately from socially and economically disadvantaged groups, and the extant research suggests that their employment and earnings rates are substantially worse than that of resident fathers. Key barriers to economic well-being among noncustodial fathers include low education (which is linked to low skills), disability, substance use, transportation, housing insecurity, interactions with the criminal justice system, caregiving, and mental health concerns.

Barriers to Child Support Payments and Compliance

Several attempts have been made to better understand the multiplicity of barriers that noncustodial parents face to pay and comply with their child support orders, often as a way to inform the improvement of policies serving families in the child support system. One perspective in this area, described by Dubey (1995), groups potential reasons for payment or non-payment of child support by noncustodial parents into three main categories: situational factors, social-emotional commitments to former families, and quality of relationships with custodial parents. Another perspective emphasizes factors related to ability to pay, willingness to pay, and the child support enforcement system (e.g. Beller & Graham, 1993; Bartfeld & Meyer, 2003). We draw on both perspectives because they are interrelated: many of the situational factors identified by Dubey (1995) can be characterized as related to the noncustodial parent's ability to pay support, and many of the variables that could be categorized as related to the noncustodial parent's commitment to the former family and the quality of the relationship between the custodial and

noncustodial parent can be seen as related to the noncustodial parent's willingness to pay support.

One of the major barriers to compliance is a noncustodial parent's ability to pay, which has been approximated by their attachment to the labor market, employment patterns, income, education, and incarceration history. The quantitative research finds strong and consistent relationships between these factors and child support payment or compliance (e.g. Bartfeld & Meyer, 2003; Dubey, 1995; Eldred & Takayesu, 2013; Goldberg, 2015; Ha, Cancian, Meyer, & Han, 2008; Neponmyaschy & Garfinkel 2010). For example, Bartfeld and Meyer (2003) show that two key variables in child support outcomes are whether a noncustodial parent is formally employed and the level of earnings. Similarly, Ha and colleagues (2008) find that nonpayers and partial payers of child support have weaker attachment to the labor force and greater histories of incarceration than (full) payers. The qualitative literature further supports the importance of ability to pay, and these related factors, vis-à-vis payment and compliance (e.g., Pate, 2002; Waller, 2002).

The social-emotional ties of noncustodial parents to their families and the quality of relationships between custodial and noncustodial parents are also associated with a noncustodial parent's compliance and willingness to provide support, but in general these have been found to be less important than ability to pay (e.g. Bartfeld & Meyer, 2003; Dubey, 1995). In this context, among the reasons noncustodial parents give for non-payment is that they do not have as much contact as they want with their nonresident child(ren). Relatedly, low-quality relationships between custodial and noncustodial parents (which may negatively influence visitation) have also been identified as a barrier to compliance (e.g. Dubey, 1995; Eldred & Takayesu, 2013; Goldberg, 2015). Noncustodial parents' concerns over how the money they provide will be spent

might also influence their willingness to provide support (Dubey, 1995; Eldred & Takayesu, 2013).

The child support system itself also affects payments and compliance. Quantitative research suggests that some child support policies are associated with increased payments and compliance (e.g. routine withholding and in-hospital paternity establishment, see Freeman and Waldfogel, 1998; Sorensen & Hill, 2004), even while others may have unintended negative consequences (Cancian, Heinrich, & Chung, 2013). Some qualitative evidence also suggests ways that the child support program is associated with lower payments and compliance. For example, cost recovery policies in which the government retains some of the child support paid to offset welfare expenditures may lead to lower cooperation with the child support program and lower payments (Waller & Plotnick, 2001), a finding supported by the quantitative literature (Cancian, Meyer & Caspar, 2008). Other policies that can inhibit payments include mandating cooperation with child support for social welfare benefit program participation, basing the amount due on imputed income (which may not be realistic), and lack of ease in modifying the amount due when circumstances change (Waller & Plotnick, 2001).

In summary, the barriers that noncustodial parents face to payment and compliance with their child support orders are primarily related to their ability to pay, but also to their willingness to do so. One of the most salient barriers is the lack of income or stable employment. Thus, we focus our attention on barriers to employment and earnings because, if such barriers can be overcome, child support payment will, in general, follow as a result of the child support program withholding wages. This is one of the first studies to examine the relationship between barriers, employment, and earnings for noncustodial fathers. We generally expect barriers to be associated with lower employment rates and less earnings, and for these employment and earnings

outcomes to then be associated with lower child support. However, direct effects of barriers on child support outcomes are possible (for example, problems with alcohol may affect child support, even holding earnings constant), and this is the first study that we are aware of to examine whether barriers to employment have both direct and indirect relationships with child support payments.

DATA AND METHODS

In this report our data come from noncustodial fathers participating in the National Child Support Noncustodial Parent Employment Demonstration Program (CSPED). We focus specifically on fathers who enrolled in the evaluation of the Supporting Parents, Supporting Kids (SPSK) program, Wisconsin's CSPED program. We also show combined data from the other seven CSPED states to explore the extent to which Wisconsin's results are consistent with those of other states implementing the CSPED program.[5] The CSPED program was an intervention that provided a variety of employment, parenting, and child-support case services to parents who were behind in their child support payments and had employment difficulties (Noyes, Vogel, & Howard, 2018). To understand the characteristics of noncustodial parents in the current child support system, we examine only noncustodial fathers who were randomly assigned to receive regular services group (that is, the group who did not receive the extra services associated with CSPED). We select only fathers who participated in the standard baseline survey, which was administered to CSPED enrollees prior to program participation in order to gather information on their demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, children and relationships, economic

[5]In addition to Wisconsin, CSPED was implemented in California, Colorado, Iowa, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas.

stability, parent background and well-being. Our sample includes 3,767 noncustodial fathers for whom we have child support and employment data from administrative records. Of these noncustodial fathers, 624 were from the Wisconsin CSPED program (though they did not receive the extra services) and the remaining 3,143 were from the other states.[6]

Measures

Outcomes

The five main outcomes of interest are: (a) formal employment; (b) formal earnings; (c) whether current child support payments were made; (d) the amount of current child support payments; and (e) compliance with current orders (amount paid divided by the amount due). All are based on administrative records and are measured in the first year after enrollment in CSPED/SPSK. Thus, we measure labor market and child support outcomes *after* we have assessed barriers. This time-ordering ensures that we are not merely measuring barriers that are the result of employment difficulties; that is, for example, we measure depression and then consider employment over the following year.

Employment and earnings data were obtained from the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) from the U.S. Office of Child Support Enforcement through a request by the Wisconsin Bureau of Child Support. From the NDNH records, we construct a measure of average monthly

[6]A total of 10,161 noncustodial parents participated in CSPED, of which 5,075 were randomly assigned to receive regular "business-as-usual" child support services. Of the "business-as-usual" group, we excluded: 579 participants from a state that used an abbreviated baseline survey that excluded many of the measures used in our analysis; an additional 458 noncustodial mothers, an additional 207 without administrative records on child support and/or employment (mainly participants from South Carolina); and an additional 64 who did not respond to the questions that we used to measure barriers to employment and child support payments from the baseline survey. This resulted in a final sample of 3,767 noncustodial fathers.

earnings that is the sum of total earnings in the year after enrollment divided by 12.[7] We also construct a measure of employment that is equal to 1 if the noncustodial parent had any record of formal earnings in the NDNH data in the year after enrollment.

Administrative records on child support were collected from each state; Wisconsin's data come from the KIDS data system. We construct a measure of any child support paid that is equal to 1 if the noncustodial parent had any record of current child support payments in the year after enrollment.[8] Our measure of child support paid is the monthly average of all current child support payments to all custodial mothers in the year after enrollment. To construct compliance, we divide the amount paid over the year by the amount owed during the year, considering amounts owed and paid for current support to all custodial mothers to whom a noncustodial father owes support.[9]

Barriers to Employment and Child Support Payments

Our main explanatory variables of interest are barriers to employment (which may also directly affect paying child support). Drawing from questions asked in the baseline survey, we construct nine binary measures of employment barriers:

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[7]NDNH data is reported by calendar quarter. Thus, the first year after enrollment begins in the first month of the calendar quarter following enrollment.

[8]For participants in some states, payment information included payments toward medical support and alimony. In some cases, the amount owed in current child support (excluding ancillary support such as medical support and alimony) was known and it was possible to distinguish payment amounts toward current support. For one grantee it was not possible to distinguish payment amounts towards arrears from payment amounts toward current support (including ancillary support). For this grantee, child support payments are equivalent to total payments made to all accounts (current, ancillary, and past-due) in a given quarter.

[9]To reduce the influence of outliers, child support payments and compliance were top-coded at three standard deviations above the mean of the entire sample and earnings were top-coded at three standard deviations above the non-zero mean.

1. *Problems with alcohol or drugs*. A binary indicator equal to 1 if the noncustodial father reported that problems with alcohol or drugs made it a little hard, somewhat hard, very hard, or extremely hard to find or keep a job in the past year;

2. *Criminal record.* A binary indicator equal to 1 if the noncustodial father reported that having a criminal record made it a little hard, somewhat hard, very hard, or extremely hard to find or keep a job in the past year;

3. *Housing instability.* A binary indicator equal to 1 if the noncustodial father reported that not having a steady place to live made it a little hard, somewhat hard, very hard, or extremely hard to find or keep a job in the past year;

4. *Issues with anger.* A binary indicator equal to 1 if the noncustodial father reported that trouble getting along with other people or controlling anger made it a little hard, somewhat hard, very hard, or extremely hard to find or keep a job in the past year*;*

5. *Caregiving responsibilities.* A binary indicator equal to 1 if the noncustodial father reported that having to take care of a family member made it a little hard, somewhat hard, very hard, or extremely hard to find or keep a job in the past year;

6. *Transportation difficulties.* A binary indicator equal to 1 if the noncustodial father reported that problems getting to work, such as not having a car or access to public transportation, made it a little hard, somewhat hard, very hard, or extremely hard to find or keep a job in the past year;

7. *Physical health limitations.* A binary indicator equal to 1 if the noncustodial father reported that their physical health made it a little hard, somewhat hard, very hard, or extremely hard to find or keep a job in the past year;

8. *Lack of job skills*. A binary indicator equal to 1 if the noncustodial father reported that not having the kinds of skills employer are looking for made it a little hard, somewhat hard, very hard, or extremely hard to find or keep a job in the past year;

9. *Depression.* A binary indicator of depression equal to 1 if the noncustodial father has symptoms of depression based on their responses to the eight-item Patient Health Questionnaire depression scale (PHQ-8), which has been used in large clinical studies and in assessing depression in the general public.[10]

[10]The measurement of the first eight barriers is similar (asking individuals the extent to which a barrier made it hard to find or keep a job). In contrast, depression is measured directly; we consider it a barrier to employment because previous research has shown a strong relationship between depressive symptoms, unemployment, and loss of income (e.g., Whooley et al., 2002).

Finally, we use each of the nine measures to construct a continuous measure of the total number of barriers to employment/child support payment, with a minimum value of zero (faces no barriers) and a maximum value of nine (faces all barriers).

Other Covariates

We include in our regression models other measures that are related to employment and child support payments, including the father's marital status at the time of the survey (married, divorced, widowed or missing, separated or never married), number of partners (custodial parents of the father's biological children), number of nonresident children (children who stayed overnight with the father fewer than 16 days in the last month), number of resident children (children who stayed overnight with the father 16 or more days in the last month), and marital status at children's births (all marital, all non-marital, both marital and non-marital). We also account for the father's demographic characteristics including race and ethnicity (Hispanic of any race; Non-Hispanic white; Non-Hispanic black; and multiple races, other, unknown, and missing), age (less than 21, 25 to 40 and over 40 years old), and education (less than a high school diploma or missing, HS diploma or GED, some college, four-year degree or more). Finally, in our models that include fathers in multiple states, we include indicator variables for each state.

Analytic Approach

We first document the extent to which noncustodial fathers reported experiencing each of the barriers to employment. We provide descriptive analysis of the levels of each barrier and the total number of barriers reported for Wisconsin fathers and fathers in the other CSPED states. We then present simple descriptive statistics on the levels of employment, earnings, child

support payments, and compliance for those with and without each barrier and by the number of barriers.

We then turn to multivariate regressions so that background factors can be controlled for, which allows us to estimate the relationship between barriers and the outcomes of interest after accounting for other observed differences. We conduct descriptive multivariate analyses of whether these barriers are related to labor market outcomes, including the likelihood of formal employment (probit), and the level of formal earnings (OLS regression). We then examine the relationship between these barriers and child support outcomes, including the likelihood of payment (probit), the amount paid (OLS regression), and compliance (OLS regression).

Our base model for child support payments is a straightforward examination of whether the level of payments is related to the barriers to employment. We conduct two sensitivity tests on the level of payments to understand this more deeply. First, because the amount paid is closely related to the amount due, we first examine whether barriers are associated with the level of payments once the amount due is controlled for. In our second test, we explore whether barriers are related to child support payments only because these barriers affect earnings, which then affect payments—or whether barriers could have an additional relationship with payments even after earnings are controlled for. (In the second sensitivity test we also account for amount owed, as in our first test.)[11]

[11]In another test (not shown) we control for whether the order is burdensome (greater than 50 percent of earnings), rather than the dollar amount of the order. Consistent with other work on burdens (Hodges, Meyer, and Cancian, 2019; Meyer, Ha, and Hu 2008; Takayesu 2011), we find that, those with a higher burden actually pay more in support but have lower compliance rates.

RESULTS

The Extent of Barriers

We begin by documenting the extent to which noncustodial fathers in Wisconsin and in the other CSPED states who were in the group that received regular child support services reported experiencing barriers that made it hard to find or keep a job (see Figures 1a and 1b and Appendix Table 1). In Wisconsin (Figure 1a), three barriers were reported by a majority of fathers: having a criminal record (56 percent), transportation difficulties (58 percent), and not having the job skills that employers were looking for (57 percent). Housing instability (not having a steady place to live) and caregiving responsibilities for a family member were also common (reported by about four out of ten fathers). Problems with alcohol or drugs, issues with anger, physical health limitations, and depression were reported with less frequency, but still at relatively high rates: 15 percent, 20 percent, 30 percent, and 24 percent respectively. The rates were similar, though usually slightly lower, for the other CSPED states (Figure 1b). Only housing instability was reported at a higher rate in the others states than in Wisconsin (43 percent compared to 39 percent).

Figure 1a. Barriers to Employment for Wisconsin Fathers



Figure 1b. Barriers to Employment for Fathers in Other States



We also examined the total number of barriers faced by these fathers (Appendix Table 1). Having at least one barrier was very common: only 6 percent of Wisconsin fathers and 7 percent of fathers in other states reported no barriers. Similarly, few fathers reported seven or more of the nine barriers (7 percent in Wisconsin and 6 percent in the other states). Most common was three barriers, but more than a quarter of fathers reported five or more.

For our main measures, we count *any* amount of difficulty finding or keeping a job because of a particular factor as constituting a barrier. When we examine the responses to the barrier questions in more detail, some important patterns emerge, as shown in Figure 2a and 2b and Appendix Table 1. In Wisconsin (Figure 2a), considering those who reported that a particular barrier made it *extremely* difficult to find or keep a job, the most common barrier is having a criminal record (22 percent), followed by 16 percent reporting transportation difficulties, and 10 percent reporting housing instability. Much smaller percentages of Wisconsin fathers reported that alcohol or substance use, problems controlling anger, and physical health limitations were "extreme" barriers; they more frequently report these barriers as making things "a little" or "somewhat" difficult. Again, these patterns were largely similar in the other CSPED states (Figure 2b).

Figure 2a. Barriers to Employment for Wisconsin Fathers



Figure 2b. Barriers to Employment for Fathers in Other States



Simple Relationships between Barriers and Labor Market and Child Support Outcomes

In this section, we examine our five outcomes for those with and without each barrier. These results, shown in Table 1, are simple means, and do not control for other characteristics. Most of the patterns in employment and earnings and in payments are consistent with expectations: those who experienced a barrier had lower rates of employment, earnings, payments, and compliance than those who did not (some exceptions to these patterns are noted below). That said, many of the barriers do not show large or statistically significant differences in the dichotomous measures of any employment or any payment. For example, in Wisconsin, 77 percent of those with major depression were employed, compared to 83 percent who were not depressed, a difference that is not statistically significant; the difference in the likelihood of payments among those who were depressed and those who were not is very small, about 0.5 percentage points, and is not statistically significant.

The continuous measures of average earnings and average payments generally show larger differences than the dichotomous outcomes. In Wisconsin, the differences in average earnings and average payments for two types of barriers—criminal records and transportation difficulties—are particularly large and statistically significant ($p<.05$). Those who reported that having a criminal record was not a barrier earned 76 percent more and paid 69 percent more than those who reported it was a barrier; these differences are $425/month for earnings and $61/month for payments. Those who reported that transportation was not a barrier earned 60 percent more and paid 55 percent more than those who reported it was a barrier, with differences of $357/month and $52/month. The difference in compliance is also large and statistically significant for those who do and do not report these two barriers (39 and 32 percent higher, respectively, for those who do not report the barrier compared to those who do).

Table 1. Bivariate Relationships between Individual Barriers and Labor Market and Child Support Outcomes

	Fathers in Wisconsin					Fathers in Other States				
	Any Employment	Average Earnings	Any CS Payments	Average CS Paid	Compliance	Any Employment	Average Earnings	Any CS Payments	Average CS Paid	Compliance
Problems with Alcohol or Drugs										
No[a]	80.9%	$765	88.3%	$118	39.4%	71.4%	$855	84.4%	$131	37.0%
Yes[b]	84.4%	$612	88.5%	$103	37.1%	65.7%**	$619**	78.7%**	$99**	30.6%**
Criminal Record										
No[a]	83.8%	$981	90.4%	$150	46.5%	73.0%	$999	86.7%	$155	40.2%
Yes[b]	79.6%	$556**	86.7%	$89**	33.4%**	68.3%**	$651**	80.5%**	$99**	32.1%**
Housing Instability										
No[a]	78.6%	$796	88.1%	$126	41.7%	71.1%	$897	85.8%	$139	39.7%
Yes[b]	85.8%**	$657	88.6%	$99**	35.0%**	69.9%	$722**	80.6%**	$110**	31.3%**
Issues with Anger										
No[a]	82.6%	$777	88.8%	$120	40.4%	71.3%	$847	83.7%	$130	36.6%
Yes[b]	76.8%	$596	86.4%	$96	33.8%**	66.6%**	$683**	82.8%	$106**	33.4%**
Caregiving Responsibilities										
No[a]	83.2%	$795	90.0%	$127	41.1%	72.3%	$895	84.7%	$137	37.8%
Yes[b]	78.9%	$663	85.9%	$99**	36.2%	67.9%**	$709**	81.8%**	$110**	33.4%**
Transportation Difficulties										
No[a]	82.8%	$949	92.0%	$146	45.4%	73.5%	$1,020	88.9%	$159	42.0%
Yes[b]	80.4%	$592**	85.7%**	$94**	34.5%**	68.2%**	$660**	79.2%**	$100**	31.2%**
Physical Health Limitations										
No[a]	83.2%	$768	88.7%	$118	39.2%	74.0%	$868	84.9%	$131	37.2%
Yes[b]	77.4%	$680	87.4%	$109	38.8%	62.1%**	$707**	80.3%**	$116**	33.3%**
Lack of Job Skills										
No[a]	84.2%	$894	89.1%	$138	41.3%	70.9%	$892	84.8%	$139	37.4%
Yes[b]	79.3%	$628**	87.7%	$99**	37.4%	70.3%	$764**	82.5%	$116**	35.0%**
Depression										
Not Depressed	82.7%	$777	88.4%	$120	40.6%	71.0%	$837	84.0%	$128	36.8%
Major Depression	77.2%	$626	87.9%	$102	34.1%**	69.0%	$763	82.0%	$120	33.4%**
Number of Barriers										
None	86.5%	$1,309	97.3%	$224	56.90%	76.5%	$1,196	92.7%	$176	45.3%
One	87.2%	994†	92.3%	139†	44.1%†	75.7%	$1,081	88.3%	$176	44.5%
Two	84.5%	883†	91.3%	148†	45.50%	73.9%	964†	85.9%†	144†	39.7%†
Three	74.6%	687†	83.9%†	97†	38.6%†	70.2%	776†	83.6%†	120†	34.9%†
Four	80.6%	643†	83.5%†	103†	33.2%†	68.3%†	716†	80%†	112†	33.9%†
Five	87.1%	574†	89.3%	82†	34.0%†	66.3%†	572†	80.2%†	88†	27.6%†
Six	78.3%	662†	93.5%	105†	38.7%†	68.7%	637†	80.3%†	90†	30.9%†
Seven or more	71.7%	312†	82.6%†	70†	27.0%†	59.7%†	506†	74.6%†	85†	28.1%†
N			624					3,143		

Sample: Noncustodial fathers in the regular-services group of the CSPED program.

[a]Made it not at all hard to find or keep a job

[b]Made it a little, somewhat, very, or extremely hard to find or keep a job

**T-test of difference in proportions/means statistically significant at p<.05

†T-test of difference in proportions/means from no barriers statistically significant at p< .05

Among the other barriers, the next most important was job skills: those who reported that their job skills were not a barrier reported 42 percent higher earnings, 40 percent higher payments, and 11 percent higher compliance than those who reported this as a barrier (all differences statistically significant at $p<.05$). In fact, all barriers show a similar pattern, though not as large and not always statistically significant. Overall, those who do not report the barrier have average earnings 13–30 percent higher and have average payments 8–28 percent higher than those who report the barrier.

However, a few unexpected results appear. We observe higher rates of employment among those who reported that housing instability was a barrier (86 percent) than among those for whom housing instability was not a barrier (79 percent, significant at $p<.05$); despite this difference in employment, the difference in earnings is not significant. While there are a few other barriers and outcomes in which those who reported the barrier have better outcomes than those who did not, these differences are not statistically significant.

The bottom panel focuses on the relationship between the number of barriers and outcomes. For fathers in Wisconsin, we generally see expected patterns, though the results are not often statistically significant for the dichotomous measures of any employment and paying any support. The patterns are stronger for earnings, payments, and compliance; those with no barriers earn more, pay more, and comply with their orders more than those with any number of barriers.[12] The relationship between the count of barriers and our outcomes is not monotonic: while in general outcomes are higher for those with fewer barriers, this is not always the case.

[12]Compliance is lower for those with two barriers than those with barriers at a significance level of .10.

The main patterns seen in Wisconsin are similar to those in the other states, though more differences are statistically significant in the other states, partly because the larger sample provides more precise estimates. The individual barriers generally show that those with a barrier are less likely to be employed, have lower earnings, are less likely to make payments, pay less, and comply less. Again, the differences in the measures of any employment and any payment are not generally large compared to the differences in average earnings and average payments. Similar to the Wisconsin results, the largest differences are between those who did and did not report that a criminal record was a barrier and those who did and did not report transportation difficulties. The results in the other states do not show the unexpected findings in Wisconsin for housing instability; all results are in the expected directions.

Finally, the count of barriers in other states also shows anticipated relationships: those with fewer barriers generally have higher employment rates, higher earnings, higher payment rates, higher payments, and higher compliance, though there are fewer statistically significant differences for any employment. Those with one barrier have the same level of earnings are those with no barriers, but any number of barriers more than one is associated with significantly less earnings than no barriers. For all three child support outcomes, one barrier is equivalent to no barriers, but any number of barriers greater than one is associated with a lower likelihood of payments, less payments, and lower compliance.

Multivariate Associations between Barriers and Labor Market and Child Support Outcomes

Next, we analyze whether these barriers are related to our outcomes after controlling for other factors that are likely to influence employment and child support. The results in Table 2 are divided into two panels. The coefficients (from OLS regressions) or marginal effects (from probit regressions) for the barriers in the first panel (individual barriers to employment) are from

models in which we estimate the relationship between each individual barrier and the outcome and do not include the other barriers. The coefficients or marginal effects for the barriers in the second panel (all barriers to employment) are from models in which we estimate the relationship with the outcome of all the barriers simultaneously. All models control for the noncustodial father's demographic and family characteristics.[13]

The first two columns show labor market outcomes for noncustodial fathers in Wisconsin. When barriers are considered individually (top panel), issues with anger and depression are associated with lower employment rates, and (unexpectedly) housing instability is associated with higher employment rates. Once we control for all barriers simultaneously (bottom panel), only housing instability is associated with the employment rate, and again in an unexpected direction, where those who report that housing instability is a barrier are *more* likely to be employed in the following year. The relationship between earnings and individual barriers (top panel) shows that those who report barriers of criminal records, issues with anger, transportation difficulties, lack of job skills and depression all have less earnings in the following year. When the barriers are considered simultaneously (bottom panel), only the criminal record and transportation barriers remain significant. The coefficients on both of these barriers are large; those who report criminal records are a barrier earned $292/month less in the next year, and those who report transportation is a barrier earned $223/month less in the next year, once background characteristics and other barriers are controlled for.

[13]Coefficients and marginal effects of the control variables are shown in Appendix Table 2 for the results in the bottom panel of Table 2. The relationships between control variables and the outcomes are generally as expected.

Table 2. Individual Barriers to Employment, Labor Market Outcomes and Child Support Outcomes

	Fathers in Wisconsin					Fathers in Other States				
	Any Employment Marginal Eff (std. error)	Average Earnings Coefficient (std. error)	Any CS Payments Marginal Eff (std. error)	Average CS Paid Coefficient (std. error)	Compliance Coefficient (std. error)	Any Employment Marginal Eff (std. error)	Average Earnings Coefficient (std. error)	Any CS Payments Marginal Eff (std. error)	Average CS Paid Coefficient (std. error)	Compliance Coefficient (std. error)
Individual Barriers to Employment										
Problems with Alcohol or Drugs	0.03	-157.20	0.01	-19.49	-2.21	-0.03	-209.58***	-0.04**	-30.69***	-6.26***
	(0.045)	(105.012)	-0.036	(13.658)	(3.441)	(0.023)	(54.285)	(0.020)	(7.223)	(1.549)
Criminal Record	-0.03	-365.55***	-0.03	-51.81***	-10.16***	-0.04***	-299.39***	-0.05***	-50.18***	-7.13***
	(0.033)	(77.200)	-0.027	(10.003)	(2.539)	(0.017)	(38.543)	(0.013)	(5.102)	(1.103)
Housing Instability	0.08**	-71.59	0.01	-19.41*	-4.15	-0.02	-166.48***	-0.04***	-29.63***	-7.46***
	(0.033)	(77.691)	(0.027)	(10.079)	(2.538)	(0.016)	(38.520)	(0.013)	(5.116)	(1.094)
Issues with Anger	-0.07*	-221.36**	-0.02	-36.35***	-7.83**	-0.03	-107.76**	-0.01	-18.88***	-2.99**
	(0.037)	(92.915)	(0.032)	(12.048)	(3.037)	(0.023)	(52.564)	(0.018)	(6.994)	(1.500)
Caregiving Responsibilities	-0.04	-99.03	-0.04	-20.42**	-1.57	-0.05***	-180.46***	-0.03**	-24.33***	-4.17***
	(0.032)	(78.046)	(0.026)	(10.128)	(2.556)	(0.017)	(38.516)	(0.013)	(5.127)	(1.100)
Transportation Difficulties	-0.03	-289.67***	-0.06**	-39.64***	-7.89***	-0.05***	-300.86***	-0.08***	-46.83***	-8.94***
	(0.032)	(76.334)	-0.027	(9.913)	(2.507)	(0.016)	(37.869)	(0.013)	(5.022)	(1.080)
Physical Health Limitations	-0.05	-111.04	-0.01	-17.13	-1.78	-0.09***	-176.02***	-0.04***	-21.67***	-5.02***
	(0.033)	(82.437)	-0.028	(10.713)	(2.700)	(0.019)	(42.060)	(0.015)	(5.601)	(1.200)
Lack of Job Skills	-0.05	-226.02***	-0.01	-32.49***	-2.25	0.00	-94.20**	-0.01	-16.19***	-1.77
	(0.032)	(75.196)	(0.026)	(9.762)	(2.477)	(0.016)	(37.885)	(0.013)	(5.040)	(1.082)
Depression	-0.06*	-147.52*	-0.02	-19.53*	-6.88**	-0.02	-70.93	-0.03*	-11.63*	-3.61***
	(0.035)	(87.117)	(0.030)	(11.327)	(2.843)	(0.020)	(46.046)	(0.016)	(6.128)	(1.313)
All Barriers to Employment										
Alcohol	0.04	-46.34	0.01	-1.28	0.83	-0.00	-93.47*	-0.02	-11.37	-2.57
	(0.046)	(106.362)	(0.037)	(13.738)	(3.508)	(0.024)	(55.962)	(0.019)	(7.389)	(1.598)
Depression	-0.04	-34.13	-0.01	-0.56	-3.96	0.01	25.10	-0.01	2.71	-0.71
	(0.038)	(92.715)	(0.033)	(11.975)	(3.058)	(0.020)	(47.786)	(0.017)	(6.310)	(1.364)
Criminal record	-0.02	-292.24***	-0.02	-41.14***	-8.79***	-0.04**	-252.38***	-0.04***	-42.58***	-5.63***
	(0.034)	(79.936)	(0.028)	(10.325)	(2.636)	(0.017)	(39.126)	(0.013)	(5.166)	(1.117)
Housing Situation	0.11***	76.82	0.03	0.11	-0.73	0.01	-20.02	-0.01	-8.07	-3.85***
	(0.035)	(82.030)	(0.028)	(10.595)	(2.705)	(0.018)	(41.853)	(0.014)	(5.526)	(1.195)
Anger	-0.04	-116.24	-0.01	-22.31*	-5.12	0.00	10.26	0.02	-1.66	0.64
	(0.040)	(97.768)	(0.034)	(12.628)	(3.224)	(0.023)	(54.332)	(0.018)	(7.174)	(1.551)
Caring for Family Member	-0.04	-39.54	-0.04	-10.91	-0.08	-0.04**	-95.32**	-0.01	-10.44**	-1.40
	(0.032)	(78.118)	(0.026)	(10.090)	(2.576)	(0.017)	(39.968)	(0.014)	(5.277)	(1.141)

(table continues)

Table 2, continued

	Fathers in Wisconsin					Fathers in Other States				
	Any Employment Marginal Eff (std. error)	Average Earnings Coefficient (std. error)	Any CS Payments Marginal Eff (std. error)	Average CS Paid Coefficient (std. error)	Compliance Coefficient (std. error)	Any Employment Marginal Eff (std. error)	Average Earnings Coefficient (std. error)	Any CS Payments Marginal Eff (std. error)	Average CS Paid Coefficient (std. error)	Compliance Coefficient (std. error)
Transportation	-0.04	-221.95***	-0.06*	-26.48**	-5.63**	-0.03*	-225.13***	-0.06***	-34.21***	-6.31***
	(0.034)	(81.217)	(0.029)	(10.490)	(2.678)	(0.018)	(40.850)	(0.014)	(5.394)	(1.166)
Physical Health	-0.04	-39.22	-0.01	-6.28	0.65	-0.09***	-116.80***	-0.03*	-11.72**	-3.01**
	(0.035)	(84.754)	(0.029)	(10.947)	(2.795)	(0.020)	(43.986)	(0.015)	(5.808)	(1.256)
Job Skills	-0.03	-102.17	0.01	-13.91	1.56	0.03*	22.30	0.02	1.53	1.71
	(0.033)	(78.694)	(0.027)	(10.164)	(2.595)	(0.017)	(39.089)	(0.014)	(5.161)	(1.116)
N	624	624	624	624	624	3,143	3,143	3,143	3,143	3,143
R-squared[a]	0.08	0.14	0.10	0.23	0.14	0.05	0.09	0.09	0.18	0.11
Log Likelihood	-275.44		-203.80			-1808.40		-1276.49		
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sq	48.44**		42.77			192.27***		257.1***		
F-test of joint significant of barriers	18.71**	4.29***	7.95	5.24***	3.18***	43.99***	14.48***	52.95***	20.37***	14.25***

Sample: Noncustodial fathers in the regular-services group of the CSPED program.
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
[a] Pseudo R-squared reported for probit models.

The next three columns show child support outcomes in Wisconsin. Only the barrier of transportation is related to the likelihood of payments in the next year; no other barrier is statistically significant either when considered individually or together. Looking at the barriers individually (top panel), seven of the nine barriers are associated with a lower level of payments in the next year. When all barriers are considered together, however, only the barriers of a criminal record, problems with anger, and transportation difficulties are associated with lower payments. The coefficient on criminal record is particularly large: those who report this as a barrier pay $41/month less in child support, all else equal. Finally, the results for compliance are similar to the results for payments except fewer barriers are statistically significant. When all barriers are considered simultaneously (bottom panel), those who reported criminal records were a barrier have compliance rates 9 percentage points lower than those who did not report this barrier, and those with transportation barriers have compliance rates that are 6 percentage points lower than those who did not report this barrier, all else equal.

The relationships between the barriers and the later labor market and child support outcomes are similar in the other states, but tend to be stronger than in Wisconsin.[14] Considering the relationship between individual barriers and labor market outcomes in the next year (top panel), four barriers (criminal record, caregiving responsibilities, transportation difficulties, and physical health limitations) are associated with a lower likelihood of employment, and eight (all except depression) with lower average earnings. When all barriers are considered simultaneously (bottom panel), the same four barriers are associated with lower employment rates. Surprisingly,

[14]Some of this could be due to differences in power (sample size); however, in general when coefficients are statistically significant in the other CSPED states but not in Wisconsin, the magnitude is larger for CSPED states in addition to the standard error being smaller.

a lack of job skills is associated with a higher employment rate a year later, all else equal. Five barriers are associated with lower earnings: problems with alcohol, criminal records, caregiving responsibilities, transportation difficulties, and physical health limitations. Similar to the Wisconsin results, the largest coefficients are for criminal records and transportation difficulties: these barriers are associated with lower earnings of more than $200/month.

Examining the child support outcomes in the other states, when the barriers are considered individually (the top panel), all or nearly all of the barriers are associated with a lower likelihood of payment, lower average amounts of payment, and lower compliance. When the barriers are considered simultaneously (bottom panel), fewer barriers are individually statistically significant.[15] However, those who reported that having a criminal record was a barrier, those who reported that transportation was a barrier, and those who reported that physical health limitations were a barrier, are all less likely to pay, pay less, and comply less. The criminal record and transportation findings are consistent with the Wisconsin results; the finding for physical health limitations was not seen in Wisconsin. In addition, housing instability and caregiving are significantly associated with worse results for one of the three child support outcomes.

Because some fathers have multiple barriers, we prefer the model that incorporates all variables simultaneously (the bottom panel). When we consider the barriers simultaneously, some barriers show a more consistent pattern of relationships than others. In Wisconsin, those who reported that having a criminal record was a barrier have lower earnings, lower child support payments, and lower compliance; those with this barrier have worse outcomes on all

[15]Note, however, that even if the barriers are not individually statistically significant, the barriers as a whole are jointly significant, as shown in the bottom row of the table.

measures in the other states. Similarly, in Wisconsin those who reported that transportation was a barrier have lower earnings, are less likely to pay, have lower payments, and comply less; those with this barrier do consistently worse than those without it in the other states. None of the other barriers examined (alcohol, housing instability, anger, caregiving, physical health, job skills, or depression) show a pattern of worse outcomes in Wisconsin; in the other states, caregiving responsibilities and physical health limitations are consistently linked to worse outcomes, but not the other barriers. All of these results are from comparisons examining individual barriers (but considering different types of barriers simultaneously). An alternate perspective is that it is not so much an individual identifiable barrier that is related to outcomes, but the number of barriers.

Results from models where we consider the total number of barriers, either as a continuous measure or as a discrete measure, are presented in Table 3. All models control for the father's demographic and family characteristics. The top row shows the relationship between the continuous count of barriers and the outcomes. This assumes that the relationship between the number of barriers and the outcomes is linear. In Wisconsin, each additional barrier is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of employment by 1 percentage point, a decline in average monthly earnings of about $100, a decline in average monthly child support payments of $15, and a decline in rates of compliance of 2.5 percentage points. The results in the other CSPED states are similar, although in these states the number of barriers is also significantly associated with a decline in the likelihood of payments (by 2 percentage points).

Table 3. Count of Barriers to Employment, Labor Market Outcomes and Child Support Outcomes

	Fathers in Wisconsin					Fathers in Other States				
	Any Employment Marginal Eff (std. error)	Average Earnings Coefficient (std. error)	Any CS Payments Marginal Eff (std. error)	Average CS Paid Coefficient (std. error)	Compliance Coefficient (std. error)	Any Employment Marginal Eff (std. error)	Average Earnings Coefficient (std. error)	Any CS Payments Marginal Eff (std. error)	Average CS Paid Coefficient (std. error)	Compliance Coefficient (std. error)
Number of Barriers (Continuous)	-0.01*	-95.71***	-0.01	-14.48***	-2.47***	-0.02***	-89.78***	-0.02***	-13.98***	-2.61***
	(0.008)	(19.554)	(0.007)	(2.525)	(0.645)	(0.004)	(9.773)	(0.003)	(1.294)	(0.279)
N	624	624	624	624	624	3,143	3,143	3,143	3,143	3,143
R-squared[a]	0.05	0.12	0.08	0.21	0.12	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.16	0.10
Log Likelihood	-283.73		-206.71			-1821.87		-1288.97		
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sq	31.85		36.95*			165.3***		232.2***		
Number of Barriers (Categorical)										
Compared to one barrier:										
None	-0.02	247.08	0.12	62.03***	9.41	0.01	94.06	0.04*	-2.84	0.64
	(0.085)	(184.262)	(0.095)	(23.644)	(6.064)	(0.035)	(84.416)	(0.024)	(11.175)	(2.408)
Two	-0.04	-112.43	0.00	2.26	2.34	-0.01	-90.92	-0.02	-24.43***	-4.13**
	(0.061)	(137.247)	(0.051)	(17.611)	(4.517)	(0.028)	(66.303)	(0.021)	(8.777)	(1.891)
Three	-0.12**	-258.00*	-0.08	-38.30**	-3.38	-0.04	-266.70***	-0.04*	-49.05***	-8.21***
	(0.057)	(133.081)	(0.046)	(17.076)	(4.380)	(0.028)	(65.178)	(0.022)	(8.628)	(1.859)
Four	-0.07	-307.01**	-0.08*	-38.95**	-8.66*	-0.06*	-314.41***	-0.06***	-54.99***	-9.18***
	(0.060)	(137.602)	(0.048)	(17.656)	(4.529)	(0.029)	(68.951)	(0.024)	(9.127)	(1.966)
Five	0.01	-342.10**	-0.01	-54.96***	-6.46	-0.08***	-439.79***	-0.06**	-76.55***	-14.60***
	(0.064)	(141.649)	(0.051)	(18.176)	(4.662)	(0.032)	(73.893)	(0.025)	(9.782)	(2.107)
Six	-0.11	-288.31*	0.03	-29.55	-3.13	-0.05	-385.28***	-0.07**	-76.10***	-12.68***
	(0.072)	(170.981)	(0.067)	(21.940)	(5.627)	(0.035)	(82.809)	(0.029)	(10.962)	(2.362)
Seven or more	-0.16**	-665.72***	-0.09	-75.99***	-14.57**	-0.13***	-514.58***	-0.12***	-82.76***	-15.38***
	(0.069)	(171.895)	(0.057)	(22.057)	(5.657)	(0.040)	(89.045)	(0.033)	(11.787)	(2.540)
N	624	624	624	624	624	3,143	3,143	3,143	3,143	3,143
R-squared[a]	0.07	0.12	0.11	0.23	0.13	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.17	0.10
Log Likelihood	-278.65		-200.3			-1820.41		-1286.99		
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sq	42.01*		49.77**			168.3***		236.1***		

Sample: Noncustodial fathers in the regular-services group of the CSPED program.
All models control for age, race, education, marital status at enrollment, marital status at children's births, number of partner, number of nonresident children, number of coresident children, no minor children, unknown marital status at children's births, and unknown residency status of children. CSPED models control for grantee (state).
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
[a]Pseudo R-squared reported for probit models.

The bottom panel of the table also examines the relationship between the count of barriers and our outcomes, but it does not assume a linear relationship. In Wisconsin, those with no barriers pay $62/month more in support than those with one barrier, but there is not a detectable difference between no barriers and one barrier for the other outcomes. In general, those with more barriers have lower earnings and pay less than those with one barrier; there is also some evidence (though not as consistent) for a lower likelihood of employment and payment, and lower compliance. For example, relative to those with one barrier those with three barriers are 12 percentage points less likely to be employed, earn about $250/month less, and pay $38/month less. Those with seven or more barriers have consistently worse outcomes than those with only one barrier: they are 16 percentage points less likely to be employed, earn more than $650/month less, pay about $75/month less, and have compliance rates that are 15 percentage points lower. The results in the other states are consistent in that those with no barriers are generally similar to those with one barrier and those with more than one barrier generally have worse outcomes for each additional barrier. Similar to the Wisconsin results, those with many barriers (seven or more) have outcomes that are significantly worse than those with only one barrier, and the differences are large.

Eight of our nine measures (all except depression) are explicitly barriers to labor market outcomes; that is, they reflect difficulty finding or keeping a job. As a result, our analyses examine the straightforward question of whether barriers to employment are related to labor market outcomes. While we find some relationships between barriers and employment, there is a stronger relationship between barriers and earnings, especially barriers related to criminal records and transportation. But our inquiry in this paper extends beyond the relationship between employment barriers and labor market outcomes; we are also interested in whether these

employment barriers affect child support outcomes. As described above, to explore the relationship between employment barriers and child support further, we take two additional steps. We first reexamine the relationship between employment barriers and child support payments after controlling for the amount owed. We then examine whether barriers are related to child support payments only because barriers affect earnings (which then affect payments), or whether barriers have an additional relationship with payments once earnings are controlled for.

We explore these questions in Table 4. In the first panel we show results for models with all barriers examined simultaneously; in the remaining two panels we examine the count of barriers, assuming a linear (continuous) relationship in the second panel and not assuming this (categorical) in the third panel. All models examine average child support payments; and all models include control variables (but these are not shown). First, examining the results with individual barriers in the top panel, the first column (base) repeats the results from the second panel of Table 2 for Wisconsin. those with barriers that include a criminal record, issues with anger, or transportation difficulties have lower payments. In the next column, we include the amount owed. The coefficients on barriers decline in magnitude, and the anger barrier is no longer statistically significantly related to payments. In the next column, we also control for the level of earnings. Again, the coefficients decline, and none of the barriers are statistically related to payments. Thus, these results suggest for Wisconsin that that criminal records and transportation difficulties are associated with lower earnings, but once these lower earnings are controlled for, they are no longer significantly associated with lower payments.

Table 4. Barriers to Employment and Child Support Payments: Additional Results

	Fathers in Wisconsin			Fathers in Other States		
	Average CS Paid Base Coefficient (std. error)	Average CS Paid Base with Amount Owed Coefficient (std. error)	Average CS Paid Base with Amount Owed and Earnings Coefficient (std. error)	Average CS Paid Base Coefficient (std. error)	Average CS Paid Base with Amount Owed Coefficient (std. error)	Average CS Paid Base with Amount Owed and Earnings Coefficient (std. error)
All Barriers to Employment						
Problems with Alcohol or Drugs	-1.28	-1.10	-0.11	-11.37	-5.18	1.81
	(13.738)	(11.410)	(9.213)	(7.389)	(6.214)	(5.209)
Criminal Record	-41.14***	-27.41***	-7.19	-42.58***	-21.16***	-9.00**
	(10.325)	(8.616)	(7.029)	(5.166)	(4.383)	(3.688)
Housing Instability	0.11	-2.74	-10.27	-8.07	-11.12**	-9.50**
	(10.595)	(8.802)	(7.140)	(5.526)	(4.646)	(3.892)
Issues with Anger	-22.31*	-16.91	-6.95	-1.66	0.61	0.99
	(12.628)	(10.493)	(8.465)	(7.174)	(6.031)	(5.052)
Caregiving Responsibilities	-10.91	-6.43	0.74	-10.44**	-11.41**	-5.53
	(10.090)	(8.385)	(6.769)	(5.277)	(4.436)	(3.720)
Transportation Difficulties	-26.48**	-17.57**	-5.04	-34.21***	-27.70***	-14.88***
	(10.490)	(8.730)	(7.058)	(5.394)	(4.538)	(3.818)
Physical Health Limitations	-6.28	-3.23	0.45	-11.72**	-6.10	-0.04
	(10.947)	(9.094)	(7.324)	(5.808)	(4.885)	(4.108)
Lack of Job Skills	-13.91	-5.04	-4.41	1.53	10.90**	7.65**
	(10.164)	(8.460)	(6.845)	(5.161)	(4.346)	(3.644)
Depression	-0.56	-2.37	2.41	2.71	-4.64	-6.35
	(11.975)	(9.947)	(8.025)	(6.310)	(5.308)	(4.447)
Amount Owed		0.40***	0.34***		0.32***	0.28***
		(0.024)	(0.020)		(0.009)	(0.008)
Monthly Earnings ($0)						
$1–$273			-6.21			3.50
			(9.792)			(5.379)
$274–$773			35.32***			30.21***
			(10.086)			(5.287)
$774–$1,561			102.07***			85.92***
			(10.469)			(5.209)
$1562 +			159.20***			171.73***
			(11.357)			(5.183)
N	624	624	624	3,143	3,143	3,143
R-squared	0.23	0.47	0.66	0.18	0.42	0.59
F-test of joint significant of barriers	5.24***	3.24***	0.848	20.37***	13.78***	5.60***

(table continues)

Table 4, continued

	Fathers in Wisconsin			Fathers in Other States		
	Average CS Paid Base Coefficient (std. error)	Average CS Paid Base with Amount Owed Coefficient (std. error)	Average CS Paid Base with Amount Owed and Earnings Coefficient (std. error)	Average CS Paid Base Coefficient (std. error)	Average CS Paid Base with Amount Owed Coefficient (std. error)	Average CS Paid Base with Amount Owed and Earnings Coefficient (std. error)
Number of Barriers (Continuous)	-14.48***	-9.41***	-3.65**	-13.98***	-9.52***	-4.66***
	(2.525)	(2.111)	(1.719)	(1.294)	(1.092)	(0.921)
Amount Owed		0.40***	0.34***		0.32***	0.28***
		(0.024)	(0.020)		(0.009)	(0.007)
Monthly Earnings ($0)						
$1–$273			-7.85			2.66
			(9.654)			(5.377)
$274–$773			34.04***			30.50***
			(9.952)			(5.289)
$774–$1,561			101.01***			86.54***
			(10.290)			(5.203)
$1562 +			158.75***			173.17***
			(11.166)			(5.171)
N	624	624	624	3,143	3,143	3,143
R-squared	0.21	0.46	0.66	0.16	0.41	0.59
Number of Barriers (Categorical)						
None	62.03***	39.81**	-28.86*	-2.84	1.76	7.82
	(23.644)	(19.623)	(15.809)	(11.175)	(9.366)	(7.829)
Two	2.26	5.12	-16.35	-24.43***	-15.49**	-4.98
	(17.611)	(14.583)	(15.085)	(8.777)	(7.360)	(7.479)
Three	-38.30**	-22.73	-38.02**	-49.05***	-36.64***	-14.43*
	(17.076)	(14.171)	(15.028)	(8.628)	(7.239)	(7.437)
Four	-38.95**	-29.38**	-39.77***	-54.99***	-39.28***	-15.40**
	(17.656)	(14.631)	(15.358)	(9.127)	(7.662)	(7.729)
Five	-54.96***	-26.52*	-36.59**	-76.55***	-53.62***	-23.05***
	(18.176)	(15.148)	(15.746)	(9.782)	(8.222)	(8.155)
Six	-29.55	-8.51	-16.98	-76.10***	-47.62***	-24.02***
	(21.940)	(18.210)	(17.509)	(10.962)	(9.220)	(8.862)
Seven or more	-75.99***	-60.90***	-47.92***	-82.76***	-53.96***	-18.70**
	(22.057)	(18.286)	(17.867)	(11.787)	(9.910)	(9.394)
Amount Owed		0.40***	0.34***			0.28***
		(0.024)	(0.020)			(0.007)

(table continues)

Table 4, continued

	Fathers in Wisconsin			Fathers in Other States		
	Average CS Paid Base Coefficient (std. error)	Average CS Paid Base with Amount Owed Coefficient (std. error)	Average CS Paid Base with Amount Owed and Earnings Coefficient (std. error)	Average CS Paid Base Coefficient (std. error)	Average CS Paid Base with Amount Owed Coefficient (std. error)	Average CS Paid Base with Amount Owed and Earnings Coefficient (std. error)
Monthly Earnings ($0)						
$1–$273			-7.64			2.77
			(9.664)			(5.380)
$274–$773			34.52***			30.55***
			(10.026)			(5.289)
$774–$1,561			98.26***			86.74***
			(10.364)			(5.205)
$1562 +			159.03***			172.91***
			(11.168)			(5.176)
N	624	624	624	3,143	3,143	3,143
R-squared	0.23	0.47	0.66	0.17	0.41	0.59

Sample: Noncustodial fathers in the regular-services group of the CSPED program.
All models control for age, race, education, marital status at enrollment, marital status at children's births, number of partner, number of nonresident children, number of coresident children, no minor children, unknown marital status at children's births, and unknown residency status of children. Models that include multiple states include indicator variables for states.
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

In the panels examining the count of barriers in Wisconsin the first column (base) repeats the Table 3 results. In the second panel (continuous), when we control for orders, each barrier is associated with a decline in payments, but instead of $14/month as in the base results, the decline is $9/month. When we control for the lower earnings associated with the number of barriers, barriers are still significantly related to payments: each barrier is associated with a decline in payments of about $4/month. The bottom panel shows the count of barriers but does not assume a linear relationship. It shows similar results to the above panels: controlling for order amounts, and then controlling for earnings results in a decline in the magnitude of the coefficients, but in general the relationships that were significant in our base results remain significant.

Comparable results for the other states are shown in the final set of columns. As was shown in Table 2 and repeated here, payments are lower for those with barriers related to a criminal record, caregiving responsibilities, transportation difficulties, and physical health limitations. Once we control for the amount owed, all barriers remain statistically significant except physical health limitations, and now we see a relationship between housing instability and lower payments, and, surprisingly, between lack of job skills and *higher* payments. Finally, adding in earnings, we see that the barriers related to a criminal record, housing instability, and transportation difficulties remain statistically significant, suggesting that even though these barriers are associated with lower earnings, they are also associated with lower payments even when these lower earnings are controlled for. The positive coefficient on job skills also remaining significant once earnings are controlled for.

Examining the count of barriers, the middle panel shows very similar results in the other states to Wisconsin: each barrier is associated with a decline in payments of $14/month, controlling for the amount owed lowers the estimate, as does controlling for earnings, but even

controlling for the lower earnings of those with barriers, each barrier is associated with $5/month less in child support payments. Finally, in the bottom panel we consider the count of barriers but do not impose a linear relationship: we see results similar to those of Wisconsin. Those with more burdens generally pay less, and this holds even when orders are controlled for and when earnings are controlled for. Thus, barriers to employment are related not only to lower earnings, but also to lower child support outcomes.

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

Although nonpayment of child support is a significant problem, and there is some qualitative information on barriers to paying support, relatively little is known from recent quantitative analyses or with larger samples. Using unique data from a large sample of noncustodial fathers behind in their payments and having employment difficulties, we provide new evidence on the extent to which these fathers report a variety of barriers to employment (things that make it hard to find or keep a job). We contribute to the literature by examining whether these employment barriers are related to both labor market outcomes and child support payments and compliance. We examine these issues both in Wisconsin and in a group of other states that participated in the CSPED demonstration.

We find that many of these fathers experience barriers. The three most common barriers, reported by more than half of fathers, were a criminal record, transportation difficulties, and not having the right job skills. About 40 percent reported that housing instability and needing to care for a family member were barriers. Issues with anger, physical health problems, and depression were all reported by more than twenty percent of fathers, and fifteen percent said that alcohol or substance use was a barrier. Multiple barriers were common, with more than half having at least three of these barriers and more than one-quarter having five or more.

Not only are barriers common, they are consequential. Several of these barriers were found to be associated with worse labor market outcomes and less child support. In Wisconsin, those who reported that transportation difficulties or a criminal record were barriers had substantially lower earnings and child support payments. The other states showed similar results, but also showed lower labor market and child support outcomes for those who reported that caregiving responsibilities and physical health limitations were barriers. In the larger sample (fathers in other states), some barriers are not solely associated with lower child support outcomes through their relationship with earnings, but are directly associated with lower child support even when earnings are controlled for. These consequential barriers are transportation difficulties and criminal records. Moreover, in Wisconsin and in the other states, the number of barriers is related not only to earnings, but also to child support outcomes, even when earnings are controlled for.

This study has limitations. We examine barriers among a particular group of noncustodial parents: fathers who are behind in their payments and who are having employment difficulties, and who live in particular states and counties. Further research with broader samples would be useful. Another limitation is that we use self-reports of barriers, and some noncustodial fathers may under-report the extent to which they have problems with alcohol or drugs, for example. Other research indicates that staff working with these noncustodial parents believe there are higher rates of substance use than reported here (Vogel, 2019).[16]

[16]Even if there is under-reporting of some conditions, there is also a potentially important difference between having a condition and having it affect one's ability to get or keep a job. For example, in the full sample of CSPED participants, 68 percent of noncustodial parents reported that they had ever been convicted of a crime, but only 52 percent said that having a criminal record made it "a little", "somewhat", "very", or "extremely" difficult to find or keep a job. Thus, there are noncustodial parents willing to admit to a criminal record who said that that criminal record made it "not at all" difficult to find or keep a job.

Still, these results point to some potential directions for child support programs, and highlight the potential advantages of a more comprehensive approach to improving child support performance. First, it may be productive for child support programs to work closely with transportation services, since this research shows that transportation difficulties are quite common and are related not only to labor market outcomes but also to later child support outcomes (and in the states outside Wisconsin, related to child support even beyond their relationship to earnings). As a result, assessing whether transportation was part of the problem when a noncustodial parent became behind in their payments, and then taking steps to address it may affect not only employment but also child support payment. In fact, transportation issues are so important that child support agencies may need an explicit strategy for addressing them, and policymakers more broadly may need to think about a variety of interventions (e.g. bus passes, van pools, gas cards as incentives, etc.) to bring disadvantaged individuals to where the jobs are. In the longer term, the prevalence of the spatial mismatch between where jobs are and where people live has implications for housing and zoning policy as well.

This research also finds associations between those reporting that criminal records are a barrier and their later labor market and child support outcomes. This highlights the potential advantages for child support performance of referrals to expungement services, or even co-locating an agency that does expungement within the child support offices. Policies that routinely stop orders during incarceration and/or interventions designed to promote later employment and child support payments among those currently incarcerated, may also have potential. Finally, close relationships with community agencies that provide prisoner reentry services to support employment and the paying of support as soon as is reasonable post-incarceration may be beneficial. These kinds of interventions may have impacts not only on employment for

disadvantaged noncustodial parents, but also, eventually, directly on child support payments themselves.

Finally, while the findings on transportation difficulties and criminal records were the most consistent and strongest, we also found that the number of barriers is associated with both labor market and child support outcomes. This suggests the importance of child support programs considering the range of barriers noncustodial parents face, and highlights the potential advantages of keeping staffing at levels that provide workers with sufficient time to assess the variety of barriers that are common in this population. Child support performance may benefit from agencies partnering not only with organizations that focus on employment services (which might address the lack of job skills and physical health limitations), but also with community organizations that provide services in substance use, housing, mental health, and respite for caregivers. Attending to a number of barriers faced by those with difficulty making payments could improve employment, earnings, and even child support payments and compliance.

Appendix Table 1. Distribution of Barriers among Noncustodial Fathers

	Fathers in Wisconsin		Fathers in Other States	
	N	Percent	*N*	Percent
Problems with Alcohol or Drugs				
Is not a Barrier	(std. error)	84.6%	2,697	85.8%
Is a Barrier	96	15.4%	446	14.2%
A Little	53	8.5%	230	7.3%
Somewhat	25	4.0%	113	3.6%
Very	9	1.4%	57	1.8%
Extremely	9	1.4%	46	1.5%
Criminal Record				
Is Not a Barrier	272	43.6%	1,538	48.9%
Is a Barrier*	352	56.4%	1,605	51.1%
A Little	61	9.8%	315	10.0%
Somewhat	86	13.8%	403	12.8%
Very	69	11.1%	301	9.6%
Extremely	136	21.8%	586	18.6%
Housing Instability				
Is not a Barrier	378	60.6%	1,790	57.0%
Is a Barrier	246	39.4%	1,353	43.0%
A Little	59	9.5%	326	10.4%
Somewhat	64	10.3%	416	13.2%
Very	60	9.6%	256	8.1%
Extremely	63	10.1%	355	11.3%
Issues with Anger				
Is Not a Barrier	499	80.0%	2,661	84.7%
Is a Barrier*,+	125	20.0%	482	15.3%
A Little	72	11.5%	254	8.1%
Somewhat	36	5.8%	148	4.7%
Very	10	1.6%	48	1.5%
Extremely	7	1.1%	32	1.0%
Caregiving Responsibilities				
Is Not a Barrier	368	59.0%	1,902	60.5%
Is a Barrier	256	41.0%	1,241	39.5%
A Little	85	13.6%	413	13.1%
Somewhat	93	14.9%	418	13.3%
Very	49	7.9%	222	7.1%
Extremely	29	4.6%	188	6.0%
Transportation Difficulties				
Is Not a Barrier	261	41.8%	1,409	44.8%
Is a Barrier	363	58.2%	1,734	55.2%
A Little	88	14.1%	375	11.9%
Somewhat	105	16.8%	455	14.5%
Very	73	11.7%	377	12.0%
Extremely	97	15.5%	527	16.8%

(table continues)

Appendix Table 1, continued

	Fathers in Wisconsin		Fathers in Other States	
	N	Percent	*N*	Percent
Physical Health Limitations				
Is Not a Barrier	434	69.6%	2,233	71.0%
Is a Barrier	190	30.4%	910	29.0%
A Little	73	11.7%	330	10.5%
Somewhat	62	9.9%	299	9.5%
Very	34	5.4%	156	5.0%
Extremely	21	3.4%	125	4.0%
Lack of Job Skills				
Is Not a Barrier	266	42.6%	1,413	45.0%
Is a Barrier	358	57.4%	1,730	55.0%
A Little	122	19.6%	646	20.6%
Somewhat	136	21.8%	657	20.9%
Very	65	10.4%	238	7.6%
Extremely	35	5.6%	189	6.0%
Depression				
Not Depressed	475	76.1%	2,475	78.7%
Depressed	149	23.9%	668	21.3%
Total Number of Barriers				
None	37	5.9%	234	7.4%
One	78	12.5%	428	13.6%
Two	103	16.5%	568	18.1%
Three	118	18.9%	615	19.6%
Four	103	16.5%	480	15.3%
Five	93	14.9%	368	11.7%
Six	46	7.4%	249	7.9%
Seven or More	46	7.4%	201	6.4%
N	624		3,143	

Sample: Noncustodial fathers in the regular-services group of the CSPED program.
*T-test of difference in the proportion of Wisconsin fathers vs. fathers in other states reporting barrier statistically significant at $p<.05$
$^{+}\chi^2$ test of difference in the distribution of a barrier for Wisconsin fathers vs. fathers in other states statistically significant at $p<.05$

Appendix Table 2. Barriers to Employment and Child Support Payments, Full Results for Labor Market Outcomes and Child Support Outcomes

	Fathers in Wisconsin				
	Any Employment Marginal Eff (std. error)	Average Earnings Coefficient (std. error)	Any CS Payments Marginal Eff (std. error)	Average CS Paid Coefficient (std. error)	Compliance Coefficient (std. error)
All Barriers to Employment					
Problems with Alcohol or Drugs	0.04	-46.34	0.01	-1.28	0.83
	(0.046)	(106.362)	(0.037)	(13.738)	(3.508)
Criminal Record	-0.02	-292.24***	-0.02	-41.14***	-8.79***
	(0.034)	(79.936)	(0.028)	(10.325)	(2.636)
Housing Instability	0.11***	76.82	0.03	0.11	-0.73
	(0.035)	(82.030)	(0.028)	(10.595)	(2.705)
Issues with Anger	-0.04	-116.24	-0.01	-22.31*	-5.12
	(0.040)	(97.768)	(0.034)	(12.628)	(3.224)
Caregiving Responsibilities	-0.04	-39.54	-0.04	-10.91	-0.08
	(0.032)	(78.118)	(0.026)	(10.090)	(2.576)
Transportation Difficulties	-0.04	-221.95***	-0.06*	-26.48**	-5.63**
	(0.034)	(81.217)	(0.029)	(10.490)	(2.678)
Physical Health Limitations	-0.04	-39.22	-0.01	-6.28	0.65
	(0.035)	(84.754)	(0.029)	(10.947)	(2.795)
Lack of Job Skills	-0.03	-102.17	0.01	-13.91	1.56
	(0.033)	(78.694)	(0.027)	(10.164)	(2.595)
Depression	-0.04	-34.13	-0.01	-0.56	-3.96
	(0.038)	(92.715)	(0.033)	(11.975)	(3.058)
Covariates					
Age (Less than 25 years old)					
25 to 40 years old	-0.18***	70.52	-0.02	24.31	3.86
	(0.058)	(117.265)	(0.041)	(15.146)	(3.867)
More than 40 years old	-0.22***	48.62	-0.14***	41.70**	8.90*
	(0.067)	(144.504)	(0.049)	(18.664)	(4.766)
Race and Ethnicity (Hispanic)					
Non-Hispanic White	0.03	-28.26	0.06*	12.60	-1.35
	(0.048)	(112.826)	(0.038)	(14.573)	(3.721)
Non-Hispanic Black	-0.02	-248.63**	0.02	-42.77***	-12.06***
	(0.049)	(117.249)	(0.038)	(15.144)	(3.867)
Multiple Races/Other Race/Missing	0.08	-30.19	0.04	16.66	-6.96
	(0.076)	(170.046)	(0.057)	(21.963)	(5.608)
Education (Less than high school diploma/missing)					
High School Diploma/GED	0.02	121.43	-0.02	20.40*	4.34
	(0.037)	(89.462)	(0.030)	(11.555)	(2.950)
Some College[a]	0.02	256.43**	0.03	33.07**	8.55**
	(0.044)	(104.538)	(0.038)	(13.502)	(3.448)
Four Year Degree or More	-0.04	251.08	-	103.39***	19.02*
	(0.126)	(308.341)		(39.826)	(10.169)
Marital Status at Enrollment (Married)					
Divorced/Separated	-0.03	115.48	0.03	20.58	-1.00
	(0.066)	(153.985)	(0.056)	(19.889)	(5.078)
Never Married	-0.10	-3.25	-0.03	1.89	0.61
	(0.066)	(154.839)	(0.055)	(19.999)	(5.107)
Widowed/Missing	-0.04	872.31*	-0.05	55.76	3.67
	(0.189)	(478.979)	(0.138)	(61.865)	(15.796)

(table continues)

Appendix Table 2, continued

	Fathers in Wisconsin				
	Any Employment Marginal Eff (std. error)	Average Earnings Coefficient (std. error)	Any CS Payments Marginal Eff (std. error)	Average CS Paid Coefficient (std. error)	Compliance Coefficient (std. error)
Marital Status at Children's Births (All non-marital)					
All Marital	0.02	161.51	0.06	23.74	3.76
	(0.073)	(167.521)	(0.065)	(21.637)	(5.525)
Both Non-Marital and Marital	-0.04	45.77	-0.02	-3.61	4.60
	(0.066)	(154.678)	(0.056)	(19.978)	(5.101)
Number of Partners (One)					
Two	0.02	-1.06	0.02	-1.04	0.11
	(0.043)	(105.338)	(0.035)	(13.606)	(3.474)
Three	0.05	134.18	0.11**	13.19	3.19
	(0.063)	(152.781)	(0.055)	(19.733)	(5.039)
Four or More	0.03	-36.05	0.08	-14.64	1.91
	(0.071)	(168.588)	(0.056)	(21.775)	(5.560)
Number of Nonresident Children (One)					
None	0.03	35.55	-0.08	26.65	9.80*
	(0.071)	(171.776)	(0.052)	(22.187)	(5.665)
Two	-0.06	-110.49	-0.01	28.57**	-4.39
	(0.040)	(99.785)	(0.035)	(12.888)	(3.291)
Three	0.10*	59.10	-0.00	60.96***	-3.37
	(0.057)	(126.454)	(0.045)	(16.333)	(4.170)
Four or More	0.02	118.41	-0.06	84.76***	-7.10
	(0.067)	(158.347)	(0.052)	(20.452)	(5.222)
Number of Coresident Children (One)					
One	-0.01	127.00	-0.02	-7.46	-1.46
	(0.048)	(117.269)	(0.039)	(15.147)	(3.867)
Two	-0.03	218.94	-0.03	14.91	-4.74
	(0.063)	(155.298)	(0.052)	(20.058)	(5.122)
Three	-0.09	-283.88	-0.08	-36.48	-10.34
	(0.091)	(241.301)	(0.073)	(31.167)	(7.958)
Four or More	-0.05	-166.33	-0.02	-14.09	-5.94
	(0.111)	(269.442)	(0.094)	(34.801)	(8.886)
Constant		962.24***		102.12***	45.86***
		(222.011)		(28.675)	(7.322)
N	624	624	624	624	624
R-squared[b]	0.08	0.14	0.10	0.23	0.14
Log Likelihood	-275.44		-203.80		
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sq	48.44**		42.77		
F-test of joint significant of barriers	18.71**	4.29***	7.95	5.24***	3.18***

Sample: Noncustodial fathers in the regular-services group of the CSPED program.
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
[a]Some college and four year degree or more combined in models predicting any child support payment due to sample size.
[b]Pseudo R-squared reported for probit models.

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