The two articles in this issue address two distinct but related topics: mass incarceration and prison proliferation. Since the early 1970s, the U.S. rate of incarceration has grown dramatically, greatly outpacing that of Western European countries; approximately 6.6 million people are currently under some type of correctional supervision in the United States. At the same time, the number of prisons in the United States has grown from about 500 in 1970, to over 1,800 today. The number of prisons more than tripled during the “prison boom” period of 1970 through 2000.

The first article summarizes the April 2019 Robert J. Lampman Memorial Lecture given by Bruce Western. Western describes three methodologies he has used to explore and understand mass incarceration in the United States: demographic analysis of U.S. incarceration as a whole; an in-depth study of people in the year after their release from prison in one American city; and personal narratives from those former prisoners. He argues...
that mass incarceration is intimately connected to the very harsh conditions of poverty in the United States, and that meaningful criminal justice reform will need to account for this reality, both in its policy specifics and in its underlying values.

The second article, by John Eason, examines the effects of prison-building on rural towns during the prison boom. Eason finds that prison-building can both help and hurt rural communities. In particular, he found that towns that built prisons before and during the early part of the prison boom experienced positive economic effects, and that this prison-building may have helped slow the economic decline in these towns during the economic downturn of the 1980s. He suggests that significantly reducing the number of prisons in rural communities, or even discontinuing future prison-building, may have unintended consequences, including increasing poverty in rural communities of color.

This issue also includes a “Research to watch” feature, describing an ongoing project by Julie Poehlmann-Tynan and colleagues at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, looking to improve family visits between children and an incarcerated parent by providing coaching during jail and home visits, providing families with tablets so that children can have in-home video visits with their incarcerated parent, and encouraging changes at the correctional system- and facility-level to support child-parent contact.
The problem of mass incarceration is strongly related to the problem of poverty; mass incarceration is the byproduct of the vast deficit of public investment, particularly in poor communities of color. In these communities, people are not only short of money, but also experience a multitude of disadvantages, including poor health, insufficient schooling, and inadequate public safety. This is the landscape in which the public policy of criminal punishment has grown. In this article, I describe three methodologies I have used to explore and understand mass incarceration in the United States: demographic analysis of U.S. incarceration as a whole; an in-depth study of people in the year after their release from prison in one American city; and personal narratives from those former prisoners. I argue that mass incarceration is intimately connected to the very harsh conditions of poverty in the United States, and that meaningful criminal justice reform will need to account for this reality, both in its policy specifics and in its underlying values.

Measures of incarceration in the United States

A country’s incarceration rate can be measured as the proportion of the population who are incarcerated on any given day. Figure 1 shows that in other OECD countries, this rate is about 100 per 100,000. However, in the United States, the rate is over six times higher at 655 per 100,000 (Figure 1).

The incarceration rate has also grown very steeply over time. As shown in Figure 2, from 1925 to the early 1970s, the imprisonment rate for sentenced prisoners in the United States was about 100 per 100,000, very similar to the current rates in Western Europe. However, beginning in the early 1970s, the rate began to grow, and

**Figure 1. The rate of incarceration in the United States in 2018 was over six times that of selected OECD countries.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Incarceration rate per 100,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Figure shows total rates of imprisonment, including pre-trial detainees and those who have been convicted and sentenced.

continued to increase every year for the next 35 years. While the rate has decreased slightly over the last 10 years, it is still about five times higher than its historic average.

The imprisonment rate includes people who are convicted of felonies and are serving at least 12 months in state or federal prison. By 2013, 1.57 million people were in state or federal prison. While the average sentence length was around 28 months, about 50,000 of the 1.57 million were serving so-called natural life sentences; life without the possibility of parole. This compares to only about 50 people in all of Western Europe. Longer sentences in the United States contribute to the high incarceration rates.

The imprisonment rate, however, tells only part of the story, as there are several different types of community supervision (see text box). Figure 3 shows trends over time in the number of people in state or federal prison, local jails, on parole, or on probation. At the end of 2016, around 6.6 million people

Figure 2. Beginning in the 1970s, the U.S. rate of imprisonment for sentenced prisoners began to rise steeply, and now stands at about five times its historic average.

Note: Figure shows imprisonment rates for sentenced prisoners who have received a sentence of more than one year in state or federal prison.
Source: 1925 to 2012 data are from the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, Table 6.28.2012; 2013 to 2017 data are from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Prisoners in 2017,” Tables 3 and 5.

Types of correctional supervision

- State or federal prison
- Local jail: For those awaiting trial, or serving shorter sentences.

Community supervision: Supervision of individuals convicted of crimes within a local community rather than in a correctional institution. The two most common types of community supervision are parole and probation. Individuals must comply with conditions of supervision, which may include residence in a halfway house or participation in substance abuse treatment, mental health service, or employment services. Conditions of community supervision differ by state and locality.
- Parole: Community supervision following release from prison.
- Probation: Community supervision in lieu of incarceration.
were under correctional supervision in the United States. The number of people on probation exceeds the number under any other type of correctional supervision, combined, and has grown dramatically in recent years.

**Inequality in incarceration**

Another way to measure incarceration is to look at the probability that a given individual will ever be incarcerated. In work done with Becky Pettit, we considered two birth cohorts: those born in 1945 through 1979, who reached their mid-30s in 1979, largely before the great explosion in incarceration in America; and those born 30 years later, who reached their mid-30s in 2009. Figure 4 shows black and white men’s probability of imprisonment by age 30 to 34 for these two cohorts by level of schooling. The figure shows that among the older cohort, African Americans were about six to seven times more likely to be incarcerated than whites, with a notable educational gradient in incarceration. For the younger cohort, the inequality of race and level of education is much more extreme; nearly all the growth in incarceration over the last 35 years was concentrated in the non-college fraction of the population. We estimate that for the younger cohort, 36 percent of non-college black men have been to prison at some point in their lives; for black men who never completed high school, this rate is 70 percent. Note that these high probabilities of imprisonment are occurring in the late 2000s, a time when crime is historically low; the homicide rate, for example, is at its lowest level since the early 1960s. Because of drastic changes in criminal justice policy, with imprisonment
becoming the presumptive sentence for a felony offense, an entire generation of very disadvantaged black men are incarcerated.

A great deal of research has been done to determine the causes of the dramatic increase in incarceration in the United States, and the ensuing consequences of that increase. Overall, the literature suggests that the rise in incarceration is due to policy changes that criminalized social problems related to racial inequality and poverty on a historically unprecedented scale during the 1960s and 1970s, a period of rising crime and social and political change. These social problems include, for example, untreated addiction, mental illness, and homelessness—all of these social problems have become criminalized, and people affected by these issues are incarcerated at very high rates.

Most research suggests that the crime-reducing effect of incarceration is small; some studies also find that the size of the effect decreased as the rate of incarceration increased.

As to the consequences of mass incarceration, most research suggests that the crime-reducing effect of incarceration is small; some studies also find that the size of the effect decreased as the rate of incarceration increased. Research on the crime-deterrent effects
of the length of time served is more definitive; the probability of apprehension appears to deter would-be offenders much more than the increase in sentence duration. Because recidivism decreases significantly with age, lengthy prison sentences (unless targeted specifically to the most dangerous or prolific offenders) provide an inefficient route to crime prevention.

Research has also examined the effects of incarceration on outcomes such as employment and earnings, health, mortality, and the well-being of children whose parents are incarcerated. The negative effects of incarceration—on economic opportunities, health, mortality, and the well-being of children—are concentrated in communities that were already disadvantaged. This has contributed to the reproduction of poverty, both over the life course and from one generation to the next, and significantly deepened racial inequality.

Quantitative analysis has three major limitations: it provides only a thin statistical portrait; the social process of reentry is neglected; and survey methods often miss men who are disadvantaged and not strongly attached to households—those who are at greatest risk of incarceration.

A National Research Council consensus panel on the causes and consequences of the growth of incarceration in the United States provides a thorough review of the research. The panel’s primary recommendation was that, given the small crime prevention effects of incarceration, and the possibly high financial, social, and human cost of incarceration, federal and state policymakers should revise current criminal justice policies to significantly reduce the rate of incarceration in the United States. Such a reduction would return the country to international and historical norms.4

The quantitative analyses that the National Research Council panel reviewed, including my own work exploring the effects of incarceration on labor markets and families, utilized large social survey data sets such as the National Longitudinal Survey, the Fragile Families Survey, and the Current Population Survey. While these data provide a great deal of statistical power, large-scale quantitative analysis of incarceration has three major limitations. First, the analyses provided only a thin statistical portrait of those at risk of incarceration. In my teaching inside prisons, I spoke to many incarcerated people and heard much of their life histories and the pathways that ultimately led them to prison. However, this depth of experience was being reduced in my quantitative analyses to four socioeconomic variables: age, race, sex, and schooling. Second, there was little detailed analysis of the social process of returning to a community after release. Third, social survey methods, which are often based on household sampling frames, likely miss many of the people who were at greatest risk of incarceration; men who are disadvantaged and not strongly attached to households.

The Boston reentry study

To address these limitations, I collaborated with Anthony Braga from Northeastern University and Rhiana Kohl at the Massachusetts Department of Correction to develop the Boston reentry study. This was a small longitudinal interview study—a field study—of a sample of 122 men and women leaving state prison in Massachusetts for communities
in the Boston area. Participants were interviewed five times over a period of a year, beginning a week before their release, with follow-up interviews two weeks later, two months later, six months later, and finally one year later. In-prison interviews included questions about pre-prison education, employment, involvement in crime, and drug use; their in-prison activities including program participation and peer networks; and their expectations for post-prison life, such as housing and employment plans. After release from prison, interviews focused on the structure and dynamics of respondents’ households and families, housing, employment, drug and alcohol use, and participation in welfare and other programs. This provided a very rich set of data, and while analysis is still ongoing, three major findings have emerged. First, most participants had very long histories of exposure to violence as victims and as witnesses, often going back to their early childhood. As these details emerged during the study, we redesigned our survey instrument so that the final interview would include a set of questions to capture the exposure of our respondents to trauma in early childhood (Figure 5). The most common childhood trauma was growing up with a family member who struggled with serious drug problems, reported by about 60 percent of the sample. Other common traumas, reported by around 40 to 50 percent of respondents, were parental physical abuse; having witnessed a violent death; and being placed with someone other than their parents, including into foster care or juvenile detention. Traumas reported by approximately one-third of the sample included having a family member be a crime victim, being exposed to domestic violence, and having depressed or suicidal family members. Nearly one in five respondents reported that they had been sexually abused as children. From the list of eight major childhood traumas shown in Figure 5, two-thirds of the sample had experienced three or more.

Most participants had very long histories of exposure to violence as victims and as witnesses, often going back to their early childhood.

Figure 5. Those leaving prison reported high rates of exposure to trauma during early childhood; the most common childhood trauma was growing up with a family member who struggled with serious drug problems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family drug use</th>
<th>57%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hit by parents</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witnessed death</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents lost custody</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family crime victim</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic violence</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depressed/suicidal kin</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual abuse</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Boston Reentry Study.
Second, we found very high rates of poor physical and mental health among those leaving prison. This included very high rates of substance abuse, mental illness, and chronic pain or disease (Figure 6). About 15 percent of our sample had been diagnosed with a serious mental illness including psychosis, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and schizoaffective disorder. About half of our sample reported four or more physical or mental health problems.

Third, we found a very deep level of material hardship in the first year after prison. The median income in our sample in the first year after prison in Boston was $6,000, about half the federal poverty line for an individual living alone.

We also found notable connections between childhood trauma, physical and mental health, and material hardship after leaving prison. Those exposed to the greatest trauma in childhood were in the worst health in adulthood. Similarly, those reporting four or more physical or mental health problems (referred to here as “frail”) were most likely to experience material hardship after release from prison (Figure 7). For example, housing instability—living on the street, in a shelter, staying with family or friends, or in a transitional housing program—was concentrated among those with the most serious health problems, while those with less serious health problems tended to live in private independent housing. As would be expected, joblessness was high among all sample members immediately after release from prison, and then declined over the course of the year. However, those with the most serious health issues were the least likely to become employed; by the end of the year, nearly 60 percent were out of work, compared to only about one-third of those with less serious health problems. Use of hard drugs was also much higher one year after release among those in poorer health.

Those exposed to the greatest trauma in childhood were in the worst health in adulthood.
While the data from the Boston reentry study did provide much more detail about the experience of those who have been incarcerated compared to analyses that rely on large-scale data sets, the analysis is still quantitative, and misses much of the detail of people’s lives. In the next section, I share one of the personal narratives we heard, which is illustrative of the types of histories we heard in our study.

**Personal narrative of incarceration and release**

My book *Homeward: Life in the Year After Prison* tells many of the stories we heard during interviews with the Boston reentry study participants. The book aims to capture more of the lives of study participants than the statistical analyses, and also to provide a more intimate view of mass incarceration. This excerpt illustrates the transition from prison to community. In particular, it shows that personal motivation and family support could ease reentry:

Peter was an older black man in his late forties with salt-and-pepper hair and an elegant bearing. He arrived early for our interview a week after his release. Waiting on the street, he was hesitant to face the crowd inside the diner in Mattapan. We began the interview by asking Peter what the best part about being out was for him.

“Breathing fresh air,” he said.

“What’s the most challenging thing?”

“Being around a bunch of people. Just being in public areas.”

Five years before we first met Peter, he was just out of prison on an earlier sentence in a history of incarceration that had consumed most of his adult life. He was out for two years, before going back in for another three. His previous release, he said, was a rehearsal for his current reentry. “When I was incarcerated that last trip, I pretty much knew what I had to do,” he said.

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**Figure 7.** Unstable housing, joblessness, and hard drug use in the year after release were concentrated among those in poorer health.

**Note:** “Frail” refers to those with four or more physical or mental health problems.

**Source:** The Boston Reentry Study.
Although he got anxious in crowds, Peter began his latest release with a flurry of activity. He came home on a Friday, and that morning he bought clothes and got a haircut. He spent time with his sister that first day and stayed over at her house. Five other people were living in his sister’s house, including her fiancé, one adult son, and two younger children. Peter worried that he was a burden on what was already a crowded family home. He could have stayed with his father, but his father drank. His brother also stayed there and he was dealing drugs. “Being at my father’s wasn’t a healthy situation. My sister’s is the safest place for me,” he said.

Peter spent his first weekend home with his 9-year-old son. They talked, did some shopping, and went to the movies. On his first Monday after getting out, he reported to probation in the morning, then visited his father in the afternoon. On Tuesday he enrolled in food stamps, then met with his older son later in the day. He went to the welfare office again on Wednesday, then visited his younger son’s school to introduce himself to the boy’s teachers. Thursday was mental health counseling. By the end of his first week out, Peter had spent time with two of his three children, enrolled in food stamps, obtained a mass transit card, made an appointment for counseling, checked in with several shelters, and visited a career center. The following week he would begin his job search.

As noted in the previous section, violence was a pervasive and lifelong presence in the lives of the people we interviewed. They came from homes that were unsafe, experienced and observed abuse in their homes and communities. Their imprisonment was often due to participation in a violent crime, and prison itself was a source of violence. For example, Luis, a 33-year-old Puerto Rican man who grew up in a very poor, high-crime neighborhood in Brooklyn, New York, had spent about half of his adult life incarcerated for assault and dealing drugs. At the baseline interview one week before his release, Luis noted that during his most recent 10-month period of incarceration, he had witnessed between six and 10 assaults involving other inmates, and an additional three to five assaults involving prison staff. He said that his neighborhood was safer than prison. This and other experiences recounted to us raise the question of whether incarceration on a massive scale could ever be a successful anti-violence strategy.

As I argue in the book, the overwhelming reality faced by people who have been to prison is characterized by poverty, racial inequality, and violence. As researchers and policymakers consider criminal justice reform, understanding and discussing these issues in a productive way presents...
a challenge, particularly the issue of violence. Understanding the context in which crime occurs is essential to finding justice.

**Alternatives to incarceration**

While we usually think about incarceration as the deprivation of liberty or a loss of autonomy, it is important to note that the men and women in the Boston reentry study were also disconnected in ways from the intimate bonds of family, friendship, work, and community. I believe that the fundamental justice challenge involves precisely strengthening the bonds of family and community for victims of violence and offenders alike. Incarceration is not designed to meet that challenge. Policies that improve the material well-being of people and empower them will help meet the challenges of poverty and human frailty that underlie mass incarceration. Designing social policy according to these principles will help relieve the justice system of much of its responsibility for the very harsh conditions of American poverty.

The great paradox of mass incarceration is that the system demands heroic feats of personal transformation from people whose agency, whose capacity to intervene in their own lives, is often profoundly compromised by trauma and human frailty. We need a justice policy that welcomes people, and secures a place for those who have been drawn into violence, whether it’s the violence of street crime or the state violence of mass incarceration.

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Observing real conditions of the poverty, racial inequality, and violence that surrounds mass incarceration provides a strong test of our values. By testing our values in this way, I hope that we might imagine a better path to justice.

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I end with a story from the preface of *Homeward*, intended to suggest the possibility that might lie in front of us:

While conducting research for this book, I made several visits to Addis Ababa for a project studying justice institutions in Ethiopia. At dinner one evening with a few Ethiopian researchers, one of them, Mulagetta, told me about a colleague at his research institute, a German anthropologist. One day the anthropologist was in a remote area driving through a small village. His car fatally struck a small child who had strayed onto the road. The girl’s parents ran outside to see what happened, and a crowd quickly formed around the anthropologist.

He asked that the police be called but was told that there were no police there. The village dealt with matters like this by itself. The anthropologist was told that he could go, but that they would send for him in a few days. Later that week a message came that he must return, and he was told to return alone. He went to Mulagetta and asked what should he do. “You have to go back to the village,” said Mulagetta. So he returned. When he arrived, he was escorted to a meeting with the elders. They told him to pay 2,500 Birr (about $125) to the family of the dead child. Next, he was ordered to buy a goat for the family. He purchased the goat, which was immediately slaughtered. The father of the dead child was called to the front of the meeting. The anthropologist, standing at the front of the room, was told to hold out his hand. He held out his hand and his wrist was bound to the wrist of the child’s father with the entrails of the goat.
The village elders announced that the anthropologist was now a member of the dead girl’s family. And that was that. He was free to go.

The anthropologist returned to Addis, very upset. He felt that he hadn’t properly compensated the family, nor had he been punished. Mulagetta said, “You have to understand, for the rest of your life, you are now part of that man’s family. You have all of the obligations of a family member. You have to visit from time to time. If they are going through problems that you might help with, you should help them just as a member of their own family would.”

Western ideas about punishment and retribution were radically absent in this case of customary justice. Like the Ethiopian story, the problem of prisoner reentry raises the question of when punishment ends. When and how are debts extinguished? These questions are as ethical as they are empirical.

In my work, I have tried to maintain this ethical perspective. In order to guide politics or policy, the ethics of punishment must confront the real stories of the people who have been incarcerated. How our research is designed shapes what we see and who we hear. However, very deeply disadvantaged people are often not fully visible to our usual methods of large-scale data collection. To see and hear these people, we must go into the field and talk to them. Observing real conditions of the poverty, racial inequality, and violence that surrounds mass incarceration provides a strong test of our values. By testing our values in this way, I hope that we might imagine a better path to justice.

Bruce Western is the Bryce Professor of Sociology and Social Justice and Co-Director of the Justice Lab at Columbia University. He delivered the 2019 Robert J. Lampman Memorial Lecture at the University of Wisconsin–Madison in April. This article is adapted from his lecture.

Source & Methods

Type of analysis: Longitudinal interview study
Data source: Interviews over a period of a year: at one week before release; two weeks later; two months later; six months later; and one year later.
Type of data: Interviews including open-ended questions
Unit of analysis: Individuals
Sample definition: 122 men and women leaving state prison in Massachusetts for communities in the Boston area.
Time frame: Recruitment occurred May 2012 through February 2013.
Limitations: Sample is small and from one particular geographic area.

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1 What constitutes a felony is defined by state and federal legislatures. Felonies include violent crimes such as murder, sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault, but may also include burglary and drug crimes.

2 Prison, parole, and probation counts are as of December 31st, 2016; jail counts are as of June 30, 2016. Note that some people were in more than one correctional status, so the total estimated correctional population is slightly less than the sum of those in prison, in jail, on parole, or on probation.


The rate of imprisonment in the United States is higher than that of any other developed nation, with communities of color being disproportionately affected (see Western article in this issue for more detail). Although racial minorities are overrepresented among the population of prisoners, they are also overrepresented among the population of corrections officers, and prisons are disproportionately built in rural areas, particularly those with larger African American and Latino communities. In this article, I argue that it is important to understand prison proliferation in the United States, particularly during the prison boom period of 1970 through 2010, when the number of U.S. prisons tripled, because such an examination can shed light on the relationship between racial and economic inequality and punishment. My study contributes to the literature on the prison expansion by exploring the consequences, both positive and negative, of prison-building on rural communities.¹ I address the following research questions:

- How did newly built prisons affect rural towns’ median home values, median family income, poverty, and unemployment?
- How did these effects vary based on when prisons were built, and between periods of national economic hardship and prosperity?

While many states are considering closing prison facilities in order to address budget shortfalls, and some activists and scholars also advocate for prison closures as part of criminal justice reform, closing prisons may have unanticipated negative economic effects on disadvantaged communities, complicating the story in ways often not acknowledged by researchers and policymakers.

Prisons in the United States

As of 2010, there were 1,663 prisons in the United States, each with an average daily population of 758 prisoners and 231 staff. Of these 1,663, roughly 81 percent are state run, 9 percent are federal (including Native American and military prisons), and 10 percent are private. Nearly 70 percent of these facilities are located in nonmetropolitan communities and, as illustrated in Figure 1, nearly half are located in the Southern United States.

The U.S. prison boom

Over two-thirds of U.S. prisons were built during the prison-boom period of 1970 to 2010. In 1970, there were 525 prisons across the United States. Over the following four decades, an additional 1,138 prisons were built (Figure 2). During the first decade of the prison boom, the 1970s, 185 prisons were constructed, and 321 more were built in the 1980s. The 1990s were the peak of the prison boom, with 462 new prisons built—more than a quarter of the total number of U.S. prisons existing in 2010. In the final decade of the boom, building slowed, with only 170 new facilities.
Figure 1. Prisons are disproportionately located in the Southern United States and in rural areas.

Source: Prison Proliferation Project.

Figure 2. Of the 1,663 correctional facilities in the United States in 2010, more than two-thirds were built during the prison-boom period of 1970 to 2010.

Source: Prison Proliferation Project.
Although the rise in imprisonment occurred at the same time as the prison boom, prison-building varied greatly by state and region. Thus, prison proliferation is not simply a function of mass imprisonment. For example, while only 5 percent of all rural towns in the United States received a prison during the height of the prison boom, Southern rural communities were disproportionately likely to receive one. Nearly 70 percent of prison-building during the boom was in rural areas, and Southern towns accounted for at least 45 percent of all rural prison-building during each period. During the peak prison-building period of 1989 to 1998, nearly two-thirds of the 314 prisons built in rural communities were located in the South. Overall, 45 percent of “prison towns” are in the South.²

While providing jobs may be an important motivator for towns seeking to site prisons, other benefits may come through poverty reduction and increases in family income and home values.

**Theories of prison effects**

Past research on the prison boom has consistently identified negative effects of prison-building on urban communities of color, and on rural communities in general.³ These studies are all based on a theoretical framework that posits the following: (1) politicians exploit crime legislation to win votes; (2) private companies seek profits by building or operating prisons; and (3) rural community leaders see prisons as positive economic development. Under this theory, these interests combine to encourage spending on imprisonment regardless of the actual demand.⁴ From this perspective, prison-building is primarily a profit-generating venture.

My own theory is informed by my Prison Proliferation Project, which for the first time gathered accurate data on all U.S. prisons as of 2010 geocoded to locations classified by rural-urban status.⁵ I argue instead that because Southern rural communities with larger proportions of people of color are the areas most likely to build prisons, a more nuanced approach is necessary to understand the effects of prisons. It also seems likely that if prisons had only harmful effects on the communities in which they were located, there would be less demand for these facilities.

I use an alternate theoretical framework that considers the prison as a complex institution that is linked to the political economy of rural communities, and that can have both beneficial and harmful effects on those towns. While providing jobs may be an important motivator for towns seeking to site prisons, other benefits may come through poverty reduction and increases in family income and home values. Understanding how prisons may benefit the towns in which they are located can better explain why disadvantaged areas might use their limited resources to acquire such a stigmatized institution.

**Effects of the prison boom on rural communities**

My study looks at how prisons affect rural communities by measuring how newly constructed prisons, across different periods of the prison boom, affect changes in median family income, median home value, poverty, and unemployment.

**Methods**

As mentioned above, the data for my analyses come from my Prison Proliferation Project. These data build on existing directory data (which sometimes use mailing addresses that
are far from the actual prison facility) to geocode the physical locations of all U.S. prisons. Prison locations were designated as rural (nonmetropolitan) or urban (metropolitan); only rural locations are included in these analyses.6

The outcomes used to measure the effects on towns of newly constructed prisons from 1970 to 2000 are: (1) change in median value of homeowner property; (2) change in median family income; (3) change in poverty rate; and (4) change in unemployment rate. Each of these is measured at three points in time: 1980, 1990, and 2000.

Prison-building is assessed over four time periods: prior to 1969; during 1969 through 1978; during 1979 through 1988, and during 1989 through 1998. These time periods reflect the assumption that it will take a minimum of two years for a prison to affect the outcomes measured at the beginning of each decade. So, for example, the decade of prison-building considered in 1980 is 1969 through 1978, rather than 1970 through 1979.

I control for several place-level demographic variables, including population, education level, proportion African American, proportion Latino, proportion of housing units that are owner-occupied, and the proportion of residents that resided in the same town during the prior census. I also control for the prior decade’s outcomes; for example, when measuring unemployment in 1990, I control for the percentage unemployed in 1979 through 1988.

The primary analysis is a state-level fixed effects regression measuring for state-level variation in prison effects at the local level.7 Outcomes are presented as a comparison between prison towns and other similar towns nationally and in the South.

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In earlier periods, prison towns tended to have higher median home values than other towns, but beginning in the second decade of the prison boom, the reverse was true.

Prison towns compared to other rural communities

Prior to 1969, compared to other rural communities, prison towns tended to be poorer, had larger total populations, and more Latinos. Towns that built prisons between 1969 and 1978 (roughly the first decade of the prison boom) had, on average, higher median home values and larger populations than did other towns. The difference in population was even more pronounced in the South, with Southern prison towns having, on average, twice the total population of other rural Southern towns. In this period only, the proportions of African Americans and Latinos were lower in towns that built prisons compared to towns that did not.

During the period of 1979 through 1988, the characteristics of towns that constructed prisons resembled the characteristics of towns that did not build prisons more than in any other period. The most significant change during this period was a reversal in relative median home values; in earlier periods, prison towns tended to have higher median home values than other towns, but beginning in the second decade of the prison boom, the reverse was true. This change was most notable in the South where, on average, median home values increased by 38 percent from the prior period for all rural Southern towns, compared to a 24 percent increase for rural Southern prison towns. While poverty increased in all rural towns from the first to the second decade of the prison boom, the increase was larger in towns that built prisons. Southern towns building prisons experienced, on average, nearly an 8 percent increase in the poverty rate from the prior
period, compared to only a 2.5 percent increase among Southern towns that did not build prisons.

The racial composition of all rural towns—particularly those that built prisons—changed during the period of the prison boom, with decreases in white populations and increases in African American and Latino populations. The rise in the proportion of Latinos in prison towns was particularly large; it tripled from 4 percent in the first decade of the prison boom to 12 percent in the third decade, compared to a rise from 6 percent to 7 percent over the same time period for rural towns as a whole. There was a similar, though less dramatic change in the proportion of African Americans from the first decade to the third decade of the prison boom, rising from 14 percent to 20 percent in prison towns, and from 15 percent to 18 percent for all rural towns.

**Estimating the effects of prison-building on rural communities in 1980**

Table 1 shows the estimated effects of prison-building during 1969 through 1978 (the first decade of the prison boom) on home values, family income, poverty, and unemployment in 1980. For each outcome, the table shows the difference in value between prison towns and similar non-prison towns. Prison-building had a positive and statistically significant association with median home values; prison-building was associated with an increase in median home values of over $2,500 for rural towns as a whole, and over $3,500 for Southern towns. I also find largely positive associations of prison-building with median family income; in particular, recent prison-building was associated with an increase of over $1,200 in median family income in rural Southern towns. The bottom two rows of Table 1 show the estimated effects of prison-building on poverty and unemployment; neither of these is statistically significant. Unlike previous research, which found a large, positive, and statistically significant relationship between prison-building and increases in the unemployment rate, my results suggest that even when prisons have negative effects on rural communities, those effects are relatively small.

| Prison-building before 1980 is associated with higher median home values and higher family income in 1980. |
|---|---|
| **Table 1. Prison-building before 1980 is associated with higher median home values and higher family income in 1980.** |
| **Prison-building effects in 1980 comparing towns building a prison during 1969–1978 to similar towns without a prison** |
| | Difference in all towns | Difference in Southern towns |
| Median home value | $2,560* | $3,529* |
| Median family income | $659 | $1,233** |
| Poverty rate | -0.21% | -1.71% |
| Unemployment rate | 0.05% | 0.04% |

**Notes:** Table shows outcomes in 1980, comparing towns that built prisons during 1969 through 1978 with similar towns without prisons. These are state-level fixed-effects estimates of rural property value, family income, poverty, and unemployment in 1980 as a function of previous prison-building, controlling for total population, percentage of residents residing in town from prior census, poverty rate, percentage African American, percentage Latino, owner occupancy, and prison-building in prior periods.

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.

**Source:** Prison Proliferation Project.

**Estimating the effects of prison-building on rural communities in 1990**

Table 2 shows the relationships between prison-building during 1979 through 1988 (the second decade of the prison boom) and towns’ economic outcomes in 1990. Towns that acquired prisons during the decade immediately prior to 1990 found little economic reprieve; in particular, prison-building in that period was associated with a significant
increase in the poverty rate of rural towns of nearly 2 percent, and with a significant
decrease in median home values. In contrast, towns that built prisons prior to 1979 had
higher median home values in 1990 (not shown in table). Towns that acquired a prison
during the second decade of the prison boom appear to be more economically challenged,
on average, than other rural towns, and prison-building did not improve their situation.

| Table 2. In 1990, towns that built prisons during the 1980s had higher poverty rates and lower median home values compared to similar towns without prisons. |
| --- | --- |
| **Prison-building effects in 1990 comparing towns building a prison during 1979–1988 to similar towns without a prison** |  |
|  | Difference in all towns | Difference in Southern towns |
| Median home value | -$278 | -$2,487* |
| Median family income | -$35 | -$339 |
| Poverty rate | 1.67%* | 1.01% |
| Unemployment rate | 0.62% | 0.12% |

**Notes:** Table shows outcomes in 1990, comparing towns that built prisons during 1979 through 1988 with similar towns without prisons. These are state-level fixed-effects estimates of rural property value, family income, poverty, and unemployment in 1990 as a function of previous prison-building, controlling for total population, percentage of residents residing in town from prior census, poverty rate, percentage African American, percentage Latino, owner occupancy, and prison-building in prior periods.
* p < 0.05.
**Source:** Prison Proliferation Project.

Estimating the effects of prison-building on rural communities in 2000
Finally, Table 3 shows the estimated effects in 2000 of prison-building during 1989 through 1998. Towns that built prisons during this later period did see a small decrease in unemployment in 2000, both in towns overall, and in Southern towns. This suggests that prison-building during this later period had a more protective immediate economic effect compared to the immediate effects of prison-building prior to 1980 (shown in Table 1), which was associated with an increase in the unemployment rate. There were no other statistically significant associations in 2000.

| Table 3. Prison-building during the 1990s was associated with slightly lower unemployment in 2000. |
| --- | --- |
| **Prison-building effects in 2000 comparing towns building a prison during 1989–1998 to similar towns without a prison** |  |
|  | Difference in all towns | Difference in Southern towns |
| Median home value | -$681 | -$358 |
| Median family income | -$304 | -$358 |
| Poverty rate | 0.89% | 0.94% |
| Unemployment rate | -1.01%* | 0.49%* |

**Notes:** Table shows outcomes in 2000, comparing towns that built prisons during 1989 through 1998 with similar towns without prisons. These are state-level fixed-effects estimates of rural property value, family income, poverty, and unemployment in 2000 as a function of previous prison-building, controlling for total population, percentage of residents residing in town from prior census, poverty rate, percentage African American, percentage Latino, owner occupancy, and prison-building in prior periods.
* p < 0.05.
**Source:** Prison Proliferation Project.
Overall, prisons provided a short-term economic boost for some rural communities, particularly those that built prisons in the early part of the boom, but these effects did not persist over the long-term. When economic conditions were unfavorable, prison-building appears to have somewhat insulated communities against adverse effects. When economic conditions were more favorable, prisons reduced unemployment, but again, this effect did not persist over time. This lack of long-term positive effects may be related to broader downward economic shifts in rural communities. However, my estimates should be considered lower-bound estimates of the positive economic effects of prison-building as my research looks at outcomes two or more years after a prison is built and benefits could begin to accrue years earlier, during the planning and building phases of new prisons.

Significantly reducing the number of prisons in rural communities, or even discontinuing future prison-building, may have unintended consequences, including increasing poverty in rural communities of color.

When considering the prison boom, prior work has overwhelmingly claimed that prison-building is bad for communities of color. However, these studies did not have access to national data in which all prisons were properly assigned to their location, nor did they consider the importance of geographical region in their analyses. I adjust for these issues and use a fixed-effects model that allows for more nuance in detecting effects.

My findings have implications for research around mass incarceration in general and prison-building in particular. I suggest that it is necessary to rethink not only what and when we measure, but also the theoretical framework used to understand prison-building. The traditional framework oversimplifies the dynamics of race and class, and is predisposed to identify negative consequences of prison-building. The more neutral perspective that I use in this study allows scholars to explore both the challenges and the opportunities that prison-building offers. It can also assist policymakers in minimizing the unintended consequences of reversing the prison boom, as it allows for an assessment of both positive and negative effects of prison-building to rural communities.

Note that I am neither advocating for prison-building as a poverty-reduction or economic-growth strategy, nor calling for the continuation of mass incarceration at current rates. I am, however, cautioning that significantly reducing the number of prisons in rural communities, or even discontinuing future prison-building, may have unintended consequences, including increasing poverty in rural communities of color.

To characterize prisons as potentially beneficial may seem counterintuitive. However, given the degree of economic disadvantage and the lack of development options faced by many rural communities, town officials may view a prison as the best choice among a poor set of options. In the future, we must both increase the development options available to these communities.
This article draws from J. M. Eason, “Prisons as Panacea or Pariah? The Countervailing Consequences of the Prison Boom on the Political Economy of Rural Towns,” Social Sciences 2017, 6, No. 1: 7. doi:10.3390/socsci6010007

The Southern United States, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, includes Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia.


See http://www.johneason.com/prison-proliferation/ for more information on the Prison Proliferation Project.

Sites are classified as metropolitan (urban) or nonmetropolitan (rural) using Rural-Urban Continuum Codes that distinguish metropolitan counties by the population size of their metro area, and nonmetropolitan counties by degree of urbanization and adjacency to a metro area.

The full paper also uses a propensity score analysis as a robustness check. See: Eason, “Prisons as Panacea or Pariah?”


Type of analysis: Cross-sectional analysis with a fixed-effects model.

Data source: The Prison Proliferation Project. Data on all U.S. prisons as of 2010 geocoded to locations classified by rural-urban status and merged with U.S. Census demographic and economic data and U.S. state-level economic and program transfer data maintained by the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research.

Type of data: Geocoded-location, housing, economic, political, and demographic data.

Unit of analysis: Rural communities (towns).

Sample definition: Rural communities with new prison-building between 1970 and 2000. “Rural” is defined as towns designated by the 1974 Rural-Urban Continuum Codes as nonmetropolitan.


Limitations: (1) There are data limitations given the sources of data used and the process used to geocode prisons within counties. (2) The study uses town rather than county as the unit of analysis. While county-level analyses have provided better and more reliable data over time, town-level analyses make it possible to assess prisons’ impact on extremely disadvantaged rural towns. (3) The use of cross-sectional analysis means that comparisons cannot be drawn between the communities most likely to build prisons.
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Edited by Emma Caspar.

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