

**“I’m Not Supporting His Kids”:
Noncustodial Fathers’ Contributions When Mothers Have Children with New Partners**

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Many nonresident parents provide informal and formal child support to their children who do not live with them. Although there is a significant body of research on formal child support, much less is known about informal support. More specifically, little is known about trends in informal support, especially whether informal support changes as family relationships evolve, for example when parents have children with new partners.

Informal support, provided outside the public child support enforcement system, may be especially preferred by low-income resident parents. One reason for this preference relates to rules applied to families receiving welfare. During any period in which resident parents receive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefits, a portion (or even all) of the formal child support paid on their behalf is retained by the government (Cancian, Meyer and Caspar, 2008), while resident parents and their children receive all informal support that is provided. Nonresident parents may also prefer informal support in that they have more control over the amount, timing, and delivery of payments. In contrast, with formal support, payments are generally withheld from their paychecks, sent to the child support agency by their employer, and then to the custodial parent. The nonresident parent has little direct control over the amount or timing. The flexibility and control available with informal support may be particularly valuable to low income families in which available income and needs are more volatile. Notwithstanding the potential advantages of informal support, informal arrangements are not subject to formal child support enforcement, and may be unstable, and more likely to break down over time.

The flexibility associated with informal child support arrangements may also be particularly relevant for couples involved in unstable or complex family situations, including those in which parents go on to form new relationships. As we review below, relatively recent research has highlighted the high prevalence of multiple-partner fertility. Multiple-partner fertility might be related to informal support on a number of dimensions. On the one hand, it might be that nonresident parents would particularly value the ability to target their support to specific children if their children lived together with another fathers’

children; formal child support payments potentially benefit the entire resident-parent family. The flexibility of informal payments may also be of value to nonresident parents trying to juggle competing demands when their children live in multiple households. Of particular concern for this analysis, voluntary informal payments may be particularly unstable and likely to decline after an ex-partner had children with a new partner.

In this paper, we focus on the most common situation, when the mother is the resident parent and the father the nonresident. We examine the existence of, and trends in, informal support for resident mothers who were in the first cohort of TANF participants in Wisconsin. Studying disadvantaged mothers is of particular importance in that informal support may be most likely (because of TANF rules) and most important (because of their economic vulnerability) for those with experience with the welfare system.

We hypothesize that fathers will be less likely to provide informal contributions over time, and this decline will be especially strong when mothers have children with new partners. In addition to being less likely to provide support, we expect that fathers whose ex-partners have new children may change the type of support they provide, away from general untargeted support (money toward rent) and toward child-specific support (gifts, clothes).

We are particularly interested in whether any differences in informal support provided when a mother has a child with another father are due to the new partnership itself. If we see that fathers whose ex-partners have new children are less likely to provide informal support and less likely to provide general support, this does not necessarily mean that new-partner fertility *causes* declines in support. There could be other factors related to both new-partner fertility and informal support. For example, contrast couples who have several children together compared to those who only have one child together. If a couple has several children together, the father may be quite likely to provide informal support, and the mother may be quite unlikely to have a child with a new partner, perhaps because she has reached her desired total fertility. This would lead to an observed relationship between informal support and new-partner fertility, but it would not be causal. In this paper, we use a rich data set that allows us to control for a range of factors associated with informal support and multiple and new partner fertility. We also use

statistical methods to account for unobserved differences between those who do and do not go on to have children with new partners.

I. PRIOR LITERATURE

Frameworks for thinking about factors associated with the payment of support are more developed for formal than informal support. Early studies of formal child support often used a framework that related whether fathers pay, and the amounts they pay, to four factors: their ability to pay, their willingness to pay, the needs of the resident-parent family, and characteristics of the child support enforcement system (Beller and Graham, 1993). As the child support enforcement system has become more routine, the needs of the resident-parent family and the willingness to pay support may have become less important determinants of formal child support payments (see, for example, Bartfeld and Meyer, 2003). There is no child support enforcement system to assist in the collection of informal support, which therefore remains discretionary. Thus, the first three factors—ability and willingness to pay, and the needs of the resident-parent family—may all remain important components in explaining father’s informal child support.

This framework has implications for our expectations regarding trends in child support over time. While most of the research on fathers’ ability to pay suggests that in general fathers have an increasing ability to pay over time (e.g., Phillips and Garfinkel, 1993; Meyer, 1995; Cancian, Meyer and Han, 2009; Garfinkel et al., 2009), there remain a group of fathers with very limited ability to pay (e.g., Mincy and Sorensen, 1998; Rich, 2001; Sorensen and Zibman, 2001). Many fathers have been found to have decreasing involvement with nonresidential children over time (e.g., Nepomnyaschy, 2007; Seltzer, 1991); new relationships may reduce their willingness to pay and new commitments may constrict their ability to pay).¹ Little research examines time patterns in the economic needs of resident-parent families.

¹Indeed, Frank Furstenberg (1995) and others have observed that many fathers tend to “swap” families, leaving behind obligations to their prior children when they have new children; this should mean that fathers’

In our review below, we highlight the likelihood (and amount) of informal support, as well as the correlates of informal support and trends over time. Where possible, we differentiate between cash paid outside the formal system and non-cash (in-kind) support. We also review prior research on the relationship between informal and formal support and the frequency and correlates of multiple-partner fertility.

Cash Informal Support

Cash informal support includes both cash provided when there is no formal child support order and cash paid directly outside the formal system (even when there is a formal order). This type of support is fairly common for nonmarital children, but only when they are quite young. For example, analyzing data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study (FF), Nepomnyaschy (2007) shows that one year after a nonmarital birth, about half the mothers who did not have a formal child support order received informal support; by the time this same group of children was three, only 29 percent received informal support. Both the National Survey of American Families (NSAF) and the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) provide information on support payments received by those who do not have a child support order. The reported likelihood of support is higher in the NSAF than in the SIPP, but in both data sources, the likelihood of support is much lower for older children, suggesting that this types of support declines over time (Garasky et al., 2007).

When informal support is received, it tends to be valuable: using SIPP, Garasky and colleagues (2007) estimate average annual amounts of about \$2,300–\$2,700. Whereas there is a strong pattern of variation in the likelihood of informal support by child's age, there is not a strong pattern of variation in

informal contributions (as well as formal contributions) decline when he has new children (see also Manning and Smock, 2000). While the relationship between a fathers' new-partner fertility and his contributions is important, this paper is focused primarily on the relationship between a mothers' new-partner fertility and her ex-partner's contributions. For the most part, this is because of data concerns. We have direct (and presumably more accurate) information on mother's new-partner fertility; in contrast, our information on father's fertility comes indirectly, from the mother's report of whether her ex-partner has had new children.

the amount of informal support by child's age. For example, Nepomnyaschy (2007) examines a subgroup of nonmarital children in the FF study, looking at those not cohabiting when the child was age 3 who did not have a child support order at age 1. As reported above, the likelihood of support declines from 51 percent to 29 percent, but the average amount received among those who receive is about \$1500 at both time points.

Cash informal support is about as common for children whose parents were married at the time of their child's birth (and are now separated or divorced) as for nonmarital children: for example, data from NSAF for children aged 0–5 show 24 percent of marital children (who now live apart from their father) receiving informal support, compared to 28 percent of nonmarital children. For both nonmarital and marital children, the probability of support is less for older children (Garasky et al., 2007). In an analysis of data from FF, Nepomnyaschy and Garfinkel (2009) examine characteristics that are related to the amount of informal support for nonmarital children. They find that fathers who have cohabited with the mother provide more informal support, though as the time since separation increases, they contribute less. African American fathers, those who have more education, are older, and have never been incarcerated, all contribute more. Multiple-partner fertility is associated with less informal support, whether it is the child's father who has had children with another woman or the child's mother who has had children with another man.

In-Kind Support

In-kind (non-cash) support is also fairly common, and five of the six data sources used in recent research provide similar results. In national data from the Current Population Survey-Child Support Supplement (CPS-CSS) covering all custodial mothers, about three-fifths report receiving some type of in-kind support, with the most common types birthday/holiday/other gifts (59 percent), clothes/diapers/shoes (37 percent), and food or groceries 26 percent) (Grall, 2009). In-kind support is also common for recent nonmarital births: about one-half of these children received in-kind support “sometimes or often” (FF data; Nepomnyaschy and Garfinkel, 2009). The PSID also shows about half the

custodial families receive in-kind support, with again the most common types toys or presents (49 percent) followed by clothes or shoes (29 percent) (Garasky et al., 2009). Similarly, in the NLS72 about 60 percent of ever-married custodial mothers report that their children receive presents, about one-third report receiving clothes, and about one-quarter report that the father paid for routine dental care or uninsured medical expenses (Teachman, 1991). In a low-income sample of mothers receiving welfare in Wisconsin (Survey of Wisconsin Works Families, or SWWF), about half receive some type of support; again the most common types were gifts (42 percent) and diapers/clothes/shoes (40 percent) (Choi, 2009). In contrast, reported receipt is much lower in the SIPP, around one-quarter of the cases report any support, perhaps because respondents were not asked questions about particular types of support but merely an open-ended question (Garasky et al., 2007).

In-kind support also appears to decline over time, with this relationship holding even in multivariate models that control for other factors (Nepomnyaschy and Garfinkel, 2009; Garasky et al., 2009). There is evidence across a number of studies and data sources that fathers are more likely to provide in-kind support when they have a closer relationship with the child. For example, in-kind support is more commonly provided by fathers who live closer to their children (Garasky et al., 2009, using the PSID), who have cohabited with the child's mother, and who have younger children (Nepomnyaschy and Garfinkel, 2009, using FF). There is also evidence that in-kind informal support is more likely to be provided by less disadvantaged fathers, for example fathers with higher education (Garasky et al., 2009, using PSID; Choi, 2009, using SWWF), higher earnings (Choi, 2009, using SWWF), and those who have not been incarcerated (Nepomnyaschy and Garfinkel, 2009). On the other hand, African American fathers are also more likely to provide in-kind informal support (Nepomnyaschy and Garfinkel, 2009, using FF; Choi, 2009, using SWWF). There are mixed results on the relationships between multiple-partner fertility and in-kind support. On the one hand, Choi (2009) finds that neither the number of other fathers with whom the mother has had children, nor the presence of other children in the father's household, is related to the amount of in-kind support (using SWWF), and Garasky and colleagues (2009, using PSID) find that fathers who have had new children are not significantly less likely to provide in-kind support. On the

other hand, Nepomnyaschy and Garfinkel (2009, using FF) find that fathers who have had children with other women are less likely to provide support, though they find no relationship when mothers have had children with other men.

Relationship between Formal and Informal Support

Some have argued that fathers generally have a desired amount they want to contribute to their nonresident children, suggesting that when formal child support is ordered, informal support will decline (see, for example Nepomnyaschy and Garfinkel, 2009). Indeed, some research has found a negative correlation between formal and informal support, especially in longitudinal research. For example, in the Parents' Fair Share program, an intervention for fathers who were behind in their formal child support payments, the intervention increased the proportion of fathers paying support, but the average amount of informal support declined (Miller and Knox, 2001). Similarly, Nepomnyaschy and Garfinkel (2009) find that total support is roughly unchanged over time; increases in formal support are nearly offset by declines in informal support. In contrast, other (mostly cross-sectional) studies have found that those who pay formal support are also more likely to be providing informal support. For example, Teachman (1991) finds that among ever-married custodial mothers, those receiving formal support are more likely to receive various types of in-kind support, and vice versa. Garasky et al. (2009) also find a positive relationship between child support and in-kind support, though this is statistically significant only for a higher-income sample. Finally, both Seltzer and Schaeffer (2001) and Choi (2009) find a positive relationship between informal support and formal support in a Wisconsin welfare sample.

Multiple-Partner Fertility and New-Partner Fertility

Emerging research on multiple-partner fertility suggests that it is relatively common, especially for those who have had nonmarital births (Cancian and Meyer, 2006; Carlson and Furstenberg, 2006; Guzzo and Furstenberg 2007b). For example, in about 60 percent of recent nonmarital births, one or both of the parents had had children with someone else (Carlson and Furstenberg, 2006). Some of this research

uses longitudinal data, and thus examines a closely related topic, new-partner fertility. Cancian, Meyer and Cook (2010) find that 60 percent of nonmarital children who were their mothers' first birth will have at least one half-sibling by age 10 (that is, either their father or their mother will have had a child with a different partner). Even for marital children whose parents later separate, multiple-partner fertility is fairly common (Carlson and Furstenberg, 2006; Cancian and Meyer, 2006).

Recent research also examines the characteristics of those with multiple-partner fertility (or new-partner fertility). In general, multiple-partner fertility is higher for disadvantaged couples. For example, it is higher for lower-income couples (Cancian, Meyer and Cook, 2010; Meyer, Cancian and Cook, 2005), those with less education (Carlson and Furstenberg 2006), those growing up in a single-parent family (Carlson and Furstenberg 2006; Guzzo and Furstenberg 2007b; Manlove et al. 2008), and men with a history of incarceration (Carlson and Furstenberg 2006). The risk of multiple-partner fertility has been found to be greater for those who had a first child at a younger age (Carlson and Furstenberg 2006; Manlove et al. 2008) or had fewer children together (Manlove et al., 2008). Blacks, and to a lesser extent, Hispanics, are more likely to experience multiple-partner fertility (Carlson and Furstenberg 2006; Manlove et al. 2008; Guzzo and Furstenberg 2007a), though differences are substantially reduced (and, in some cases, no longer statistically significant) in multivariate models with extensive controls.

Multiple-Partner Fertility, Formal Child Support, and Informal Child Support

Has multiple-partner fertility been found to be related to *formal* child support? Research results are mixed. Nepomnyaschy and Garfinkel (2009) find no relationship between either parent having had multiple-partner fertility and the amount of formal child support the mother reported, using FF data. Meyer, Cancian and Cook (2005), examining nonresident fathers of children receiving welfare in Wisconsin, find that the fathers' multiple-partner fertility, but not the mothers', is related to the fathers' formal payments. More specifically, they find that fathers are more likely to pay formal child support when they owe support to more mothers; fathers associated with more mothers also pay higher amounts; however, when the total amount owed is controlled, fathers who owe to more than one mother pay less. In

other words, men with multiple-partner fertility pay more child support, but their orders go up faster than their payments. In the Wisconsin analysis, mother's multiple-partner fertility is not related to the likelihood of formal payment or the amount. Manning and Smock (2000) find that fathers who have new biological children between the two waves of data in the NSFH pay less child support in the second wave.

In summary, multiple-partner fertility is common; many parents, especially parents of nonmarital children, have had, or will go on to have children with different partners. Focusing only on new-partner fertility (how a new child affects the payment of old obligations), there are conflicting results. In cases with new-partner fertility, formal child support may decline (Manning and Smock, 2000), be unchanged (Nepomnyaschy and Garfinkel, 2009), or perhaps even increase (Meyer, Cancian, and Cook, 2005, though note this last result is for the total amount across all mothers, and the amount paid for any one mother may actually decline). One might expect formal support to decline in the face of new responsibilities for fathers (his new-partner fertility) or in the face of fathers' unwillingness to contribute to someone else's children (her new-partner fertility). If there is little change in formal child support in the face of new-partner fertility, this could be due to the vigor of the enforcement system; fathers simply do not have much choice as to whether they pay a child support order if they are working in the formal economy (Bartfeld and Meyer, 2003).

Informal cash support and in-kind support might be more responsive to a nonresident parent's desire to decrease support than formal support. These sources seem to be common early in a nonmarital child's life, but to decline substantially as time passes; this is the pattern we would expect if new children (on either parent's side) caused declining contributions from nonresident parents. A few studies have examined this possibility, but the results are inconclusive. In the research reviewed above, there is evidence that multiple-partner fertility for either parent is related to lower informal cash support (Nepomnyaschy and Garfinkel, 2009). There are conflicting results for in-kind support; in FF, multiple-partner fertility on the fathers' side is related to lower support, but not on the mother's side (Nepomnyaschy and Garfinkel, 2009); similarly, in the SWWF mother's multiple-partner fertility does not matter, but father's does, at least in terms of the ordering of relationships (Choi, 2009). In contrast,

father's multiple-partner fertility is not related to in-kind support in the PSID (Garasky et al., 2009). The research using FF and SWWF (that finds relationships) controls for a variety of observable characteristics, but no attempt was made to control for unobserved differences between those couples who do or do not experience multiple partner fertility.

In this paper we make a contribution to this body of research by providing new data on informal support, explicitly examining whether its likelihood declines over time, and, especially, focusing on whether the decline is related to mother's multiple-partner or new-partner fertility. We also make a contribution by differentiating between shared and child-specific support, expecting to see a stronger connection between new-partner fertility and declines in shared support—testing the idea that fathers may signal: “I’m not supporting his kids.” Another key contribution is the use of a rich set of control variables, as well as alternative statistical methods, with the aim of accounting for both observed and unobserved differences between those couples who do or do not experience multiple-partner or new-partner fertility.

II. DATA AND METHODS

Data

We use the Survey of Wisconsin Works Families (SWWF), a longitudinal telephone and in-person survey of a stratified random sample of welfare mothers conducted in 1999, 2000, and 2004. Response rates in each wave are over 80 percent; weights account for differential nonresponse. For each mother, a child was randomly selected, and questions were asked about the father of the focal child. The survey provides information on father's informal contributions, on mother's re-partnering and fertility, as well as rich data on other demographic and socioeconomic factors.

We also use administrative records from three Wisconsin management information systems. The first is the child support system (KIDS), which we use to determine the amount of formal child support paid and received. We also use records from the welfare data system (CARES) to select the initial sample and to measure mothers' welfare receipt and food stamp receipt. Finally, we use records from the

unemployment insurance system to determine the amount of both parents' earnings. Administrative records of formal child support and welfare are complete; administrative records of earnings contain only earnings in the formal economy covered by the Unemployment Insurance system; nonetheless, Wisconsin's earnings records are estimated to include over 90 percent of all formal earnings (for a discussion of the use of administrative records, see Wallace and Haveman, 2007).

Sample

Because we are primarily interested in examining whether new-partner fertility is linked to changes in informal support, we need information on informal support at two time points. We use the first wave of the survey, conducted in 1999 (with most questions covering calendar-year 1998) and the third wave, conducted in 2004 (with most questions covering calendar-year 2003.² Seven hundred and nine mothers were interviewed in the third wave of the SWWF. We include only cases in which both parents and the focal child are known to be living (excluding 25 cases), the focal child lived with the mother and not the father for most of 1998 and 2003 (excluding 129 cases), at least one of the father's children living with the mother is under age 18 (excluding 36 cases), and the father was not incarcerated (excluding 77 cases). From this sample of 442 cases for whom informal support is potentially relevant in both years, we exclude 15 cases in which key information related to informal support or other variables is missing. Our final sample thus includes 427 mothers.

Key Variables

Informal Support. In 2004, the survey asked mothers six questions about whether the focal child's father contributed informal support, including: (a) shoes/clothes; (b) money for chores/spending money/allowance; (c) birthday, holiday, or other gifts; (d) food or groceries; (e) money for your rent or

²For 57 mothers, we use the 2000 survey rather than the 1999 survey because we do not have complete information from 1999.

mortgage or pay for it directly; (f) money to spend on child (other than regular child support).³ From these questions, we construct a simple dichotomous variable measuring whether any informal support was provided.

The six types of support can be divided into two categories, those specifically for the child and those more likely to be shared with others in the household. Shoes/clothes (a), giving a child money directly (b), and giving a child gifts (c) are all “child-specific” support, and in general cannot be used by any other children in the household. In contrast, food (d), money for the rent and money given to the mother (even if for the child), is more difficult to target, may directly benefit the mother or the other children, and thus is categorized as “shared” support. Conceptually, a given father may provide child specific support, shared support, both, or neither. However, in our data, almost everyone who provided shared support also provided child-specific support. Thus, in our analysis we consider whether fathers provided any informal support (child specific and/or shared), and whether they provided any shared support.

New-Partner Fertility. The survey includes an expanded household roster as of the interview date, and for each child, mothers were asked to identify whether that child’s father was the father of another child in the household. By comparing these expanded rosters, we are able to identify mothers who had new-partner fertility between 1998 and 2003.⁴ Note that our measures of paternity reflect mothers’ reports; these cases may or may not have had paternity formally established in the child support system.

³The survey also asks the mother to consider all sources and provide the total amount of informal support; with several ranges provided. Because the different years of the survey differ in the ranges provided, the unfolding sequence, and do not consider inflation in the setting of the ranges, we do not examine responses to this question. Moreover, the 1999 and 2000 surveys were identical to each other but slightly different from the 2004 survey in that the 1999/2000 survey provided two additional categories of support: paying for child care, school, or educational expenses and paying for medical expenses. Because these questions were not asked in 2004, we do not examine responses to these questions in 1999 and 2000. A second difference between 1999/2000 and 2004 is that in the earlier surveys, the question about money for chores, spending money or allowance was only asked if the oldest child in the sibship was at least three years old.

⁴To increase responsiveness, mothers are not asked to provide the name of each father, but merely whether a child’s father is the same or different. This makes it difficult to reconcile differences in reports across survey waves. We construct the number of fathers in each survey period. A “new” father occurs when the number of fathers increases. Note that some mothers report fewer fathers of their children in the 2004 survey than in 1999. This could

Formal Child Support. We use the state's administrative records of formal child support. We consider all child support payments made to the focal child's mother by the focal child's father, whether they are ever received by the family or not (some payments are retained by the state to offset welfare expenditures, others are for interest or fees rather than for the family, etc.). For fathers who do not pay support, we differentiate between those who do not have a formal child support order and those who have an order but did not pay. For fathers who do pay, we consider the dollar amount paid; we also include an indicator variable for whether the formal child support order was fully paid.

Analytic Strategy

Our primary interest is whether fathers provide less informal when the mother of their child(ren) has a child (or children) with another father (or fathers). One straightforward measure of this relationship is the simple cross-tabulation between the number of mother's partners and informal support. Alternatively, if the sequence of partnering matters, another simple measure would consider the relationship between the mother's new-partner fertility (NPF) between 1998–2003 and informal support provided in 2003. We consider both these measures below. We expect to find that mothers who have had children with multiple partners (MPF) or a child with a new partner (NPF) receive less informal support from the focal child's father. However, as noted above, rather than reflect a causal effect, a negative relationship could be the result of observed or unobserved characteristics that are correlated with MPF or NPF and informal support. For example, we might expect that if the focal child's parents do not get along well, the father would be less likely to provide informal support. If parents do not get along they may also be more likely to move on to another romantic relationship. In that case we would observe less informal

occur for a variety of reasons. For example, a father may have terminated paternity rights, and the child may not have an adoptive father. Still other cases are data errors. In our definition of new-partner fertility, we examine whether the number of fathers increased, treating the small number of cases with a decreasing number of fathers as identical to those with a constant number of fathers.

support among those with NPF—even if there was no causal relationship between NPF and the provision of informal support.

With these issues in mind, we are cautious in interpreting our first estimates, derived from a logit model estimating the relationship between mother's partnerships and the probability of informal support in the cross section (in 2004). We contrast these results with those from a difference-in-difference model that aims to identify the effect of changes in the number of partners (NPF) and informal support. Our hypothesis is that fathers will be less likely to contribute informal support when the mother has had a child with a new partner.

In addition to measures of mother's other partners, our models of the probability of informal support control for the amount of formal support paid by the focal father. Because fathers in the formal economy have little discretion over the amount of formal child support paid (Bartfeld and Meyer, 2003), for most fathers their discretion will be exercised in whether or not informal support is provided, treating formal payments as given. In addition to the amount of formal support, our models of whether informal support is provided include four other categories of variables. First, we consider measures associated with a father's ability to provide support, including indicators of his earnings capacity (his earnings, education, and age) and competing obligations (the mother's report of whether he has new children to support, and his current marital/partnership status). Second, we consider variables that might be related to his willingness to provide support to the focal child's household (the number of children the parents had together, the age of the youngest child in the focal child's sibship, and whether the parents were married when the focal child was born). Third, if fathers are altruistic, they would be more likely to provide support if the mother and children were in economic need (Beller and Graham, 1993). To measure this, we consider whether a mother's own income (including earnings, TANF, food stamps, and child support) was below the poverty line for her family size (including herself and all minor children), whether she received TANF, and whether a spouse or partner was living with her at the time of the interview. Finally, we control for several factors that could be related to either subsequent fertility or informal support (a

mother's race, the focal child's gender, and whether the mother was a part of a welfare reform group that was allowed to keep child support paid on their behalf (Cancian et al., 2008)).

Our primary interest is in the estimated relationship between MPF or NPF and informal support. Our cross sectional logit models of informal support paid in 2003 include measures of mother's number of partners (MPF). Our difference-in-difference estimates are based on two observations for every mother, one for 1998 and one for 2003. The model includes a variable indicating whether the mother experienced new-partner fertility between 1998 and 2003, another variable that differentiates the 2003 observations, and an interaction term. The coefficient on new-partner fertility provides information on whether the types of mothers that experience NPF differ from those who do not, and the interaction tells us whether informal support is lower once NPF has occurred. In this way, the model controls for time-invariant unobserved differences between mothers who do and do not experience NPF; to the extent those can be captured by the single variable.⁵

Both the cross sectional and difference-in-difference models are estimated with two alternative measures of informal support; any informal support, and any shared support. Shared support is, by definition, less easily targeted. Thus, we expect that shared support will be especially sensitive to MPF and NPF, since fathers may be less willing to provide support shared by other fathers' children.

III. RESULTS

Sample Characteristics

Characteristics of our sample are provided in Appendix Table 1. Consistent with other samples of welfare participants, the final panel shows that in the first wave, most the mothers in our sample were young (about two-thirds were under age 30), had young children (on average, the focal child was 5 years

⁵In these models, we estimate standard errors that incorporate the fact that there are two observations from the same mother (1998 and 2003). We have also tested preliminary models using a propensity-score matching technique in which only the cases without NPF that are statistically similar to those with NPF are used in the comparison. These models show substantially similar results.

old), had low levels of formal education, and were more likely to be women of color (only about one-fourth were white). The fathers of focal child were also disadvantaged: more than two-fifths had no earnings reported in 1998, and more than one-third had less than a high school degree.

In 1998, three out of five mothers received informal support. Child-specific support was more common than shared support. The most common type of support was gifts (52 percent), followed by clothes or shoes (47 percent). Less common were allowances (23 percent), food (20 percent), cash (24 percent), and money for rent (7 percent). Overall, fewer mothers received informal support in 2003, with the percentage decreasing from 60 percent to 50 percent. There is some consistency over time: those who received support in 1998 were fairly likely to receive in 2003 (66 percent), while those not receiving in 1998 were quite likely to continue without support in 2003 (74 percent). Shared informal support is less common and also declines, from 30 percent in 1998 to 23 percent in 2003. For shared support, there is also some consistency over time, but in this case among those who were providing in 1998, more stopped (56 percent) than continued (44 percent).

Even in the first year of the survey, multiple-partner fertility was fairly common, with 15 percent of mothers having had children with three or more fathers and an additional 33 percent of mothers having had children with two fathers.

Bivariate Relationship between Mothers' Partnerships and Receipt of Informal Support

As expected, simple bivariate analysis suggests that an individual father is less likely to provide informal support when the mother has also had children with another father (or fathers). Among mothers who do not have multiple-partner fertility in 1998, seventy percent of focal fathers provided informal support, compared to only 49 percent of the focal fathers whose partners had children with another father. Shared support shows a similar pattern in 1998: 39 percent of the fathers provide shared support to mothers who had not had children with other fathers, compared to fewer than 19 percent of fathers in cases in which the mother had MPF.

Consistent with our hypotheses, those who experienced new-partner fertility between 1998 and 2003 were less likely to receive support in 2003: 53 percent of those without NPF received informal support, compared to 41 percent of those with NPF. The difference for shared support is even stronger: 26 percent of those without NPF received shared support, compared to only 15 percent of those with NPF.

Based on these simple cross-tabulations, it appears that when the mother has had children with other partners, fathers are less likely to provide informal support, and especially less likely to provide shared informal support. But as outlined above, this simple analysis is difficult to interpret because unobserved differences between mothers with and without multiple partners may account for differences in informal support.

Multivariate Analysis: Is Multiple-Partner and New-Partner Fertility Related to Providing Informal Support?

In Table 1 we show results from both a cross-sectional logit model and a difference-in-difference analysis of the likelihood of a mother receiving any informal support from the father of the focal child. The first set of columns shows the cross-sectional results for 2003. We examine whether the existence of other fathers is associated with a lower likelihood of informal support, controlling for a variety of observed characteristics. As hypothesized, when there is more than one father, there is a lower likelihood that the father of focal child will contribute informal support, even in a multivariate context controlling for other observed characteristics.⁶

The previous literature shows conflicting results on the relationship between informal and formal child support. Our results suggest that both those without an order, and those fully paying their formal child support order are more likely to provide informal support, relative to those with an order who are paying less than is owed. The remaining variables are broadly consistent with expectations. We find some

⁶We also estimated a cross sectional model of the relationship between NPF between 1998 and 2003 and informal support in 2003, and found a similar relationship as shown here for MPF (coefficient estimate of -0.791; p=.009).

TABLE 1
Likelihood of Providing Any Informal Support

| | Cross-Sectional (2003) | | Difference-in-Difference | |
|--|------------------------|----------|--------------------------|----------|
| | t3 | | | |
| New-Partner Fertility and Multiple-Partner Fertility | | | | |
| <i>Multiple-Partner Fertility (compared to one father)</i> | | | | |
| 2 fathers | -0.540 | 0.299* | | |
| 3+ fathers | -0.730 | 0.338** | | |
| <i>New-Partner Fertility</i> | | | -0.693 | 0.293** |
| <i>Time</i> | | | -0.086 | 0.253 |
| <i>Interaction</i> | | | 0.040 | 0.349 |
| Formal Child Support | | | | |
| <i>Amount Paid (compared to paid nothing on a formal obligation)</i> | | | | |
| Nothing owed | 1.297 | 0.523** | 0.806 | 0.308*** |
| Paid \$1–1000 | 0.456 | 0.378 | 0.346 | 0.275 |
| Paid \$1000–3000 | 0.066 | 0.449 | 0.044 | 0.349 |
| Paid \$3000+ | 0.213 | 0.577 | 0.284 | 0.447 |
| <i>CS Fullpay</i> | 1.020 | 0.422** | 0.352 | 0.338 |
| Father's Ability to Provide Support and Constraints | | | | |
| <i>Father's Earnings (compared to 0)</i> | | | | |
| 1–5000 | 0.307 | 0.403 | -0.008 | 0.301 |
| 5000–15000 | 0.766 | 0.457* | 0.846 | 0.294*** |
| 15000–25000 | 1.848 | 0.702*** | 1.640 | 0.470*** |
| 25000+ | 0.420 | 0.502 | 0.786 | 0.383** |
| <i>Father's Education (compared to < 12 years)</i> | | | | |
| High school degree | -0.467 | 0.286* | 0.165 | 0.224 |
| More than high school | 0.310 | 0.357 | 0.497 | 0.293* |
| <i>Father's Age (compared to < 30)</i> | | | | |
| 30–39 | 0.089 | 0.304 | -0.154 | 0.224 |
| 40+ | 0.088 | 0.422 | 0.195 | 0.332 |
| <i>Any Children in Father's Household</i> | -0.684 | 0.293** | -0.590 | 0.239** |
| <i>Father Married or Cohabiting</i> | -0.159 | 0.306 | -0.275 | 0.234 |
| Father's Willingness to Provide Support | | | | |
| <i>Number of Children Together (compared to one)</i> | | | | |
| 2 | -0.281 | 0.324 | 0.002 | 0.228 |
| 3+ | 0.553 | 0.395 | 0.612 | 0.324* |
| <i>Youngest Child in Sibship's Age (compared to 0–5)</i> | | | | |
| 6–12 | -1.327 | 0.445*** | -0.956 | 0.239*** |
| 13+ | -1.560 | 0.507*** | -1.394 | 0.381*** |
| <i>Parent's Living Together at Child's Birth</i> | -0.210 | 0.295 | 0.265 | 0.222 |
| Mother's Need | | | | |
| <i>Mother's Own Income Below Poverty</i> | 0.842 | 0.366** | 0.371 | 0.232 |
| <i>Mother's Marital/Cohabiting Status (compared to no partner)</i> | | | | |
| Married/cohab to father of a child | -0.236 | 0.428 | -0.150 | 0.342 |
| Married/cohab to non-father | -0.470 | 0.338 | -0.532 | 0.273* |
| <i>Mother's TANF Receipt in Last Year (compared to none)</i> | | | | |
| < 6 months | -0.149 | 0.351 | -0.077 | 0.233 |
| 6 to 12 months | 0.863 | 0.431** | 0.527 | 0.268** |

(table continues)

TABLE 1, continued

| | Cross-Sectional (2003) | | Difference-in-Difference | |
|--|------------------------|----------|--------------------------|----------|
| | t3 | | | |
| Control Variables | | | | |
| <i>Mother's Race (compared to white)</i> | | | | |
| black | 1.323 | 0.343*** | 1.190 | 0.275*** |
| other | -0.210 | 0.437 | 0.039 | 0.320 |
| <i>Focal child male</i> | -0.491 | 0.253* | -0.566 | 0.204*** |
| <i>Full pass-through group</i> | -0.443 | 0.251* | -0.495 | 0.202** |
| <i>t2 case</i> | 0.339 | 0.497 | 0.948 | 0.444** |
| Intercept | 0.635 | 0.715 | 0.497 | 0.442 |
| N | | 427 | | 854 |
| Log-likelihood | | -220.3 | | -445.3 |

Note: Model also includes indicator variables for missing focal father's age, children in focal father's household, and focal father's earnings.

*** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.10

evidence that fathers with more ability (and fewer constraints) are more likely to provide support. More specifically, fathers with higher earnings and those who are not living with new children are generally more likely to provide informal support. Our predictions that father's willingness to provide support will be important receives some confirmation: those with younger children (i.e. more recent relationships) are more likely to provide support. Mothers with higher need (below poverty or receiving TANF benefits for longer periods) are more likely to receive support. Finally, mothers of color are more likely to receive informal support, girls are more likely to receive support than boys, and those in the full pass-through group are less likely to receive informal support.⁷

These models, which control for a variety of observable characteristics of fathers, mothers, and the focal child, suggest that fathers are less likely to provide informal support when other fathers are involved. But this could simply reflect unobserved characteristics of the mothers who have children with other fathers, which may be related to their partnering with fathers who are less likely to provide support. With this in mind, we estimate a difference-in-difference model to capture differences in informal support in response to NPF.

The results, shown in the second set of columns in Table 1, include measures of the relationship between informal support and new partner fertility, time (comparing 1998 and 2003) and an interaction between new-partnered fertility and time. In this model, those with new-partner fertility are less likely to receive support. The coefficients on time and the interaction coefficient are small and statistically insignificant. This pattern of results shows that fathers whose ex-partners have new-partner fertility are no less likely to provide support in the second period (after new-partner fertility has occurred) than they were in the first period (before new-partner fertility occurred). These results suggest that the types of mothers who will have new-partner fertility are different from those who will not, and that the unmeasured characteristics of the parents or their relationship, rather than the new partner fertility itself, are related to

⁷Note that in the original Child Support Demonstration Evaluation, those in the full pass-through group were found to be significantly more likely to receive formal support (Cancian et al., 2008), and related results were suggestive of those in the full pass-through group receiving more, rather than less, informal support.

a lack of informal support. In most other respects, the results of the two models are similar, though some estimated relationships are statistically significant in one model and not the other.

Multivariate Analysis: Is New-Partner Fertility Related to Providing Shared Informal Support?

Recall that our expectation is that fathers will be particularly likely to cut back on shared support when the mother of their child has had a child with another partner. Table 2 examines these relationships, following the same modeling strategy as reflected in Table 1. The first set of columns show the relationship between MPF and receipt of shared informal support in 2003. Consistent with expectations and with the results of the analysis of any informal support, the first set of columns show that fathers are less likely to provide shared support when their child's mother has had children with other men.⁸

The second set of columns shows the estimates from a difference-in-difference model of shared informal support. While the coefficient estimate on NPF is negative, it is not statistically significant; there is no statistically discernible difference between mothers who eventually have NPF and those who do not in the likelihood of receiving shared informal support. Shared support is less likely in 2003 than in 1998. More importantly, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that those with new-partner fertility are even less likely to provide shared support in 2003 after new-partner fertility has occurred than fathers whose partners did not experience new-partner fertility. In contrast to the results for any informal support (Table 1), we find that NPF is associated with a decline in shared support, even when controlling for time-invariant unobserved differences between those who do and do not have NPF.

In other respects our models of shared informal support generally show similar relationships to those for any informal support in Table 1: fathers with more ability to pay and fewer constraints are more likely to provide shared support, as are fathers with characteristics suggesting they might be more willing

⁸We also estimated a cross sectional model of the relationship between NPF between 1998 and 2003 and shared informal support in 2003, and found a similar relationship as shown here for MPF (coefficient estimate of -0.922; p=.010).

TABLE 2
Likelihood of Providing Shared Informal Support

| | Cross-Sectional (2003) | | Difference-in-Difference | |
|--|------------------------|----------|--------------------------|----------|
| New-Partner Fertility and Multiple-Partner Fertility | | | | |
| <i>Multiple-Partner Fertility (compared to one father)</i> | | | | |
| 2 fathers | -0.618 | 0.345* | | |
| 3+ fathers | -0.936 | 0.397** | | |
| <i>New-Partner Fertility</i> | | | -0.124 | 0.309 |
| <i>Time</i> | | | 0.513 | 0.285* |
| <i>Interaction</i> | | | -0.717 | 0.443* |
| Formal Child Support | | | | |
| <i>Amount Paid (compared to paid nothing on an obligation)</i> | | | | |
| Nothing owed | 0.662 | 0.592 | 0.360 | 0.345 |
| Paid \$1–1000 | 0.371 | 0.442 | 0.152 | 0.300 |
| Paid \$1000–3000 | -1.167 | 0.592** | -0.977 | 0.461** |
| Paid \$3000+ | -1.644 | 0.733** | -1.416 | 0.608** |
| <i>CS Fullpay</i> | 1.298 | 0.523** | 1.238 | 0.371*** |
| Father's Ability to Provide Support and Constraints | | | | |
| <i>Father's Earnings (compared to 0)</i> | | | | |
| 1–5000 | -0.320 | 0.511 | 0.054 | 0.320 |
| 5000–15000 | 0.318 | 0.580 | 0.626 | 0.341* |
| 15000–25000 | 0.787 | 0.681 | 0.611 | 0.471 |
| 25000+ | 1.328 | 0.601** | 0.750 | 0.488 |
| <i>Father's Education (compared to < 12 years)</i> | | | | |
| High school degree | -0.469 | 0.347 | 0.037 | 0.235 |
| More than high school | 0.255 | 0.408 | 0.363 | 0.327 |
| <i>Father's Age (compared to < 30)</i> | | | | |
| 30–39 | 0.424 | 0.367 | 0.089 | 0.256 |
| 40+ | 0.312 | 0.505 | 0.333 | 0.373 |
| <i>Any Children in Father's Household</i> | -0.405 | 0.341 | -0.453 | 0.251* |
| <i>Father Married or Cohabiting</i> | -0.388 | 0.345 | -0.720 | 0.251*** |
| Father's Willingness to Provide Support | | | | |
| <i>Number of Children Together (compared to one)</i> | | | | |
| 2 | -0.061 | 0.387 | 0.148 | 0.258 |
| 3+ | 0.651 | 0.436 | 0.567 | 0.305* |
| <i>Youngest Child is Sibship's Age (compared to 0–5)</i> | | | | |
| 6–12 | -1.206 | 0.457*** | -1.147 | 0.241*** |
| 13+ | -1.635 | 0.565*** | -1.751 | 0.456*** |
| <i>Parent's Living Together at Child's Birth</i> | -0.150 | 0.341 | 0.182 | 0.261 |
| Mother's Need | | | | |
| <i>Mother's Own Income Below Poverty</i> | 0.696 | 0.451 | 0.310 | 0.259 |
| <i>Mother's Marital/Cohabiting Status (compared to no partner)</i> | | | | |
| Married/cohab to father of a child | 0.337 | 0.540 | 0.497 | 0.389 |
| Married/cohab to non-father | -0.230 | 0.434 | -0.725 | 0.373* |
| <i>Mother's TANF Receipt in Last Year (compared to none)</i> | | | | |
| < 6 months | -0.021 | 0.408 | 0.104 | 0.260 |
| 6 to 12 months | 0.756 | 0.448* | 0.074 | 0.290 |

(table continues)

TABLE 2, continued

| | Cross-Sectional (2003) | | Difference-in-Difference | |
|--|------------------------|----------|--------------------------|----------|
| Control Variables | | | | |
| <i>Mother's Race (compared to white)</i> | | | | |
| black | 1.454 | 0.430*** | 1.485 | 0.285*** |
| other | 0.184 | 0.605 | 0.325 | 0.407 |
| <i>Focal Child Male</i> | -0.043 | 0.295 | 0.127 | 0.214 |
| <i>Full Pass-Through Group</i> | -0.380 | 0.293 | -0.545 | 0.225** |
| <i>t2case</i> | 0.103 | 0.591 | 0.511 | 0.555 |
| Intercept | -1.037 | 0.815 | -1.362 | 0.506*** |
| N | | 427 | | 854 |
| Log-likelihood | | -169.5 | | -384.7 |

Note: Model also includes indicator variables for missing focal father's age, children in focal father's household, and focal father's earnings.

*** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.10

to provide shared support, and fathers associated with mothers with higher economic needs. In contrast to the results for any informal support, those who pay more formal child support are less likely to provide informal shared support.

IV. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

Using panel data for a sample of TANF participants, for whom informal support may be particularly important given their economic vulnerability, we find that informal support is fairly common in 1998, but it declines over time. In our descriptive data, we find that declines in informal support are more likely for mothers who have children with new partners. In our simple multivariate models, we find evidence that mothers with multiple partner fertility are less likely to receive any informal support and are also less likely to receive shared informal support. However, our preferred difference-in-difference estimates suggest that differences in the likelihood of receiving any informal support are due to unobserved differences between those who do and do not go on to have children with new partners. In contrast, the decline in shared informal support persists, suggesting a causal relationship: these results imply that fathers are less likely to provide support that is not child-specific when another father's children are added to the household.

The decline over time in informal support highlights the importance of formal support, and understanding the relationship between informal and formal support. Our preferred models show no evidence that those who pay more formal support are less likely to provide informal support (though they are less likely to provide shared support). While some may worry that requiring formal support leads to a decline in informal support, and to mothers being no better off overall, we find little evidence of this tradeoff here.

This research provides additional information on how fathers are responding to complicated families through how much they contribute in informal support. This research complements other work examining how fathers respond to complicated families through the formal system. Multiple-partner fertility creates thorny policy problems for the formal child support system; this is similar to a number of

areas in which social policy has difficulties responding to contemporary family complexity (Smeeding and Carlson, 2010). Because family complexity is becoming increasingly common, the policy response in the child support system and in other systems is quite important.

APPENDIX TABLE 1
Descriptive Information on Variables

| | 1998 | | 2003 | |
|--|------|-------|------|-------|
| | N | % | N | % |
| Any Informal Support | | | | |
| No | 169 | 40.19 | 203 | 50.19 |
| Yes | 258 | 59.81 | 224 | 49.81 |
| Any Shared Support | | | | |
| No | 303 | 70.23 | 332 | 76.96 |
| Yes | 124 | 29.77 | 95 | 23.04 |
| Multiple-Partner Fertility for Mother | | | | |
| Children with 1 father | 227 | 52.35 | 152 | 35.61 |
| Children with 2 fathers | 142 | 33.05 | 169 | 38.53 |
| Children with >2 fathers | 58 | 14.6 | 106 | 25.86 |
| New-Partner Fertility For Mother | | | | |
| No change | | | 300 | 71.09 |
| Increase | | | 127 | 28.91 |
| Formal Child Support | | | | |
| Nothing owed | 148 | 34.79 | 70 | 18.95 |
| Something owed, paid zero | 86 | 21.25 | 97 | 23.27 |
| Paid \$1–1000 | 84 | 19.83 | 83 | 19.53 |
| Paid \$1000–3000 | 69 | 16.40 | 99 | 22.82 |
| Paid \$3000+ | 40 | 7.74 | 78 | 15.43 |
| Full Payment | | | | |
| No | 236 | 80.22 | 294 | 71.20 |
| Yes | 91 | 19.78 | 133 | 28.80 |
| Father's Ability to Provide Support and Constraints | | | | |
| Father's Earnings | | | | |
| 0 | 177 | 42.67 | 223 | 52.44 |
| 1–5000 | 64 | 14.71 | 44 | 11.02 |
| 5000–15000 | 79 | 17.58 | 42 | 9.71 |
| 15000–25000 | 38 | 7.54 | 29 | 5.05 |
| 25000+ | 29 | 5.68 | 49 | 9.96 |
| Missing | 40 | 11.82 | 40 | 11.82 |
| Father's Education | | | | |
| Less than high school | 148 | 35.53 | 119 | 30.55 |
| High school degree | 190 | 44.12 | 221 | 49.76 |
| More than high school | 30 | 6.66 | 87 | 19.69 |
| Missing | 58 | 13.69 | 0 | 0 |
| Father's Age | | | | |
| Less than 30 | 220 | 51.45 | 115 | 26.92 |
| 30–39 | 147 | 33.71 | 207 | 48.06 |
| 40+ | 43 | 9.17 | 88 | 19.36 |
| missing | 17 | 5.67 | 17 | 5.67 |
| Any Children in Father's Household | | | | |
| No | 165 | 35.87 | 182 | 40.66 |
| Yes | 122 | 28.62 | 214 | 49.93 |
| Missing | 140 | 35.52 | 31 | 9.41 |

(table continues)

APPENDIX TABLE 1, continued

| | 1998 | | 2003 | |
|--|------|-------|------|-------|
| | N | % | N | % |
| Father's Marital Status | | | | |
| Single | 157 | 35.55 | 124 | 27.66 |
| Married/cohab | 144 | 32.41 | 284 | 65.94 |
| Missing | 126 | 32.04 | 19 | 6.4 |
| Father's Willingness to Provide Support | | | | |
| Number of Focal Child's Full Sibship | | | | |
| 1 | 262 | 61.88 | 234 | 54.73 |
| 2 | 109 | 25.87 | 115 | 26.99 |
| 3+ | 56 | 12.25 | 78 | 18.28 |
| Age Of Youngest Child in Focal Child's Full Sibship | | | | |
| 0-5 | 265 | 61.71 | 64 | 13.69 |
| 6-12 | 159 | 37.33 | 255 | 61.12 |
| 13-18 | 3 | 0.96 | 108 | 25.19 |
| Parent's Living Together at Focal Child's Birth | | | | |
| NOT living together | 295 | 71.39 | | |
| Living together | 132 | 28.61 | | |
| Mother's Needs | | | | |
| Mother's Own Income | | | | |
| In poverty | 334 | 79.73 | 367 | 86.43 |
| Not in poverty | 93 | 20.27 | 60 | 13.57 |
| Mother's Marital Status | | | | |
| Single | 346 | 82.71 | 304 | 74.27 |
| Married/cohab to a father | 30 | 5.95 | 51 | 10.51 |
| Married/cohab to a non-father | 51 | 11.34 | 72 | 15.22 |
| Mother's TANF Status in the Year | | | | |
| No receipt | 135 | 28.56 | 330 | 73.69 |
| Less than 6 months | 150 | 30.41 | 55 | 15.06 |
| 6 to 12 months | 142 | 41.03 | 42 | 11.24 |
| Other Information | | | | |
| Mother's Age in 1998 | | | | |
| less than 30 | 280 | 65.45 | | |
| 30-39 | 112 | 26.76 | | |
| 40+ | 35 | 7.79 | | |
| Focal Child's Age in 1998 | | | | |
| 0-5 | 248 | 57.45 | | |
| 6-12 | 160 | 38.46 | | |
| 13-18 | 19 | 4.09 | | |
| Mother's Education in 1998 | | | | |
| Less than high school | 130 | 33.07 | | |
| High school degree | 267 | 60.15 | | |
| More than high school | 21 | 4.36 | | |
| Missing | 9 | 2.42 | | |

(table continues)

APPENDIX TABLE 1, continued

| | 1998 | | 2003 | |
|------------------------------------|------|-------|------|---|
| | N | % | N | % |
| Mother's Race | | | | |
| White | 134 | 25.74 | | |
| Black | 241 | 61.02 | | |
| Other | 52 | 13.24 | | |
| Focal Child's Gender | | | | |
| Female | 240 | 55.01 | | |
| Male | 187 | 44.99 | | |
| Full Pass-Through Group | | | | |
| No | 226 | 50.6 | | |
| Yes | 201 | 49.4 | | |
| Source of First-Period Data | | | | |
| First wave interview | 396 | 93.4 | | |
| Second wave interview | 31 | 6.6 | | |

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