Chapter 8
Nonresident Fathers' Involvement with Children: A Look at Families on W-2

Judith A. Seltzer and Nora Cate Schaeffer

Children have both material and emotional needs.[1] Policies designed to improve their material well-being, such as the pass-through of the full amount of child support under CSDE, may also affect parents' behavior in ways that affect children's emotional well-being. This chapter describes the social and economic involvement of nonresident fathers of children supported by Wisconsin Works (W-2). We focus on aspects of paternal involvement that may be important for children's welfare. In describing how fathers are involved with their children, we distinguish between social aspects of nonresident fathers' participation in child rearing and economic transfers of two types—the in-kind contributions fathers may make (e.g., providing food or clothing) and money that nonresident fathers provide the mother and child "under the table" to help support the children. Thus, the social and economic contributions we focus on here are those outside the system of formal child support. However at the end of the chapter, we also describe briefly the coincidence of informal and formal child support contributions and the coincidence of social involvement, informal economic contributions, and formal child support.

The constraints and demands faced by low-income families make them difficult to study, although they are frequently the target of social policies. Much of what we know about nonresident fathers' involvement in low-income families comes from ethnographic research and from sample surveys, which rely largely on mothers' reports. This chapter uses data from a two-wave survey of parents whose children were eligible for formal child support (whether or not the family already had a formal child support order) and the resident mother was on W-2. We describe fathers' involvement using information from both mothers' and fathers' reports as well as administrative data. Although the population is restricted to families on W-2 at the end of the 1990s, these families on W-2 have experiences in common with other low-income families. Information presented elsewhere in this report and in reports of other programs with similar goals can be used to suggest ways in which this population may be similar to or different from other populations of interest to policy makers.[2] Our description complements those in other studies because of the unusually high response rate for low-income resident mothers and the availability of reports from matched mothers and fathers for part of the sample.

The chapter is organized as follows. We begin with a brief review of research on fathers' social and economic involvement with children. The second section summarizes the effects of a random-assignment experiment to evaluate the effects on paternal involvement of a full pass-through of formal child support as compared to a partial pass-through. (See Volume I for a detailed discussion of the

---

[1]The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance received in preparing this report. Research assistance was provided by Sheri Meland, Shauna Morimoto, and Sara Wakefield (University of Wisconsin) and Christine Schwartz (UCLA). Administrative data used were constructed under the supervision of Patricia Brown, CSDE Data Manager; survey data are from the Survey of Wisconsin Works Families, Margaret Krecker, Survey Manager. Steven Cook provided expert help with administrative data on child support payments and many last-minute questions. A preliminary version of this report was presented at the CSDE National Advisory Board meeting November, 2000. The authors thank participants, and especially the discussants, Vivian Gadsden and Virginia Knox, and the Principal Investigators, Daniel Meyer and Maria Cancian for helpful comments.

[2]Compare, for example, the population targeted by Parents' Fair Share (Knox and Redcross, 2000) or Fragile Families (McLanahan, Garfinkel, and Padilla, 1999; McLanahan, Garfinkel, and Waller, 1999).

experiment and its results.) In the third section we present our approach and the data we use in this chapter. The fourth section describes our results. We report first about levels of involvement and informal economic contributions from fathers in these low-income W-2 families. The data emphasize fathers' time and economic investments in children over measures of the quality of father-child interaction. When possible we compare the W-2 data to data from a national sample of separated families. Our description compares the reports of all the mothers we interviewed at two points in time to the reports of mothers and fathers who are "matched" by being parents of the same child. We then turn to describing how nonresident fathers combine informal and formal child support contributions and how they combine spending time with children with informal and formal child support. The last section summarizes and interprets our findings.

Previous Research

Ethnographic evidence suggests that even in "separated" families the father may live with the mother and child for part of the year (Edin and Lein, 1997; Levine, 1997). Coresidence is an important way that fathers share the social and economic responsibilities of taking care of children. This strategy of coresidence may be particularly important when low-income parents are living together because they cannot afford to marry. (See Seltzer, 2000b, for a review of differentials and explanations for nonmarital childbearing and cohabitation.)

Once they begin to live apart from their children, nonresident fathers may still participate in child rearing by spending time with children and contributing to their economic support. Fathers who pay more child support also spend more time with their children (Furstenberg et al., 1983; Seltzer, Schaeffer, and Charng, 1989; Seltzer, 1991; McLanahan et al., 1994; but see Veum, 1993). Nonresident parents who pay support are likely to spend more time with the children and pay closer attention to how the resident parent spends the child support money (Weiss and Willis, 1985; Braver et al., 1993). When nonresident parents, usually fathers, pay child support, they may see themselves, and be seen by the resident parent, as better parents; as a result, they may spend more time with their children and try to play a bigger role in making decisions about the children's lives. Resident parents, usually mothers, who receive child support may see the nonresident parents' claims to access and influence as more legitimate and, as a result, may facilitate greater involvement by the nonresident parent with their children.

Although child support policies and fatherhood policy initiatives seek to increase nonresident fathers' participation in child rearing, such policies may also increase children's exposure to parental conflict if parents who would otherwise avoid each other are drawn together. Parents who separate are likely to disagree about important issues, including how to raise their children. In addition, when nonresident parents seek greater access to their children, parents may disagree about scheduling visits and what nonresident parents and children do when they are together. Thus, any benefits to children of increased nonresident parents' involvement must be balanced against the potential costs of children's greater exposure to conflict. On the other hand, if resident parents adopt a positive image of nonresident parents, particularly those who are more involved in child rearing, children may not be exposed to high levels of parental conflict, at least not the intense conflict that is potentially more damaging to children's well-being.

Fathers' participation in child rearing changes as children grow older, due to the child's development and changing needs and to changes in fathers' and mothers' lives. New parents have had little opportunity to establish hard-to-break habits of interaction, and for this reason it is particularly important to examine fathers' involvement in low-income separated families as the parents are learning how to negotiate child-rearing responsibilities when they live apart. Parents of young children may be

particularly responsive to policies that try to change parents' behavior. Recent results from the Parents' Fair Share evaluation suggest a greater impact of the program on paternal involvement when parents have young children (Knox and Redcross, 2000). Similarly, programs to alleviate problems of child access are more successful when parents are not yet entrenched in their positions (Pearson and Thoennes, 1998). Investigations using national survey data also suggest that to understand whether child support policies affect other aspects of family relationships, one must focus on family experiences during the early period after separation or when children are young (Seltzer, 2000a). The design of the Fragile Families and Child Well-Being Study, which follows children and their parents from the time the child was born, explicitly recognizes this need (McLanahan, Garfinkel, and Padilla, 1999; McLanahan, Garfinkel, and Waller, 1999).

Summary of Experimental Results

In Volume I of this report we analyzed the effects of the pass-through experiment on the social involvement of fathers and their informal economic transfers to their children. We expected that the experiment would increase fathers' social involvement with children, increase children's exposure to conflict, and increase their informal economic contributions. We were unable to predict an experimental effect on the financial value of informal transfers because theory and past research are inconsistent. Overall, our analysis shows a general absence of any experimental effect on fathers' social involvement with children, when social involvement is measured by the amount and type of time fathers spend with children. Our findings do suggest that parents may have less intense conflict under the full pass-through than in the control group, at least according to mothers' reports, and the financial value of informal transfers is somewhat higher for those in the experimental group than for those in the control group. However, there is no evidence overall that mothers in the experimental group are more likely to receive informal transfers than those in the control group. Nor is there an effect of the experiment on the number of different types of informal transfers using mothers' reports for the full sample. Because we find experimental effects on some of the outcomes examined in this chapter, we limit the analysis in this chapter to families in the experimental group, that is, those who were eligible for the full pass-through. Wisconsin Works families who were not randomly assigned to the experiment are eligible for the full pass-through, so the descriptive results we report describe the circumstances of the typical separated family in which the mother and child receive W-2 support.

Data and Analysis Plan

Our analysis combines data from the Survey of Wisconsin Works Families, a two-wave survey, and administrative data on formal child support payments from KIDS, the statewide system for recording formal child support payments and receipts. The target population for the survey was mothers associated with W-2 cases that entered the system between September 1997 and July 1998 who had at least one minor child eligible for formal child support from the father. The survey design also includes interviews with the legal fathers of these children. The design explicitly excludes families in which the father alone or someone other than the mother (or mother and father together) was the primary resident parent. Moreover, most questions in the survey were designed for families in which the mother was the resident parent, and many questions did not apply to families in which she was not. The first wave of the survey was conducted in 1999; most questions asked respondents about their lives and W-2 experiences in 1998, the first full year that W-2 was in place. Follow-up surveys conducted in 2000 asked about experiences in 1999. Interviews were conducted by telephone and in person. The response rate for mothers was about 82 percent at each wave. For nonresident fathers the response rate was considerably lower, as for other

surveys of nonresident fathers (Schaeffer, Seltzer, and Dykema, 1998). At each wave only about one-third of eligible fathers were interviewed. The analysis below uses weights to adjust for nonresponse and stratification in the original sample design (see Volume III, Technical Report 4, which describes the construction of sample weights).[3] Tables include unweighted numbers of cases.

Our analysis describes the experiences of a triad: the mother, a randomly selected child in her home, and that child's father. For selected outcomes we compare resident mothers' reports about paternal involvement with reports from nonresident fathers. Mothers reported about the child's father whether or not he was the child's legal father. Fathers reports are only available when he was legally identified as the child's father either because the child was born when the father and mother were married or because paternity was established. More details about the sample, including its demographic characteristics, and other aspects of the study design are in Volume III, Technical Reports 1 and 5.

Data on time that fathers spend with children, activities they pursue, parents' attitudes, conflict between parents, and informal transfers (those outside the formal child support system) come exclusively from the survey because the administrative records do not cover these topics. With a single exception, there are no external criteria with which to evaluate the reports obtained in the survey. The exception is formal child support: the survey included questions that asked about the amount of child support received, and reports in the survey can be compared with information taken from administrative records. Comparisons of mothers' and fathers' reports about formal child support with information in the administrative records provide grounds for speculation about differences between the reports of mothers and fathers on other matters (Schaeffer, Seltzer, and Dykema, 1998, pp. 13–14; Dykema and Schaeffer, 2000, p. 620).

Our description has two components: We use the reports of mothers who were interviewed at both times to describe the experiences of all families for which the full amount of child support was passed through (i.e., mothers in the experimental group and all resident mothers on W-2). This analysis is based on mothers interviewed at both times, so that the composition of the analytic sample is the same for 1998 and 1999, with very minor exceptions for change over time in whether the father and child were still living. We use mothers' reports to describe the sample as a whole because mothers participated in the survey at a much higher rate than did fathers.[4] There is also reason to think that for some variables, there is less response error in the reports of mothers (see, for example, Schaeffer, Seltzer, and Klawitter, 1991).

---

[3]The results in this chapter report weighted percentages and means. The results in Volume I, which examines experimental effects, are weighted and adjusted for several aspects of the composition of the sample at entry into the experiment. Therefore the levels of involvement reported in these two locations will differ slightly.

The analysis in this chapter, like that in Volume I, uses data from cases in which the mother was interviewed in both 1998 and 1999. The data for matched parents include cases where both the mother and father were interviewed in 1998, or in 1999. Finally, we use the original weight variables current on January 15, 2001. The correlation between these weights and the weights used in Volume I are: .96 for all mothers, .98 for matched parents in 1998, and .97 for matched parents in 1999.

[4]Previous methodological work demonstrates that differences between estimates based on data from mothers and fathers are due to differences in rates of survey participation (fathers who are more likely to be involved with their children are much more likely to participate), as well as to reporting differences that reflect differences in parents' knowledge about the outcome and parents' desire to provide socially approved responses. (See, for example, Schaeffer, Seltzer, and Dykema, 1998; Schaeffer, Seltzer, and Klawitter, 1991.)

The second component of our description compares the reports of matched mothers and fathers who are reporting about the same child. Although this comparison concerns a highly selective group—the proportion of W-2 cases in the sample for which both parents participated is relatively small (see Volume III, Technical Report 6)— the comparison is not affected by compositional differences, as would be the case if we compared all mothers interviewed with all fathers interviewed. Because the comparison concerns the same parents reporting about the same child, it provides us with the best picture available with these data of how fathers' and mothers' perceptions of the same phenomena differ.

The survey sample and instrument are structured so that the data refer to resident mothers and nonresident fathers. This reflects the most common living arrangement for children in separated families (Grall, 2000). The questionnaire identifies families in which the father lived with the mother and focal child for all of the reference period (1998 for wave 1 of the survey, 1999 for wave 2). It also provides information about the number of months of coresidence for families in which the father was present in the household for part, but not all of the year. The portion of the analysis that examines residence includes families in which the mother was the resident parent as well as families in which the focal child lived with both parents. All questions about visiting, informal transfers, and conflict between parents refer to the period when the father lived apart from the mother and child; therefore, families in which the father lived with the mother and child for the entire year are excluded from these parts of the analysis.[5] All questions about fathers' contact with children ask about involvement with the randomly selected focal child. All questions about in-kind contributions, informal financial transfers, and formal child support are about contributions for the focal child and his or her full siblings. Finally, as noted above, the analytic sample includes only families for which the full amount of formal child support was passed through to the mother (i.e., experimental cases).

The analysis has four parts. First, we describe the extent to which children lived with their mother or both parents and compare mothers' and fathers' descriptions of living arrangements for the matched parents. We then focus on families in which the mother reported that she was the primary resident parent. For this group of families we examine contact, including the amount of time the father and child spent together when they lived apart and whether the father looked after the child so that the mother could work, look for work, or go to school. We also describe two evaluations that may be important to the father's relationship with his children: evaluations of his role as a father and conflict with the mother. In addition, this section includes a description of reports about informal transfers and their value. Throughout we compare the reports for all resident mothers to those for mothers with a matched father and those for fathers with a matched mother. In most tables we also compare the experiences of families with young focal children to the experiences of all families.

The third part of the analysis describes the association between fathers' informal economic contributions and formal child support payments. This section also examines the extent to which nonresident fathers combine time with children with both informal and formal economic contributions. Finally, we compare mothers' and fathers' reports about formal child support with information in administrative records to assess the relative accuracy of mothers' and fathers' reports for this case in which a criterion is available.

---

[5]Among mothers interviewed in both years, we define the analytic sample separately for each year. This means there is a small number of cases in the 1998 data who do not appear in the 1999 data, and vice versa. Discrepancies occur because of change between the two interviews in the number of months children lived with both parents and in whether both the randomly selected child and father were alive at each interview.

Results

Reports about Coresidence

Table II.8.1 shows mothers' reports about coresidence for 1998 and 1999. In both years, the focal child lived with the mother for all 12 months of the reference period in just over 85 percent of the families. In another 7 or 8 percent of the families, the focal child lived with the mother for most of the year while the father lived elsewhere. A significant minority lived with both parents together for the entire year—nearly 5 percent in 1998 and 6 percent in 1999. Panel 2 of the table shows that in 12–13 percent of the families, children lived with their father and mother together for at least part of the year. Thus, the vast majority of the focal children lived with their mothers during all or most of the entire reference period, although fathers were not necessarily absent from their lives.

The next table, Table II.8.2, compares the reports of matched mothers and fathers about coresidence. The dramatic decline in sample size between Table II.8.1, which includes almost 1,000 cases, and Table II.8.2, which includes between 220 and about 250 cases, reflects the difficulty of interviewing low-income nonresident fathers.[6] The small matched sample of former couples compared to the full sample also suggests that the couple sample may provide a selective view of nonresident fathers' participation in child rearing for the W-2 population. (We explore this issue below.) In both 1998 and 1999, the reports of mothers and fathers about coresidence agreed in a little more than three-fourths of the cases (the sum of the percentages on the diagonals). Although mothers rarely disagreed when the father said that the focal child lived with her for all 12 months, a substantial minority of fathers disagreed when mothers made this claim. Thus, approximately 15 percent of fathers in 1998 and 9 percent in 1999 reported that the child lived in some other arrangement, even though the mother had reported that the child lived only with her for all 12 months. The disagreements recorded in Table II.8.2 suggest that some fathers will report that the child lives with the mother for fewer months and with him for more months than the mother reports. (See Tuschen, 1994, for a similar finding with different data.)

Fathers' Involvement with Children When They Live Apart

We can examine reports from all mothers about fathers' contact with focal children in Table II.8.3, which shows that in 1998 just under 60 percent of fathers saw the focal child at least once while they were living apart. A slightly lower percentage kept in touch in 1999, which is consistent with national evidence showing a decline in contact over time (Seltzer, 2000a, 1994, 1991). Almost 30 percent of nonresident fathers saw their child at least weekly during each year. Compared to data for a national sample of separated families, fathers in the Wisconsin Works Survey sample were less likely to have seen their children in the past year (59 percent compared to almost 71 percent for the U.S. National Survey of Families and Households [NSFH][7]), but about equally likely to have weekly contact (about 30 percent in the W-2 Survey, compared to about 26 percent in the NSFH). The difference between the

[6]There are more matched parents for 1999 than for 1998, because fathers became eligible to be interviewed if they acquired legal paternity in the interval after the sample for the first wave of the survey was drawn.

[7]We rely on the NSFH to compare the Wisconsin Works Survey sample to a national sample because the NSFH includes a wider array of indicators of fathers' involvement and conflict between parents than other national data sources. Although the NSFH describes an earlier cohort of families than the W-2 Survey because its first wave was conducted in 1987–88, the NSFH is still unique in its combination of information about fathers' involvement with children of all ages and child support transfers among those without formal child support orders. The NSFH figures come from Seltzer and Brandreth, 1995, Table 9.1, unless otherwise noted.

Table II.8.1
Father's Presence in Home with Focal Child and Mother
(Mothers' Reports)

	1998	1999
(1) Type of Residence		
Mother only for 12 months	85.6%	85.8%
Both parents for 12 months	4.7	6.0
Mother only for 6–11 months	8.0	6.6
Both parents for 6–11 months	1.5	1.5
(2) Coresidence		
Any coresidence with both parents	12.6	11.9
N	978	975

Notes: Percentages in Panel 1 do not sum to 100 because the table excludes arrangements in which the focal child spent most of the year in a household without a parent or in multiple types of households. Panel 2 includes cases that are missing information about the number of months of coresidence.

Table is based on cases from the experimental group in which the focal child lived with the mother or with both parents for at least half of the reference year. Table includes only mothers interviewed in both 1998 and 1999. At each time, table deletes cases for which the mother reported that the focal child or father had died.

All Ns are unweighted.

Table II.8.2
Comparison of Mothers' and Fathers' Reports about Father's Presence in Home with Focal Child and Mother, among Matched Mothers and Fathers

	Mothers' Reports			
Fathers' Reports	Mother Only for 12 Months	Both Parents for 12 Months	Mother Only for 6–11 Months	Both Parents for 6–11 Months
(1) 1998				
Mother only for 12 months	68.0%	0.0	0.6	0.5
Both parents for 12 months	6.8	6.1	2.3	0.0
Mother only for 6–11 months	4.8	0.0	2.2	0.4
Both parents for 6–11 months	3.5	0.2	1.1	1.0
(2) 1999				
Mother only for 12 months	67.8%	0.2	1.3	0.0
Both parents for 12 months	3.6	10.1	0.3	1.5
Mother only for 6–11 months	5.0	1.3	1.2	0.0
Both parents for 6–11 months	0.5	0.0	0.6	0.4

Notes: Cell entries show percentage of total number of cases in each panel (N = 222 in 1998 and 254 in 1999). Table percentages in each panel do not sum to 100 because the table excludes arrangements in which the focal child spent most of the year in a household without a parent or in multiple types of households.

Table is based on cases from the experimental group in which the focal child lived with the mother or with both parents for at least half of the reference year. Table includes only cases in which mothers were interviewed in both 1998 and 1999. At each time, table deletes cases for which the mother reported that the focal child or father had died or the father reported that the focal child or mother had died.

All Ns are unweighted. At each time, cases that are missing on the dependent variable for either mothers or fathers are missing from the analysis.

Table II.8.3
Fathers' Face-to-Face Contact with Children When They Lived Apart

	1998			1999		
	All Mothers	Mothers with Matched Fathers	Fathers with Matched Mothers	All Mothers	Mothers with Matched Fathers	Fathers with Matched Mothers
(1) All Families						
Any contact (%)	59.1	73.2	88.4	54.1	65.2	79.6
At least weekly contact (%)	29.6	40.9	67.4	29.2	37.6	55.6
Mean days of contact (including those with no contact)	60	74	126	49	52	90
(SD)	(102)	(99)	(113)	(86)	(74)	(90)
Range of N	887–916	175–181	176–181	873–904	208–212	203–212
Mean days of contact, among those with any contact	104	103	143	92	80	113
(SD)	(114)	(102)	(110)	(98)	(76)	(86)
N	533	130	155	478	146	171
(2) Focal Child Age 0–2 Years in 1998						
Any contact (%)	71.3	77.2	91.1	62.2	73.6	87.9
At least weekly contact (%)	44.4	56.5	69.2	38.3	48.1	60.1
Mean days of contact (including those with no contact)	94	120	117	65	64	99
(SD)	(116)	(124)	(104)	(95)	(76)	(85)
Range of N	230–238	37–38	36–38	229–236	58	56–58
Mean days of contact, among those with any contact (SD)	133 (118)	157 (115)	129 (101)	105 (102)	87 (77)	113 (81)
N	165	30	33	144	44	51

Notes: Table is based on cases from the experimental group in which the mother is the primary resident parent for the focal child. Table includes only cases in which mothers were interviewed in both 1998 and 1999. At each time, table deletes cases for which the mother reported that the focal child or father had died. At each time, columns for matched parents delete cases for which the father reported that the focal child or mother had died or for which the father reported he was the primary resident parent.

All Ns are unweighted.

W-2 Survey sample and the national sample in whether or not nonresident fathers remain in contact may be due to differences in the populations. Mothers may be more likely to rely on public support, such as W-2, if they do not have help from the child's father.

The table also shows that nonresident fathers who had contact with their child saw the child 104 days a year, or an average of twice every week. Contact may not occur at regular intervals; for instance, if fathers and children live far apart, the contact may occur when children spend blocks of time (e.g., summer vacations and other holidays for school-age children) in the father's home. We cannot compare the W-2 survey estimates of contact days to those in national data because, as far as we know, no national data sources include as much detail about the amount of time fathers spend with children.

Examining the columns that show results for matched mothers and fathers, we observe two patterns. First, levels of contact reported by the matched parents were substantially higher than those reported by the less selective sample of all mothers. Second, levels of contact reported by matched fathers were substantially higher than those reported by mothers in nearly every instance. Because these mothers and fathers were asked to report about the same child and the same questions were used, differences in the answers given by mothers and fathers are due to differences in the way they interpreted the question, in the way they constructed their answers, or in the way they wished to present themselves. It is unlikely that differences of the size we observe here arise because fathers know about contacts with children that mothers do not know about.

Data in Panel 2 of Table II.8.3 show levels of fathers' contact with children among families in which the focal child was aged two or younger in 1998. Fathers of younger children were more likely to have contact and have more frequent contact compared to fathers of all ages, at least when the reports of mothers are examined. The magnitude of the difference by child's age appears to be smaller at the second interview in 1999 than at the first interview.[8] This pattern is consistent with evidence from other studies, which shows that parents spend more time on child care when children are younger (Pleck, 1985) and that nonresident fathers' contact with children declines over time, regardless of the child's age (Seltzer, 1991). However, the pattern is much less consistent for reports by fathers in the group of matched parents, possibly because these fathers all reported high levels of contact on average.

Table II.8.4 shows that roughly a quarter of nonresident fathers or someone in their families looked after the children so that the mother could work, look for work, or go to school (see entry for all mothers). This supervision might include child care for young children as well as monitoring the activities of older children. Not surprisingly, fathers or their families were more likely to provide this help when children were younger, 42 percent compared to 28 percent in 1998. This reflects the greater need for adult supervision when children are very young as well as the disproportionate number of recent separations, when all types of contact are greater, in the group with younger children. In this table, mothers in the group of matched parents are roughly comparable to the sample of all mothers, but the answers given by fathers again indicate substantially higher levels of contact.[9]

---

[8]Child's age is as of December 31, 1998. In 1999, young focal children were roughly aged 1–3 years, which may account for the smaller differences between levels of contact for those in the full sample and those with younger focal children.

[9]The wording of the question differed for the mothers' and fathers' interviews. The mother was asked two questions, one about care the father provided and one about care someone in the father's family provided. The father was asked a single question about whether he or someone in his family looked after the child. It is unlikely that this difference in wording would account for the large difference in matched mothers' and fathers' reports.

Table II.8.4
Father or His Family Looked after Children So Mother Could Work, Look for Work, or Go to School

	1998						1999					
	All Mothers		Mothers with Matched Fathers		Fathers with Matched Mothers		All Mothers		Mothers with Matched Fathers		Fathers with Matched Mothers	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
All Families	27.8	906	29.4	179	52.1	177	23.4	883	28.4	210	44.1	205
Focal Child Age 0–2 Years	42.4	234	50.7	38	64.3	37	37.1	230	37.9	58	58.7	55

Notes: Table is based on cases from the experimental group in which the mother is the primary resident parent for the focal child. Table includes only cases in which mothers were interviewed in both 1998 and 1999. At each time, table deletes cases for which the mother reported that the focal child or father had died. At each time, columns for matched parents delete cases for which the father reported that the focal child or mother had died or for which the father reported he was the primary resident parent.

All Ns are unweighted.

Evaluations of Father as Parent and Reports of Conflict

Table II.8.5, Panel 1, indicates that approximately one-third of mothers thought that the child's nonresident father was doing a good job. Mothers in the full and matched samples were quite similar in 1998, but in 1999 all mothers were less positive than the subgroup of matched mothers, 29 percent compared to 37 percent. In contrast to mothers in either group, fathers viewed themselves much more positively—over 80 percent reported that they were doing a good job as a parent. For families in which the focal child is young, both mothers and fathers viewed the father more positively than did parents in the larger group that included families in which the focal child was older. Fathers of young children may have more positive evaluations because they spend more time with the child and are more likely to provide informal transfers (see below) than fathers of older children. The causal association between a positive role evaluation and nonresident fathers' participation in child rearing is ambiguous.

Table II.8.5, Panel 2, considers another aspect of the parents' relationship with each other. It shows that at both times almost 40 percent of all resident mothers reported either "pretty much" or "a great deal of" conflict about some aspect of child rearing (how the child is raised, money, child support, time with the children). The wording of the question about conflict at the second interview included an additional response category, "a very great deal," to take account of interviewer feedback and notes from the first round of interviewing. Even with this addition, there was a slight decline in intense conflict between the two interviews. The NSFH used response categories different from those in either wave of the W-2 Surveys. In the first wave of the NSFH, when the data represent families with a broader range of children's ages, the categories were: none, some, a great deal. Only 23.1 percent of resident mothers in the NSFH reported a great deal of conflict about any of the topics (where the child lives, how the child is raised, how the respondent spends money, how the other parent spends money, the other parent's visits with the children, and the other parent's contributions to children's support) (authors' tabulations).

When we consider only instances in which the mother reported "a great deal" of conflict in the W-2 data for 1998, we find that about 34 percent reported a great deal. This is still considerably higher than the percentage in the NSFH, which allows respondents to report about a wider range of aspects of child rearing after separation. Families which face severe economic constraints experience more strain and conflict (Conger et al., 1990), and this may account for the higher prevalence of intense conflict in the W-2 sample than in the national sample. Among families with a young focal child, levels of conflict were generally a little higher than for all families with focal children. This may be due to the greater involvement of nonresident fathers in these families, if parents disagree more when they are in closer touch about their children.

Informal Economic Transfers

Table II.8.6 shows the percentages reporting informal transfers of various types. Almost half of the sample of all mothers reported at least one type of transfer in 1998, and over 44 percent in 1999, a slight decline (Panel 1).[10] Gifts and diapers, clothes, or shoes are by far the most common sorts of transfers, at least according to mothers. The proportions reporting each type of transfer or any transfer are generally higher among the group of matched mothers, and even higher for the fathers in this group.

[10]We know of no national data sources with the detail on informal transfers available in the W-2 survey for families with and without child support orders. The NSFH does include reports on financial transfers from nonresident fathers without child support orders. These data show that about 20 percent of resident mothers receive some money from their children's nonresident father, even in the absence of a child support order. Among those who received an informal transfer, the median reported was slightly more than $1,400 per year in 1998 dollars (Seltzer, 1995).

Table II.8.5
Effects on Parental Interaction

	1998						1999					
	All Mothers		Mothers with Matched Fathers		Fathers with Matched Mothers		All Mothers		Mothers with Matched Fathers		Fathers with Matched Mothers	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
(1) Mother Thinks That Father Is Doing a Good Job or Father Thinks That He Is Doing a Good Job												
All Families	31.2	919	35.4	181	82.4	181	28.7	904	36.9	212	83.5	212
Focal Child Age 0–2 Years	39.5	238	47.0	38	87.4	38	35.9	236	42.2	58	95.5	58
(2) Mother Reports Intense Conflict with Father or Father Reports Intense Conflict with Mother												
All Families	38.7	919	47.4	181	45.3	181	37.2	904	46.5	212	34.4	210
Focal Child Age 0–2 Years	46.1	238	56.8	38	46.9	38	40.9	236	57.1	58	32.0	58

Notes: Table is based on cases from the experimental group in which the mother is the primary resident parent for the focal child. Table includes only cases in which mothers were interviewed in both 1998 and 1999. At each time, table deletes cases for which the mother reported that the focal child or father had died. At each time, columns for matched parents delete cases for which the father reported that the focal child or mother had died or for which the father reported he was the primary resident parent.

All Ns are unweighted.

Table II.8.6
Types of Informal Transfers

Transfers	1998			1999		
	All Mothers	Mothers with Matched Fathers	Fathers with Matched Mothers	All Mothers	Mothers with Matched Fathers	Fathers with Matched Mothers
(1) All Families						
Diapers, clothes, or shoes	39.6%	51.8%	70.4%	35.6%	43.0%	65.9%
Gifts	42.4	60.2	77.6	38.9	50.1	73.8
Food or groceries	14.8	16.8	48.2	14.3	13.8	47.6
Child care, school, or educational expenses	8.6	14.6	29.6	7.8	7.2	29.6
Medical expenses other than health insurance	7.5	11.6	29.2	8.3	8.3	25.4
Money for rent or mortgage	6.4	8.8	16.6	6.1	5.5	13.9
Money to spend on the children	18.8	24.0	44.6	15.9	17.4	41.8
Any type of transfer	48.1	66.5	78.7	44.4	54.8	77.8
Range of N	916	199	200–201	903	212	211
(2) Focal Child Aged 0–2 Years						
Diapers, clothes, or shoes	51.7%	65.1%	72.8%	45.5%	55.9%	69.2%
Gifts	53.2	71.6	83.6	45.4	56.7	78.2
Food or groceries	25.7	20.0	59.9	23.4	24.3	56.3
Child care, school, or educational expenses	10.7	10.9	26.0	11.9	11.2	27.5
Medical expenses other than health insurance	17.1	23.0	28.3	13.5	13.9	35.3
Money for rent or mortgage	11.6	6.6	15.6	8.6	8.7	25.3
Money to spend on the children	31.4	28.3	60.1	24.5	23.5	59.0
Any type of transfer	61.3	75.0	84.4	51.7	61.6	82.9
N	238	44	44	236	58	58

Table II.8.6, continued

Notes: Table is based on cases from the experimental group in which the mother is the primary resident parent for the focal child. Table includes only cases in which mothers were interviewed in both 1998 and 1999. At each time, table deletes cases for which the mother reported that the focal child or father had died. At each time, columns for matched parents delete cases for which the father reported that the focal child or mother had died or for which the father reported he was the primary resident parent.

All Ns are unweighted.

In addition to giving gifts and diapers, clothes or shoes, fathers in the matched sample were also very likely to report that they provided the mother with money to spend on the children—nearly 45 percent did so in 1998, compared to 24 percent for matched mothers and 19 percent for all mothers. The levels of informal transfers reported by parents who had a young focal child were substantially higher than for the full sample. Panel 2 of Table II.8.6 shows that over 60 percent of all mothers of a young focal child reported a transfer of some type in 1998, and although the percentage declined in 1999, even then over half the sample received some type of informal transfer.

Although informal transfers may have a symbolic importance for children's well-being, transfers are also important because they enhance children's material well-being. Table II.8.7 shows parents' reports of the economic value of all the in-kind and informal cash contributions provided by the nonresident fathers. The survey question used ordered response categories because of the difficulty of eliciting a specific dollar amount for such diverse transfers.[11] The question explicitly asked for an assessment of value excluding formal child support. As might be expected for families selected because of participation in W-2, the total value of most informal transfers was quite low. For about a quarter of families, the informal transfers were worth between $1 and $250 a year, according to all mothers' reports. About 6 percent received transfers worth at least $1,000 either in 1998 or in 1999. By comparing the reports of matched mothers and fathers, we can see that fathers value their contributions substantially more highly than do mothers. Just over 22 percent of fathers in the matched sample reported contributions worth at least $1,000 a year in 1999, compared to just over 5 percent of mothers in the matched sample. We do not examine the economic value of informal transfers for parents of young focal children because of small sample sizes.

Informal Transfers, Formal Child Support, and Visits

Fathers who live with their children contribute to their welfare economically and by spending time with them. This section provides a broad-brush description of how nonresident fathers whose children were supported by W-2 combined economic contributions and spending time with children. We use the larger sample of mothers who were interviewed in both waves of the survey. We begin by asking whether fathers who made formal child support payments were also more likely to make informal transfers. Previous research on divorced fathers shows that those who pay formal support are more likely to provide in-kind or informal transfers than those who do not pay formal support (Teachman, 1991). Because the W-2 sample is from a lower-income population than that studied in previous work on divorced fathers, the association between formal and informal transfers may be different. Fathers with limited economic resources may be able to provide only formal child support or informal transfers, or they may provide less economically valuable informal transfers when they pay formal support then when they do not. Table II.8.8 shows the value of informal transfers for families with and without formal child support. In both years, mothers who are shown by administrative records to have received formal child support were also more likely to report that they received other transfers. In 1998, 56 percent of mothers who received formal support also received informal transfers, compared to 43 percent of mothers without formal support. The percentage difference is about the same size in 1999. The percentage who reported transfers worth $1,000 or more, among those who received any informal transfers in 1998 (see rows "Less than $100" through "More than $1,500"), is about the same for those with formal child support as for those without formal support, 10 percent (5.7/57.1) vs. about 13 percent (5.5/43.7), respectively.

[11]The response categories in the table are those used in the time 1 survey. For the time 2 survey, we revised the response categories to allow for responses of less than $50. The table combines the two lower categories at time 2 to show the same metric at both times.

Table II.8.7
Value of Informal Transfers

	1998			1999		
Value of Informal Transfers	All Mothers	Mothers with Matched Fathers	Fathers with Matched Mothers	All Mothers	Mothers with Matched Fathers	Fathers with Matched Mothers
No Informal Transfers	50.4%	33.5%	11.9%	55.1%	45.3%	22.6%
Less than $100	15.9	24.7	8.8	13.6	18.3	8.4
Between $100 and $250	10.8	11.0	10.6	9.7	12.7	13.9
Between $250 and $500	11.1	15.7	20.7	10.2	11.4	19.7
Between $500 and $1,000	6.1	12.2	26.0	5.3	7.0	12.8
Between $1,000 and $1,500	2.2	0.7	11.6	3.0	3.0	9.0
More than $1,500	3.4	2.1	10.5	3.0	2.3	13.5
N	905	178	178	894	210	206

Notes: Column percentages add to 100 within rounding error. Table is based on cases from the experimental group in which the mother is the primary resident parent for the focal child. Table includes only cases in which mothers were interviewed in both 1998 and 1999. At each time, table deletes cases for which the mother reported that the focal child or father had died. At each time, columns for matched parents delete cases for which the father reported that the focal child or mother had died or for which the father reported he was the primary resident parent.

All Ns are unweighted.

Table II.8.8
Value of Informal Transfers, by Whether or Not Child Support Was Received in Reference Year, Resident Mothers' Reports

	Received Formal Child Support? (Administrative Records)			
	1998		1999	
Value of Informal Transfers	Yes	No	Yes	No
No Informal Transfers	43.0%	56.3%	48.4%	62.2%
Less than $100	18.8	13.6	17.0	10.1
Between $100 and $250	14.0	8.4	11.8	7.6
Between $250 and $500	11.8	10.6	11.2	9.2
Between $500 and $1,000	6.8	5.6	6.6	3.8
Between $1,000 and $1,500	2.1	2.3	2.4	3.7
More than $1,500	3.6	3.2	2.6	3.4
N	402	503	399	495
χ^2_6	18.9 $p \leq .01$		25.9 $p \leq .01$	

Notes: Column percentages add to 100 within rounding error. Table is based on cases from the experimental group in which the mother is the primary resident parent for the focal child. Table includes only cases in which mothers were interviewed in both 1998 and 1999. At each time, table deletes cases for which the mother reported that the focal child or father had died.

Ns are from weighted tables that have been renormalized for missing values on the dependent variable.

Table II.8.9 shows how nonresident fathers combined visiting with formal child support and with informal transfers. The data show a positive relationship between visits and receiving formal payments and between visits and informal transfers, although the latter association appears stronger. In 1998 only about 14 percent of mothers received formal child support even though the nonresident father and focal child did not spend time together, whereas fewer than 3 percent received informal transfers and had no visits. In nearly 46 percent of families, fathers spent time with the children and provided informal transfers. The patterns are similar in 1999. The higher percentage of fathers who combined visits with informal transfers than of fathers who combined visits with formal child support probably occurs because many informal transfers occur during visits, such as gifts that are given during a visit to celebrate a birthday. Certainly the opportunities to provide such transfers, and information about the types of transfers that might be needed or appreciated, increase when there is face-to-face contact.

The three-way relationship among visits, formal child support, and informal transfers is shown in Table II.8.10. In 1998, about a quarter of the nonresident fathers spent time with the focal child, paid formal child support, and made informal transfers. About an equal percentage did none of these things. Just over one-fifth of fathers spent time with children and provided informal transfers, but did not pay formal child support. Whether or not they paid formal child support, it was uncommon for fathers to spend time with children but not to provide informal transfers (approximately 14 percent, 7.6 + 6.3). A similar minority of fathers, about 13 percent, paid formal child support but neither visited nor made informal contributions. The combinations of activities in 1999 are generally similar to those in 1998.

Administrative Records and Survey Reports about Formal Child Support

We suggested earlier that examining the relationship between mothers' and fathers' reports about formal child support and the criterion provided by the court record might provide insight into the likely direction of the errors that mothers and fathers might make when responding about related topics. The administrative data we use summarizes all formal child support received by the resident mother. If she had children from more than one relationship, the formal records show the total support from the focal child's father and the other children's father(s). For nonresident fathers, however, the administrative data record the amount the father paid on behalf of the focal child and the child's full biological siblings, excluding any formal support the father might have paid for children from other relationships. This means that for any pair of parents, the mother's formal child support receipts may be higher than the father's formal child support payments, although when the mother's children all have the same father, receipts should equal payments in the formal record. About a quarter of the mothers in the matched sample had children by two or more legal fathers, according to administrative data at entry into W-2. With this exception—which means that mothers' survey reports will necessarily underestimate the incidence and amount of child support recorded in the administrative records—we believe that the administrative records of formal child support receipts and payments are extremely accurate and are an appropriate criterion by which to evaluate survey reports about child support. The survey asked explicitly about formal child support received (or paid) for the focal child and the child's siblings.

Table II.8.11 compares survey reports about formal support with administrative-record data on formal support for three respondent groups, all mothers, mothers with matched fathers, and fathers with matched mothers. By comparing the percentage who reported having received any child support in 1998 with the administrative data, we can see that among all mothers, about 9 percent fewer women reported receiving child support in the survey than are shown as having received any by administrative records. Among mothers in the matched sample, the difference is even larger, about 13 percent. Among fathers, in contrast, about 9 percent fewer fathers among the group of matched parents reported paying any child support than are recorded as paying any support in the administrative records. When the mean amount of

Table II.8.9
Reports of Visits by Whether or Not Child Support and Informal Transfers Were Received in Reference Year, Resident Mothers' Reports

	Received Formal Child Support (Administrative Records)		Received Informal Transfers	
Reported Visits	Yes	No	Yes	No
(1) 1998				
Yes	31.0%	28.2	45.5%	13.8
No	13.6	27.3	2.8	37.9
N	916		913	
χ^2_1	33.1 p ≤.01		429.8 p ≤.01	
(2) 1999				
Yes	33.1%	21.0	43.8%	10.3
No	18.2	27.7	1.5	44.4
N	887		886	
χ^2_1	40.6 p ≤.01		536.4 p ≤.01	

Notes: Percentages sum to 100 for columns indicating formal payments (yes/no) and to 100 for columns indicating informal transfers (yes/no), within rounding error. Table is based on cases from the experimental group in which the mother is the primary resident parent for the focal child. Table includes only cases in which mothers were interviewed in both 1998 and 1999. At each time, table deletes cases for which the mother reported that the focal child or father had died.

Ns are from weighted tables that have been renormalized for missing values on the dependent variable.

Table II.8.10
Reports of Visits by Whether or Not Child Support and Informal Transfers Were Received in Reference Year, Resident Mothers' Reports

	Received Formal Child Support (Administrative Records)		Did Not Receive Formal Support (Administrative Records)	
Reported Visits	Received Informal Transfers	Did Not Receive Informal Transfers	Received Informal Transfers	Did Not Receive Informal Transfers
(1) 1998				
Yes	24.5%	7.6	21.2	6.3
No	0.8	13.0	2.0	24.7
(2) 1999				
Yes	26.4%	7.7	17.6	2.7
No	0.7	18.1	0.8	26.0

Notes: Entries show percentage of total number of cases in each panel (N = 913 in 1998 and 886 in 1999). Percentages sum to 100 within rounding error. Table is based on cases from the experimental group in which the mother is the primary resident parent for the focal child. Table includes only cases in which mothers were interviewed in both 1998 and 1999. At each time, table deletes cases for which the mother reported that the focal child or father had died.

Ns are from weighted tables that have been renormalized for missing values on the dependent variable.

Table II.8.11
Comparison of Survey and Administrative Reports about Formal Child Support, 1998

	Survey Reports			Administrative Records		
	All Mothers	Mothers with Matched Fathers	Fathers with Matched Mothers	All Mothers (Support Received)	Mothers with Matched Fathers (Support Received)	Fathers with Matched Mothers (Support Paid)
Any support	35.2%	55.4%	75.9%	44.4%	68.4%	66.6%
N	918	181	181	919	181	181
Mean support including those with no support	$439	$735	$2,034	$688	$1,047	$1,129
(SD)	(1,018)	(1,292)	(2,222)	(1,295)	(1,424)	(1,507)
N	830	164	161	919	181	181
Mean support among those with any support	$1,293	$1,398	$2,725	$1,547	$1,531	$1,695
(SD)	(1,376)	(1,378)	(2,148)	(1,543)	(1,423)	(1,501)
N	291	101	123	421	136	131

Notes: Table is based on cases from the experimental group in which the mother is the primary resident parent for the focal child. Table includes only cases in which mothers were interviewed in both 1998 and 1999. At each time, table deletes cases for which the mother reported that the focal child or father had died.

All Ns are unweighted.

support among each group is calculated, the underreporting by mothers and overreporting by fathers (as compared with the administrative records) is even more striking: All mothers reported approximately 64 percent of the support recorded in administrative records, mothers in the group of matched parents reported approximately 70 percent of the support shown in administrative records; but the comparable fathers overreported by 180 percent.

Part of the survey-administrative-data discrepancy in mean amounts of formal support received (or paid) occurs because the survey and administrative records differ in the proportion recorded as receiving no support. Thus, when the mean amount of support among those receiving any is considered, the underreporting by mothers is reduced (to 83 percent of the administrative records among all mothers and 91 percent among matched mothers) and the overreporting by fathers is also slightly reduced (to 161 percent). Even among those who received (paid) any formal child support, mothers' reports were more accurate, in the aggregate, than were fathers' reports. (See Schaeffer, Seltzer, and Klawitter, 1991, for a similar finding using a sample of divorce cases.)

To examine if the discrepancy between mothers' reports about formal child support and the administrative records of mothers' child support receipts can be explained by the inclusion of child support from more than one father in the administrative record, we reestimated Table II.8.11 excluding mothers who had children by more than one legal father at entry into W-2. The results were quite similar to those shown in Table II.8.11, suggesting that mothers underestimated child support received even when the administrative criterion excludes formal support from men other than the focal child's father (not shown). However the degree to which mothers underestimated is quite small relative to the degree to which fathers' survey reports overestimated formal child support payments.

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter provides a preliminary description of nonresident fathers' social and economic participation in the lives of children of single mothers supported by Wisconsin Works. Our data show that although the children in the great majority of these families lived with their mother alone, a minority lived with their mother and father together for part of the year. However, when the father did not share a home with his child and the child's mother, frequency of contact between the father and child was somewhat lower than in a national sample of separated families. Fathers of young children spent more time with the children, and the father or someone in his family was more likely to spend time looking after the child so that the mother could work than fathers whose children covered a broader age range.

Our data also show that only about a third of resident mothers thought that the father was doing a good job as a parent, and roughly two-fifths of mothers reported intense conflict with the children's father about some aspect of child rearing. Intense conflict between parents about child rearing after separation is somewhat higher among these W-2 families than for a national sample of resident mothers, perhaps as a result of the greater economic strain the W-2 families experience.

Ethnographic evidence points to the importance of nonresident fathers' economic contributions, including informal support, for low-income children's material welfare (Edin and Lein, 1997). Our data show that about half of resident mothers received some type of informal transfer, but that for most families the financial value of the transfers was less than $500 a year. Few mothers reported receiving money for rent or the mortgage, but this was more common among mothers of young children whose fathers might still be living part of the time with the mother and child. Informal transfers were more common among families in which the mother received formal child support and when the nonresident father saw the child. It was uncommon for fathers who did not spend time with their children to pay

formal child support, and extremely uncommon for those who did not spend time with children to provide informal transfers of any type. About a quarter of fathers neither spent time with children nor invested in them financially, either through formal child support payments or informal contributions. But on the other side of the continuum of paternal involvement, about the same percentage contributed to children by spending time with them, paying formal support, and making informal contributions.

Nonresident fathers participated in the survey at substantially lower rates than did resident mothers. By comparing all mothers' reports to those of mothers and fathers in the matched sample, we show that the matched sample is highly selective. Fathers in the matched sample were more involved with their children in many ways than those described by all mothers. Our comparisons also show that fathers reported higher levels of social and economic involvement and, not surprisingly, evaluated their role performance more favorably than did mothers when they described fathers' involvement. When we use administrative records of formal child support receipts (payments) as a criterion against which to evaluate resident mothers' and nonresident fathers' reports, we find that fathers dramatically overstated their formal child support contributions. Mothers' survey reports slightly understated formal child support receipts.

Our broad-brush portrait of fathers' participation in the lives of children whose single mothers are on W-2 lays the groundwork for studies of how low-income mothers and fathers manage child rearing when they receive public support. As Volume II, Chapter 4 shows, mothers in this sample moved on and off W-2. Ability to leave W-2 may depend, in part, on the degree to which the children's father spends time with and looks after the child, thereby facilitating mothers' employment, and provides economically valuable informal transfers. Most importantly, low-income nonresident fathers' participation in child rearing may also enhance the welfare of children whose mothers receive public support, an important question for future research.

References

Braver, Sanford L., Sharlene A. Wolchik, Irwin N. Sandler, Virgil L. Sheets, Bruce Fogas, and R. Curtis Bay. 1993. "A Longitudinal Study of Noncustodial Parents: Parents Without Children." *Journal of Family Psychology* 7: 9–23.

Conger, Rand D., Glen H. Elder, Jr., Frederick O. Lorenz, Katherine J. Conger, Ronald L. Simons, Les B. Whitbeck, Shirley Huck, and Janet N. Melby. 1990. "Linking Economic Hardship to Marital Quality and Instability." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 52 (3): 643–656.

Dykema, Jennifer, and Nora Cate Schaeffer. 2000. "Events, Instruments, and Reporting Errors." *American Sociological Review* 65: 619–629.

Edin, Kathryn, and Laura Lein. 1997. *Making Ends Meet: How Single Mothers Survive Welfare and Low-Wage Work*. New York: Russell Sage.

Furstenberg, Frank F., Christine Winquist Nord, James L. Peterson, and Nicholas Zill. 1983. "The Life Course of Children of Divorce." *American Sociological Review* 48: 695–701.

Grall, Timothy. 2000. *Child Support for Custodial Mothers and Fathers: 1997.* U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P60-212. Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office. (http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/childsupport/cs97.html)

Knox, Virginia, and Cindy Redcross. 2000. *Parenting and Providing: The Impact of Parents' Fair Share on Paternal Involvement.* New York: Manpower Research Demonstration Corp., Oct.

Levine, Judith A. 1997. *How Poor Women Decide about Welfare and Work: Economic and Sociological Models of Choice.* Ph.D. dissertation, Sociology Department, Northwestern University, December.

McLanahan, Sara, Irwin Garfinkel,, and Yolanda Padilla. 1999. *The Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study: Austin, Texas. Baseline Report*. Center for Research on Child Wellbeing, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.

McLanahan, Sara, Irwin Garfinkel, and Maureen Waller. 1999. *The Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study: Oakland, California. Baseline Report.* Center for Research on Child Wellbeing, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.

McLanahan, Sara, Judith A. Seltzer, Thomas L. Hanson, and Elizabeth Thomson. 1994. "Child Support Enforcement and Child Well-Being: Greater Security or Greater Conflict?" In *Child Support and Child Well-Being*, ed. Irwin Garfinkel, Sara McLanahan, and Philip K. Robins. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.

Pearson, Jessica, and Nancy Thoennes. 1998. "Programs to Increase Fathers' Access to Their Children." In *Fathers Under Fire: The Revolution in Child Support Enforcement*, ed. Irwin Garfinkel, Sara McLanahan, Daniel R. Meyer, and Judith A. Seltzer. New York: Russell Sage. Pp. 220–252.

Pleck, Joseph H. 1985. *Working Wives/Working Husbands*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Schaeffer, Nora Cate, Judith A. Seltzer, and Jennifer Dykema. 1998. "Methodological and Theoretical Issues in Studying Nonresident Fathers: A Selective Review." National Center on Fathers and Families Working Paper No. WP-02. University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.

Schaeffer, Nora Cate, Judith A. Seltzer, and Marieka Klawitter. 1991. "Estimating Nonresponse and Response Bias: Resident and Nonresident Parents' Reports about Child Support." *Sociological Methods and Research* 20: 30–59.

Seltzer, Judith A. 1991. "Relationships between Fathers and Children Who Live Apart: The Father's Role after Separation." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 53: 79–101.

Seltzer, Judith A. 1994. "Consequences of Marital Dissolution for Children." *Annual Review of Sociology* 20: 235–266.

Seltzer, Judith A. 1995. "Demographic Change, Children's Families, and Child Support Policy in the United States." In *Families, Human Resources and Social Development,* ed. Hsiao-hung Nancy Chen, Yia-ling Liu, and Mei-O Hsueh. Taipei, Taiwan: National Chengchi University. Pp. 31–54.

Seltzer, Judith A. 2000a. "Child Support and Child Access: Experiences of Divorced and Nonmarital Families." In *Child Support: The Next Frontier,* ed. J. Thomas Oldham and Marygold S. Melli . Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Pp. 69–87.

Seltzer, Judith A. 2000b. "Families Formed Outside of Marriage." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 62 (4): 1247–1268.

Seltzer, Judith A., and Yvonne Brandreth. 1995. "What Fathers Say about Involvement with Children after Separation." In *Fatherhood: Contemporary Theory, Research, and Social Policy,* ed. William Marsiglio. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Pp. 166–192.

Seltzer, Judith A., Nora Cate Schaeffer, and Hong-Wen Charng. 1989. "Family Ties after Divorce: The Relationship between Visiting and Paying Child Support." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 51: 1013–1032.

Teachman, Jay D. 1991. "Contributions to Children by Divorced Fathers." *Social Problems* 38*:* 358–71.

Tuschen, Kay L. 1994. "When Parents 'Live' with Their Children." Unpublished senior honors thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin.

Veum, Jonathan R. 1993. "The Relationship between Child Support and Visitation: Evidence from Longitudinal Data." *Social Science Research* 22: 229–244.

Weiss, Yoram, and Robert J. Willis.1985. "Children as Collective Goods and Divorce Settlements." *Journal of Labor Economics* 3: 268–292.