

**Appendix I.4.1**

**Experimental Impacts on Child Support Outcomes among Those with Knowledge of Child Support Policy**

	In 1998					In 1999				
	N	Experimental	Control	Impact	P-value	N	Experimental	Control	Impact	P-value
		Group	Group				Group	Group		
<b>(1) Percentage of Nonresident Fathers Paying Any Child Support</b>										
All Nonresident Fathers	14,343	52%	50%	2%	0.083	14,343	56.3%	53.2%	3.1%	<b>0.005</b>
Survey Respondents	575	67	67	0	0.907	608	75.9	61.7	14.2	<b>0.000</b>
Knew Policy Rules in Time Period	65	78	78	1	0.957	69	96.6	74.6	22.0	<b>0.025</b>
<b>(2) Annual Amount of Child Support Paid among All Nonresident Fathers</b>										
All Nonresident Fathers	14,343	\$798	\$770	\$28	0.228	14,343	\$946	\$891	\$54	0.055
Survey Respondents	575	926	1,002	-75	0.460	608	1,438	1,179	259	<b>0.035</b>
Knew Policy Rules in Time Period	65	1,562	1,203	359	0.429	69	2,166	1,472	694	0.178
<b>(3) Percentage of Resident Mothers Receiving Any Child Support</b>										
All Resident Mothers	15,977	38%	35%	3%	<b>0.006</b>	15,977	47.8%	45.1%	2.7%	<b>0.014</b>
Survey Respondents	2,295	43	42	1	0.627	2,242	50.4	49.4	1.0	0.668
Knew Policy Rules in Time Period	549	55	51	4	0.434	543	58.3	57.0	1.3	0.768
<b>(4) Annual Amount of Child Support Received among All Resident Mothers</b>										
All Resident Mothers	15,977	\$641	\$499	\$142	<b>0.000</b>	15,977	\$848	\$725	\$123	<b>0.000</b>
Survey Respondents	2,295	614	547	67	0.098	2,242	866	786	80	0.160
Knew Policy Rules in Time Period	549	954	747	207	<b>0.023</b>	543	1,143	952	191	0.160

**Note:** First row in each panel shows outcomes regressed on extended list of control variables; second and third rows show basic list of control variables. Probability values of 0.05 or less are shown in bold type.

## Appendix I.4.2

### Effects of the Experiment on the Short-Term Stability of Paternal Involvement

This appendix examines the short-term change in nonresident fathers' involvement with children and the quality of parents' relationship with each other. The analysis reported in the main text examines differences at each time and is thus a cross-sectional analysis, even though the sample consists of mothers who were interviewed in both surveys. In this appendix we use data from both waves of the survey together to ask if the full pass-through increased fathers' participation in children's lives over the short term. The analysis examines experimental effects on the stability of fathers' involvement with children by looking at whether fathers changed their behavior between the two waves of the survey. Past research on separated families shows that nonresident fathers' participation in child rearing declines over time after the parents' relationship is dissolved (Seltzer, 1994). This analysis investigates whether the experiment slows down the deterioration of fathers' involvement with children.

We consider four outcomes: change between 1998 and 1999 in the number of days fathers spent time with children when they were living apart, whether families without intense conflict in 1998 experienced intense conflict in 1999, whether families without informal transfers in 1998 received transfers in 1999, and whether those whose transfers were worth less than \$500 in 1998 (including those with no transfers) received transfers worth at least \$500 in 1999. The analysis is structured as a difference-in-difference analysis and therefore uses only those cases in which the respondent reported any change in the outcome of interest. With that modification, the analysis uses the same sample as in the main text, that is, families in which the mother was the primary resident parent for at least half of the year. We continue to rely on resident mothers' reports because of the broader sample coverage and generally high quality of mothers' reports in the survey. Sample sizes for most analyses are quite small because of the exclusion of cases in which the dependent variable does not change. We examine experimental effects for all cases and for families in which the focal child was two years old or younger at the end of 1998. The table reports ordinary least squares-regression-adjusted or probit-regression-adjusted percentages as in the main text.

Appendix Table I.4.2, Panel 1, shows that contact declines for both experimental- and control-group families. The decline is larger for those in the experimental group, but the difference between experimental and control groups is not statistically significant. Among families with young children this difference is larger and is statistically significant. The experimental impact is in the opposite direction from that we expected. Additional analysis (not shown) suggests that the difference is robust across subsamples and some exclusion of outliers.

There is no difference between experimental and control groups in the development of intense conflict. Panel 2 of Appendix Table I.4.2 shows that among families whose level of conflict changed, 47 percent of mothers in the experimental group and 44 percent of those in the control group experienced an increase in the likelihood of intense disagreements between 1998 and 1999. However, the difference between the two groups is not statistically significant either for all cases included in the analysis or for those with young children.

The next two panels show differences between the experimental and control groups in changes in informal transfers between the two surveys. Appendix Table I.4.2, Panel 3, shows that, of those families whose transfer behavior changed between interviews, over a third who received no informal transfers in 1998 received something in 1999. There is no experimental impact shown in the row for all cases. Among families with young focal children, control-group families are somewhat more likely than experimental-group families to change in the direction of making informal transfers (32.9 percent compared to 12.3 percent). When we define the analysis sample slightly differently, to include families in which the father lived with the mother and child for most but not all of the year, the experimental effect is smaller and is only statistically significant using a more generous criterion ( $p \leq .10$ ) (not shown).

**Appendix Table I.4.2**  
**Effects on Change in Family Relationships**

	N	Experimental Group	Control Group	Impact	P-value
<b>(1) Mean Difference in Days Father Saw Child When They Lived Apart (Time 2 – Time 1), among Families Who Changed</b>					
All Cases	1,026	-14.1	-4.4	-9.8	0.130
Focal Child Age 2 or Younger in 1998	294	-54.8	-8.7	-46.1	<b>0.001</b>
<b>(2) Percentage of Families Who Had High Conflict in 1999 and Did Not Have High Conflict in 1998, among Families Who Changed</b>					
All Cases	552	47.4%	44.0%	3.4%	0.420
Focal Child Age 2 or Younger in 1998	133	41.9	33.9	8.0	0.355
<b>(3) Percentage of Families Who Had Informal Transfers in 1999 and Who Had No Transfers in 1998, among Families Who Changed</b>					
All Cases	350	38.8%	37.7%	1.1%	0.836
Focal Child Age 2 or Younger in 1998	99	12.3	32.9	-20.6	<b>0.022</b>
<b>(4) Percentage of Families Who Had Informal Transfers Worth at Least \$500 in 1999 and Transfers Worth Less than \$500 in 1998, among Families Who Changed</b>					
All Cases	163	49.2%	42.0%	7.2%	0.363
Focal Child Age 2 or Younger in 1998	62	23.8	44.1	-20.3	0.121

**Notes:** Table is based on cases in which mother is the primary resident parent for the focal child. Table includes only mothers interviewed in both 1998 and 1999. Table deletes cases for which mother ever reported that focal child or father had died. Table also excludes one case in which there was an instrument error in 1998. Cases that are missing on or for which there was no change in the dependent variable are deleted from the analysis. In Panel 1, means are adjusted using Ordinary Least Squares regression; in Panels 2–4, percentages are adjusted using a probit model. Probability values of 0.05 or less are shown in bold type.

Finally, Appendix Table I.4.2, Panel 4, shows that nearly half of families for whom the value of informal transfers changed between the two interviews received informal transfers worth less than \$500 in 1998 but received transfers worth at least this much in the next year. This suggests that amounts of informal or in-kind transfers are fairly unstable. There are no experimental effects on the stability of amounts of informal transfers.

Taken together, our findings show no evidence for all cases included in the analysis that the experiment retards the deterioration of paternal involvement that characterizes most separated families. However, our results also suggest that the experiment may have a different effect on the stability of paternal involvement for families with young children. Among such families, fathers in the control group are more likely to maintain contact (less likely to reduce contact) with their children than fathers in the experimental group. Those in the control group may also be somewhat more likely to begin giving transfers than those in the experimental group. Fathers in the control group whose child support is partly withheld may prefer to provide for their children informally by giving children clothes and presents when they spend time together.

Parents of young children may show greater change as a result of the experiment than parents of older children, in part because fathers of many of these young children are very involved with the mother and their child. Parents share with each other information about the child support system and about the child's material needs. In addition, parents of young children are new to the system: they may not yet have established paternity for the child and acquired a formal child support order. Until they are part of the formal child support system, the pass-through policy is likely to have little effect on fathers' involvement with children. As children begin to grow up, the experiment seems to increase the likelihood of informal contributions to children from fathers in the control group compared to fathers in the experimental group, among families who changed. In evaluating the effects of a full pass-through policy, policy makers must balance the slightly greater likelihood of improvement in informal transfers for toddlers among those in the control group against the greater likelihood of formal child support for those in the experimental group.

For the sample including parents of both older and younger children, the lack of significant change at the individual level is generally consistent with the results presented in the main text. However, our findings in this appendix suggest that the largely null aggregate results presented in the main text may mask some changes at the individual level for families with young children—a segment of the population more likely to experience change than is the population as a whole.