Linda Gordon

SOCIAL INSURANCE AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE: THE INFLUENCE OF GENDER IN WELFARE THOUGHT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1890-1935

DP # 960-91
Social Insurance and Public Assistance:
The Influence of Gender in Welfare Thought in
the United States, 1890-1935

Linda Gordon
Department of History
Institute for Research on Poverty
University of Wisconsin-Madison

November 1991

I am grateful to Tom Archdeacon, Paul Boyer, Allen Hunter, Linda Kerber, Barbara Laslett, Judith Walzer Leavitt, and Robert Moeller for critical comments on this paper, and to Nancy Fraser for a more general education on some of the concepts herein. I could not satisfy, or even please, all of them, but that doesn’t lessen my gratitude. I am grateful to the University of Wisconsin/Madison Graduate School and the Institute for Research on Poverty for supporting this research, and to Lisa Brush for superb research assistance.
Abstract

In this paper the author argues that welfare reformers in the United States had recognizably gendered views of what a welfare state should offer. These views become apparent when one examines the welfare thinking that produced the Social Security Act of 1935. That act spawned two categories of programs: social insurance and public assistance. Social insurance programs, such as Old Age Insurance and Unemployment Insurance, were designed primarily by men and had as their goal the elimination of poverty. Public assistance programs, most notably Aid to Dependent Children (now AFDC), were designed with much more female influence and had as their goal the elimination of "pauperism"—understood as an economic and moral condition in which the work ethic is missing and handouts are expected. What most distinguished these two types of programs was the commitment to casework among the predominantly female social workers. Yet despite this disagreement over casework, the men and women both supported the concept of the family wage and what it implied: that men ought to be the primary breadwinners in a family while women should remain full-time housewives and mothers.
The . . . method of handling as one problem all cases involving needy mothers, regardless of the cause of their difficulties, is as ill considered as would be the treating of all sick persons alike . . . Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong, *Insuring the Essentials* (1932).

All insurance is a substitution of social, co-operative provision for individual provision . . . known as the theory of distribution of losses and the subsequent elimination of risk. I. M. Rubinow, *Social Insurance* (1913).

In this essay I suggest that welfare reformers in the United States had recognizably gendered views of what a welfare state should offer—and thus of what a good society, in the industrial period, should be like—and that these gendered visions help explain why we have the welfare system we do. In identifying the influence of gender I do not argue that these visions were dichotomized. There were commonalities, based on other social experiences, that were at least as important as the differences. My purpose is not so much to distinguish male from female as it is to illustrate the importance of asking questions about gender, questions which illuminate similarity as well as difference.

We can see these visions by examining the welfare thinking that produced the U.S. Social Security Act of 1935. Generally identified as the foundation of the U.S. welfare state, Social Security was an omnibus law establishing several programs, prominently Old Age Insurance, Unemployment Compensation, and Aid to Dependent Children. It also established aid to the elderly, to the blind, and to certain other disabled groups. Welfare scholars generally recognize that these programs fall into two categories, social insurance and public assistance. Social insurance programs include Old Age Insurance and Unemployment Compensation and are more generous and less stigmatizing; public assistance programs include the remainder and are stingier and highly stigmatizing. In the last two
decades scholars have also recognized that these programs are gendered as well as racially divided. The better programs, Old Age (now OASI) and Unemployment Insurance (UI), disproportionately serve white males, and the inferior assistance programs, women and minority men. The better programs have become so respectable that they are not even considered by most Americans as "welfare"—this word being now pejorative. Their stipends are relatively high, offered without means-testing, and received as a matter of entitlement without the requirement that the recipient submit to personal supervision. The second track continued the old poor-law tradition: the stipends are low and the standard awards are below the poverty line, not designed to allow a recipient to attain a respectable working-class standard of living. The biggest and most well known example of such a program is Aid to Dependent Children (now AFDC). It is stringently means-tested, thus encouraging—one might say requiring—a recipient who desires to better herself and her children to present a false picture of her economic circumstances; it has required the recipient to submit to personal supervision of her private life; and it carries a great deal of stigma.

Scholars have identified this stratification in the structure of our welfare state, but not in the thinking that gave rise to it. In fact, the social insurance programs grew from an almost exclusively male stream of thought, while public assistance developed from an integrated stream with a great deal of female leadership. OASI and UI were designed by men, the remainder primarily by women. This division of labor was achieved by mutual assumption, without a struggle, and with mutual support; indeed, the division of labor was such a given to those involved that they did not explore their differences but tended to see mainly their agreement. I think they were right to do so, because they shared a fundamental premise: that a welfare state should protect the family-wage system. Still, that family-wage system did not have entirely the same meanings for men and women, and their preferred methods of supporting it also differed. By scrutinizing the welfare thinking of these important generations of reformers, with particular attention to their assumptions about the roles men and
women should play in society, we gain new understandings of how our welfare system and our
gender and family systems have changed in the course of the past century.

Recognizing this division of labor in welfare planning substantially modifies one influential
feminist critique of the welfare state: that AFDC is inferior because it was designed by a "patriarchal"
state for women. Certainly men were always the powers in government but in fact a network of
women reformers had the defining influence in the design of ADC. Why did women design inferior
programs for women? Were they dupes, male-identified, convinced that women deserved less?
Hardly; the women designers of welfare programs were the inheritors of the women's-rights legacy,
and they were aware of sexual inequities. Some of what follows may help to answer these questions,
although its purpose is less to answer specific questions than to illuminate neglected aspects of how
we got the welfare system we have.

This essay is situated in two fields of theoretical and empirical scholarship: welfare history
and gender studies. Ignoring the (male) gendered assumptions of much welfare legislation, some
histories of the welfare state have failed to interrogate that which was taken for granted. For
example, by taking for granted that, in families, males were the only breadwinners, welfare advocates
construed poverty mainly as a result of lapses in male breadwinning and made men the designated
objects of help. Both welfare designers and scholars missed not only historical changes in family
economies but also evidence that the norms never matched the reality. "Gender," meanwhile, has
often been used as a synonym for women, maintaining the invisibility of maleness. The resultant
scholarship has sometimes somersaulted into a kind of female Whiggism, crediting the value of such
welfare programs as we have to women's nurturant inclinations, while the limitations of our welfare
state are derived from male individualism. This approach is limited both by a romantic view of
women's generosity and by an overly dichotomized view of gender, which in turn assumes a kind of
unity among women which was never present. Specifically, this supposed unity denies that women's
agency also derives from other aspects of their social position, such as their class, religion, and race, and not only their gender. In arguing for a more complicated interpretation I do not back off from claims that gender must be a primary unit of analysis, but argue against conceiving gender as a fixed, dichotomous, and oppositional dualism.

The comparison of male and female visions implies neither a universal gender system, nor that gender was necessarily the determining or even dominant factor in constructing these visions. The subject here is the influence of gender among particular groups in a limited time period. Moreover, the groups were by no means homogeneous. There were substantial disagreements among them and considerable changes in their views over time. This analysis necessarily occludes such differences for the sake of a comparison. Still, by treating as one a disparate network extending over forty-five years, we gain a birds'eye perspective, making manifest certain broad patterns which have been missed in more monographic studies.

I. MALE AND FEMALE REFORMERS: A COMPARISON OF BACKGROUNDS

The welfare advocates discussed here do not constitute a representative sample and I did not set out to define a group of individuals for study. But they accumulated so noticeably in my notes, and they so frequently wrote and memoed each other, that they seemed to demand consideration as a network. Only after I began to see the patterns in their thought did I systematize this information, counting individuals and collecting biographical information. The end result was seventy-six white women and seventy-six white men who were national leaders of welfare reform movements from 1890 to 1935. (They are listed in the appendix, along with a fuller explanation of how they were chosen.) These include the leaders of national organizations in the field, such as the American Association for Labor Legislation and the National Consumers' League, individuals who were prominent for their advocacy of public social and economic provision; I excluded those whose
primary contributions to the cause were made as elected officials or as philanthropists. I make no claims to having assembled an inclusive or representative list, but, on the principle of saturation, I doubt that the addition of more people would alter my findings.

I did not decide to segregate these individuals by sex and race; they did that themselves. Even those married to others on my list networked primarily with their own sex. Most of these prominent whites excluded Blacks from their networks and counsel. In this forty-five-year period African Americans were still mainly concentrated in the South, overwhelmingly disfranchised, with little influence on government at any level. As a result their energetic campaigns for improving the welfare of their people took rather different forms--more often building private institutions because their campaigns for public provision were much less successful. (I have discussed Black welfare activism elsewhere.)

Having gathered biographical information about these welfare leaders, I looked for and found some significant patterns. They were, as one might expect, from rather elite backgrounds on the whole. This is indicated by their high educational levels, the proportion with wealthy or high-professional parents, and their typically Protestant, northern-European backgrounds. Most had Republican and temperance allegiances. Most took their Christianity very seriously, and considered their reform work part of a Christian moral vision. Some evidence suggests that the women were, on average, from more elite backgrounds than the men. The men were slightly more highly educated than the women (of men 96 percent had a college education and 84 percent had been to graduate school; among women the figures are 86 and 66 percent), but the women were more exceptional in their educational achievements than the men because fewer women on the whole had higher educations. Two-thirds of the women had elite parents, one-third of the men. The women's network also included fewer immigrants or non-Protestants than the men's. One-fifth of the men were Jewish, and in the later part of the period, considering men born after 1880, the proportion went
up to one-third. Half of the Jewish men were immigrants, and many of these and the native-born Jews were from poor backgrounds, often with radical political inclinations. The nine Jewish women were primarily from wealthy German backgrounds and were born in the United States. Another indicator of the privileged backgrounds of these women was that a third of the unmarried were nevertheless not usually employed—that is, they were able to live without earning. It is safe to assume that this figure underestimates those who could have lived on family money, since many of these women chose to take jobs even without economic necessity.11

Occupational comparisons between the men and the women are necessarily limited in meaning, since virtually all men of their class grew up assuming that they would find a career, and virtually all these men had found a way to integrate welfare advocacy and salaried jobs. The women often worked as volunteers, although the proportion that was employed—61 percent—was far beyond the national average, which moved from 18 to 25 percent in this period. Allowing for these gender differences, a significant occupational difference remained. Most of the men were academics, and this proportion grew to 70 percent among the younger men (those born after 1880).12 While the majority of the men had participated in social work, most had done so only temporarily, before committing themselves to their professions. By contrast, virtually all the women had participated in some social-work activity, and two-thirds were social workers all their lives; only one-fifth were academics.13 There is nothing surprising about this, given the widespread discrimination against women in academia and the development of social work as a female and low-status profession, but what is important here are the different influences on men and women working for welfare. Being mainly social workers as opposed to academics, the women were much more likely to have had long-term direct contact with the poor, through settlement houses or relief agencies. All except the oldest women had personally experienced the transformation of social work from a volunteer to a professional activity, beginning their careers as volunteers for charity or reform groups, ending as
salaried workers for the same or similar groups. Women's careers had arisen directly from their charitable and reform activism, and their identities were strongly influenced by their goals and the fact that they defined themselves as altruists. Men's identities were far more defined by their professions, and men with equivalent passions for social justice and mercy fulfilled that mission through a vocation, experiencing from their youth the pressure for discipline, specialization, and achievement. Yet, paradoxically, more men in this network were actively religious than women. This suggests, again, a difference in what drew men and women to reform activism: for women, the activism was the career; men's welfare activism sometimes represented sacrifice of a more conventional road to success, a choice which may have been connected to their religiosity. The unconventional reform careers they chose may also have served as routes to upward mobility for the immigrant Jews among them.

Because proper family life was so important to their welfare vision, it seemed useful to investigate their domestic circumstances, and here too there was a significant gender difference. Virtually all (91 percent) of the men were married and two-thirds (68 percent) had children; only 34 percent of the women had ever been married, only 28 percent had children, and only 18 percent remained married during their peak political activity. These figures verify patterns well known to social historians of this period. The years in which these women were young (approximately 1870-1915) represented an important transitional period for privileged women, who were entering the public sphere through professions and activism in larger numbers than ever before; but it remained socially very difficult to combine this public-sphere activity with marriage. The difficulty arose not from the stresses of the "double day" that working-class women faced, because these women in the main could afford household and child-care help. Instead, the barrier to combining marriage and "career" was cultural. Men and most women of this class expected wives to remain domestic. The letters, diaries, and fiction of this class and generation of women indicated that, as they approached
adulthood, they faced a choice between two mutually exclusive options. (It should be noted that this sense of choice was distinctly a white as well as middle-class perspective. Black women of comparably elite status in respect to their communities felt it respectable to combine the two and mainly did so.)

Thus in the organizations and committees on which they sometimes worked together, married men faced single women. These women, often middle-aged before they reached positions of importance in their reform area, in contrast to men who were often younger, were frequently perceived as spinsters. It is true that they were removed from the heterosexual marriage-and-family experience of most women. Many of them were in some kind of emotional and/or sexual partnership with other women, but since this alternative pattern of coupling was not widely recognized at the time, the group did not appear to represent a rejection of conventional family life. Rather they were considered exceptions, and by the 1930s increasingly seen as unfortunate exceptions, women who had been unable to achieve, or who had sacrificed, the joys of family.

As a group these welfare advocates were simultaneously close and riven with disagreements, both personal and political. Most of them saw others in their network frequently. The sex segregation was mutual, but its meanings were somewhat different for men and for women. The welfare "old boys’ network" reproduced existing professional and governmental patterns in which men occupied almost all positions of authority. Some of these men turned to women like Grace and Edith Abbott, Molly Dewson, Florence Kelley, Mary Van Kleeck, and Lillian Wald for information or to get something done; it is evident that men like John Andrews, Louis Brandeis, John Commons, Paul Raushenbush, and Carroll Wright understood the extraordinary competence of many of the women in this group. But the men, on the whole, did not promote women for public leadership positions. The "girls" network, for this is what they often called themselves, was probably stronger, more personally intimate; with so many members lacking conventional families, they spent a great
deal of leisure time together—weekending and vacationing at summer homes, nursing others through illness, and living with each other privately, in settlements, or in their clubs.

The strong sense of community among the women and their largely nonprofessional, volunteer status kept alive a somewhat autonomous women’s political culture even after they entered mainstream politics. All but the youngest women were women’s-rights advocates and at least half had worked for woman suffrage. For most, however, suffrage was not their primary work by the early twentieth century; rather they were "social feminists," motivated more by their concern for the women and children of less fortunate classes. Still, their reform strategy had grown from the experience of disfranchisement and exclusion from the high professions, and most of them—until 1932—avoided party politics in favor of civic organization. Their practice was characterized by extremely tight communication and joint planning between those in public office and those in civic organizations, to a higher degree than the men's. White middle-class women’s patterns of nonemployment conditioned this strategy, as these women supplied a great deal of volunteer activism upon which welfare leaders depended. For just one example, 3,000 volunteer club women did the interviewing in the early Children’s Bureau birth registration surveys.19

At the end of the nineteenth century, women like these were the acknowledged force behind charity work, and some had even made their way into its national leadership. As charity became social work, during the Progressive Era, it remained one of the quintessential female professions. Women like Josephine Shaw Lowell, Mary Richmond, Sophonisba Breckinridge, and Edith and Grace Abbott powerfully influenced, possibly dominated, the field, from the 1880s through the Depression. University of Chicago sociology professor Charles Henderson’s 1901 textbook on social work and social reform assumed women as its readership.20 Men as well as women conceived of the welfare state as female. Thus Alexander Johnson, in his Presidential address to the National Conference of Charities and Correction, referred to "The Mother State and her Weaker Children."21 Men were
active in social work, and disproportionately represented in its leadership, but the field nevertheless carried a distinctly feminine identity.

Although social work involved both men and women, with the latter providing the majority of influence and leadership, the other field of social welfare—social insurance—was almost exclusively male. In what follows these gendered visions will be explored in four dimensions: in the programs they proposed, in the rhetoric with which they constructed the problems of the poor, in the fundamental principles on which their welfare philosophies rested, and in their research methods, disciplines, and epistemology. We will see how the personal/social biographies of the these welfare activists—their class, race, professional, and familial circumstances, for example—contributed to forming their welfare visions and strategies.

II. SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL INSURANCE PROGRAMS

Perhaps the best way to discuss social work and social insurance programs is to begin with the language of welfare in the first half of this century. Distinctions between social work and social insurance developed within this period and were used quite inconsistently and generically. Social work remained an umbrella term, referring not to a profession but to an inclusive range of "helping" activities, including the voluntary and the paid, the private and the public, to relief, moral reform, and socioeconomic reform. The move away from helping activities to professional occupations began most visibly with the development of settlement houses in the 1890s, and fissures widened in the second decade of the twentieth century as social workers built professional schools, devoted themselves to establishing their status as professionals, and separated themselves from reform activism. Nevertheless, well into the 1930s the term "social work" continued to be used in its wider, inclusive meaning. Furthermore, this meaning was gendered. Every woman in the welfare network I identified considered herself a social worker, largely because the term described a unity
they felt among employed and volunteer activists; only some of the men considered themselves social workers, since they more often defined themselves by their vocation and not by their volunteer or noncareer work. Thus in 1931 Amy Maher, chairman [sic] of the Ohio Council on Women in Industry, wrote Mary Dewson of the Democratic Party, reporting her pleasure in a brief that women from the National Consumers League had written: "It's a great piece of work ... and as feminists we're proud of it, and as social workers, and as litterateurs!!" (She added "also as college grads--," revealing how special that status still made women feel.)

Although social work could mean so many different things, there was a network of social workers who, throughout these years, shared a coherent welfare program. It is by now commonly accepted that this program expressed their privileged class position. Accepting a community obligation to help the poor, they believed that aid to the poor must avoid making their lot too easy and should never become more lucrative than the lowest-paid wage labor; this view was known as the "least eligibility" principle from the English Poor Law Reform of 1834. They distinguished between the deserving and the undeserving poor and felt it important to treat them differently. The undeserving could threaten the entire social order by their failure to internalize a work ethic, and social workers worried about the potential of their own helping activity to worsen that shiftlessness. The most important word in the social-work vocabulary in the nineteenth century had been "pauperization," which is what happened when the poor allegedly lost their work ethic and began to expect handouts. From this concern stemmed the conviction that good social work required not only relief, but also moral reform; without it poverty would become pauperism. Listen to Belle Israels (later Moskowitz), a member of the social-work network, writing in 1908: "Poverty easily drags the poor man down, weakens him physically, diminishes his moral resistance, makes him less valuable as a working force, and frequently leads to [my emphasis] lack of employment, as at every crisis or industrial depression the mediocre working men and women are the first to be dismissed."
problem she is discussing is complex, many-layered, and self-perpetuating; being poor can make a person grow poorer still. And "In individual cases it is often difficult to determine if poverty is the result of idleness, or idleness the result of poverty." Aid to the poor must always be accompanied by guidance towards rehabilitation or at least maintenance of "good standards" of home life. In the early twentieth century the emphasis on pauperization was criticized, and by the 1920s most social workers considered environment the primary cause of social maladjustment, some emphasizing economic distress and others individual-level influences. But social workers remained committed to treating the individual, who they assumed to be damaged by the environment, even if they were less likely to refer to this damage as pauperization. They agreed that welfare required screening out the unworthy and personal supervision of the worthy.

Male influence on welfare thought increased in the twentieth century not through a critique of this female-influenced social-work program but through a new stream of thinking, introduced at the turn of the century: social insurance. Its basic principles were government provision, based on compulsory participation, and automatic (that is, not means- or morals-tested) benefits among covered groups. Indeed, social-insurance programs were not exclusively directed at the poor; one of their selling points was that they benefited all classes. While the social workers focussed on treating poverty so as to prevent pauperism, the social-insurance proponents aimed to prevent poverty itself. Social insurance could achieve this end, they believed, by aiding workers as soon as there was a loss of earnings, as in the case of workmen's compensation, or by providing incentives for employers to maintain steady employment and safe working conditions, as for example through the use of tax incentives. They had great confidence that poverty could be prevented. Richard Neustadt, who moved from settlement work, within the social-work tradition, to early social-insurance advocacy, considered the view that [poverty] "is ultimately preventable [to be] a fundamental doctrine of
democracy, an axiom of civilization. But they did not concentrate on perfecting individuals; they devoted little attention to individual character.

Social-insurance advocacy was almost exclusively male, unlike social-work thinking, which was integrated. This stream of ideas had been brought to this country from Europe by male academics educated abroad, particularly in Germany, and its opponents were quick to brand it un-American, a German plot. The first to begin popularizing German social-insurance ideas in the United States was John Graham Brooks, who was encouraged by the U.S. Commissioner of Labor Carroll Wright in the 1890s. In 1902 Charles Henderson of the University of Chicago sociology department induced the National Conference of Charities and Corrections (NCCC)--the main national social-work professional organization--to appoint a commission to study social insurance. Soon several states organized studies of European schemes, and in 1906 the American Association for Labor Legislation was organized to campaign for workman’s compensation, health insurance and, later, unemployment insurance. But many social-insurance proponents were academics from the beginning, as we have seen; Wilbur Cohen, recalling this history many years later, thought that social-insurance ideas started among people in "key colleges and universities."

Generally, social-work women supported social insurance but rarely participated in its formulation. The NCCC commission, for example, was all male despite the prominence of women in the organization, such as Elizabeth Brandeis Raushenbush, the daughter of Louis Brandeis. She was frequently involved in social-insurance efforts but primarily as a kind of assistant to her husband, Paul Raushenbush, who was a student of John Commons and author of the Wisconsin unemployment compensation law. During the New Deal two academic economists, Eveline Burns and Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong, worked on Social Security; but these were the first of a younger generation to enter the field, outside both the social-work and the women's-rights network, and they were critical both of social-insurance and social-work approaches. Edna Bullock, editor of the Debaters Handbook
Series during the Progressive era, anthologized excerpts from the national discussions of a variety of social issues, and many of her volumes featured the work of many women activists; yet her volume on "compulsory insurance" had only one piece by a woman, out of 32 articles; it was also the only article that mentioned poverty and the only article from a social-work, as opposed to an academic, journal.32

III. THE RHETORIC OF SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL INSURANCE PROPONENTS

Gender was also imbedded in the language of these welfare activists. I do not mean here to distinguish language from ideas, but merely to highlight an aspect of these welfare ideas. The social-work approach to poverty, the concern with personal maladjustment, showed in the language of these reformers. They more often used narrative and actual cases. Their stories were sometimes sentimental, and their audiences were different: social-insurance advocates were more often writing academic texts or reports, while social workers were addressing more general publics, hoping to move their listeners and readers and thereby persuade. This female style was more sophisticated than naive. In 1923 Julia Lathrop referred to her group's accustomed use of "'sob stuff [and] high ideals afloat . . ."33 Twelve years later when the Children's Bureau women were drafting ADC, and Grace Abbott's colleagues suggested she was asking for too small an appropriation, Abbott responded that to increase their request they should focus not just on children but on crippled children.34 But this manipulative rhetoric did not mean rank opportunism. Julia Lathrop's 1912 defense of pity is instructive: "... pity is a rebel passion ... it does not fear the forces of society but defies them ... it often has ruthless and stern ways, but ... at last it is the Kingdom of Heaven working within us. The justice of today is born of yesterday's pity ... this bureau [the Children's Bureau] ... is an expression of the nation's sense of justice. It will need as perhaps no other bureau of the government will need, the continuance of the popular pity which demanded and secured it ..."35 Moreover,
because their stories were taken from actual cases, they gained the complexity that combats sentimentality. That is, they avoided the dichotomies of good and evil, victim and brute, innocent and guilty, pure and polluted, that characterized some Victorian women's reform rhetoric. Indeed, at its best the distinction between poverty and pauperism was precisely about that complexity, because the concept of pauperism could be seen as trying to integrate what Richard Sennett called the "hidden injuries of class." There were some stereotyped stories of saintly, pale, overworked widows, but there were also stories of child abuse and maternal negligence, wife-beating and alcoholism, demoralization and dishonesty. Their stories were tinged with condescension and moralism, to be sure, but they were not wrong to recognize personal and intrafamily problems among the poor.

By contrast the social-insurance rhetoric was more often abstract. When a "case" was used as an example (an infrequent device), it was invented, simplified or hypothetical, while the women's stories came straight from case records. Again the exceptions illuminate the pattern. William Hard, perhaps closest to the women in his concerns, used hypothetical rather than real cases, for example, longshoreman "Smith" who was burned in an explosion of benzine, naphtha, and gasoline on a ship, and how he would have been taken care of had there been a social-insurance system. The social-insurance male writing usually addressed incidence of need, costs of various systems, administrative arrangements of various systems, impact of insurance on economic incentives. These choices grew in part from their need to persuade politicians and scholars of a new method of distribution of provision, while the social workers were defending a traditional form of aid. The social-insurance abstractions did not tend towards the philosophical; there was very little ethical argumentation or grounding in social or political theory. They spoke the language of actuarial computation and administration, and argued from a logic that assumed profit motives as the only motives (despite, ironically, the socialist affiliations of several prominent social-insurance advocates). Altruism was not only absent, but was implicitly denied potency as a social motive.
IV. UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL INSURANCE AND SOCIAL WORK: RIGHTS VERSUS NEEDS

When welfare advocates sought to derive their arguments from fundamental principles, gender showed again, albeit less dramatically. Men more often made rights claims. Frederick Wines spoke of a "natural right" to relief as early as 1883. In his 1920 *The Scientific Spirit and Social Work*, Arthur James Todd began with "Natural Rights and Social Wrongs," finding the origins of modern social work not in the church, the peasant moral economy, the paternal bond between lord and peasant, or anything of the English tradition, but in *The Declaration of the Rights of Man* and Tom Paine. "There is no forcing of analogies or misreading of history when I say that modern social-reform movements and social work represent a series of concrete attempts to define and redefine the Rights of Man [emphasis in original]." Prefiguring Franklin Roosevelt, Todd lists some new "rights": to a decent income, to organize for economic protection (unions), to leisure, to education, to recreation, to health (including sanitation, preventive hygiene, protection from impure and adulterated food), to decent habitation, to a childhood "untainted by unnecessary and preventable diseases or degeneracies" (eugenics), and to women's rights.

Women often used rights rhetoric also. A vivid example is Florence Kelley's 1905 *Some Ethical Gains through Legislation*, which spoke of the right to childhood, to leisure, and the rights of purchasers. Kelley even found constitutional grounds for these: "The right to childhood . . . follows from the existence of the Republic . . ." But women more often used this rhetoric in combination with the notion that needs themselves were a claim on the polity. Needs talk was developed particularly strongly in the settlements, where leaders spoke of learning from the poor about their needs. The protracted struggle against child labor was a decisive factor in spreading and establishing an authoritative discourse about the needs of others, as social workers argued that children "needed" play and companionship and talked of "meeting" children's needs.
An important aspect of social work—that of casework—was premised on ascertaining the individual and social needs of clients. (The influence of casework will be discussed later in the paper.) This is one of the ways in which casework skills could be said to be feminine—they were similar to women’s nurturing work—attentiveness, empathy, asking the right questions. Bertha Reynolds came to believe that casework was defined by "perceptiveness regarding needs." The variability of needs did not seem to these social workers to make determinations less exact; casework discourse sought to make needs scientific through empirical studies of the costs of living and the making of family budgets (women’s work in quantitative social-science research is discussed below). Social-insurance plans, by contrast, required no discretionary ascertainment of need.

From the Children’s Bureau’s first infant mortality studies to the New Deal, needs talk continued to be influential. At the end of the New Deal and particularly during World War II, Left-of-center social workers appeared to be attempting to define a new integration of needs and rights principles. An influential example, and perhaps the ultimate defense of the women’s social-work tradition, was Charlotte Towle’s *Common Human Needs*, published in 1945 when the ascendancy of the social-insurance programs within the Social Security Act already threatened to make casework stigmatizing and inferior. Towle tried to unify rights with needs talk, arguing that there was a right to have one’s needs met. "... public assistance services [the general name for casework-accompanied relief] achieve their broad social purpose only when those who administer them understand the significant principles which make for sound individualization in a program based on right. ... understanding of common human needs and ... basic principles of human behavior ...."

Due to the Depression, "want and fear became the base for a progressive curtailment of man’s freedom. Today, as repeatedly throughout history, this basic want and fear have engendered hostile feelings which, in turn, have pitted man against man and prompted him to use his scientific
enlightenment in that wholesale destruction of life and property which now threatens not only the realization of his social goals but also his very survival.”

Discourse about needs has been criticized because defining a person’s needs is so open to manipulation from above. In social work, when "needs" are defined by professional experts, the client’s own expression of need may be silenced, and the client may lose access to defending her claims through the adversarial proceedings that adjudicate "rights." The practice of making family budgets allowed social workers to decide what clients needed, and with psychiatric influence, social workers became authorities on what their clients needed spiritually as well. (The social work appropriation of Freud often suppressed not only the discipline of nondirective, listening therapy that the orthodox psychoanalysts used, but also the critique of "adjustment"—i.e., conformity—that Freudian thought contains.) The use of needs talk as a means of control and even domination fit the skills of social-work women. Social insurance provided no individualized definition of a client; casework defined a client as multiply needy, not only economically, and this definition gave caseworkers a position of power and authority not easily achieved then by women outside their families.

As caseworkers, these women always found egalitarian empathy difficult to achieve. For these social workers, distance was created not only by casework theory, not only by their sense of class, religious, and racial/ethnic superiority, but also by their own family situations which rarely called upon them to combine earning and child-raising. Freed by their relatively privileged economic position from the necessities of marriage to a greater degree than was possible for poor women, being single was in many cases the condition that allowed for their activism or career. This might logically have made them, as single women, critical of the family-wage norm, but it did not do so. Their experience of singleness fit the class distance they felt from their clients and their acceptance of the premise that children and women needed breadwinner husbands, that children needed full-time
mothers, that women should choose between family and career. Certainly the premise of the social-work mainstream during the period 1890-1935 (with the important exception of the social-work rank-and-file movement during the Depression) was that welfare clients could not define their own needs properly without professional expertise. In the Depression, the social-work Left, as represented in the rank-and-file unionizing drive and the journal Social Work Today, criticized needs talk for its inegalitarian implications, and began to reclaim rights rhetoric. Grace Coyle was typical of this tendency in her call to social workers to defend clients' rights as well as their needs—their right to organize, to social security, to free speech.

The development of needs talk coincided with the rise of the realm of the "social," as Hannah Arendt identified it, a realm distinct from the private (as in family or friendship), from the state, but also from the economic. In this realm arose a range of wants that could be classified as needs, from telephones to certain family structures. Arendt, in this respect following a Frankfurt School orientation, sees the social as inevitably oppressive, a space being defined precisely as it was filled with the subtle forms of oppression that so characterize late-capitalist culture—advertising, market research and opinion polls, "pop psych," and state and other coercive intervention into the private.

This critique of the language of needs misses much, owing particularly to the absence of a gender analysis. Since needs talk often involves bringing into public a previously private discourse, such as bodily and psychological matters, it has often been a feminine discourse, constructed by those who take responsibility for the quality of the private. Needs language was often brought into political debate by women. When women argued for access to public citizenship rights, such as the voting rolls or juries, they often argued from needs—of the poor, of the children, of the city dwellers. Arendt saw the social only as "one-dimensional space wholly under the sway of administration and instrumental reason." In fact needs discourse has been intensely argumentative. The rhetoric of needs has been mobilized particularly fervently and frequently in welfare activism. I met it in
campaigns against child abuse and neglect and changing prescriptions about what children "need"; in pressures to raise the minimum provision for the poor in conformity with new social needs, such as telephones; in the as yet failed arguments for public medical provision about health care needs.

Needs talk was sometimes turned introspective, and made subversive, notably by settlement women. One particularly stunning use of needs talk was Jane Addams' insistence that settlement work fulfilled needs for the privileged women who did it, needs that she considered at once spiritual and "primordial." Needs talk is not inherently dominating; it seems rather that needs and rights talk represented two different kinds of complex discourse, each containing authoritative and democratic potential.

The gender difference must not be overstated. Most political activists used needs and rights talk, like Charlotte Towle or like that rhetorical master, Franklin Roosevelt. (For example, "Freedom from Want.") On balance, however, there is a gender in this rhetoric and its assumptions, as well as class and race meanings. The rights legacy had been male traditionally, and its more inclusive republican version became overshadowed in the last two centuries by the possessive-individualist version, resting on forms of power--economic and political--from which most women and men were excluded. The authority of this approach was that of law and contract in their irrevocability and universality. By contrast the needs tradition called up a female experiential and discursive realm of nurturance, and of authority through the power to give. The oppositional use of needs talk represented similarly the bringing into public of a private logic, in the way in which family members ask for help because they need it, not because they deserve it or it is their share.54

V. GENDER AND ROUTES TO PROFESSIONALISM

This brings us to a fourth gender orientation: the organization of professional/occupational disciplines and methods through which welfare thought was expressed and in turn shaped. Social
insurance was mainly an academic stream of thought and many of its most prominent proponents were academics: Arthur Altmeyer, Wilbur Cohen, John Commons, Richard Ely, Isidore Falk, Abraham Epstein, Charles Henderson, Robert Hunter, John Kingsbury, Paul Raushenbush, Edgar Sydenstricker, and Edwin Witte, to name but a few. Moreover, the men’s primary mode of agitating for social insurance, at least before the New Deal, was through academic writing and publishing. By the 1920s most of the Jews in this network (eleven of fifteen) had found academic positions, despite anti-Semitism. Indeed, the academic profession and the social-insurance reform network represented an upward mobility route for the poor and foreign-born Jews in the group. Social-insurance thought was consonant with the European social democracy that had been the legacy of so many of these Jews.

By contrast, the minority of women who were academics were usually only marginally so. Of the ten women welfare activists who were academics, five taught social work, one was the president of a "Seven Sisters" women's college, and only four taught traditionally academic subjects. The women, by contrast, were primarily involved in speaking, lobbying, and organizational work; the men they were closest to were the minority of nonacademics with whom they worked in civic organizations, such as John Andrews, for many years head of the American Association for Labor Legislation, and Alexander McKelway of the National Committee on Child Labor. Yet they felt comfortable and confident with male academics, so many of them having gone to the best schools.

The sex segregation of social-insurance thinking was not due to women's poorer academic performance. Many of these women had been stellar college students who found themselves without career opportunity upon graduation or even after receiving doctorates. This was an academically ambitious generation: nearly one-third of women earning college degrees between 1868 and 1898 went on to do graduate work; eight times as many women earned Ph.D.s in the 1890s as in the whole history of the United States before. However, of the nine women who earned Ph.D.s in the social
sciences during the University of Chicago’s first fifteen years, none got a faculty appointment, while two-thirds of the male Ph.D.s did. Yet despite their nonacademic orientation, women reformers in the late nineteenth century had been prominent among those who envisioned the application of expertise, science, to society. "The work of social science is literally woman’s work," wrote Franklin Sanborn of the American Social Science Association in 1874; it was the feminine side of political economy. Jane Addams even wanted to rationalize children’s recreation: "This stupid experiment of organizing work and failing to organize play . . ." Helen Sumner Woodbury called for the application of "scientific methods of invention and experiment . . . to political and economic affairs" and for taking up the science of the "production . . . of happiness." Three decades later Charlotte Towle called for extending the "critical, empirical attitude of the natural sciences . . . to the study of personality."

Even in the 1930s the social-work network continued Progressive traditions of statism and belief in expertise. They favored coercive measures, such as housing codes, wages and hours regulations, health and safety regulations, food and drug testing, and labelling. Despite men’s greater professional achievement, women had an equal commitment to authoritative expertise. They sought professionalization of social work and scientific methods of public administration. The U.S. Children’s and Women’s Bureaus considered themselves pioneering in the incorporation of expertise and meritocratic principles into government. As local and state governments inaugurated welfare programs, after about 1910, women in these agencies were among the foremost proponents of nonpatronage hiring and professional standards. Today we might see an inconsistency between their commitment to civil service and their use of an "old girls’ network" to bring women into jobs, but this is not the way that they saw it: their view was that they needed such a network to help highly qualified women get past discriminatory practices.
Moreover, social workers in this period were continually anxious about their status as professionals. In 1915 at the annual National Conference on Charities and Corrections, Abraham Flexner declared that social work lacked the characteristics that would allow it ever to become a profession, a critique repeated by Maurice Karpf in 1931. The defensive response to these insults to social work should not obscure the gender issues here. (Another occupation that has been marked by equal anxiety about its professional status is nursing.) This network of women had a triple burden: proving that women, social workers, and government employees could be professionals.

The sexual division of labor among welfare proponents was not only a matter of discrimination, for at issue is not only what the women were kept from doing but what they did do. This sexual division of labor, in fact, affected the structure and content not only of welfare programs but also of the modern social science disciplines, especially sociology. At the turn of the century there was little distinction between sociology and the research and scholarly side of social work, or between social reform and the applied side of sociology. In fact some who worked for the charities called themselves sociologists, while at the turn of the century Lester Ward acknowledged, albeit critically, that most people identified sociology with philanthropy. The same motives that led women into social work were drawing them in large numbers into graduate sociology and, to a slightly lesser extent, economics departments, which were rapidly expanding at this time. The understanding of their professors was that they would do "applied" work, research rather than teaching, and research about contemporary social problems, for institutes, government investigations, and the private sector, but not for universities. Thus Ida Merriam, considered a brilliant young economist, upon earning her Ph.D. in 1928 from Brookings had three job offers: for the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, for the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care under director Isidore Falk (a leading social-insurance proponent), and for Eastman Kodak. In her later memoir she remembered being resigned to not being considered for an academic job. Edwin Witte much
admired Elizabeth Wilson's thesis on "Distribution of Disability Costs," but recommended that she
seek out a job with the Social Security Board, not with a college. The refusal of the University of
Chicago sociology department to hire Edith Abbott or Sophonisba Breckinridge can be argued to have
shaped the development of the entire modern field of social work and the social survey; this refusal
then impelled them to build the School of Social Service Administration which dominated social-work
social research for many decades.

In addition to applied research, women were active in the infancy of quantitative social
scholarship. Up until World War I, social science quantitative work was, in fact, mainly developed
outside universities, by reformers, and women were prominent among them. In 1878, when the
tenth census was being planned and appropriated for, the Association for the Advancement of Women
was one of the few groups who criticized the 1870 census and suggested survey information that
should be gathered in 1880. Massachusetts statistical officer Carroll Wright recognized and
supported the survey work being done by female investigators and the importance of the issues they
raised: he supported Annie Howes' study of the health of women college graduates in the early 1880s,
published The Working Girls of Boston in 1884, and sponsored a national study of working women in
1888. Women's contributions in this field were further marked by Helen Campbell's quantitative
monograph on Women Wage-Earners (1893) and Lucy Maynard Salmon's study of domestic servants
in 1892 in the Journal of the American Statistical Association. When Wright persuaded Congress to
fund investigations into urban slum conditions in the 1890s, he turned to the settlement women of
Hull-House to conduct the Chicago survey. Many contemporaries and modern scholars consider
the result, Hull-House Maps and Papers (1895), one of the most influential social surveys, joined a
bit later by Du Bois' The Philadelphia Negro (1899) and Atlanta University Studies (1898-1913), and
the Pittsburgh survey (1914), also done mainly by women. Florence Kelley, through her work on
this Chicago study, as an Illinois factory inspector, and later in developing projects funded by the
Russell Sage Foundation, was one of the definers of modern standards for social research along with Wright and Du Bois.

The women’s network was influential in persuading the National Conference on Charities and Corrections of the importance of social data, and in establishing its first committee on statistics in 1905. Julia Lathrop argued, for example, that America’s backwardness in the matter of social provision was owing to the fact that its public was not being given "ascertained facts." Kelley listed at length the issues on which information was lacking. Their approach helped create the modern practice of conducting studies which serve as a basis for policy decisions. Their belief in the power of data to persuade was of a piece with their rhetorical preference for the concrete, the specific. And their influence helped to transform social work. Doing social surveys became so numerous that it could be called a social movement; at least 2,775 were completed by 1927. An indicator of the growing importance of surveys was the renaming of Charities and the Commons, the key journal of the social-work establishment, as Survey in 1909, newly supported by a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation.

By the Progressive era many women were acknowledged authorities in the discipline of "social statistics." By the 1920s the woman-led Children’s Bureau of the DOL was recognized as the federal government’s leader in statistical studies. The test for applicants to the female-dominated Children’s Bureau required outlining a statistical table from raw data and a plan for investigation of a social problem. The Children’s Bureau was the source of most Depression data on poverty; when better information on unemployment and wage rates was wanted, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins turned to Clara Beyer of the Children’s Bureau to set up the Bureau of Labor Standards and collect data.

Within the developing field of sociology women’s overrepresentation in this kind of research was such that quantitative research was sex-typed as female. Empirical study of contemporary social
problems, such as poverty, crime, and immigration, was increasingly considered a branch of (female) social work while (male) sociological scholarship remained more theoretical and/or qualitative.

The story of the relationship between Hull-House, arguably the most important enclave of the women’s welfare network from 1890 to 1910, and the University of Chicago Sociology Department may serve to illustrate. Between these two centers of social research and scholarship there arose close cooperation and division of labor. The first sociology faculty were from the social-work, Christian reform tradition, such as Charles Henderson and Graham Taylor, and Dean of Women Marion Talbot, who also taught in the department in its first years. They greatly admired Jane Addams, who frequently lectured in University sociology classes, often enough that one historian described her as "adjunct professor." In 1895 the University tried to acquire Hull-House, but was rejected by Addams and Julia Lathrop; they had several reasons for preferring autonomy, despite the value of durable economic support, one of which was the inevitable subordination that would be the settlement’s fate once inside such a male institution as was a university in the 1890s. Accepting Hull-House’s autonomy, University of Chicago sociologists still viewed it as their "laboratory." These sociologists considered quantitative work "applied" and preferred to subcontract it out, so to speak, to lower-status workers—in this case often the Hull-House women, led particularly by pioneer social researcher Florence Kelley. Despite this early cooperation with Hull-House, after about 1915 quantitative work at the University of Chicago was deemphasized altogether as sociologists like W. I. Thomas, Robert Park, and George Herbert Mead developed their influential qualitative methods. (Ironically, W. F. Ogburn, hired at the University of Chicago in 1927, is often credited as the initiator of quantitative sociology.) Nothing illustrates the malleability of gender meanings so well as the transition over the last century from a feminine association with statistical work to today’s language about "hard data" and the masculine domination of the "hard" social sciences.
This gender reversal occurred mainly in the 1930s. Then, as academic sociology returned with enthusiasm to quantitative research, that work became detached from social action. Gradually the social survey tradition, which had become part of social work, was separated from sociological survey research, which defined itself as disinterested. Sociology, particularly vividly at the University of Chicago, moved from closeness to coolness in its relation to social welfare, and welfare and social survey advocates were increasingly associated with the School of Civics and Philanthropy, renamed the School of Social Service Administration in 1920 by Breckinridge and Edith Abbott.

This divorce of social work from sociology underlay yet another gendered set of meanings, concerning objectivity. The social survey movement had established the premise that welfare policy should be based on empirical data; a corollary was that most social studies of the early twentieth century had as their purpose policy recommendations. A bibliography of social surveys refers to them as "Reports of Fact-finding Studies Made as a Basis for Social Action..." The notion that policy should rest on accurate data did not make the early social-work researchers aspire to objectivity in the sense of disinterest or political neutrality.

The partisan use of social research characterized all welfare advocates, male and female, of the social-insurance as well as the social-work persuasion. They were closer to the nineteenth-century, often amateur, social scientists of the American Social Science Association, than to the twentieth-century discipline-specialized academic social scientists. But while the reform-related research tradition involved both men and women, the separation between academics and advocates was particularly a male creation. The development towards "objective," professional, disciplinary, technical social science has been narrated in such a determinist fashion, as such an inevitable development, that the story is virtually teleological. As Mary Furner showed in her 1975 Advocacy and Objectivity, the victory of the professionals in social science occurred through pitched political battles in which those committed to "objectivity" as an academic norm used their institutional power
to support shutting up radicals and mavericks of various sorts. The role of women has been invisible in this history because they did not hold academic positions, but they were present in the social-science debates nonetheless.

The social-work researchers made no claim to producing value-free work. They believed that scholarship could be truthful and moral and partisan. Carroll Wright, for example, never thought that statistics were neutral or inert in respect to social/political controversies. In publishing the 1890 census, for example, he knew that his improved data on women's employment, controlled for "conjugal condition," would challenge the myth of the family wage. He, like his women allies, openly took stands on social and moral issues. Responding to the allegations that "shop girls" were immoral, he asserted that his study showed that they were rather "'honest, industrious and virtuous, and are making an heroic struggle against many obstacles, and in the face of peculiar temptations, to maintain reputable lives.'" As Agnes Sinclair Holbrook put it in her introduction to Hull-House Maps and Papers, "The painful nature of minute investigation, and the personal impertinence of many of the questions asked, would be unendurable and unpardonable were it not for the conviction that the public conscience when roused must demand better surroundings for the most inert and long-suffering citizens of the commonwealth. Merely to state symptoms and go no farther would be idle; but to state symptoms in order to ascertain the nature of disease, and apply, it may be, its cure, is not only scientific, but in the highest sense humanitarian." Even Sophonisba Breckinridge and Edith Abbott, two of the most exclusively academic of the women's welfare network, insisted on purposeful research--data should be collected because of their contribution to reform--and required their students to participate in reform activity. Edith Abbott said of her mentor Julia Lathrop that she rejected "the academic theory that social work could be 'scientific' only if it had no regard to the finding of socially useful results and no interest in the human beings whose lives were being studied."
At the turn of the century no gender difference was visible here, but the rise of academic social science soon created one. Already by the 1909 White House Conference on Children there was an open disagreement about objectivity in which the two sides corresponded considerably to gender difference. Lillian Wald spoke for the unity of research and advocacy; Homer Folks and a male group insisted on the separation of the two. By the 1920s male academic social scientists increasingly denied that their work was value-laden and instead considered themselves not reformers but consulting experts to reform. By contrast women social workers continued to maintain that their studies were intended not only to reveal sufferings and injustices but also to advocate government intervention—"welfare"—and to plead for social cooperation as opposed to social conflict as the basis for progress and order. Let us recall here their sense of social work as a vocation that united study and action, accuracy and social purpose, individual help and social change.

For a number of reasons one might have expected some convergence between the male and the female welfare discourse by, say, the 1920s. First, academic social-science insistence on "objectivity" contributed to a division between sociologists and social workers, and social-insurance advocates had to go with the latter camp, because they were not disinterested scholars. "One would not be true to one's self or to one's conscience were one, after all the facts have been revealed, to speak calmly and 'impartially' of the injustice now meted out . . . ," Abraham Epstein wrote in 1928 (in a book he dedicated to New York Governor Roosevelt and Lieutenant Governor Herbert Lehman). Second, the rise of social-insurance thinking shifted the male welfare discourse away from sociology towards economics, although the distinction was not particularly firm at this time; this transition was accompanied by greater male interest in numbers. And third, academic economics became increasingly laissez-faire while the social-insurance spokesmen wanted government intervention. But no convergence developed. Instead the social-insurance spokesmen were increasingly influenced by professional social science, and they tended to argue in nonethical,
technical terms (creating the discourse of today's poverty research and welfare policy). The explanation for this apparent paradox lies in the different goals, already discussed, that the two groups believed welfare programs should have: the prevention of poverty and the prevention of pauperism.

VI. POVERTY VERSUS PAUPERISM: THE INFLUENCE OF CASEWORK

Both women social workers and male social-insurance advocates were dissatisfied with relief and sought prevention. But while social-insurance advocates wanted to prevent poverty, social workers aimed to prevent pauperization. The former is an economic condition—lack of money; the latter is also an internal, moral/psychological problem. Pauperism might be caused by poverty, but not all poor people were paupers. We have seen that environmental causes of pauperism were emphasized in the early twentieth century, but the condition was remarkably similar to that of the nineteenth century: a culture of poverty, or long-term dependency, marked by loss of work ethic, inability to accept industrial discipline, hopelessness, and sexual immorality—what is today called "underclass" behavior. Thus "prevention" in the social-work tradition required environmental and character reform, not just economic tinkering. Gertrude Vaile emphasized the "rehabilitative forces" such as "local churches, local schools, local health facilities, parks and libraries and social organizations and the daily job..." which could be brought to bear on individual cases. This fear of pauperization receded somewhat over time, and the social-work Left in the 1930s became particularly critical of it. But the social-work leadership retained it. Gertrude Vaile was one of many who, even in the depths of the Depression, feared that relief without casework would encourage clients to "lean."

Just as social-insurance advocates devised schemes aimed simultaneously at helping and preventing the need for help, so did social workers, through the technique of casework. The casework approach was individualized, unlike social-insurance administration; often called
"differential casework," it required in-depth investigation of a "client’s" background, circumstances, and attitudes. Individualization was in fact the essence of casework: its guiding principle was "to treat unequal things unequally." The very premise of casework was antibureaucratic, in the pure sense of bureaucracy, since it insisted on the worker’s discretion. The caseworker was emphatic that money alone was not enough. The deindividualization of the social-insurance approach was anathema to true social workers unless combined with other programs that provided casework.

But casework was also scientific in an important sense. It derived, of course, from the "scientific charity" movement, but went beyond it, too. In the nineteenth century, charity workers identified causes of poverty which they then counted. As Lilian Brandt said in criticizing this method in 1906, "The method consisted in tabulating the opinions of a large number of charity workers as to what was the cause of poverty in a large number of individual cases. . . . [This] meant reliance on opinions, not on facts; and . . . the burden of deciding whether it was intemperance, lack of work, unwise philanthropy, inefficiency or illness, in a given case, that brought the family to dependence, and the conviction arising that the decision could not be of much value, did much to make statistics in general hateful to charity workers." These single-cause data were then used to separate out the deserving. Thus a table of 28,000 cases investigated by the Charity Organization Societies in 1887 produced the following results:

- Worthy of continuous relief: 10.3 percent
- Worthy of temporary relief: 26.6
- Need work rather than relief: 40.4
- Unworthy of relief: 22.7

The scientific casework developed by social workers during the early twentieth century, however, rejected such enumeration of simple, alternative, isolatable causes and insisted on the whole context,
which might include family, neighborhood, or the whole society. This new understanding did not equate science with single-factor, unambiguous answers.\footnote{107}

One of the attractions of social-insurance schemes was that they were outside this tradition of identifying the "deserving," thus insulating their recipients from stigma.\footnote{108} Yet many social-insurance advocates understood the distinction between insurance and public assistance as ideological and political, that "insurance" was merely a metaphor. All tax-funded public provision is in a sense insurance, to which all contribute so as to provide for those who happen to need help. "... the sooner we get away from our fine distinctions of insurance versus relief the better off we will be," Abraham Epstein wrote in 1933.\footnote{109} The consensus for promoting the insurance idea was grounded in politics, not economic planning. By invoking the "apparent analogy with private insurance" the programs would become "acceptable to a society which was dominated by business ethics and which stressed individual economic responsibility," Eveline Burns wrote.\footnote{110} "Social insurance" was called "contributory" (although all tax moneys are in fact contributions) and could therefore be made to seem "earned" in a way that the dole wasn't.\footnote{111} Nothing about this approach differed from that of the social-work tradition. Edith Abbott argued passionately at the beginning of the New Deal for seizing the opportunity to create one universal program of public assistance without stigma.\footnote{112}

The irreducible conflict, then, the difference that ultimately made AFDC separate from the Social Security Act's social-insurance programs, came not from social-work rejection of insurance or universal plans of provision, but from social-insurance rejection of casework. In the New Deal Harry Hopkins referred to the (mainly women) social workers in the federal government as "pantry snoopers."\footnote{113} What was it about casework that repelled the social-insurance advocates? There is no evidence that they were more generous or democratic in their class or cultural attitudes. Rather, since they were not mainly "front-line" social workers, actually meeting the poor, and since they did not
direct their primary concern towards the very poor anyway, they ignored actual evidence of need for extra-financial help (counseling, education). One cannot avoid wondering, also, if they found the supervision inherent in casework as demeaning to men, an attack on a (largely unconscious) masculinity.\textsuperscript{114}

On the other hand, why were the social workers so committed to casework, and why did they fail to make social-insurance proposals of their own? It is difficult to think thus counterfactually because by this time the casework approach was so widely accepted that it was practically definitional, especially for women. Casework was in some respects the exact opposite of social-insurance thinking: it meant assembling all the unique and particular facts of a "case," and attempting to solve or ameliorate problems on the basis of a command of many subtle as well as obvious characteristics of human individuals and groups. Casework thinking corresponds to stereotypes of female as opposed to male approaches: specific rather than universal, grounded rather than abstract, tailored rather than generalized. And casework represented, for this class of women, an integration of their impulse towards control with a female acculturation to help, and to help personally.

In this respect casework played an ironic role in the outlook and contribution of social workers. Casework had arisen in the early twentieth century out of the desire to define an objective, professional method. In their struggle for professional status, social workers had particularly to reject the practices and values of their legacy of friendly visiting--sentimentality, intuition, personal kindness. In 1930 the leading historical text on social work argued that "helpful" relationships came in four types--"friendly, benevolent, commercial and professional."\textsuperscript{115} Indeed some leaders longed to defeminize their field. When Stuart Alfred Queen wrote in 1922 of making social work "a profession, a 'man's job,'" he was speaking for many.\textsuperscript{116} Writing about 1890s social work, Queen and Ernest Bouldin Harper constructed sentences to have the plural subject, "they"; in describing professional social work in 1928, their subject was always "he."\textsuperscript{117} Yet in attempting to attain
professionality and defeminization through casework, social workers were choosing an approach and a technique that was perceived by many as quintessentially feminine. Moreover, as a technique that required close contact with welfare recipients, casework served to strengthen commonalities between trained and amateur social workers and thus to retard the removal of the latter from welfare agencies.

Equally importantly, women's relative lack of interest in social insurance came from the fact that it was premised on the wage form. Employers or employees might contribute, but the majority of women were neither. Those women who were employees were disproportionately minorities, usually disregarded by the white women's social reform network. What more than anything else made insurance seem different from relief was that it taxed the population at a different moment in the circulation of goods—in the wage transaction; it taxed primarily white men, and gave primarily to white men.

Moreover, the fiction that public insurance was different from public relief supported yet an older fiction, that women were economic dependents of male breadwinners, and that women would therefore be taken care of by men's insurance. This understanding of the sexual division of labor was known in this period as the family wage: men were to be breadwinners, women were to remain domestic. In fact, recent working-class history has demonstrated definitively that the family wage was never a reality for the great majority of the U.S. working class, whose men rarely earned enough to support their families single-handedly. Yet as a norm for desirable gender relations and family organization, it was accepted not only by most men but also by most women, middle- and working-class alike.

Male and female welfare activists almost all endorsed the family-wage principle and considered that women's employment was a misfortune and/or a temporary occupation before marriage. But there were a variety of interpretations of this norm. From a gendered perspective there was a world of difference between a conservative reading that considered it mandatory for a
proper woman to remain domestic, and what we might call a womanist desire to build social respect for domestic labor, and especially mothering, and awareness of the particularly low wages and terrible working conditions of employed women. The union men's family-wage demand, to earn enough to support families, had yet a different meaning, one probably supported by many working-class women. The family-wage view of the social-insurance advocates was, for the most part, an unconscious conservative one, based on the unexamined assumption that women's full-time domesticity was desirable for all concerned. Moreover, the women reformers' views changed as the employment of married women increased; that there was a time lag in their understanding of the breadth and permanence of this increase should not be surprising, particularly not in a group of women all born in the nineteenth century. Sybil Lipschultz has shown how between two key Supreme Court briefs defending protective legislation—*Muller v. Oregon* in 1908, and *Adkins v. Children's Hospital* in 1923—the arguments of the social feminists changed considerably. The *Muller* brief privileged sacred motherhood, treating women's wage labor as an anomaly that must be prevented from interfering with the true female vocation. *Adkins* argued from women's weaker position in the labor market and the need for government to intervene in order to create gender equity; it "was not a matter of protecting unborn offspring, as it had been in *Muller*; it became a concern for the health and social participation of women themselves." During the 1920s some influential women welfare activists began to doubt the efficacy of attempts to maintain the family-wage system, and to note its serious costs for women. But when the representatives in government of this women's network—Grace Abbott, Katherine Lenroot, Martha Eliot—wrote the Aid to Dependent Children section of the Social Security Act of 1935, they continued the charity and casework model, not only disregarding social-insurance ideas but declining also to develop an approach which recognized mothers' increasingly frequent employment.
Their program rested not only upon the family wage, but upon the sexual division of labor among welfare advocates. They assumed that male-designed social-insurance programs would aid poor women through their husbands, and that they need provide only for a few exceptions. The alternative—long-term public provision for needy mothers—they feared as a form of pauperization. They were opposed to policies that would establish female-headed families on a long-term or permanent basis. They did not wish to undermine the hegemony of family-wage thinking.

And yet they knew the consequences of sending money into families only through their male heads. They knew that the assumption that resources would be shared fairly among family members was unfounded. Many among them had worked for agencies dealing with family violence, desertion, and drunkenness, and they knew the fallacy of considering men the universal protectors of women and women the dependents of men. The male social-insurance advocates were mostly uninterested in directing grants to women, something British feminists were demanding. Abraham Epstein argued, "Nor is it the mission of family allowances to usher in a new relationship between man and wife . . . no apparent reason why the alleviation of this particular form of insecurity should have to carry with it a general reformation of the world." But the women welfare advocates did want to reform the world, and the family in particular, and thought the state could do it. Nevertheless they refrained from challenging the family-wage principle.

Women welfare activists, in short, designed programs that would benefit women directly when male wage-earners failed them, but they did not support programs that would encourage or support women's independence from men. Thus both tracks of the two-track welfare system were designed to maintain the family-wage system, and to provide incentives for women to remain economically dependent on men. (That they did not succeed is another matter.) The gender differences we have seen were part of a shared gender system which produced similar visions of the economic structure of the proper family.
These visions diverged more in their assumptions about the nature of poverty and how to help the poor. The social-insurance advocates tended to assume that the damages of poverty would be cured by money and jobs. They differed among themselves as to how best to provide what was missing—how generously, at whose expense, in what relation to private capital and the federal system. The social-work welfare advocates had a more complex view. In part it was a feminist one. They attempted the difficult and perhaps counterhistorical task of defending the value of women’s traditional domestic labor in a capitalist-industrial context. They also tried to integrate a social and psychological with an economic theory of poverty. They believed that the injuries of class were experienced through problems like alcoholism, defeatism, and violence as well as through inadequate food and shelter, and considered the social-insurance definition of poverty partial, reductive, and naive. They had been influenced by the experience of social workers combatting drinking and domestic violence, and particularly by their clients. Despite class and other social distance between them and the objects of their concern, they identified with the women and children who were hurt by intrafamily abuse perhaps even more than with those hurt by societal abuse. They could not, in this period of time, grasp that economic independence might be a precondition for the self-esteem and self-development they sought to give to poor women, nor did they develop a system of casework that was not oppressive and biased. Nevertheless their vision at its best—articulated most vividly not in their words but in, for example, their settlement-house work—foreshadowed more recent projects for the empowerment of the poor, such as community organizing, far more than did social-insurance schemes.

But it was the social-insurance advocates who moved towards what T.H. Marshall called "social citizenship," the notion of public provision as an entitlement. And it was these men who argued that only through universal provision could the stigma of the dole and the humiliation of dependence be removed.
This study must be treated as exploratory, not definitive. It asks more questions than it answers. I do want to suggest, however, something about the formulation of research questions, which of course affects how they are answered. The institutional focus of much welfare history has sometimes had the disadvantage of passing over the assumptions and values that underlie those institutions. A gender analysis can help render such assumptions visible if it incorporates maleness as well as femaleness. Moreover, failing to incorporate women’s activism into welfare history may produce accounts that explain sex discrimination in terms of an undifferentiated "sexism" or a historical "patriarchy," when in fact that inequality was constructed in specific, contingent historical events, from women’s as well as men’s activity.

While this article pleads for the value of gender analysis, it also tries to demonstrate the inaccuracy of dichotomizing men and women. In the very process of a binary comparison I hope to have shown that male and female were hardly discrete and opposite categories. The men and women welfare reformers shared many values, and these similarities were often themselves part of the gender order, such as their joint belief in the family-wage system. In an area like welfare history, ignoring the impact of gender obscures some of the most fundamental patterns.
The women and men in this sample were selected because they were leading national advocates for public welfare programs, or government officials responsible for welfare programs who were also important advocates of such programs. Those who were only the employees of welfare programs or institutions are not included; for example, educators were only included when they were builders of educational institutions. I included only those whose major reform identification was with welfare; thus I excluded those whose primary association was, for example, with labor or civil rights. Among men, I excluded elected officials.

I identified the women and men in different ways, in order to convey the most indicative identification succinctly. For the men I cited occupation, not by specific position but by general category. Many of the women did not have occupations in the sense of employment, and those that did were overwhelmingly social workers or social work administrators. Instead for the women I cited major area of welfare activism or their specific organization if it was a major one, because these identifications show patterns and networks. To do this among the men would have been less informative, since they did not group themselves so much in a few organizations.

Because many were active in several areas, or had a variety of occupations during their lifetimes, the identifications given here do not necessarily conform to some figures in the text, for example, how many were social workers or academics.
### White Male Welfare Activists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (Occupation)</th>
<th>Name (Occupation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Felix Adler (Minister)</td>
<td>Harry Lurie (Social Work Administrator)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will Alexander (Minister)</td>
<td>Valentine Macy (Financier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur Altmeyer (Welfare Administrator)</td>
<td>Alexander Jeffrey McKeelway (Minister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Andrews (Welfare Administrator)</td>
<td>J. Prentice Murphy (Social Work Administrator)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Bane (Welfare Administrator)</td>
<td>Louis Heaton Pink (Lawyer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Edmund Bigge (Economics Professor)</td>
<td>Paul A. Raushenbush (Social Insurance Administrator)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob Billikopf (Social Work Administrator)</td>
<td>James Bronson Reynolds (Lawyer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Dwight Bliss (Minister)</td>
<td>Jacob August Riis (Journalist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarence Monroe Bookman (Welfare Administrator)</td>
<td>Raymond Robins (Lawyer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Brandeis (Judge)</td>
<td>Isaac Rubinow (Physician)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Graham Brooks (Minister)</td>
<td>John Augustine Ryan (Priest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Bruno (Social Work Academic)</td>
<td>Henry Rogers Seager (Economist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen Burns (Educator)</td>
<td>Nathan Sinai (Welfare Academic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amos Butler (Penologist)</td>
<td>Charles Stelzle (Minister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ewan Clague (Economist)</td>
<td>Isaac Newton Phelps Stokes (Physician)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilbur Cohen (Welfare Administrator)</td>
<td>Elwood Vickers Street (Welfare Administrator)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Commons (Economics Professor)</td>
<td>Linton Bishop Swift (Welfare Administrator)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Darlington (Welfare Administrator)</td>
<td>Edgar Sydenstricker (Statistician)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Marks Davis, Jr. (Social Work Administrator)</td>
<td>Graham Taylor (Minister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miles Menander Dawson (Lawyer)</td>
<td>Rexford Tugwell (Economics Professor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Weeks De Forest (Lawyer)</td>
<td>Lawrence Turnure Veiller (Welfare Administrator)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Thomas Devine (Social Work Administrator)</td>
<td>William Walling (nonemployed by choice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carroll Warren Doten (Economist)</td>
<td>Adna Ferrin Weber (Economics Professor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Theodore Ely (Economics Professor)</td>
<td>Walter Mott West (Social Work Administrator)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abraham Epstein (Welfare Administrator)</td>
<td>Aubrey Williams (Welfare Administrator)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mordecai Ezekiel (Government Economist)</td>
<td>Frederick Howard Wines (Statistician)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isidore Sydney Falk (Public Health Professor)</td>
<td>Edwin Edward Witte (Economics Professor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Walcott Farnam (Economics Professor)</td>
<td>Robert Archey Woods (Social Work Leader)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homer Folks (Social Work Administrator)</td>
<td>Benjamin Emanuel Youngdahl (Welfare Administrator)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee Kaufman Frankel (Insurance Executive)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felix Frankfurter (Judge)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Mark Glenn (Foundation Executive)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Hard (Journalist)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hastings Hornell Hart (Minister)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Richmond Henderson (Sociology Professor)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Hodson (Welfare Administrator)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederick Ludwig Hoffman (Statistician)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Hopkins (Welfare Administrator)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Hunter (Social Worker)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harold Ickes (Lawyer)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Kellogg (Journalist)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Adams Kingsbury (Foundation Executive)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Morris Leiserson (Government Economist)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel McCune Lindsay (Sociology Professor)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benjamin Lindsey (Judge)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owen Lovejoy (Minister)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
White Women Welfare Activists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (Main Reform Area/Organization)</th>
<th>Name (Main Reform Area/Organization)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edith Abbott (Social Work)</td>
<td>Lucy Randolph Mason (Consumers' League)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grace Abbott (Children's Bureau)</td>
<td>Mary Eliza McDowell (Settlement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane Addams (Settlement)</td>
<td>Eleanor Laura McMain (Settlement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beulah Elizabeth Amidon (Social Work)</td>
<td>Frieda Segelke Miller (Women's Bureau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary Anderson (Women's Bureau)</td>
<td>Belle Israels Moskowitz (Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong (Social Security)</td>
<td>Pauline Newman (Women's Bureau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florence Arzelia Armstrong (Social Security)</td>
<td>Frances Perkins (Social Security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clara Mortenson Beyer (Children's Bureau)</td>
<td>Agnes L. Peterson (Women's Bureau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emily Newell Blair (Democratic Party)</td>
<td>Mary Elizabeth Pidgeon (Women's Bureau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornelia Foster Bradford (Settlement)</td>
<td>Jeannette Pickering Rankin (Congresswoman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophonisba Preston Breckinridge (Social Work)</td>
<td>Elizabeth Brandeis Raushenbush (Unemployment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josephine Chapin Brown (Social Work)</td>
<td>Agnes Gertrude Regan (Social Work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eveline Mabel Burns (Social Security)</td>
<td>Mary Ellen Richmond (Social Work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ida Maud Cannon (Medical Social Work)</td>
<td>Josephine Aspinall Roche (Consumers' League)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joanna Colcord (Social Work)</td>
<td>(Anna) Eleanor Roosevelt (Social Work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grace Longwood Coyle (Social Work)</td>
<td>Rose Schneiderman (Labor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caroline Bartlett Crane (Sanitation Reform)</td>
<td>Belle Sherwin (Club)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neva Ruth Deardorff (Social Work)</td>
<td>Mary Kingsbury Simkhovitch (Settlement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary W. (Molly) Dewson (Democratic Party)</td>
<td>Gertrude Hill Springer (Social Work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emily Wayland Dinwiddie (Housing Reform)</td>
<td>Mary Elizabeth Switzer (Social Work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helena Stuart Dudley (Settlement)</td>
<td>(Julia) Jessie Taft (Social Work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loula Friend Dunn (Social Work)</td>
<td>M. Carey Thomas (Education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crystal (Catherine) Eastman (Industrial Health)</td>
<td>Charlotte Helen Towle (Social Work Academic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hannah Bachman Einstein (Mothers' Pensions)</td>
<td>Gertrude Vaile (Social Work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martha May Eliot (Children's Bureau)</td>
<td>Mary Abby Van Kleeck (Women's Bureau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katherine Pollak Ellickson (Social Security)</td>
<td>Lillian D. Wald (Settlement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harriet Wiseman Elliott (Democratic Party)</td>
<td>Sue Shelton White (Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lavinia Margaret Engle (Social Security)</td>
<td>Edith Elmer Wood (Housing Reform)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth Glendower Evans (Consumers' League)</td>
<td>Helen Laura Sunner Woodbury (Children's Bureau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnie Ursala Fuller (Child Welfare)</td>
<td>Ellen Sullivan Woodward (Social Work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josephine Clara Goldmark (Consumers' League)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes

1 The "poverty line" is itself, of course, a highly malleable construction dependent upon decisions by elites about how many should be allowed to appear poor--it is not an "objective" indicator of well-being. See Diana Karter Appelbaum, "The Level of the Poverty Line: A Historical Survey," Social Service Review 51 #3, September 1977, pp. 514-523.

2 Barbara J. Nelson, "The Origins of the Two-Channel Welfare State: Workmen’s Compensation and Mothers’ Aid," and Diana Pearce, "Welfare is Not For Women: Why the War on Poverty Cannot Conquer the Feminization of Poverty," in Women, the State, and Welfare, ed. Linda Gordon (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990); Linda Gordon, "What Does Welfare Regulate?" Social Research 55 #4, Winter 1988. This dichotomy between social insurance and public assistance can be and has been described in other terms as well, and this gender interpretation is meant to supplement, not to replace, other characterizations. For example the second-track programs grew out of voluntary charity and "friendly visiting," with roots in the English poor law and in the American tradition of charity organization. The first-track program designs were often modelled on German or other European statist systems of providing for and disciplining the proletariat. The second track grew from private charity; the first was primarily state-operated from the start. For early discussion of this dichotomy, see Jacobus tenBroek and Richard B. Wilson, "Public Assistance and Social Insurance--A Normative Evaluation," UCLA Law Review 3 #1, April 1954, pp. 237-302; Richard M. Titmuss, "The Role of Redistribution in Social Policy," Social Security Bulletin 28 #6, June 1965, 14-20; Joel Handler and Margaret Rosenheim, "Privacy in Welfare: Public Assistance and Juvenile Justice," Law and Contemporary Problems 31, 1966, pp. 377-412. For a more recent discussion see Jill S. Quadagno, "From Poor Laws to Pensions: The Evolution of Economic Support for the Aged in England and America," Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly/Health and Society 62 #3, 1984, pp. 417-
446; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "Our poorest citizens—Children," in *Focus*, newsletter of the University of Wisconsin/Madison Institute for Research on Poverty, 11 #1, Spring 1988, p. 5.

3 For example, Sylvia A. Law, "Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 131 #6, May 1983, pp. 1251-1331; Carol Brown, "Mothers, Fathers, and Children: From Private to Public Patriarchy," in *Women and Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism*, ed. Lydia Sargent (Boston: South End Press, 1981), pp. 239-268; Mimi Abramovitz, *Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy from Colonial Times to the Present* (Boston: South End Press, 1988). One of the errors of this view which I do not have space to discuss here is that second-track programs also include general relief, in which men are the main recipients. I am indebted to Joel Handler for this important point.


and Social Change: From the Settlement House Movement to Neighborhood Centers, 1886 to the Present (New York, 1987). Stephen Kalberg appears to have done something similar in his "The Commitment to Career Reform: The Settlement Movement Leaders," Social Service Review 49 #4, December 1975, pp. 608-628, but he does not tell us who his sample was and so ignores gender as to not mention whether he included women, men, or both.


8 Ratios of male:female college degrees throughout this period are as follows, computed from Historical Statistics of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census, 1975), Part I, p. 386:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>100:23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>100:23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>100:28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>100:51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>100:66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>100:70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 I considered elite parents of substantial wealth and/or high professional position; exact figures were 69 percent of women and 34 percent of men.

10 Thirteen percent of the men were foreign-born; only 8 percent of the women were.

11 Of the ten women who were divorced, widowed, or separated, only four were employed.
The men born before 1880 were most commonly lawyers, ministers, or economists/statisticians; the younger men were most often administrators or academics. In other words, they made a transition characteristic of all educated men from being self-employed to salaried workers.

I am here defining social work the way they did, including both salaried and volunteer activity.

Robyn Muncy, "Creating a Female Dominion," forthcoming, typescript in author’s possession, p. 172. Muncy argues that Edith Abbott’s main goal was to have a career and that she was forced into reform work by the lack of professional opportunity for women. While this is true, it is also true that Abbott united career and social goals beyond separability. Even had her primary goal been to have a career, she was disciplined into a reform orientation by her social milieu, the women’s political culture in which she lived.


In contrast to these white women welfare activists, 85 percent of Black women I studied were married; only 14 percent were widowed or separated. Gordon, "Black and White Visions of Welfare."

Twenty-eight percent were in relationships with other women that might have been called "Boston marriages," long-term coupled relationships. (My figure is conservative since I counted only those women for whom I could identify a partner.) Today some of these women might be called lesbian, and there is a spirited discussion among historians as to whether it is appropriate to apply this more recent word to this generation and this kind of relationship, but that issue is not relevant to my argument.

For example, the men were divided over alternate models for social-insurance funding in the
1920s and 1930s; the women were divided over their attitudes towards an Equal Rights Amendment in the same period.


20 For example, the first chapter is entitled "Home-making as a Social Art." He begins: "Let us imagine a progressive woman in a village or town where the houses are bare, untidy, and ugly. What can she do to communicate her higher ideals? First, she can . . ." Charles Richmond Henderson, *The Social Spirit in America* (Chicago: Scott Foresman, 1901), p. 37.


22 In failing to recognize this social work continuum, Donald Brieland in "The Hull-House Tradition and the Contemporary Social Worker: Was Jane Addams Really a Social Worker?", *Social Work 35 #2*, March 1990, pp. 134-38, is mistaken in his denial that Addams was a "social worker."

23 Maher to Dewson, 9-6-31?, Dewson Mss., Box 2, folder 17, Schlesinger Library. ("Sept. 6" is in Maher's writing, and "1931?" was added later, probably by Dewson going through her own papers.) For a contemporary definition see the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. Edwin R. A. Seligman (New York: Macmillan, 1931), entry for "public welfare," volume 12, p. 687, by social-work education leader Edward Lindeman.

24 Belle Israels, "Poverty and Insurance for the Unemployed," *Charities and the Commons* 20, June 6, 1908, 343-47.
Judith Leavitt pointed out that the public health discourse had by this time shifted definitively away from pauperism, because this kind of welfare required universal programs, such as municipal sewers and water.


36 William Hard, "Pensioners of Peace," in Bullock, Compulsory Insurance, pp. 118-41. It is of course possible that "Smith" was the pseudonym for a real person, but if so my point still holds, for Hard was not interested in the actual facts of his life but only in the hypothetical situation he would have been in had there been public insurance.


Kelley's rights discourse must be understood in the light of her Marxist education, for she used the concept of exploitation a great deal and in general could be said to be postulating a right to freedom from exploitation.


To appreciate properly the progressive content of their family-wage position, it is useful to distinguish their version of the family-wage system—that women should be free to choose between family and public life—and the conservative version, which insisted that all women belonged in the home.


For this quotation and my view of needs talk, I am indebted to Nancy Fraser’s "Struggle Over Needs: Outline of a Socialist-Feminist Critical Theory of Late-Capitalist Political Culture," in Gordon, ed., *Women, the State and Welfare*, p. 223, footnote 12.

This essay, "The Subjective Necessity of Social Settlements," originally delivered in 1892, was reprinted in Addams’ *Twenty Years at Hull-House*, orig. 1910 (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1990), esp. p. 69.

Fitzpatrick, Endless Crusade, pp. 13, 72-5.


Charlotte Towle, Common Human Needs, p. 3.


On patronage, see Muncy, "Creating a Female Dominion," pp. 184-200.


64 The Brookings Institution at that time ran the Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government.


67 Bulmer, The Chicago School of Sociology, pp. 39 and 68; Fitzpatrick, p. 212; Robyn Muncy, "Creating a Female Dominion," typescript, pp. 164 ff. We must not take as given or predetermined the definitional boundaries academic/nonacademic and basic/applied, any more than we accept as eternal the notion that women were not fit to be university professors. The definition of "applied" research that excluded it from universities has not been stable; today work that fits that definition is commonplace and respected in social science departments.


71 Margaret Byington, Crystal Eastman, Elizabeth Butler, and Florence Lattimore did four of the
six parts of the Pittsburgh Survey. Hull-House Maps and Papers, of which Kelley was the main author, was published in a series edited by prolabor economist Richard Ely of the University of Wisconsin. He had first discovered Kelley as the translator of Engels and an important New York socialist intellectual before she came to Chicago. The study, addressed to "the constantly increasing body of sociological students," documented an area about one-third of a square mile around Hull-House. It detailed methods of investigation, defined its categories, reprinted the schedules used. It challenged the 1890 census; to cite but one example, the census had reported 5,426 employed children in Illinois, while Kelley and her crew identified 6,576 in 1894 in only five months of investigation. It featured graphically complex, color-coded maps (inspired by Charles Booth's maps of London) which offered visual representation of sociological conditions, including demography, migration patterns, ethnicity, wages, occupations, and housing conditions. Oberschall also sees Hull-House Maps and Papers as the originating work of the American social survey, in "Institutionalization of American Sociology," p. 216, as does Michael Gordon, "The Social Survey Movement and Sociology in the United States," Social Problems 21, 1973, p. 290; and Robert E. Park, "The City as a Social Laboratory," in Chicago: An Experiment in Social Science Research, ed. T. V. Smith and Leonard D. White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), p. 4.


Shelby Harrison, p. 31.


The early (1890-1930) social surveys were not exactly statistics in the modern sense: they did not use probability sampling, and they did little if any analysis of their data. These techniques developed in survey research only in the late 1930s. See Bulmer, The Chicago School of Sociology. Nevertheless, the term "statistics" is loosely used and was regularly applied to this early work. I have refrained from calling it statistical unless I am quoting, reserving the appellation "quantitative" for this early work which was mainly descriptive.

Zimbalist, pp. 193-5. For an example of the Children’s Bureau’s self-consciousness about this role, see Grace Abbott to Frances Perkins, memo, 3-23-33, in Abbott Mss., Box 36, folder 13.

Muncy, "Creating a Female Dominion," p. 205.


Steven J. Diner, "Department and Discipline: The Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago, 1892-1920," Minerva 13 #4, Winter 1975, pp. 514-553.


1894 a University of Chicago sociology department brochure called settlement houses "'social observing stations' where students could 'establish scientific conclusions by use of evidence which actual experiment affords.'" Quoted by Fitzpatrick, p. 41.


The important early role of women in developing quantitative social science represents an important amendment to Rosenberg's study, *Beyond Separate Spheres*, which suggests that quantification was among the factors excluding women from academic scholarship, p. 241. A more recent article gets the situation entirely wrong. Howard Goldstein, in "The Knowledge Base of Social Work Practice: Theory, Wisdom, Analogue, or Art?" *Families in Society: The Journal of Contemporary Human Services* 71 #1, January 1990, pp. 32-43, distinguishes the male "scientific pursuit" strategy in early social work from the female "down-to-earth, humanistic," do-gooders. On the language of hard and soft, consider Michael Gordon's rendition of these early sociologists' "point of view that the survey provided the vehicle for the transformation of sociology from a 'soft' to a 'hard' discipline . . . ."

In the 1929 *Social Work Yearbook*, for example, there were separate entries on social surveys and social research. The latter entry considered that "how nearly such informal contributions and the numerous and popular reports, surveys, and social studies approach research rather than unsupported opinion depends upon the validity of the methods used . . . ." But his sixteen examples of good recent

87 Bulmer, The Chicago School of Sociology, pp. 39 and 68; Hunter, "Why Chicago?"; Diner, "Department and Discipline."

Although he marginalizes women's contributions, Thomas Haskell's interpretation of the meaning of the development of professional social science is consonant with mine on this point. He identifies professionalism as "a major cultural reform, a means of establishing authority so securely that the truth and its proponents might win the deference even of a mass public . . ." Haskell, The Emergence of Professional Social Science, p. 65.

88 Eaton and Harrison, Bibliography of Social Surveys.

90 We cannot, of course, know if the lines would have been differently drawn had women been numerous in university faculties, but we must at least raise the question, as Ellen Fitzpatrick has done in her "Rethinking the Intellectual Origins of American Labor History," American Historical Review 96 #2, April 1991, p. 427.

91 Mary Furner has observed the political implications of this development well, but, at the time her book was written, neglected its gender dimensions. Ellen Fitzpatrick, in Endless Crusade, her fine study of four women of this group, sees them as representing a transitional phase between less and more advanced scholarship and takes the victory of the male-model "nonpartisan" scholarship of the universities after the 1920s as unarguable and inevitable progress; pp. 66 passim. I would argue a less determinist version of this transition.


93 Quoted in ibid., p. 28.


97 Muncy, "Creating a Female Dominion," pp. 107 ff.


100 On the technocratic nature of contemporary discussions of poverty and welfare, see Michael B. Katz, *The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare* (New York: Pantheon, 1989).


Kathy E. Ferguson, in The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy (Philadelphia: Temple, 1984), argues that the female style is inherently antibureaucratic; this argument is similar to that made by Carol Gilligan that women have different moral approaches.


For example, Margaret F. Byington, "Fifty Annual Surveys," Survey 23, 1910, pp. 972-977.


Grace Abbott to Lillian Wald 2-25-37, Abbott Mss. Box 72, folder 7.

In this feeling they were reflecting a sensibility widespread throughout the working class as well. Its presence does not imply that only men felt the "dole" as humiliating; there is ample evidence that poor women hated the infantilization and loss of privacy that came with casework. The gendering of that rejection was a secondary, not a primary, attribute—though this is often misunderstood; one is reminded of the once-widespread view that slavery was somehow more of an
assault on masculine than feminine identity. The more intense male rejection of casework may have come from the inability of these middle- and upper-class male reformers to adopt a parental stance toward the poor, and the ease with which their female cohort adopted a maternal one.


117 Warner, Queen, and Harper, *American Charities and Social Work*, chap. II.


119 Even Florence Kelley, at the radical edge of this group, shared these views; see her "Minimum-Wage Laws," *Journal of Political Economy* 20 #10, December 1912, p. 1003.


121 An excellent example of this challenge is in Sophonisba Breckinridge’s "The Home Responsibilities of Women Workers and the ‘Equal Wage’," *Journal of Political Economy* 31, 1928, pp. 521-543.

122 There was a Left-wing alternative to the Social Security Act which would have guaranteed old-age and other insurance to housewives as well as employees, but there is no evidence that any members of this network--with the exception of Mary Van Kleeck who was by this time associated with the Communist Party’s initiatives--supported it.

123 Epstein, *Insecurity*, pp. 639. A notable exception here was Paul Douglas, influenced by his feminist first wife Dorothy Wolf Douglas. In the 1920s he argued for family allowances which should be paid directly to mothers, both to ensure their wisest use and to provide them with a