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

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ABSTRACT

The degree to which blacks have penetrated municipal civil service bureaucracies is found to vary positively from city to city as a function of several economic factors: the health of the local private sector, relatively fewer prestige jobs in private industry for blacks, and weak or absent public employee union coverage. To the extent that bureaucratic employment provides access to policymaking, blacks are increasingly laying claim to a significant share of the governance of growing, healthy cities where both white and black populations are expanding. It is in these places that the true possibilities for biracial local government are seen to exist.

The Economic Conditions of Black Employment in Municipal Bureaucracies

No assessment of the general status of blacks in American society would be complete without exploring the extent and conditions of their evident penetration of civil rights bureaucracies in major cities. Bureaucratic employment at the municipal level in the United States has long been regarded by various ethnic groups as a path to higher and more secure economic status (Erie, 1978; Clark, 1975). Robert Dahl wrote in his New Haven study, for example, that "politics was evidently one of the main routes the Irish took to climb out of the wage-earning class. Although the Irish comprised only 13 percent of the families in the sample, they held almost half the jobs in city government" (1961, p. 41). And if, as Dahrendorf has argued, bureaucrats who participate in the exercise of authority may be regarded (with all the necessary qualifications) as part of the "ruling class" (1959, p. 56), then the route to the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy also marks a path to power.[1]

Black municipal employment has grown steadily during the 1970s (Cayer and Siegelman, 1980), and data collected for the present study show that increases have been particularly striking in the most prestigious categories of civil service work (see Table 1). Indeed, black representation in professional and managerial positions in city bureaucracies substantially exceeds the black presence in similarly situated jobs in the private sector (New York Times, Oct. 14, 1979).

The degree to which blacks have penetrated the public work force varies greatly from city to city, as Table 2 shows. The variations have been shown elsewhere (Eisinger, 1980b) to be a function, to a substantial

Table 1

Growth of Black Municipal Employment in 49 U.S. Cities[a]

Employment Category	1973 Mean Percentage Black	1978 Mean Percentage Black
Total Civil Service Work Force	27	33.3
Civil Service Managers and Administrators	9.1	15.0
Civil Service Professionals	11.1	17.9

Source: Individual affirmative action annual reports (EEO-4 documents) provided by each city.

[a] All of the cities were more than 10% black in 1970; the mean percentage black was 27.9%. All but 17 had populations greater than 250,000; none had populations below 50,000. The cities are listed in Table 2.

Table 2

Affirmative Action Rankings (Percentage Black) of 49 Cities, 1978

	Total Civil Service Municipal Work Force			Administrators and Managers			Professionals	
	% Black, 1978	% Change 1973-1978		% 1978 Black,	1973-1978 % Change		% 1978 Black	1973-1978 % Change
1. East St. Louis	78.9	52	1. East St. Louis	69.0	47	1. East St. Louis	71.0	18
2. Gary	77.0	NA	2. Gary	63.0	NA	2. Gary	71.0	NA
3. Atlanta	55.6	34	3. Atlanta	32.6	NA	3. Newark	49.1	NA
4. St. Louis	55.3	12	4. Berkeley	32.3	35	4. Atlanta	42.2	122
5. Cleveland	54.0	NA	5. Detroit	32.2	166	5. St. Louis	38.2	NA
6. Detroit	53.9	19	6. Newark	31.9	NA	6. Detroit	37.6	108
7. Newark	48.2	NA	7. Cleveland	31.9	NA	7. Hampton	34.3	84
8. Hampton	45.6	45	8. Hampton	29.1	77	8. Durham	27.4	138
9. Norfolk	44.0	5	9. Chicago	26.8	65	9. Berkeley	27.1	0
10. Memphis	44.0	9	10. Oakland	23.7	110	10. Chicago	23.6	57
11. Kansas City, Mo.	43.8	22	11. Pontiac, Mich.	23.5	38	11. Pontiac, Mich.	22.4	149
12. Columbia, S.C.	43.4	NA	12. Philadelphia	21.2	8	12. Baltimore	22.0	NA
13. New Orleans	43.0	32	13. St. Louis	19.3	23	13. Philadelphia	21.3	6
14. Philadelphia	42.2	40	14. Columbus	19.3	151	14. Indianapolis	21.0	16
15. Durham	39.8	3	15. Houston	18.7	187	15. Tulsa	20.4	-40
16. Charlotte, Va.	37.8	15	16. Indianapolis	17.0	29			
17. Columbus, Ga.	37.7	-6						
18. Pontiac, Mich.	37.0	32						
19. Berkeley	36.8	12						

(Table Continued)

Table 2 (Cont.)

Affirmative Action Rankings (Percentage Black) of 49 Cities, 1978

	Total Civil Service Municipal Work Force			Administrators and Managers			Professionals	
	% 1978 Black	1973-1978 % Change		% 1978 Black	1973-1978 % Change		% 1978 Black	1973-1978 % Change
20. Baltimore	36.0	NA	17. Little Rock	15.8	NA	16. Little Rock	20.0	NA
21. Oakland	35.8	6	18. Columbus, Oh.	13.8	68	17. Memphis	18.0	500
22. Raleigh	34.3	-2	19. Raleigh	13.2	408	18. Raleigh	17.5	122
23. Beaumont, Tex.	34.0	-31	20. Baltimore	13.0	NA	19. Oakland	14.9	-2
24. Cincinnati	32.0	19	21. Norfolk	11.0	83	20. Columbus, Ga.	13.5	2
25. Miami	31.8	35	22. Miami	9.4	488	21. Cincinnati	13.0	63
26. Houston	30.4	30	23. Cincinnati	9.0	45	22. Houston	12.7	22
27. Little Rock	29.2	27	24. Durham	8.8	6	23. Birmingham	11.6	NA
28. Indianapolis	27.0	8	25. Tulsa	8.0	-26	24. Miami	11.3	900
29. New Rochelle, N.Y.	26.0	4	26. Memphis	7.0	46	25. Buffalo	10.6	54
30. Birmingham	25.4	373	27. Wichita, Kan.	7.0	-24	26. Rochester	10.3	47
31. Chicago	25.1	9	28. Dallas	6.8	172	27. Columbia	9.4	NA
32. Nashville	24.9	NA	29. Hartford	6.5	-19	28. Milwaukee	9.1	-52
33. Los Angeles	24.7	12	30. Waco	6.2	158	29. San Francisco	8.0	76
34. Waco	24.1	39	31. Beaumont, Tex.	6.0	20	30. Oklahoma City	7.9	1
35. San Francisco	24.0	10	32. Austin	5.7	850	31. Dallas	7.9	108
36. Akron	22.5	61	33. Birmingham	5.7	NA	32. Los Angeles	7.7	54
37. Dallas	21.2	19	34. San Francisco	5.5	NA	33. Columbus, Oh.	7.5	-19
38. Tulsa	20.4	7	35. Buffalo	5.0	-6	34. Austin	7.1	22
39. Columbus, Oh.	20.0	-7	36. Akron	4.4	-23	35. Akron	6.5	-369
39. Pittsburgh	20.0	33	37. Los Angeles	4.1	215	35. Hartford	6.5	90
39. Austin	20.0	16	38. Rochester	3.3	-53	37. New Rochelle New York	6.0	-14
42. Oklahoma City	18.6	9	39. Pittsburgh	2.5	+733			
43. Hartford	18.4	8	39. Milwaukee	2.5	-38	38. Bridgeport, Conn.	5.5	244
44. Toledo	17.4	6	41. Bridgeport, Conn.	2.0	-6	39. Wichita, Kan.	5.3	-24
45. Milwaukee	16.7	22	42. New Rochelle, N.Y.	1.7	-15	40. Norfolk	5.0	150
46. Bridgeport, Conn.	14.9	6	43. Oklahoma City	1.3	+333	41. Waco	4.8	94
47. Rochester	14.5	-8	44. Toledo	.4	33	42. Toledo	1.9	90
48. Buffalo	13.0	18	45. Columbia, S.C.	0.0	NA	43. Beaumont, Tex.	.4	300
49. Wichita, Kan.	12.4	NA	46. Kansas City, Mo.	NA	NA	44. Pittsburgh	.3	0
			47. New Orleans	NA	NA	45. Cleveland	NA	NA
			48. Charlotte, Va.	NA	NA	46. Kansas City, Mo.	NA	NA
			49. Nashville	NA	NA	47. New Orleans	NA	NA
						48. Charlotte, Va.	NA	NA
						49. Nashville	NA	NA

Source: Affirmative action annual reports (EEO-4 documents) provided by each city.

Note: NA = not available

degree, of the size of the black population and the presence of a black mayor. These findings may be interpreted in part to suggest that politicians in heavily black cities -- and particularly black chief executives -- have sought to respond to actual or potential black voting blocs seeking income, jobs, and power by pursuing vigorous affirmative action strategies in regard to public employment. But black gains in civil service jobs in American cities are not simply a matter of political will. In an era of declining resources in the public sector and stiff competition in the urban labor market for available jobs, we may guess that a number of economic factors will greatly constrain both affirmative action initiatives and their effectiveness. Public sector retrenchment, a deteriorating economy, taxpayer resistance, and competition for public jobs by those unable to find employment in the private sector may all serve to undercut black advances in public sector work. In this paper I have set out to analyze the relationship of some of these economic factors to levels of black penetration of local bureaucracies.

THE DATA BASE

Under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited discrimination in private employment, was extended to state and local governments (Hill, 1977). The law requires local government units employing more than 100 full-time workers to file annual affirmative action reports with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) detailing the race and sex of all employees -- except those in the field of education -- by function and occupational category. Since Congress prohibited the EEOC from releasing these data

except in aggregate form, the analysis in this paper is based on individual affirmative action reports from 1973, the baseline year, and 1978 data gathered through a survey of selected cities.

These cities were chosen by a two-stage sampling procedure from all those over 50,000.[2] Of the 131 cities chosen, 85 responded by providing data. Of these, however, 36 had black populations of less than 10%. Because of extreme skewing effects produced by including these cities, the final analysis was limited to those cities whose 1970 populations were 10% or more black.

The data yielded six dependent variables. The 1978 data on the percentage of blacks in each city's total civil service work force, the percentage of blacks at the civil service administrative level, and the percentage of blacks at the civil service professional level provide three static measures of black penetration.[3] Percentage changes in each of these three categories from 1973, the first year in which such data were required by law, to 1978 provide three dynamic measures of black penetration.

ECONOMIC FACTORS AND BLACK BUREAUCRATIC PENETRATION

There are two broad sets of economic factors that may bear on levels of black employment in the local civil service. One of these may be called the resource matrix; the other involves the configuration of competitive forces in the labor market.

The first set of factors has at least two important components: the amount of resources available to the public sector and public sector effort. The amount of available resources is largely a function of the health of the local private sector economy. Where the local economy is growing, the

income base is potentially subject to taxation increases. Tax policies under such conditions may be designed either to expand the public sector or to stabilize it.

Conversely, in times of economic hardship, the tax base contracts. The local public sector has recently been particularly sensitive to economic decline, typically cutting services and personnel to accommodate reduced or stagnating revenues (Levine, 1978). The recent dramatic experience of cities such as New York, Cleveland, and Detroit, each of which laid off substantial portions of their civil service work force in the face of well-publicized fiscal troubles, illustrates the more general point (Pascal, 1979; Morris, 1980).

Public sector effort, the second component of the resource matrix, is not so much a function of a community's wealth as of the proportion of resources devoted to public services. It may be measured by the number of public employees per 1,000 people and by per capita spending for public services.

Economic trends that make their influence felt on the local public sector may be expected to affect levels of minority employment. The relationship may be especially acute under conditions of economic distress. Because affirmative action efforts are of relatively recent origin, it is likely that a disproportionate number of black workers will not have earned sufficient seniority to protect themselves from layoffs (Rosenbloom, 1979, p. 298). Furthermore, as Gill has pointed out with regard to Proposition 13 cutbacks in California, public employee layoffs are more likely to occur among the unskilled and semiskilled categories, which are disproportionately filled by racial minorities (1980, p. 60).

Economic decline in a city's private sector, then, should be associated with relatively lower levels of black bureaucratic penetration. Economic growth in the private sector, however, is likely to have positive effects on black employment levels. A growing tax base may be used to expand the public sector or at least to protect it from attrition. In either case, black employment levels are likely to remain high relative to cities whose economies are deteriorating, for affirmative action obligations, combined with the growing concentration of blacks in central city labor pools,[4] are likely to assure blacks a large share of newly created jobs or of those jobs vacated through turnover.

We may test these arguments by examining the hypothesis that levels of black penetration of city bureaucracies will vary with the fortunes of the local economy.

Public sector effort is another matter. It is negatively related to measures of local economic health, but at generally weak levels.[5] It may be seen rather as a reflection of local law and traditions regarding the range of responsibilities and obligations of the public sector. Where local government performs a wide range of services, as in New York or Cleveland, there will probably be higher per capita expenditures than in a city such as Houston, with its more modest array of service obligations. We may hypothesize that as a greater proportion of resources is devoted to the public sector, there will be more opportunities for civil service employment (see Grandjean, 1981, p. 1062). Piven has in fact argued that there is a direct link between a large public sector and black opportunities One response by politicians sensitive to black demands, she points out, has been the creation of new service agencies -- such as antipoverty programs -- to be staffed largely by blacks (1973, p. 384). Thus, the more opportunities

for civil service employment (a function of public sector effort), the higher the level of black bureaucratic penetration, since, once again, affirmative action doctrines and an increasingly black labor pool will be likely to claim a disproportionate share of jobs for black workers.

The second set of economic factors that potentially bears on levels of black public service employment involves certain competitive forces in the labor market. Black penetration of municipal bureaucracies should vary to the degree that there is competition between public and private employers for black workers and competition among social groups for public jobs.

Levels of black representation in public service organizations are likely to vary specifically with opportunities for similar work in the private sector. Despite the fact that blacks have been more dependent on the public sector than on the private sector for prestige occupations, private sector work, particularly in business, accords with what E. Franklin Frazier once persuasively argued are long-held cultural preferences among upwardly mobile blacks (1957, pp. 25, 154). All things being equal, we would expect job seekers to look for private sector jobs to the extent that such positions are available. Anthony Downs has made a similar point with respect to black penetration of federal jobs:

> Each bureau's representativeness depends partly upon the type of recruiting conducted by other organizations. If they exclude certain groups that the bureau does not, then these may be disproportionately attracted to the bureau. This has certainly been the case regarding Negro employees in the federal government (1967, p. 233).

We may hypothesize, then, that black penetration of municipal work forces will vary inversely with competitive opportunities in the private sector. The latter may be measured by the growth during the 1970s in the representation of blacks in managerial and professional jobs in the private

sector metropolitan labor force.

The possibilities for black municipal public employment may also vary with the presence of public employee unions and with the number of ethnic competitors for city jobs. Piven (1973) has been among those scholars who have most forcefully depicted white ethnic groups and municipal employee unions as barriers to blacks seeking public work. "Blacks are the newcomers," she writes. "But they come at a time when public employment has been preempted by older [ethnic] groups and is held fast through civil service provisions and collective bargaining contracts . . . . Obviously, elaborate entrance and promotion requirements now limit access by blacks to municipal jobs" (pp. 380, 383). She goes on to argue that where municipal workers are well organized, they will be successful in maintaining the sorts of job requirements that will serve to limit black recruitment. Thus, we may hypothesize that black penetration of city bureaucracies will vary inversely with the presence of public employee unions and white ethnics.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC FACTORS AND BLACK EMPLOYMENT

The most important single factor associated with levels of black employment in 1978 is the proportion black in the city's population. Percentage black in the total city civil service corps is related to black population (1970 figures) at the .85 level (Pearson r), while the percentage black among managerial and professional workers is related to black population at the .76 and .81 levels, respectively.[6] Thus, the percentage black in the city's population must be controlled, along with the size of the city, in all calculations.

Partial correlations were calculated for each of the six dependent variables against an array of nine independent variables measuring economic conditions, controlling simultaneously for black population and city size. These partial correlation coefficients are reported in Table 3.

Several general observations may be made about these calculations. One is that missing data on the 1973 dependent variables (percentage black in the work force) is a problem in analyzing change in black employment levels between 1973 and 1978. When that lack is combined with missing data on several independent variables, we lose as many as 20 cities from certain of the calculations. Thus, change data must be interpreted with caution.

A second point is that the coefficients are uniformly small. This is in great part a function of the small sample. But I would also speculate that it is a product of what appears to be the relatively homogeneous geographical penetration of affirmative action doctrines across the nation. To establish this, a black employment effort score was calculated, taking the ratio of percentage black in the city civil service to percentage black in the city population. Perfect representation yields a score of 1.00. The mean effort score of the 49-city sample is 1.22, indicating that blacks were overrepresented in municipal employment, at least in relation to their 1970 population. The regional distribution of cities above and below this mean showed little variation, as Table 4 indicates.

Regional homogeneity in the penetration of blacks in city employment suggests that the partial correlation coefficients are in all likelihood mainly measuring intraregional economic differences and their relation to black employment levels, rather than the more dramatic interregional ones.

Table 3

Partial Correlations, Controlling for Percentage Black and City Size, Between Black Municipal Employment and Economic Variables

Dep. Var. \ Ind. Var.	(1) Growth in Manuf. Jobs, 1972-77[a]	(2) Unemp. 1977[b]	(3) Per Cap. Inc. Change 1970-77[c]	(4) Public Emp. Per 1,000 1977[d]	(5) Per Cap. Expendit. 1977[c]	(6) Change in Black Priv. Managers, 1970-78[e]	(7) Change in Black Priv. Professionals 1970-78[e]	(8) Public Emp. Union Presence[f]	(9) Percentage white foreign stock 1970[g]
Percentage black in municipal work force 1978	.12 (N=46)	-.23* (N=49)	.22* (N=40)	-.12 (N=49)	-.26* (N=40)	-.03 (N=46)	-.20* (N=46)	-.29** (N=49)	-.24* (N=44)
Percentage black administr. 1978	.14 (N=42)	.19 (N=45)	.21 (N=36)	-.26** (N=45)	-.38** (N=36)	-.24* (N=42)	-.16 (N=42)	-.08 (N=45)	.05 (N=40)
Percentage black profess. 1978	.17 (N=40)	.03 (N=44)	.17 (N=35)	-.17 (N=44)	-.26* (N=35)	-.36** (N=41)	-.05 (N=41)	-.18 (N=44)	.04 (N=39)
Percentage change in num. black emp. 1973-1978	-.09 (N=39)	.02 (N=42)	-.12 (N=34)	-.08 (N=42)	-.12 (N=34)	-.10 (N=39)	.01 (N=39	-.12 (N=42)	-.12 (N=37)
Percentage change in black admin. 1973-1978	.29** (N=33)	-.15 (N=36)	-.03 (N=29)	.09 (N=36)	-.25* (N=29)	-.12 (N=33)	-.11 (N=33)	-.27* (N=36)	-.14 (N=31)
Percentage change in black profess. 1973-1978	-.05 (N=34)	-.04 (N=37)	-.14 (N=30)	-.02 (N=37)	-.06 (N=30)	.17 (N=34)	.26* (N=34)	-.05 (N=37)	.00 (N=32)

* Statistically significant at the .10 level
** Statistically significant at the .05 level

Sources: (1) U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1977 Census of Maufacturers (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1980); (2) U.S, Dept. of Labor, Unemployment Levels by Counties and Localities, 1977; (3) and (5), Advisory Commission on Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant Features of Fiscal Federation, 1980-81; (4) Calculated basis of data in U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, City Employment in 1977; (6) and (7), U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Minorities in Private Industry (Washington, D.C.: 1980); (8) U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, State, County and Municipa; Bargaining Agreements on File (Washington, D.C.: Annual); (9) U.S. Census, 1970.

Table 4

Regional Distribution of Black
Employment Effort in 49 Cities

(mean effort = 1.22)

Region	Cities above mean	Cities below mean
North	12	11
South and Southwest	13	13

Note: Effort score is ratio of percentage black in city work force to percentage black in the city population. Perfect representation would give a score of 1.00.

Since variation in the former tend to be modest, the relationships will be small.

Finally, it should be noted that the coefficients pertaining to the 1978 data are generally larger than those pertaining to the change-over-time data. Change in the proportion black in the city work force in all probability may best be explained by the rate of growth in the black population during the decade of the 1970s. Since the definitive 1980 Census data were not yet released at the time of this writing, however, we cannot test this supposition. In any event, we can be substantially more confident in interpreting the static relationships than the dynamic ones.

In general, the first hypothesis -- that black representation in city bureaucracies will be positively related to the economic health of the local private sector -- is borne out with regard to the 1978 data. Three independent variables were chosen to test this hypothesis: the percentage change in manufacturing jobs in the metropolitan area between 1972 and 1977, the percentage change in real per capita income of city residents between 1970 and 1977, and the unemployment rate in the city in 1977. All three coefficients are in the predicted direction with respect to the percentage black in the municipal work force in 1978: black employment varies positively with the growth of manufacturing jobs and per capita income and negatively with unemployment. The relationships of these variables and black employment in prestige occupations in city government are reasonably consistent with this finding. Blacks had done better by 1978, then, in places where more resources were available to the public sector.

These resources, however, appear to have been used to <u>maintain</u> previously substantial levels of black employment rather than to <u>expand</u> black job opportunities. With the exception of growth in administrative

jobs (relative to black population), proportional increases in black employment between 1973 and 1978 were not related in any significant degree to a growing local economy.

Cities with growing economies tend in fact to have more modest public sectors than those with deteriorating economies. The additional income produced by economic growth is not being used by government to expand the public sector. Per capita income growth, for example, is associated negatively both with the number of city employees per 1,000 population and with per capita government expenditures (-.10 and -.04 respectively). Manufacturing growth is associated with those two public sector effort variables at the -.09 and -.16 levels, respectively. Even though these relationships are very small, they indicate at least that expanding economic resources are not associated with an expansive public sector.

Black city-employment levels are not only higher in cities with booming economies but also, indeed, in cities with smaller, less elaborate public sectors. Black public employment in 1978 and growth in black public employment from 1973 to 1978 are associated <u>negatively</u> both with the ratio of public employees to population and with per capita expenditures for public services. To put the matter another way, blacks do relatively less well in cities with more elaborate and more expensive public sectors. The hypothesis which suggested that black opportunities would rise as the public sector became larger and more complex must be rejected.

What is going on, then, in such cities? How can we explain the finding that <u>more</u> city employees and <u>more</u> public spending are associated with relatively fewer jobs for blacks, proportionally speaking? By 1978 cities with expensive public sectors were under pressure to cut back. These cities tend to be in fiscal trouble, and many are losing population. The zero-order

correlation between population growth from 1960 to 1970 and per capita expenditures is -.40 (significant at .008), while that between population growth and employees per 1,000 city population is -.11. Cutbacks in such cities during the 1970s affected black public employees drastically. For example, Detroit, whose per capita expenditures in 1977 were above the sample mean, has been laying off police officers since the mid-1970s. In one of the most recent cutbacks, 18% of the police force was laid off. Although the police department at the time was 34% black, 74% of those laid off were black (New York Times, Sept. 7, 1980). When New York City reduced its work force by 13% during the fiscal crisis of the 1970s, 40% of the black males employed by the city lost their jobs (Pascal, 1979). The roster of cities with high per capita expenditures (Table 5) reads like an urban casualty list. Thirty-six percent of the high expenditure cities cut back their municipal work forces between 1973 and 1978, as compared to 23% of the low per capita expenditure cities. The mean effort score, a measure of percentage black employees to percentage black in the city population, is higher for the low expenditure cities than for those which spend more per capita. Blacks do relatively less well, then, in public sector employment in cities with elaborate and expensive public services in part because blacks disproportionately suffer the consequences of the retrenchment pressures which have arisen in most such cities.

The partial correlations provide relatively consistent support for the third hypothesis; namely, that black public employment levels will vary inversely with black penetration of the private sector. To measure the latter process, data were gathered on the percentage change between 1970 and 1978 in the proportions both of managers and of professionals who were black in the metropolitan private industry work force. While these data do not cover

Table 5

Per Capita Public Expenditures and Public Sector Retrenchment[a]

HIGH EXPENDITURE CITIES, 1977 (mean effort = 110[b])		LOW EXPENDITURE CITIES, 1977 (mean effort = 119)	
Reduced the number of employees, 1973-78 (mean effort = 102)	Did not Reduce Employees (mean effort = 129[c])	Reduced the number of employees, 1973-78 (mean effort = 113)	Did not reduce employees (mean effort = 125)
Buffalo	Atlanta	Birmingham	Akron
Cleveland	Baltimore	Los Angeles	Chicago
Detroit	Cincinnati	Nashville	Columbus, Oh.
Newark	Kansas City, Mo.	Philadelphia	Dallas
Bridgeport, Conn.	Norfolk	Rochester	Houston
	Oakland	Toldeo	Indianapolis
	St. Louis		Memphis
	San Francisco		Milwaukee
	Hartford		New Orleans
			Oklahoma City
			Pittsburgh
			Tulsa
			Wichita
			Austin
			Berkeley
			Charlotte
			Columbia, S.C.
			East St. Louis
			Gary. Ind.

[a]High and low per capita noneducation expenditures are determined by relation to the mean expenditure of $452 in 1977. Data for 9 cities were unavailable.

[b]Effort scores are the ratio of percentage black in the total city work force to percentage black in the population (1978).

[c]Mean effort without Kansas City's score of 219 would be 118.

all managerial and professional jobs (e.g., most doctors and lawyers are not included), they do account for most bureaucratic -- as opposed to self-employed -- positions in the private sector. Furthermore, given the diversity of the manufacturing economy and the variety of different occupations covered,[7] they provide a good sense of the openness to blacks of alternative jobs in the institutionalized private sector.

The level of black penetration of city bureaucracies as well as the growth rate in black penetration during the 1970s were greater in cities where opportunities for blacks in prestigious manufacturing occupations grew relatively slowly or did not grow at all. These negative relationships are not a mere artifact of the general state of a city's economy. The rate of change in the proportion black among private sector managers and professionals is positively related to the economic growth indicators.[8] However, blacks do best in the public sector in those cities in which the private sector economy is growing but where prestige jobs in the private sector are relatively less available to blacks.

Such cities tend on the whole to have low levels of public employee unionization and small white ethnic populations. The hypothesis that black employment levels would vary inversely with these competitive factors is supported in virtually every instance. The unionization measure itself is problematic, but the consistency of the predicted relationship lends it credence. Data on the percentage of public employees covered by union collective bargaining contracts are collected annually through voluntary questionnaires sent out to cities by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Great fluctuations appear for certain cities from year to year. A problem arises in interpreting these fluctuations, particularly sharp downward shifts. According to BLS staff[9] these are less likely to reflect the

dissolution of unions or the layoff of unionized employees than the failure of a city to report union membership in a given year. The measure of union presence applied in this paper, then, is the largest percentage of municipal workers covered by union bargaining agreements (excluding school personnel) recorded for any year between 1973 and 1977. In 22 of the 49 cities, high points were recorded for union membership in some year prior to 1977.

Despite these problems, the data show clearly that the more employees under union contract, the lower the level and growth of black public employment. As we might expect, union coverage and the presence of a substantial white ethnic population (measured by the 1970 percentage of white foreign stock[10] in a city's population) are strongly related ($r = .57$). Public employee unions have traditionally been used by ethnic groups to protect their public service jobs. The classic case involves Jews in the teachers' unions of eastern seaboard cities, but Italian sanitation workers and Irish transit workers offer similar examples. The two variables -- unionization and ethnicity -- are difficult to sort out here. But we need not be compelled to do so: the former is in many instances simply the instrumentality of the latter. We may presume that to the degree to which there is resistance to black public employment, much of it is mobilized by the unions in the name of the preservation of merit principles and seniority.

DISCUSSION

Cities where blacks have the highest levels of bureaucratic growth relative to their populations are those with growing private sector economies, modest but stable public sector work forces, relatively fewer

prestige positions for blacks in private industry, moderate or low levels of public employee unionization, and small white ethnic populations. Cities which exemplify this combination of characteristics include Austin, Berkeley, Columbia, S.C., Indianapolis, and Raleigh. Tulsa, San Francisco, and New Rochelle, N.Y., come close to this combination.

The decisions of black job seekers to take public employment are undoubtedly complex and cannot be confidently inferred from these aggregate data. Certainly, we may guess that their motives reflect a mix of desires for service, security, income, power and status all of which are shaped to some degree by the structure of opportunities. To some extent opportunities are created by the political system. City officials responsive to black demands for jobs, for example, can influence the hiring process through the application of vigorous affirmative action programs, thereby creating opportunities for black employment that had not existed before (Eisinger, 1980a). This seems especially to be the case in cities where there is a black mayor. The partial correlation between the presence of a black mayor and level of black penetration of the total work force, controlling for black population, is .21 ($p < .01$); and between black mayor and black professionals, .32 ($p < .05$).

But opportunities are also shaped by the economic context in which the public sector operates. The configuration of economic forces that we have measured suggests that black employment in the public work force is at least in part a product of <u>negative</u> opportunities. This is not to say that there are no attractive features, or "pull" factors, in public service: we simply have not measured them. But we do witness in these data certain "push" factors at work, and certain negative opportunities. Where the private sector is relatively inhospitable, blacks appear to turn to public

employment. Where public employee unions are weak, blacks are able to achieve significant penetration of city bureaucracies. Where the economy is healthy, job positions, especially those at the bottom of the seniority ladder, will not be cut, thus preserving a disproportionate share of black jobs. But a growing economy, a large and complex public sector, and strong unions do not appear to expand black employment opportunities in the public sector. Furthermore, it is clear that the deteriorating economies of cities headed by black mayors impose evident limits on the employment opportunities that those politicians can create. Although blacks have done well in cities headed by black mayors, they have done relatively better elsewhere.

That blacks are achieving the most significant levels of penetration in the bureaucracies of cities in relatively healthy economic condition has at least one interesting political implication. Much commentary on the rise of urban black power has focused on the irony of black empowerment in "dying" cities: Newark, Detroit, and Gary are cases in point. This viewpoint is dependent upon an understanding of black power as a purely electoral phenomenon. But that is an unnecessarily restrictive perspective. Power also has a bureaucratic dimension.

In American cities blacks are quietly laying claim to bureaucratic power in the public domain. This is not an insignificant form of power. Bureaucratic power provides opportunities to gather and interpret the information which underlies political decision making, to shape and establish choices on which elected officials act, to implement laws passed by elected bodies, and to shape the very character of the public work force through internal procedures for recruitment, hiring, and promotion. Bureaucratic work, both at the street level (Lipsky, 1980) and at the higher reaches, has

a major discretionary component. Bureaucrats are not drones, but major shapers of the character of public services and therefore, in some central way, of the quality of urban life.

What is particularly important about black penetration of city bureaucracies is that it is happening to a greater degree in healthy, growing cities than in the so called dying ones. Blacks are gaining positions of bureaucratic authority in cities where both the white and the black populations are growing, and they are doing so where the private economy is expanding. Observers of the urban scene have come to expect the mobilization of black power in the grim cities of the Great Lakes industrial crescent and the northeast, but we have not looked for evidence of black power in the more prosperous urban centers. In these latter places, I would suggest, it is taking the form of bureaucratic penetration as much as, if not more than, electoral mobilization. To the degree that the enterprise of government involves the bureaucratic process, then, it may be argued that it is in these economically healthy cities that the greatest possibilities for biracial local government truly exist.

NOTES

1. A similar argument is made by many students of "representative bureaucracy." See, for example, Kranz (1976).

2. All cities over 250,000 were selected in the first stage, except for New York, Washington, and Honolulu. Of these cities, 32 (61%) are included in the analysis. The response rate of the large cities was 85%. Nine cities were cut from the analysis because their 1970 black populations were below 10%. A supplementary sample of 83 cities with populations between 50,000 and 249,999 was chosen, of which 44 provided usable responses. Only 17 of these met the black population criterion. These represent about 7% of all cities in this population category. Although city size made very little material difference in the statistical tests, size is nevertheless controlled throughout.

3. Employment categories used by the EEOC include administrators, professionals, technicians, protective service, paraprofessionals, clericals, skilled craft, and service and maintenance.

4. Krislov has explained the high proportion of blacks in the federal civil service in Wahington as a function of their high concentration in the labor force in that city (1967, p. 103).

5. The Pearson correlation coefficient between per capita expenditures for public services and (a) per capita income growth from 1970-77 is -.04; (b) unemployment for public services .29; and (c) growth in manufacturing jobs, 1970-77, -.16. Public employees per 1,000 people is related to the three economic health variables, respectively, at -.10, .13, and -.09.

6. All three coefficients are significant at the .001 level.

7. Jobs covered include administration, accounting, law, purchasing, personnel, engineering, finance, planning, data management, general supervision, public relations, research, sales and advertising.

8. The percentage change in black professionals is related positively to change in manufacturing jobs ($r = .36$) and change in per capita income (.22) and negatively to unemployment (-.15). Percentage change in black managers is related to these three variables at .12, .27, and -.17.

9. Measurement problems were discussed in interviews with three different Bureau of Labor Statistics officials during January and February 1981.

10. The standard census designation for foreign-born persons and children of at least one foreign-born parent.

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