SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT POLICY ANALYSIS AND POLITICAL THEORY

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April 1978

This paper was prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association and was supported by funds granted to the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin-Madison by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare pursuant to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.
ABSTRACT

If ethics is practical reason, then call political theory worldly reason. It is concerned with value, but value in its relationship to a public world.

Policy analysis is concerned with realizing value in a public world. As such it is like political theory. Indeed it is perhaps best thought of as applied political theory, properly a part of the political theoretical endeavor.

Such a conception of policy and political theory raises many questions about their similarities, relationships, and what they have to learn from each other. Such questions are what this paper is about.
SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT POLICY ANALYSIS AND POLITICAL THEORY

Policy analysis and political theory share many characteristics. They are both concerned with the same society and both would change it (change is usually fancied as improvement). While both are "normative" in that they prescribe what should be, both use empirical facts in their analysis. They vector the world toward a future promise, and (at least implicitly) presume a comprehension of the ways in which men and women can live together freely, productively, and decently. Political theory is concerned with the transition from ought to is, and with studying authority, power, persuasion, friendship, and the other "currencies" of politics necessary to effect this change. This analysis of the interrelationship of telos, process, and fact is common to political theory and policy analysis. Although both use empirical facts in their analysis, neither is scientific; both are more interested in changing the world than in describing it. Political theory is not empirical precisely to the degree that policy analysis is not empirical. Since policy analysts pride themselves on the hardness of their noses, that policy analysis is not empirical is significant; it shows those who have assumed that only what is empirical can be hard nosed that there are many ways to be practical.

In what follows I take advantage of the unique virtues of political theory as a mode of discourse, and confirm what political theory and policy analysis share. First, I examine three forms of policy analysis: law, economics, and social intelligence. These three are the major forms of political theory in modern America as well as of policy analysis.
A vital political theory should build on them, criticize them, and alter them where they are inadequate. I discuss the political theoretical vacuum of the twentieth century, speculate about social intelligence without self-conscious political theory, and warn both against political theory and its absence. I then turn to some concrete issues in public policy that seem reasonably opaque to our usual ways of thinking about and changing public policy, our ways of thinking about the political world, and therefore our political theory. Finally, I consider ideology, risk, and reconsider political theory.2

1. LAW AS POLITICAL THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS

Traditionally, political theory in this country has been constitutional, and in turn, constitutional theory has been legal. The courts have been an important policy arm of the American polity (Lowi, 1969). Since decision by a major court often contains not only policy but the opinion that explains the basis for the decision as well, it is an exemplary model of the connection of political theory to public policy. The connection of either to policy analysis is more obscure, having to do with precedent, legal expertise, and wisdom. The range of decision here is not sufficiently great to make policy, political theory, and their fusion into universally replicable models, but it has offered a lasting realization of the political theory that went into the founding of this nation and that perpetuates and transforms itself through the courts.3

As the governments of people developed in historical and societal complexity, it became increasingly necessary to rationalize every new
policy with policies that had gone before and policies that surrounded it. Our constitution was designed as law that would govern future action, and chief justice Marshall soon made it more so. The constitution, a document of founding, rationalized the rights and obligations of different social groups and bound the promise of the future with the present. It also created a place for lawyers in public policy.

Traditionally, human governments were aimed inward, toward the human beings who composed them. People were unable to affect the outside physical world except as other nations became important. But the United States was growing toward a Manifest Destiny carved from the unknown and formed into a polity. The frontier (see Turner, 1920) and, equally important, the immigrant (see Schlesinger, 1950) were two sorts of contacts with the outside world that were important in causing policies of education (Katz, 1968) and expansion within law.

We were open from two sides and developed in a way able to comprehend a third opening, not unique to this nation: the scientific, technological, and industrial revolution. No longer was it true that the world could not be changed. How to change it and what effects change would have on the polity became policy issues of weight. The relationship of the social system to the physical world was refracted through various organizational channels. The doctrine of laissez-faire left many of the policy decisions connected with the opening to the physical world in the hands of private enterprise, and law assured that this opening was the prerogative of the private sector.

Law was thus important in three ways: first, it regulated the internal workings of the polity; second, it expanded with the conquest of new
lands and the incorporation of new people; and third, it defined and rationalized the conditions for the opening to the physical world.

Our society and law have changed, particularly in the last century, as the economy became ever more mixed and the industrial revolution proceeded at an ever faster rate, changing the environment of the polity and the polity itself; as we reached our frontier to the west and started to bar immigrants; and as nuclear weapons changed the character of war. Theodore Lowi (1969) has lamented that we should go back to a juridical democracy, a polity in which law is resurrected to what it was. The complexity of the modern world makes this, if at all possible, at the least a conscious policy choice of the intensest effort.

The days when law had substantive contributions to make to policy are gone; it has moved from substance to form, telling us not what to do and why we should do it, but rather how to do it within the structure of increasingly arcane law, something to be gotten around rather than a framework to conform to. It differs from other substantive policy advice—military, educational, scientific, technological, and economic. Law is like political science, having expertise largely only regarding formal matters in the polity. 7

2. ECONOMICS AS POLITICAL THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS

Economics, once upon a time, was all substance. But it is starting to dress in a formal way. It is starting to proclaim itself as political theory, to reckon the prices of laws, to allocate justice, to make decisions in ever expanding areas, and to develop models for decision making itself. If such moves only dredge up criticism from political science, that would
be as sad as was political theory's obsession with criticism of behavioralism. But if they call forth a confrontation with political science and political theory and some sort of synthesis, then political science will have forged a bond with the physical world that traditionally has been absent. In so doing it will have forged a bond with the future and with changes we must make as a polity to reach the future.

A model for the political theorist in the world of public policy newer than counselor to prince, consiglieri to don, Lady Macbeth to Macbeth, classical advisor or lawyer is that which has allowed policy analysis to measure the gap between the economy and public policy. Political scientists sometimes call it "rational policy analysis," and economists call it just plain "policy analysis." I shall call it "economic policy analysis." It is the policy arm of modern neoclassical economics, and has replaced law as the most significant American political theory.

Bureaucracies have divisions of planning and evaluation; the policy analyst has a niche. His advice is sometimes paid attention to, and his language affects the language not only of policy but of policy criticism among policy makers. If the role is hardly that of counselor, consiglieri, or Lady Macbeth, the country is hardly so simple. Policy analysis has found a way into the realms of policy making that is hardly the dream of the philosopher king, but is nonetheless a relationship of political theory to the process of making policy itself. Policy analysis, the systematic application of quasi-academic, quasi-political, and quasi-economic reasoning to problems of public policy is a growing field both in size and maturity, and one that could use the insights of political theory. Public policy analysis is a systematic procedure having to
do with the public policy output that exists in the world. Political
theory is the exploration of relevant statements about the polity,
including those of policy analysis. It, too, has to do with policy.
Economists learn much in contact with the policy making process; there is no reason why political theorists could not and should not do likewise. For law and economics alone are inadequate as political theory and as guides for policy making. Hopefully, a political theory more adequate than either economics or law alone could be developed for public policy analysis--call it "applied political theory."

Legal criticism tends toward scholastic exegesis. Economics is incapable of fundamental criticism of itself. Economic and legal thought should be brought into the compass of a wider political theory even as economic policy and law have been brought into the compass of politics. One sample is the criticism of economics and law. Another sample would be a criticism of legal realism. Another would be of the welfare economics of which cost benefit analysis is the policy side. And how can economic policy analysts disagree? What is their relationship to government? What is their relationship to the academy? What is the interaction between the market system and systems of authority? Policy analysis is directed toward change, but what is being changed? It is prudent, indeed overdue, to indicate what is meant by public policy.

To use an analogy or "model"--implicit in the economists' view of public policy--compare the public sector to the firm. The firm takes certain inputs, selected according to specifiable market constraints, combines them, and sells the outputs, subject again to market constraints.
The "input" into the polity, variables such as socialization, participation, and attitudes are largely variables of behavioral political science. The "output" is public policy, which creates products of the public sector such as in monies, programs, regulations, rules, laws, norms, and the cultivation of authority.

Usually, the firm's output changes marginally; similarly, public policy generally changes incrementally (or marginally—I shall use the two interchangeably). Even the "rational" methods of policy formation and analysis, such as cost benefit analysis, are incremental in the fundamental and profound sense that they always presuppose the adjustments predefined by conventional neoclassical economic equilibrium.

Pluralist policy making, the vector sum of group interests, is incremental in a more common sense, but also in the profound sense mentioned above. Regard interest groups as oligopolies operating in the social arena. Public policy, in which pluralist group interest in expressed, reestablishes the situation of equilibrium where for some reason, frequently exogenous to the system itself, political equilibrium has been disturbed.

Public policy tries to reestablish market equilibrium and political equilibrium. But what about other goals? What is the nature of the equilibrium? How did it come to be so important in public policy? Are there alternatives? What is the relationship of market and political equilibrium? How are they affected by class and technology? All these questions are interesting, relevant, and urgent. Political theory has a responsibility to attend to them. If the answers are disturbing, it is necessary to know why. If the answers given are not disturbing,
it is necessary to ask why so we can ask questions anew. Economics and the pluralist and economic policy analysis that developed from it are locked into the equilibrium that defines their very movement. This Machiavellian equilibrium is different from the equilibrium of the conservative; it is in continuous motion. The purpose of public policy in a polity of progress is to recalibrate the tone of policy to the bouncing ball. What remains constant is not the state of the polity, but its distance from market and political equilibrium, which public policy always tries to make vanish. Conservatism, a return to an earlier equilibrium, is as severe a threat to the economy and polity of progress as radicalism, (see Oakeshott, 1962) which involves not reequilibration but movement to some other point defined by criteria mysterious to the equilibrium maintaining policy apparatus. Equally embarrassing is any analysis of the motion of the equilibrium point, the welfare economics which defines it, or any thought that the whole process be made conscious, much less change.

Economic policy analysis is based in neoclassical economics, which is concerned with equilibrium and marginalism (anachronistically, a sort of incrementalism of the market). Indeed, economic policy analysis in its assumptions and goals is more timid than incrementalism, which does not assume policy making is nonpolitical and is willing to try more audacious steps than returns to equilibrium (is situations of crisis, those situations in which we have been told that political theory is particularly valuable). Economic political analysis is only less incremental than incrementalism in that its goals seem exogenous to the system; but when these
goals themselves are analyzed, they turn out to be market goals and not exogenous at all—they are extracted from the very system to which they are returned as normative regulators. Rather than criticize other approaches for being mindless and timid, the economic policy analyst should criticize his or her own approach and arrive at algorithms (invaluable to the intelligent application of economics to policy analysis) to determine when it should be used, in what ways, and what it leaves out.

Economic policy analysis developed out of systems analysis and operations analysis. It was nurtured by contracts with the Air Force, grew up in the Defense Department, and was rendered adult in the Great Society (see Nelson, 1974). There are political reasons for its growth. There was a need to gather some control over the bureaucracy. There was a need to torpedo policy legitimized by saying that it was not cost beneficial. Economic policy analysis is connected with institutions like Rand and Brookings, and is in some measures how think tanks think. It was born in war and tied to peace time decision making by adding to its systematic decision making process an evaluation of outcomes (by assigning a price to benefits as well as to the rather more easily measurable costs).

As economic policy analysis became important enough to become politically significant political scientists started to criticize it. It didn't work; it disrupted the political process; it was naive. Such criticisms are easy to catapult against any political theory that seeks to inform a political process. Whether or not such criticism is apt depends on the intelligence of the political process, the method, and the relationship of the two. Frequently, the political process was assumed intelligent, the relationship between it and policy analysis was diagnosed insane and the rationality of policy analysis was
rarely questioned. Criticism perhaps was vindicated but for the wrong reasons. In fact, the intelligence of economic policy making is dubious, political systems sometimes are and sometimes are not intelligent (we usually don't know where and when), and the relationship of economic policy analysis to public policy may be irrational in fact, but accommodations can and should be made.

Meanwhile, the economist has been reasonably oblivious to the criticism of the political scientist. After all, the economist engages in the actual formation of public policy, and the political scientist is not the most influential of his critics.

After some efforts spent showing that aloof criticism is not the prerogative of the political theorist, political scientists started to get involved in policy analysis and policy making. Slowly, a dialogue has started between political scientists and economists. It is a fortunate development, for they have much to learn from each other. And indeed, the political scientist is following the economist in establishing schools of public policy, chairs of public policy, and getting grants from the government to engage in the study of public policy.

Where is political theory? In the main on the periphery of public life. In part, insofar as modern economics is itself political theory, right at the center of things. And, in part, when actively involved with economic policy analysis whose procedures and logic are being questioned, debated, and confirmed, it informs the area of political concerns. Whether right or wrong is less the point here than to realize that this sort of political theory is of political consequence trying to change the policy making process either directly or by changing the logic of policy analysis.
This sort of political theory has led to some critiques of economic policy analysis that should be shared with the rest of political theory. One is that rational policy analysis is a political theory without goals, seeking merely to achieve economic equilibria as defined from within the system (Roth, forthcoming). Another is that economic policy analysis is embedded in welfare economics, which takes a given distribution of resources as proper, when from the standpoint of a more egalitarian theory it is precisely this distribution of resources that must be questioned. Others are the matter of prices in conditions of acknowledged market failure where in fact no prices exist (Margolis, 1970); and the appropriateness of the formal calculus of cost benefit analysis to the formation of public policy (it may be that the form of the mathematics is too simple to capture the complexities, and too linear to capture the shape of policy as it exists and as it would become [Roth, forthcoming]). Most encouraging about these developments is that the debates are with live political entities and not with corpses or zombies. A lesson from the history of political theory is that frequently arguments of importance are grafted on to predecessors, without regard to their intrinsic merit, but only to their historical immanence and liveliness. Without Filmer what would Locke's political theory have been?

Economic policy making has redirected our eyes to an important aspect of political theory that we sometimes consider beneath us. Although it would be foolish to pretend that problems of "distributive justice" are the be all and end all of the polity, it is equally foolish to presume that distributive justice is anything but crucial for any polity—and policy (Rawls, 1971; Wolin, ). The fundamental question of cost benefit

analysis is "Are we getting our money's worth?" This question concerns the distribution of resources. However, it slides over certain facts of distributive justice (the initial distribution of resources). The "new political economy," self-avowedly normative and with pretensions of social guidance, is partially predicated on it and the welfare economics to which it is attached. Whereas cost-benefit analysis, the new political economy, and welfare economics are all concerned with distribution, they take the existing distribution of resources for granted. The only question left is "Is a given distribution of resources efficient?" (Or, more formally, according to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, "Can the gainers from a policy theoretically compensate the losers equivalent to asking if the benefits are greater than the costs?" But such a solution will necessarily be just only to the degree that the initial distribution of resources is just.)

The political theoretical capabilities of economics do have some potential to answer certain questions of distributive justice which the legal system has lost. The realization of that potential depends on an embedding of economics within the rest of political theory. To put it traditionally, it depends on the resuscitation of political economy. For the nature of the problem necessitates a rationality capable of comprehending both the authoritative and allocative dimensions of policy. There seems little reason to suspect that a modern, complex, energy rich state has problems of distribution solvable by classical political theory. The situation is new, and the theory must be new, combining law, economics, political science, and political theory. It is a problem the existing intelligence of democracy does not seem bent on solving. If the problem of distributive justice is important, incomprehensible by traditional
public policy or political theory, and made more acute by the presence of
private interest groups who function in the shadow of its neglect, we
are left with a "rational choice": Leave things alone and let the interest
groups play with the intelligence of democracy or infuse legal, economic,
and political theoretical insights into its service.

We have economic policy analysis to thank for the resurrection of a
problem last addressed by classical and Marxian economists. That we have
been able to pay it as little attention as we have should be cause for
strict self-questioning.

3. SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE AS POLITICAL THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS

If law and economics are two articulate fundamental expressions
of political theory there is also a political theory of substantial
importance that is mute, and whose workings must be deciphered from the
symbols in which it is engraved. The tradition of study is as old as Plato
and has been most recently revived by Freud, Marx, Chomsky, Levi-Strauss,
and Piaget: How can we account for what is? What is the logic? Where
is the consistent structure? If these questions have not been consis-
tently asked of societies, apart perhaps from Marx and Levi-Strauss,
perhaps it is time that they were. If there is an intelligence to
democracy, we need to know not only where and when it appears, but what
it is and how it works. The risks of modern policy make such investigations
urgent. If there is a social intelligence, its rules should be discovered
and put on a par with other fundamental patterns of political theory.

It is a cliche that if a centipede knew how to walk he wouldn't get
anywhere; but it is also true that the centipede walks regardless of whether
we know it. Societies are different. They are made up of beings more intelligent and self-conscious than centipedes, who are part of the society that politics may seek to change. Nonetheless, it has been persuasively argued, particularly by conservatives, that just because we do not understand society, this does not mean that society cannot work. Indeed, when studying a working society the presumption is that our theories are inadequate to the extent that they show the society not to work. The distinction between trying to explain something before admitting its working and accepting its working as the beginning of theory marks Kant's move away from Hume. In our generation, it is Talcott Parsons who embodies this Kantian perspective to society most consistently. He takes it for granted that societies in some fundamental sense work and seeks to account for how this can be. (Thus, in the area of socialization, an area about which much has been written but surprisingly little is known, Parsons proceeds by saying that any society that continues through history must socialize its children; the degree to which we do not understand it is the fault of theory, not the socialization, which takes place nonetheless.)

A similar move in political science has been more questionable. Thus Dahl (1956) in A Preface to Democratic Theory takes it for granted that this is a reasonably democratic country, finds little basis for that in traditional thought, and tries to account for it—largely through pluralism. Parsons' way seems a prudent starting point in any examination of society. However, matters become more difficult when the Kantian-Parsonian conception is applied as pluralist politics. Even granting that a society works, it is far from clear that a theory of any existing
society (which, however, is in the process of change) is anything like a theory to predict change much less guide it. There is more at stake here than what we mean by saying that society works. Even with an agreed definition of "works," one risks justifying any social change (thus coming back on "equilibrium" from another side). Some pluralists who have studied public policy have concluded that descriptions of the ways in which society works are in themselves theories for future policy making, not at all a logically necessary conclusion. Yet the humility of investigator and policy maker confronting a complex, ongoing process is as well taken in policy analysis as in epistemology.

It is possible that something like social intelligence exists and that a polity of a changing society need not be entirely aware of what it is doing in order to do it. It is also possible that people pursuing individual ends become comingled in some sort of general will. In short, it is possible that the wisdom of society lies not in the head of the social scientist but in the heads, feet, hearts, and hands of the people who make it up, and in their culture, organizations, and history. If this is so, and this wisdom exhausts what one means by wisdom, if everything works perfectly and perfectly agreeable definitions of work can be found then, obviously, no exogenous political theory need be applied to a society for purposes of policy; indeed, the most that it could do would be harm. To the extent that one can discern intelligent policy making apparatus in society, the outside political theorist, operations analyst, cost-benefit analyst, or economist becomes superfluous. It is to verify whether or not polities are intelligent that the study of how policy is formed in fact becomes a guide to what policy should be.
Charles E. Lindblom has most astutely studied the "intelligence of democracy" and the relationship of political theory to public policy. (In such moments of course, Lindblom is a political theorist.) He conceives it as his task to expose what might be instead of simply describing a process and calling it intelligent, and brings an exogenous idea of intelligence or rationality to the study of political systems. He agrees with Karl Popper (1945) that our knowledge is not such that we can design utopias from our vision. 34

Lindblom has sometimes been called a nonbeliever in thought by political theorists and rational policy analysts. But this critique is economic policy analysis is fallacious; the critique from political theory involves thought about questions that political theory must confront when it leaves the academy and enters the policy making process. The first crucial question is whether the policy is spontaneously intelligent or whether it needs guidance. We should expect no uniform answer. It is likely that in certain situations either statement is true, and that in most situations the truth lies somewhere in between. But this is banal; we must know when, how, as well as if. It is sad that so few political theorists are pursuing this investigation, much less the investigation of how that intelligence might work.

Political theory must explore the political terrain and specify in what ways a system is capable of self guidance, and in what ways it needs the guidance of rationality, tradition, and art. Of course political theory must include itself and other policy analysis in such an investigation, for to the extent that a polity listens to this voice, they become part of its spoken intelligence. And, of course intelligence must always be held accountable to value. That there was system in the economic transactions
hardly made the prisoner of war camp a desirable place to live. Rationality in the operation of a concentration camp makes it repulsive. These are not intelligent; their method is but a method to madness. Political theory is always concerned with the political realization of value in the world of fact. It is partially this concern that separates it from, and makes it capable of criticizing, madness and ideology alike.

The application of political theory to the ongoing policy process involves risks. These risks may be intolerable, particularly to the degree that the policy making process contains its own intelligence. It is thus one of the first obligations of political theory, before applying itself to the analysis of public policy, to map out the intelligence of a policy making process—in short, to understand the political organization that is itself, along with law and economics, one of the three forms of modern political theory.

4. RISKS OF POLITICAL THEORY IN THE MARKET WORLD

A system's theory image of policy making is steering a boat. As the boat becomes ever more loaded with people, the waters rougher and the sharks more plentiful, advice from the passengers on how to steer may be reckoned an intrusion by the captain. Steering has become delicate and dangerous, and the captain may think he does best to rely on established systems of information and on his own ability. Unperceived by the captain is a hungry iceberg to one side or an isle or paradise to the other. Perhaps fundamental changes in course are necessary. Information becomes more important precisely when the passage becomes more risky. Perhaps the
political theorist should think of himself democratically, as just another of the passengers. He should realize that he is in the boat along with everybody else and appreciate the delicacy of disturbing the captain. The political theorist is not particularly used to thinking of himself that way, perhaps because he luxuriates, like the counter culture, an organic, blissed-out convert in his political irrelevance. But there is always room for change. Can the rest of us afford the risks? Can we afford not to take risks given the apparently disastrous direction of our policy toward nuclear holocaust or energy burn out—"fire or ice" as Robert Frost put it?

Reckoning the risks inflects the role of theory itself and must be looked at in the context of society. The debates about Stalinism, the commentary of Burke on Locke, and of Aristotle on Plato are from this tradition. Not only political theory but the relationship of it to society must become the object of such reflection.

In the science fiction film, Forbidden Planet, there is a world whose population is extinct. Tapping into an immense energy source, the former inhabitants devise a machine that converts wish into reality—we can think of it as a public policy machine. This machine was connected into sources of energy surpassing even the fossil fuel, nuclear, thermonuclear, etcetera, energy we have on earth. The inhabitants of Forbidden Planet made a naive and fatal assumption. They assumed that an individual good would be a social good. For a while they played with the machine. Then one person plugged himself into it and turned it on full. An individual good and a virtually infinite energy destroyed the planet.
On Earth we have made an analogous assumption: Individual good is transmuted into social good through the mechanism of the market. In many ways the market has succeeded. But we too are about to develop scientific capabilities to tap immense energy—in fact, we may have already done so and perhaps the market as a policy machine is becoming more and more like the machine on Forbidden Planet. Even with certain rules, the market only works if the individual has access to limited amounts of energy and other resources. The policy machine in Forbidden Planet was like the market. Perhaps because the energy available was too great, this perfect public policy machine destroyed itself and the civilization that had created it. The energy available to Earthlings is increasing past the capabilities of the market. The market no longer can solve every policy problem, even in principle. So we have a mixed economy with an expanded public policy. What is to replace the market as a policy machine? Law? Authority? Input-output analysis? Social intelligence? Political theory? Religion? Ideology? Super egos? Or do we need a replacement? Or where and when?

Ethical wisdom may be political folly. The market connected individual value to social value. Arguably, nonmarket societies without such connections have policy problems with the allocation of individual and social resources, the adjudication of individual and social injustice, and the meshing of individual and social value. But the market alone can no longer provide the answer.

For the market has transformed our planet into something it is not. By its very success it has transformed the world, increased the scale, the energy, and the concentration of social and economic power so that the market's frequent failures cause the government to regulate it, pursue an increased role in the distribution of resources, pursue macro-economic
countercyclical policy, and a host of other interventions whose possibility and necessity has transformed the study, change, and application of public policy.

The government frequently intervenes to redeem market failures. The very existence of a market presupposes a polity, which socializes, regulates, and governs, and presupposes a substantial amount of synchronicity predicated on the social structure. That the market communicates prices of goods quickly and efficiently is predicated on a social system in which people are capable of understanding market signals. The information is not all in the communication; some exists in the socialized communicator, much as in those cyphers predicated on identical "one-time tapes" in both sender and receiver through which the messages must be refracted to mean anything at all.

Adam Smith and the society in which he lived reasoned that a possible and proper role for politics was to structure a society so that a market could work. Thus, the birth of economy from the belly of mercantilism. The achievement of Smith's radical and difficult public policy agenda required sometimes violent revolution, sometimes painful evolution, but always politics. To say that the invisible hand is the absence of politics is to misunderstand history. The insight is that it is possible and indeed in many ways desirable to have a society that is largely run by synchronous "one-time tapes," a market, instead of a society always run and coerced from above; and it is possible to have a society like this work, to have people sufficiently similar, have similar expectations, and sufficiently well behaved utility functions, so that a large part of their behavior is characterizable by a linear market model, in which people out for their own ends, seemingly miraculously, achieve a public good. But, that
individuals in society are to a large extent explicable by an economy, is not only a descriptive statement, more important, it is a normative policy move that has quite arguably been the most significant policy move in history. The insight was that such a policy move was possible—the policy move was the actualization of the possibility of its working; partially by accident, partially by socialization, partially by ingenuity, partially by human nature, and partially by self-fulfilling prophecy.

Nobody would dream of a free market in plutonium (although for a while disposal of nuclear waste was predicated on its being a valuable enough commodity so as not to be dealt with carelessly), but we seem ever more disposed to cling to the market. Social intelligence is supposed by some to work at least in part something like the market, transmitting information at low cost. Cost benefit analysis presupposes the market, in its allocation of shadow prices, its equilibrium, and its distributional preconditions even as it would set foot precisely in instances of market failure. Seemingly, we have no systematic device other than the market or totalitarianism for transforming individual intelligence into social intelligence. Lacking such a replacement, conservatism (in relationship to a moving equilibrium point defined by technological progress) becomes the better part of valor. Such conservatism, more properly called liberalism, becomes evermore dangerous to do away with. Both the market and liberalism are sensible modes of procedure because life is better than death. Shall we ask political theory to tell us otherwise? And if it does shall we listen? Or shall we be suspicious and protective?

Let us reckon that political theory had complete knowledge about how policy works and knew how to direct the polity to new goals. Even
this would be insufficient. For industrialization, technology, the market, science, and the environments in which societies exist are continually being transformed. In order to have any part in the policy making process, political theory must be political theory of a new sort. But then of what sort?

We are in a time of historically unparalleled crises. It is, however, a luxury and obligation of each time to think itself in unparalleled crisis. The recognition of a novel appropriation of the eternal verities enables societies to prevail and develop. Resultant crises have called forth timely political theories in the past. Today none appears forthcoming. The prudence of an agonized polity skeptical of broad-based theoretical solutions is in part responsible. The rapid transformations by the scientific and industrial revolution have foreshadowed the possibility of nuclear war, the reality of the energy crisis, and the concomitant crisis in ecology. Economic and pluralist public policy sees these phenomena as signifying disequilibrium. Technology has torn us out of equilibrium with the market, ourselves, and nature. Is reestablishment of the equilibrium point enough? Or is it that equilibrium, as Keynes observed in an economic context, can occur in any fashion—including slavery, poverty, and most commonly of all, death? With the vast increases of socially accessible energy, the questions become urgent, perhaps making a difference between burning ourselves out and prevailing, between digging ourselves in and emerging.
5. APPLIED POLITICAL THEORY

Political theory must learn about the physical world, the social world, transforming the social world toward new goals, and what those new goals should be. It must develop empathy with public policy, learn what it is like to make it, what the effects are as seen by the policy maker, and learn the nuances of public policy. To do this, political theory must learn humility, never easily believing that it is wise and policy foolish, that it is right and policy wrong, that it is good and policy bad. It must also have the wisdom to realize when it is right and when policy is wrong.

Such learning characterized the political theorist of the past. It is conspicuously absent today when political theorists presume that since their predecessors had wisdom about past societies, it is more appropriate to study the theorists than to study the workings of the political process that made it possible for past political theorists to have something to say in the first place. A recalibration of political theory is in order, necessary to the vitality of political theory and necessary for political theory to have any informative relationships to the policy process.

 Accordingly, perhaps the first task of the political theorist is to learn the main lesson of the tradition, which is how to learn from a polity. It is quite probable that the mechanisms by which this could be accomplished today have changed dramatically from what they once were. These analogous mechanisms must be disclosed by any recalibrated political theory. Whether or not it is in practice possible for political theory to learn these things and to have a closer relation to public policy is problematic; but it is a problem that political theory must start to address.
Whether or not political theory should get involved with public policy at all is an academic question. In the forms of economics and law political theory is already involved.

The traditional history of political theory can be practiced concomitantly with an "applied political theory," enriching it even as application enriches political theory itself. And even though social criticism is perhaps a lowly form of political theory, we want to be able to criticize society even if we are unable to affect its course. Certainly, scholarship, translation, and history have a legitimate part in the political theoretical enterprise. But a political theory restricted to such possibilities is not political theory at all in the sense in which we have usually understood that word. If political theory will not take on its traditional role, then economics, law, ideology, habit, and interest are eager. I have been suggesting that they too are incomplete to always adequately advise public policy, that a more adequate rationality is sometimes needed, and that political theory can sometimes provide it.

Policy analysis is anything but a science. It is concerned with the implementation of values through concrete programs and strategies in the world of men and women. Policy analysis may use science to establish ground rules in the world. But the decisive move of policy is always the concoction of a plan to realize what should be. The study of public policy is the study of such plans, the development of ways to arrive at other plans, the study, in general, of how to arrange a better polity.

Political theory has invaluable contributions to make. Weber's often maligned distinction between fact and value is true at another level. Reasoning from facts public policy cannot achieve plans for the
implementations of values. Usually, it happens that self-interest group pressure, ideology, and sometimes value judgments are brought to bear in the formation of public policy. These by themselves are insufficient. They allow public policy to be run too much by ideology and group interest.

6. POLITICAL THEORY AS ALTERNATIVE

At times, political theory is acknowledged an alternative to tradition. In fact, the two are related. At times political theory is compared to ideology. In fact, theory is an alternative. At times political theory is supposed to arise from interest. In fact, theory allows the possibility of disinterestedness beyond most sorts of action.

Frequently public policy comes about by way of tradition, ideology, and interest. These may or may not be reasonable bases for policy. They may obscure incremental and fundamental changes in policy and the necessity for both. Thus, our tradition and ideology, which includes expansion and progress, blinded us for years to the possibility widespread decades ago in the scientific community, that we were using up our energy. An inquiring political theory could have noticed it and could have informed a willing polity. Fortunately, we are not too late with regard to energy. We may in fact be too late in regard to nuclear war. Self-evidently we are too late in the preservation of species already extinct.

If modern political science is to be believed, the influence of private interest groups in the formation of public policy is huge. To some extent, economic policy analysis and just law are alternatives to the influence of private groups. But neither is complete and rich enough to be able to adequately perform such an heroic service. If the
alternative to an intelligent political theory is a betrayal of democracy, it is an odd time for political theory to sit on the bench off the 50 yard line congratulating itself on its excellent view of the game and second guessing the coach.  

Political theory as alternative to interest groups, ideology, and tradition deserves our respect. All three should be listened to, particularly in incremental policy change, but they can be followed blindly only at severe risk to the polity. 

America has been conspicuous both for the absence of home grown political theory nourished on the soil of America and for the existence of a strong (strong enough to be largely invisible) ideology. Political theory as an enterprise that can comprehend itself and has had long experience in dealing with values can transcend ideology. In the absence of political theory, ideologies flourish. Our polity is not only one where there is an invisible hand at work; there is an invisible mind as well, sufficiently invisible so that a decade ago we were able to think of the "end of ideology." In fact, the existing political theories of law, economics, and social intelligence are so pervasive, so much a part of us, that like a certain Transylvanian count, they are invisible to us in most of our social mirrors and may have already approached ideology. 

Political theory can be a siren of either sort--it can lure us into blissful oblivion or it can alert us to the realities of the political and physical world. Which sort it is depends on how and for what it is used, for it is not a neutral tool. But political theory is uniquely capable of responding to the excesses of ideology on its
own terms, exposing the contradictions and fallacies, showing the unconnectedness of ideology with the real world as it is and as we should like it to be, and of discerning in our political practice the unconscious rhythms of ideology, exposing them, and changing them at least in thought. Political theory is capable of guarding ideology, of watching where it goes, and of discerning where it should go. 48

And the same for tradition and interest. Frequently, working in their direction will be beneficial if only by virtue of its synchronic ease. But at times, it will be detrimental. And there may even be times when it is disastrous. Sometimes political theory acting as a scout can recognize such times before they are upon us in fact.

Social and physical circumstances are sometimes invisible to us because of ideology. (Or it may be that although visible, it is only through a glass darkly, or through the lens of a camera obscura, upside down.) There is frequent need to make changes in social and political practice to accommodate changes in the physical and social world that would ordinarily be made by ordinary policy analysis and public policy, but for reasons of ideology, interest, or tradition are entirely invisible.

7. A FEW SUBSTANTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF APPLIED POLITICAL THEORY

In the past, political theory seemed proper for the grand issues; in times of crisis we turned to it. But we can turn to it more frequently, not only in times of crisis, but in other times as well; not only for the revolutionary changes, but for the modest marginal incremental
changes as well. For there is a reasonable doubt that existing policy making procedures can cope with some policy making demands. What are some possible places where political theory can inform public policy—in effect be applied political theory? Where is it proper to think that applied political theory has a role, not only in situations of crisis, but in more common situations as well? Following are three examples for such possible situations.

One obvious place is nuclear weapons. We still have not achieved a world in which the use of nuclear weapons is impossible. Such a world is imperative.

Assume that we were able to achieve nuclear safety by surrender. Should we surrender? It is reasonable to form a new sort of Leviathan? Right or wrong, Hobbes thought that it was reasonable for individuals in a similar situation to our nations to form a Leviathan. If that is not true today, then what is? And why?

And what of nuclear ethics? It may be simply wrong to set up missiles in Cuba or to mine the Haiphong harbor. And then what of the question of freedom? When is it unreasonable for an individual or nation to prefer freedom and jeopardize nuclear safety? All such questions are difficult. Certainly interests, tradition, and ideology make them doubly difficult—and certainly all are important.

Consider another problem that has been touched on. The market is an efficient allocator of goods and resources. A just government is a just authority for the polity. How far should the market go? How far should the government go? What of the grey zone, sometimes through cost-benefit analysis, seen marked by wholesale importations of market
techniques. Indeed, current attempts to account economically for the polity have been unjustifiable incursions by market techniques. A sane and reasonable way of judging where and when the market or techniques of authority are appropriate is necessary. Lindblom has been brilliant in discussing the properties of each and pointing to areas in which the virtues of one outweigh the virtues of the other. And yet, we have no political rationality for adjudicating between the two. In the absence of such a rationality the adjudication will largely be made from interest, ideology, and habit.\textsuperscript{50}

Currently, interests, ideology, and political practice are largely directed under the presumption that all have the same bodies. In fact, at the very basis of political interaction, that anyone has a body at all is ignored. We seem to assume that a group of disembodied minds form a polity. Such, is not the case. Political theory should take into account the corporeality of citizens and the ways in which corporeality may differ. The first project has been started by Merleau-Ponty;\textsuperscript{51} the second project has not been started in theory, although both political practice and tradition make some of the necessary distinctions.

Indeed, there are many people whose bodies differ who forged our initial contract. Most conspicuously such people include women. Less conspicuously, largely for reasons of social neglect, are the handicapped (see Gliedman and Roth, forthcoming). After a little reflection, the very young and the very old also fall outside the structuring of the social contract. Needless to say, this has had bizarre implications for public policy directed toward any of these groups. Further, it seems that language of the social contract, primarily the language of equal rights, is inapplicable.
One does not want to give a child rights equal to a citizen, nor does the provision of equal rights help the handicapped person with transportation, access to buildings, and all that most of us take for granted. Nor is equality in the sense of sameness what we want for women or more importantly what women want for themselves. Working all this out not only in writing but in the concrete policies that shape our everyday life is a process of the utmost subtlety, which public policy has been unable to comprehend, much less accomplish. It may well take the flexibility, imagination, and sensitivity to matters ethical and political, which the political theorist has to acquire, to handle such problems.

8. POLITICAL THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS

Public policy as applied political theory is one of the ways to leap from what now exists into what can and will exist past the economist's powers of incremental prediction. It is an invaluable liberator of the imagination, capable not only of investigations into public policy but of policy making itself.

Because political theory has a certain freedom from the workings of society, it can reflect on them with a certain playfulness. Like art, political theory enjoys a luxury without which there can be no imagination. For imagination demands abundant resources, which in a world of scarcity are those coerced from others or those that are cheap, such as thoughts, words, paint, and canvas. From play come new combinations, syntheses, and thoughts inaccessible to social intelligence no matter how wise. The "transaction costs" of embodied social intelligence are frequently too high to allow for imagination as opposed to a Darwinian selection of policies and practices that by some mutation happen to be
the fittest. The intelligence of political theory is at least a desirable complement to the intelligence of society. The intelligent polity will regard the political theorist as a contributing member and the political theorist will regard himself as a contributing citizen. Though society may have an intelligence, that is has vision, imagination, and creativity are less clear. But that it needs these in order to influence the policy agenda and to prevail is quite clear.

Ultimately, political theory is concerned with a serious world in which resources are to be distributed, peace maintained, personal safety insured, taxes collected, disputes adjudicated. With enough energy to transform and destroy ourselves, policy is serious.

As politician and citizen, we could care less about the internecine feuds of political science. In the end it is the realization of "values" that matters. The structure of political institutions, rules, and behavior can only be described and predicted scientifically; most people are justifiably indifferent to this. What is of concern is how to live with such structures, how to make them livable, how to better assure the survival of the species, the achievement of dignity, the arrangement and production of material wealth, and of humanity itself. Toward this end the political theorist is invaluable. The economist, technician, interest group, and ideologue alone will not do.

A lesson conferred on us by political theorists of the past is that philosophy and society are not separate. It is a lesson perhaps hard to appreciate in a time when things have become so distinct. But, that is another task for political theory to set itself. Political theory lives by its interchange with the world of politics; and cannot live without
such interchange, without in the short run becoming impotent, and in the long run becoming sterile. Applied political theory is as important for the enterprise of political theory itself as it is for the structuring of the good polity. It is possible that political theory may wish to remain aloof after its contact with reality and be social critic, carrier of an ideal, or for that matter, poet, philosopher, or teacher. But is this all we want from political theory? Whether it is possible to make links with the policy making process even with a reform of political theory remains unclear. What is clear is that without such links to the policy making process political theory as we have come to understand the concept will not be written, and, more important to the real world, will have no chance for realization. The political theorist reduced to an historian of thought, no matter how hermeneutic, linguistic, phenomenological, or structural, is a political theorist who has been reduced to something quite different from what that word means to us. Lord Keynes said that it is the ideas of political theorists and economists that are decisive to the evolution of society remains to be proved right. He suffered the illusion that political theory was still practiced, that its practice was not limited to theorizing, but learned from what a later generation was to call the "relevance" of life and informed the structure of life in turn.
Perhaps the political theorist is virtuous in being able to contemplate the relationship of political theory to policy analysis. After all, few policy analysts consider their enterprise in regard to political theory. Perhaps political theory is just expansionary. Or perhaps it is sufficiently petulant to point to itself and whisper, in regard to any issue, "I exist; consider me in relationship to you"—then the political theorist would indeed be a rancorous and petty person.

Rather it may be that political theorists can ask, as policy analysts cannot, "What should be the relationship of policy analysis to political theory?" Thus the political theorist can conceive the connection, whereas the policy analyst does not have accessible the language and logic even to frame the question.

Political theory quite legitimately reflects on the whole of political reality, including not only facts and values, but their relationship. It is hardly a matter of an insecure, expansionary political theory calling attention to itself and its connection with policy analysis. Rather, political theory quite properly is and must be a synthetic discipline that includes other disciplines such as public policy analysis.

Perhaps recollecting the model kits of my youth, or the last time I prepared a particularly excellent soup, by recipe or that far off last time when a foreign language learned in school allowed me to ask directions in a foreign capital, I should like to specify some uniform relationship between political theory and policy analysis.
The relationship between theory and analysis is complicated by the vagueness of the two terms taken singly. What is policy analysis? What is political theory? If we knew the answers to both, perhaps we could concoct a relationship. But there seem to be many kinds of policy analyses applicable to yet more kinds of public policy. And political theorists pride themselves on disagreeing with other political theorists, and everyone else—and being right. The critical reader may discern political theory as critic; the gadfly will see political theory as gadfly; those concerned with words may see political theory as establishing a field of discourse; and the explorers among us may see political theory as revealing a new frontier. Those with synthetic minds will say that political theory's relationship to policy analysis is all of these and more. Those with analytic minds may suspect that it is none of these and less.

There is something troubling in the very definition of policy analysis (and public policy) and political theory, not to speak of their relationship as it is or as it should be. Given such an unvirtuous state of affairs, I have several courses open to me. I could probe for the truth and discover unique definitions and connections, or take a small part of the problem such as the relationship of Immanuel Kant to modern nuclear war as refracted through Henry Kissinger. But, I shall not pretend to define a unique relationship between political theory and policy analysis, or even what is unique to each of them singly. Rather, this paper is a sort of sketch book, indicating a broad range of possible connections of political theory with policy analysis. Although they may bear a family resemblance, there is no essential connection between them, nor are these discernable rules of transformation.
Unfortunately, such a consistent relationship does not exist. Political theory is the master plan. It comprehends the ethical dimension, embeds policy in the history of thought, and interlaces the language of policy with appropriate aphorisms from Rousseau or Plato. But the notion of political theory is beyond even eclecticism. Rather, it is opportunistic, a field established in the first place by a concrete policy problem. If this seems a betrayal to the promise of political theory, we welcome less opportunistic accountings of it. Political theory's relationship to policy analysis is multitudinous and both their relationships to public policy yet more so. We are about the illumination of some issues of public policy and social intelligence by political theory of one sort or another and an exploration of possibilities; not just any possibility but a possibility triggered off by the mundane political world echoing in the mind of political intelligence.

3 And, of course, the business of Congress is the making of law, although here the connection with political theory is not so vivid.

4 In fact, Schlesinger and Turner are not two alternative explorations—they are complimentary.

5 See also the exquisitely painful thought of Horace Mann.

6 Technology is seen as the historical motor in the immensely important work of Jacques Ellul; revisionists such as Langdon Winner and, differently, Marxists see social organization as the crucial mediator.

7 Political science can say things about government reorganization, about the conduct of propaganda, and political integration. The entrance
of public policy analysis into the curriculums is necessarily changing
the nature of political science itself into something much more like
political theory. It is making political science something flexible
enough to capture the formality of law together with the substantive
contributions which law once made. If the political scientist and political
theorist restrict their knowledge to formal matters, they will go the
way of the lawyer. It is the integration of form and substance that
the future lies.

8 See Yehezkel Dror (1968) for an impressive attempt at synthesis.

9 According to Lester Thurow (1977) this has made them especially "responsive" to the needs of policy. Someone else has commented that the responsiveness is like that of an expert prostitute. Deciding which and when is obviously a pressing task for political theory.

10 See Maurice Dobbs for a devastating critique.

11 Noam Chomsky has been particularly forceful here referring to social
scientists who assist policy as "new mandarins" as betraying the ideals
of both academy and government. Many of "the best and brightest" would
disagree. This question, like the one put to us by Thurow, is difficult
and crucial. Perhaps it is more a matter of ethics than of political
theory.

12 Albert Hirschman and Charles Lindblom (1977) have begun to provide answers.

13 Try Plato for starters; or better yet consider why Socrates was condemned.

14 Charles E. Lindblom (1965, 1977) and Sheldon Wolin have a most
unexpected meeting place here.
Dror (1968) has made a start here. Important is his distinction between policy and metapolicy.

The coincidence of the war in Vietnam and the curiously named "war" on poverty undoubtedly had something to do with tying the knot.

Aron Wildavsky (1964) writes about such matters with sensitivity, intelligence and perception starting with his *The Politics of the Budgetary Process*. Most of descriptive public policy analysis on the other hand tends to be rancorous and beside the point. A dazzling example of irrelevance is George D. Greenberg et al. (1977).

I shall mention no names here, but only note that the question of motive is central here.

Samuelson, Leontieff, Becker, Arrow and other economic luminaries figure to be the most important political theorists since Keynes.

For example, see Lindblom (1977), Tribe (1972), and in different ways, Rawls (1971).

See Maurice Dobbs for a devastating critique of the new welfare economics.

In some ways these are being realized and worked on at the Institute for Research on Poverty. See Irwin Garfinkel, Harold Watts, and others.

I do not mean the "new political economy" which adopts the new welfare economics virtually intact (although there is some wisdom here); rather we mean political economy in the classical sense of Smith, Ricardo, Mill, and Marx. For contemporaries in this tradition, see John Galbraith and Gunnar Myrdal.

The work of Michel Foucault is vivid history in this tradition.
But what do we mean by intelligence anyway? It is hard enough to use the term with regard to a person. Perhaps one definition of intelligence, personal, organizational or societal might be a sort of Darwinian adaptability. But adaptability invokes that which is adapted to, most simply some sort of equilibrium, a concept which have had occasion to question.

Or perhaps by intelligent we mean rational. Some organization theorists like to claim it as a virtue or organization that personal quirks and irrationalities are discounted by the organization which alone is capable of rationality. Rationality here appears to mean "organized"; it is a property of the organization much like the capabilities of a computer are a property of the hardware. But what of the software, the programming ... the learning? Surely these have something to do with the intelligence of a person, computer and organization alike. And, when you come right down to it, this down to it, this definition of intelligence is tautological.

Or do we not mean by intelligence something to do with correctness of output? Is it not a purely instrumental notion? But that seems too limited. Do we mean by intelligence economic rationality? And isn't that how some people attribute intelligence to organizations? So let us go with the ordinary language analyst. How do we use the word "intelligence" in normal speech. Well for one thing, we do not ordinarily use it to describe politics or organizations. Is its ascription here merely a figure of speech then? It is a dangerous habit to adapt words from technical contexts into more everyday language. Certainly, the "charm" of a quark has little to do with the smiles of a summer night.
What intelligence is, personal, methodological, societal or organizational is no simple question. It is a question which has been central to political theory and a question which deserves to be considered afresh in the context of real world policy problems which frequently assume some sort of answer. And if we are to consider law, economics and social intelligence as the three most formidable contenders in modern political theory, then some understanding of social intelligence would be requisite to intelligent discussion. And yet its examination would lead is so complete. So let us be shy here and bracket the term, understanding by it, something like the cluster of probes above. Removal of these brackets is a proper and urgent task for political theory.

26 Noam Chomsky has been most incisive on the political consequences of intelligence and language. See his Bertrand Russell lectures (1971) and his article on language and freedom (1972).

27 And most recently by neo-conservatives such as Nathan Glazer, Seymour Martin Lipset, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Irving Kristol and others associated with the magazine The Public Interest.

28 See his autobiographical essay for a direct statement of this.

29 The sociological argument, of course, regards functionalism, a concept which quantitative sociology has rendered irrelevant and which Marxists disdain. We are suggesting that it be taken more seriously although not mistaken as it has been in pluralist political science.

30 It is admittedly a conservative stance and pluralist accounts of policy making have been criticized for this point by Dror (1968).
31 I speak here of some students of the early pluralists who have not changed as much as have their teachers.

32 The insight, of course, is Adam Smith's. See his classic book, *The Wealth of Nations* (1937). Smith's remarkable insight was later formalized by Walras who showed that an economy could be characterized by a system of linear equations. That it is politics which sets up the preconditions for a true market is an insight, the dating of which depends on one's reading of economic anthropology (substantive, formalist, or Marxist). But even if one believes that markets have always existed and that the desire to truck, barter and trade is innate to human nature, it is obvious that at one time they one accounted for a fragment of the social system.

33 It is largely at such rare moments that descriptive public policy becomes of normative interest. See Hirschman, Lindblom, Wildavsky, and Pressman.

34 See also the early Lindblom as well as his recent masterpiece, *Politics and Markets* (1977), to which this paper owes much of what may be of value in it.

35 It is hard to even write about such things. Eli-Viesel has tried in his book, *Night*.

36 This characterization of politics is Maurice Merleau-Ponty's in *Humanism and Terror* (1969).

37 The image is Anati Etzioni's; the imagery is Carl Deutsch's.
The insight (in regard to religion more than ethics), of course, is Machiavelli's, but there is a further point to be made about the distinction between ethics and political theory. "Thou shalt not kill" is an ethical precept. The job of the political theorist is to render "practical reason" worldly. Thus, is this precept realized in the political world. If not, why? If seldom, should it be realized more often? What policy will aid in its realization? What of the political problems of starvation, execution, and war? All such questions are predicated on the acceptance of the ethical precept, which then threads itself through the discussion like a modifier in modal logic. The logic of the discussion of such value issues is the logic of political theory. But, simultaneously, ethical precept is at least partially derived from political artifact, situation, and history. However, for the purposes of this paper we may take ethics as given.

Indeed, precisely such problems make public policy in centralized economies different from public policy in market economies. Again, see Lindblom (1977) for a perceptive discussion.

Indeed, this is seen as the principal task of policy in quasi-market economy economists.

The early Lindlom (i.e., The Intelligence of Democracy [1965]) is usually read in this way. Other less perceptive work (i.e., Buchanan and Tullock, Anthony Downs, and a large part of the "new political economy") is sometimes written in this way.

For an insightful discussion of the eternal verities of political theories, see Larry Spence, Political Theory as a Vacation.
It is easy for political theorists to look down at public policy analysis as once upon a time they did upon behavioralism. But the fact is that the study of public policy is quite close to that of political theory, close enough in fact to be called applied political theory. It is foolish to recapitulate the same sterile battles which more than their object have done their part to make political theory look foolish. Political theory can and should be applied to the analysis of public policy. In so doing, political theory will simultaneously contact the real world and lose any pretense to purity.

It was widespread even beyond the scientific community. See Harrison Brown's book, The Challenge of Man's Future (1954) and note the introduction by Albert Einstein who seemingly was more influential in advocacy of an atomic bomb than he was in this or in the need for disarmament. Perhaps this is in instructive piece in terms of descriptive policy history. See the volume, The Atomic Age, edited by Grodzins and Radinowithc (1963) on this last point and the article by Mar Born (1963) on the first point.


This is the enterprise of the descriptive policy analyst. Hopefully the entry of political science into policy analysis will begin to look more like Dror and Lindblom and will address itself to some of the questions put to it here.

Of course, all three are related. Ideologies have their tradition and are predicated on interest.
In some ways, political theory is only political theory if it runs counter to existing ideology, else, like a perfect glove, it is invisible. It is usually wise to have least part of social intelligence aware of the nature of its practice. It can work without such awareness, but it may then be hard to change when it should change.

Again, consult Grodzins and Rabinowitch (1963) for why we may wish to do so—and also for some insight as to the natural scientist as policy advisor and political theorist.

Political rationality has been thought by some to be like market rationality. This is hardly an adequate model. If we really want to rely on the intelligence of democracy to decide our fate, then is it not worth our while, even when presuming that it exists, to question it and define it, and having done that, to specify wherein it consists? The fact that we can all use language is not prevented by an explanation of how it is that we are able to do so, quite the contrary, it has been a basic datum in such inquiries.

Even though there may be a social rationality, it is still relevant to find out wherein it consists, both out of intellectual curiosity, and to learn to learn how to feed in other economic, legal and political theoretical information into it. Thus, language is partly learned, and presumably the way it is taught may be improved, or made worse. Social intelligence presumably is partly learned as well.

This, in ways, is derivative of Sigmund Freud, who has as well an analysis on which the second project could be partially based.
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