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COMMUNITY STRUCTURE AND MOBILIZATION: THE CASE OF PUBLIC HOUSING

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ABSTRACT

In this study, the participation of a city in the federal housing programs of 1933, 1937, and 1949 is an indicator of the capacity of the community to mobilize to gain external resources. For the 676 cities over 25,000 population in 1960, this dependent variable is correlated with a series of independent variables: bureaucratization, political structure, the needs of the population (educational, income, and occupational level) and social heterogeneity (nonwhite composition and ethnicity). Cities with more bureaucratized, "non-reform" governments, and with needy, heterogeneous populations, were found to have built more housing or to have entered the program earlier. But, the sheer size of a city and its age (as measured by the decade it reached 10,000 population) were also associated with the mobilization measure even after the "effects" of the other variables were removed statistically by means of regression analysis. The argument is advanced that size and age are crude indicators of the number of "centers of power" in a city and of the quality and quantity of exchanges of resources between those centers of power. Such exchange relationships are termed "interfaces." Greater numbers of centers of power and greater numbers of interfaces contribute to the ability of a city to mobilize by increasing the amount of information in the community political system.

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INTRODUCTION

Public housing is an area of government activity which is relatively undeveloped in the United States by comparison with Europe. Most government support for housing here has been indirect, through tax laws favorable to private building. But the U.S. does have a public housing program, dating essentially from the New Deal days of 1937. This program is an important one to study from the point of community action for several reasons. First, as with most such federal legislation, initiative must come from the local community in the form of an application which bears the stamp of approval of the governing body of the community. Second, we may expect considerable variation from community to community in the speed of application and the scope of the proposed program, because public housing was not in 1937, and is still not, established as a non-controversial service to be provided by government--whether federal, state or local. As Robert C. Wood expressed it in 1961, housing--and he adds renewal and redevelopment programs--represent ". . . new grants of authority, confirmed by judicial decisions only in the last ten or twenty years. They constitute an expansion of public activity that is still questionable in the view of many and still provokes political debate about the propriety of it all."[1] Third, the public housing is not identical with the urban renewal and development program, and therefore constitutes quite a different measure of the mobilization of a local community in order to secure external resources.[2]

Although the federal urban redevelopment and renewal program began with the 1949 Housing Act, which was a revision of the 1937 Housing Act, the two programs--urban renewal and public housing--were structurally dissimilar. Under the provisions of this act urban renewal funds specifically could not be used for the construction of public housing, although other sections of that act did provide for public housing. This is not to suggest that the two programs are completely unrelated, but rather to say that a community could enter one program independently of the other. In another paper we shall consider the interrelationships of these and other federal programs and the ways in which they feed into or contradict each other. But, the incentives for local groups were different, the application was different, and different coalitions of interests were involved. Therefore, it is appropriate to treat public housing as an independent measure of community mobilization.

Fourth, but not least, public housing represents one of the most important actions to help the poor. Private enterprise has never begun to solve the problem of decent housing for the urban poor. No doubt this is because there is little profit in housing the poor in conditions other than overcrowding, poor maintenance, minimum esthetic standards, and minimum amenities. Whether or not American cities take advantage of the availability of federal funds to create public housing for those with low income is an important indication of the continuing viability of the American tradition of local autonomy in these public policy areas.

CENTERS OF POWER AND INTERFACES IN A COMMUNITY

Our analysis of factors associated with a city mobilizing to secure federal low-rent housing funds is essentially a replication of studies of poverty and urban renewal programs. We regard the attempts by communities to participate in such federal programs as measures of their capacity to mobilize their political and organizational resources for collective action. If evidence of such mobilization is found only in one decision-area, then it could be argued that the conditions which lead to that decision--for example, the needs of a segment of the community and the organizational capabilities of certain leaders--have little or nothing to do with general patterns of social organization in the community.

In this paper we thus extend our analysis to low-rent housing programs to see whether the same general characteristics of community structure that produce poverty and urban renewal programs also produce successful public housing efforts. Different individuals, agencies, and decision paths are involved, so that it should not be concluded from a finding of similarly predisposing community structures that an integrated or monolithic power structure exists. Rather, we infer that the existence of loosely coordinated centers of power helps to account for the capacity of a community to mobilize for these collective actions.

Centralization and integration have often been regarded as key characteristics of a community which lead to mobilization. That is, it is often reasoned that the more integrated and centralized communities are more successful in such activities. We believe that a

somewhat different model of community structure is not only more realistic, but leads to better predictions of those communities that are able to generate collective actions. This model starts from the assumption that communities are composed of loosely integrated and relatively uncoordinated centers of power, that is, groups or organizations which have some degree of autonomy and which act as relatively homogeneous entities with respect to the community issues which arise within a given historical period. Over the years these centers of power develop exchange relationships with each other. We term these relationships interfaces.[3] Experiences of building a coalition to achieve some political or organizational goal, of communicating information about policy positions, or of exchanging resources of personnel, money, clients, prestige, and promises of support lead to relations of trust and confidence which become a community resource. The greater the number of interfaces and the more extensive the nature of these interfaces, then the greater the extensiveness of information that characterizes the system as a whole. We shall now briefly elaborate on this theoretical framework.

A center of power in a community may be defined as an organization which possesses a degree of autonomy, resources, and cohesion. The more autonomy an organization has, defined as the more control which it has over its goals, policies, procedures, personnel and budget, the more able it is to function as a center of power in the community with respect to a variety of community decisions affecting major areas of community welfare. Control over these aspects of internal organizational functioning is clearly difficult to measure, but the number of supervisors over these functions, the number of formal submissions and approvals required, the number of informal

consultations with superiors which occur, the number of outside constituencies which must be taken into account in making decisions, the number and severity of sanctions available to the outside constituencies if the organization moves in a disapproved direction, are all possible measures of the degree of autonomy which the organization has.

The more resources an organization has, the more capable it is of functioning as a center of power in a community. Resources are defined as anything which the organization possesses which can be exchanged with other organizations in ways which further the achievement of the organization's goals. These can include money, information, personnel, clients, political support by constituencies inside or outside the community, prestige, or a promise of future exchange of resources. As we shall see later, the concept of interfaces refers to the historical accumulation of these exchanges of resources, insofar as they result in increased knowledge within given centers of power about the probable course of action which would be followed by other centers of power vis-a-vis particular community issues.

The greater the cohesion within an organization, the more capable it is of functioning as a center of power in a community. Again, cohesiveness is not an eternal quality, but refers to the degree to which the organization (center of power) presents a united front with respect to those decisions which are salient to it. Cohesiveness has both intensive and extensive aspects. The number of members of the organization which can be mobilized to attend meetings in support of their spokesmen, the degree to which voting support approaches 100 per cent of the membership, are intensive aspects of cohesiveness, a more

passive level exists where spokesmen do not fear internal opposition, but also cannot mobilize active support. Extensive aspects include the number and variety of issues on which there is cohesion regardless of how passive or active it is.

Autonomy, resources and cohesion are three independent defining aspects of centers of power. An organization may have great autonomy but few resources and little cohesion. Many voluntary associations are usually of this type. But our intention here will be misleading if we give examples of types of organizations which might fit into one or another of the implied eight-fold typology, because this would perpetuate the static character of definitions and types usual in structural concepts common in sociology. It is important to emphasize that we assume a continuous process of struggle on the part of organizations to become "more" of a center of power, i.e., to increase their autonomy, resources and cohesion. Usually this process means also that an organization struggles to reduce the autonomy, resources and cohesion of other organizations, as the opposite side of the coin of increasing their own.

It should be emphasized again at this point that an organization may well be an important center of power with respect to certain decisions which affect salient organization-defining goals, but may lack the resources, autonomy and cohesion to affect other decisions, and therefore not be a center of power with respect to those decisions. This again is subject to change to the extent to which the organization is successful in building up its resources, autonomy, and cohesion through processes of exchange with other organizations.

In these definitions we leave aside the question of whether or not an organization is legally or formally subordinate to another organization. A city traffic engineering department, a branch office of a bank, a county welfare agency, a service station franchise operation, may or may not be a center of power in its own right independent of the central authority, depending on how much autonomy, resources, and cohesion it possesses. There is probably a relatively high correlation between legal and formal subordination and not being a center of power, but we do not want to build that assumption into our definitions.

Centers of power do not function in a vacuum. They must exchange resources with other centers of power in order to grow or even exist. These exchanges, it will be recalled, we term "interfaces." The exchange of resources requires, by definition, some channel of communication between two centers of power about the resources which they have. The information communicated is of two types: the actual content of the resources available--prestige, money, personnel, support, clients, etc.,--and the positive or negative response to the information about the contents. Over a period of time, the positive or negative responses accumulate to become the "reputation" which one center of power has among others as a potential ally or enemy in given categories of decisions. It should be emphasized here that by "information" we do not mean merely verbal promises or commitments, but actual performance of some obligation as well. If an organization continually welshes on its leader's promises, this information becomes part of the negative information which accumulates.

Our definition of an interface is obviously quite general. It includes the credit records of banks, commercial litigation, joint

programs between welfare agencies, appearances of several organizations before the city council, membership of carpenters in a Registered Builder's Association, arrangements between the ward organizations of a political party on how to organize precinct work, and many others. These diverse examples illustrate the point that our purpose is to define a general property of the interorganizational relationships which develop in a community to facilitate the functioning of various centers of power. We are not interested in all of the aspects of these various relationships, but only in those which serve to increase the amount of information available to the greatest number of organizations about the resources available to them and the conditions under which an exchange would be to their advantage.

A few caveats are in order. We recognize that not all exchanges of resources between organizations can be assumed to be of benefit to both or even one of them. The personal ends of members and leaders of organizations may frequently be served by sacrificing the goals of the organization, either through embezzlement of resources, an exchange of political support which benefits certain individuals but carries a high cost for the organization, or in many other ways. To the extent that certain types of organizations may be peculiarly subject to exploitation for personal ends, and to the extent that these vulnerable types are important in particular types of community decisions, this may well be an important aspect of the problem for investigation.

Even aside from the possible exploitation of an organization by individuals, in many cases the exchange of resources is one in which one organization loses more than it gains. We might suggest

that such a loss is most likely where one of the basic conditions for existence as a center of power contradicts another. That is, an organization may have too few resources and too little cohesion to prevent its autonomy from being whittled away, exchange after exchange. Or it may have too little autonomy to insulate itself from demands for performance which reduce its cohesion.

Seemingly paradoxically, the more interfaces which come to exist--the more exchanges of resources--the more autonomy is lost by each center of power. This, however, is only a measure of the extent to which a high degree of coordination potential is established in the community system. One of our basic hypotheses is that the more diverse the community is with respect to the number and type of centers of power and the more extensive and intensive the numbers of interfaces between them, the easier it will be for a given collective action to take place.

Implicit in this entire discussion has been a rejection of two aspects of the traditional concept of community integration. There has been an overemphasis of the degree to which a community must be integrated either with respect to consensus on some overriding values which presumably must inform and guide community decisions, or with respect to some pervasive authority or hierarchy which presumably must control and order community decisions. That is, a community has been defined as an organic entity either with respect to its norms and values (its culture) or its law and government (its structure). Perhaps easily rejected when so baldly stated, these views have been implicit in definitions of "community." By defining the basic

elements which make up a community structure of decision-making--centers of power and interfaces--in terms of properties and relationships which are defined in probabilistic and variable terms, we hope to avoid any implication of an overriding integration through either a culture or a single set of structures.

Rather, the set of organizations which makes up a community at any given time is presumed to have goals and requirements which need have nothing in common with any other organization except those imposed by the necessity to exchange resources. The exchange relationships which emerge over a period of time establish rules or norms which constitute the content of the community culture, and the success or failure of organizations in winning the successive struggles to increase their autonomy, expand their resources, and further their internal cohesion, establishes the configuration of centers of power which are the structural components of the community at any given time. To the extent that the community's history is constrained by national laws and values, the emergence of a community culture and structure cannot be explained solely by local factors. But this is another conceptual problem.

We assume that the entire community political system does not have to be mobilized with respect to every issue which arises. The number of centers of power which possess interfaces with each other and which must be activated on a given issue in order to effectuate a decision constitutes the necessary arena with respect to a given issue. The dimensions of each <u>issue-arena</u> include: 1) which centers of power are involved, 2) which centers possess interfaces, 3) the substantive

position of each center of power on the issue, and 4) the relative weight of each center of power in the community as a whole, and with respect to the particular issue. The weight which each center of power carries depends upon the type of resource which a particular issue requires. Number of supporting members, legal powers, wealth, and information are among the resources which give different centers of power different weights in different issues.

Why do these characteristics affect a community's capacity for mobilization? Our thesis is that the more centers of power there are and the more interfaces established among them, the higher the probability that a collective decision will be successfully implemented. There are several reasons for this assertion. First, the greater the accumulation of knowledge in a community system (i.e., the greater the number of interfaces), the greater the probability that centers of power most relevant for a given issue will have a history of prior contact. The centers of power that are both the most relevant and also the most likely to be favorable to a given issue can be activated first and brought into a coalition in the issue-arena. Second, the greater the number of centers of power, the less likely that any one center of power can dominate in an issue-arena (assuming that community differentiation means fragmentation of power). Third, under such conditions centers of power are more likely to know which other centers are potential opponents. They can then take steps to either avoid that center of power or artfully co-opt it.

It is thus our basic hypothesis that communities with more centers of power, numerically more and qualitatively more extensive interfaces

among them, will be better able to mobilize for collective action than communities with fewer centers of power and fewer (and qualitatively less extensive) interfaces, even when objective factors of community need are held constant. This means that we expect cities having more centers of power and many interfaces among them to evidence more success in mobilization efforts to enter the federal housing program. Concomitantly, we expect cities having few centers of power and few interfaces to be less successful in such mobilization efforts.

We similarly suggest, and demonstrate elsewhere, that such a hypothesis is true for a number of decision-areas. This, of course, does not mean that the same sets of centers of power are involved in all issues; quite the contrary. As already noted, we assume that different centers of power are activated on different issues and that not all centers of power need be activated on a given issue. Nor need all decisions be filtered through a common set of actors or institutions. Our conceptualization of a community is thus one of a relatively open social system in which only a limited number of subsystems may be activated in a given mobilization effort. This model of community structure varies considerably from that of the centralization-integration thesis which hypothesizes greater mobilization success under conditions of a single concentrated "power structure" in which few men make most of the major decisions. Thus, we start with the assumption that community systems in general are decentralized and loosely structured, and that the critical factors that predict mobilization success are the number of centers of power and the number and quality of interfaces among them.

Before testing our central proposition that mobilization is greatest in cities with many centers of power and with many interfaces among them, we turn first to a discussion of the indicators of mobilization--participation in the low-rent housing program under the Housing Act of 1949.

THE LOW-RENT HOUSING PROGRAM AND COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION

In this paper we have chosen participation in the low-rent housing program under the Housing Act of 1949 (HA 1949) as our measure of community mobilization. We shall examine several aspects of participation in this program, and then select three for more intensive analysis. An understanding of our indicators of community mobilization presupposes some knowledge of the Housing Act of 1949 as well as prior public housing legislation, especially the United States Housing Act of 1937 which is the authorization for this more recent housing legislation. In this section we shall first briefly review the history of public housing programs in the United States, including a brief description of the various programs, and then examine in detail the nine indicators of mobilization from which we later select three for intensive analysis.

History of Public Housing in the United States[4]

Public housing in the United States was a child of the Great Depression, with the exception of a small scale housing program during World War I. The fact that ". . . millions of people had left the middle class for the subsistence level or worse . . . created a tremendous pressure for government housing.. . ."[5] But this pressure did not produce a program which fused slum clearance with adequate public housing, something which still does not exist. The Public Works Administration (PWA), created by the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, began to buy land, clear houses, and build public housing. Under this legislative mandate of the NIRA, the PWA constructed 21,000 units in 50 low-rent housing projects in 37 cities, and the

Resettlement Administration constructed another 15,000 units in a number of resettlement projects and "Greenbelt" towns. But the housing and other activities of the NIRA were stopped by a federal court decision in 1935 which held that eminent domain could not be used to clear slum property and to then ". . . construct buildings in a state for the purpose of selling or leasing them to private citizens for occupancy as homes." This decision was never appealed, possibly because ". . . the outlook for the New Deal programs before the Supreme Court looked dismal in 1935. . . ."[6]

The next significant commitment to public housing by the federal government occurred on September 1, 1937, when the United States Housing Act (USHA), under Public Law 412, was approved. It was the purpose of this legislation

> "...to provide financial assistance to the States and political subdivisions thereof for the elimination of unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions, for the eradication of slums, for the provision of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low income, and for the reduction of unemployment and the stimulation of business activity. . . ."[7]

The "key figure" in the passage of the 1937 housing act was Senator Wagner of New York.[8] The State of New York has always been a heavy user of federal funds. "Since the earliest New Deal days, when the close personal ties of Mayor La Guardia and President Roosevelt helped assure a steady flow of relief and housing funds, New York City has always led the nation in its proportional share of federal funds for direct housing and development activities."[9]

Local housing authorities were responsible for the construction, ownership, and operation of these federally assisted low-rent housing programs. However, state enabling legislation authorizing and

empowering these local public agencies had to be enacted in states not already having such legislation.[10] In this federal and local government partnership, the federal government made loans (not to exceed 90 per cent of the development costs) and provided annual subsidies for such projects. Local municipalities were required to pay the equivalent of 20 per cent of the federal contribution (although their contribution was often in the form of a tax exemption). In 1940, Public Law 671 amended the USHA by permitting the use of USHA funds for defense housing. By 1948, a total of 189,000 low-rent housing units had been built in the United States, 168,000 of these having been built under USHA of 1937.

Perhaps the most significant and far-reaching commitment to public housing by the federal government occurred with the Housing Act of 1949 (Public Law 171) which was signed into law by President Truman on July 15, 1949. The preamble of this legislation stated:

> "The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare and security of the Nation and the health and living standards of its people require housing production and related community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing shortage, the elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing through the clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family, thus contributing to the development and redevelopment of communities and to the advancement of the growth, wealth, and security of the Nation."[11]

Numerous amendments to this legislation have been made in the ensuing years, although the structure of the program remains basically unaltered. The federal government's major role has been in the creation of a revolving loan fund to aid local housing authorities in the construction and development of low-rent housing projects and the

provision of grants which are limited to the amounts and periods necessary (annual contributions) in order to assure the integrity of the low-rent nature of these housing programs.

In addition to having a local housing authority (which, of course, assumes that the state in which the city is located has appropriate enabling legislation), the local housing authority must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the federal government that there is a need for such low-rent housing not currently being met by private enterprise, must obtain the approval from the local governing body of its application for a preliminary loan from the federal government,[12] and must sign a formal contract with the local governing body which grants a tax-exempt status to the low-rent housing project.

There are a number of distinguishable steps that a local community goes through in the "conventional bid method" of participation in the low-rent housing program under the Housing Act of 1949. Some of the major steps in this method are as follows: 1) the application for a program reservation (which, of course, can be made only by a local housing authority); 2) the approval by the federal government of the application for a program reservation; 3) the execution of a preliminary loan contract for surveys and planning (which requires the approval of the local governing body but which is an optional step); 4) the execution of the annual contributions contract between the local housing authority and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (which can be signed only after the local housing authority and the local governing body have signed a cooperation agreement granting tax-exempt status to the project and, as of 1956,

only if the community has a Workable Program outlining plans for the eradication of slums); 5) site acquisition; 6) the advertising, opening, and awarding of construction contracts; 7) the start of construction; 8) the final completion of construction; and 9) the full availability and occupancy of the housing project. Some other programs under HA 1949 such as the acquisitions, leasing and "turnkey" programs which were created by the 1965 amendments to HA 1949 do not require the negotiation of each of these stages. Since this study concerns participation in the programs of HA 1949 only as of June 30, 1966, this does not introduce any major difficulties, since only a few communities first entered the programs of HA 1949 through either turnkey or leasing programs.

The speed with which a community first enters any one of these stages, or all of them, can be construed as an indicator of local community mobilization, although the dates of entry into the program reservation stage, preliminary loan contract stage, and annual contributions contract stage seem to be the most appropriate since each of these steps presupposed some degree of leadership and coordination at the local level.

There have been a number of important amendments, and additions, to the provisions of the Housing Act of 1949 and the basic authorization in USHA 1937. For example, the 1954 amendments made it mandatory that the local housing authority make payments to the local governing body in lieu of taxes, usually at the rate of ten per cent of shelter rents. The amendments of 1956 were such that the annual contributions contract could not be executed without the local governing body having

a Workable Program for the prevention and elimination of slums. The 1956 amendments also permitted low-income single persons aged 65 and older to become tenants of low-rent housing programs, changed the general age requirements to conform to the Social Security Act, and granted greater control to the local housing authority for establishing income limits and rents. The 1961 amendments were concerned to a great extent with provisions for low-rent housing for the elderly. The 1964 amendments eliminated the requirement (established in the Housing Act of 1937) that the local contribution should be at least 20 per cent of the amount of the federal contribution. Among other things, the 1965 amendments established a new program, the leasing program, which permits the local housing authority to lease low-rent housing units from private owners. The turnkey program, also developed in 1956 (but based on the prior legislation), permits local housing authorities to purchase low-rent housing units from a private developer or builder after construction or rehabilitation is completed.

A number of states have their own public housing programs. It is possible that some of our findings might be accounted for by the presence of large state housing programs in cities which have thus not had the incentive to seek federal funds. If such states are in the Far West, or contain small and younger cities, we could not argue that the factors we suggest are linked to age and size are really the important ones. However, most of the states with public housing programs are also those states containing cities with a higher level of federal funding for housing: New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and others. It may be that the same factors which are conducive to a

city undertaking housing programs also further state programs, but in any case it cannot be argued that state housing compensates for or obviates federally supported housing.

The Indicators of Community Mobilization

The previous section has briefly described the low-rent housing program under the Housing Act of 1949 (HA 1949) as authorized by USHA of 1937. We suggested that the dates of entry into these various stages can be used as indicators of community mobilization. We have taken eight different indicators from this process as possible indicators of community mobilization, all as of June 30, 1966, as well as a ninth indicator reflecting intensity of involvement. These indicators are discussed below.

1) Date of Establishment of the Local Housing Authority:[13] In most states a city can enter the low-rent housing program under HA 1949 only if it either has its own housing authority or is located in a larger political body which has a housing authority.[14] There are five different jurisdictional types of housing authorities: municipal housing authorities, consolidated housing authorities, county housing authorities, regional housing authorities, and state housing authorities. In the first kind, the local governing body of the municipality creates a housing authority that has jurisdiction only over housing in that municipality. In some cases, several municipalities create a common housing authority known as consolidated housing authorities. The metropolitan housing authorities in Ohio (the jurisdictional area of which must be less than a county) are prime examples of this type of housing authority. In 34 states, it is legally possible to have county housing authorities, although these are most prevalent in the states of Pennsylvania, Illinois, California, and Washington. Such

county housing authorities do not preclude the existence of municipal or consolidated housing authorities, however. In such cases, all the municipalities located in a county with such a housing authority can enter the HA 1949 housing programs through the county unit. In 15 states, it is legally possible to establish regional housing authorities (i.e., one housing authority for several counties). This kind of housing authority exists primarily in the states of Mississippi, Florida, South Carolina, and North Carolina. Finally, the states of Alaska and Hawaii have statewide housing authorities which serve all local communities.[15]

Among the 637 cities of size 25,000 or more that are included in this study, 21 per cent (or 132 cities) had no housing authority and were not located in any larger jurisdiction with such a body (see Table 1).[16] Sixty per cent (or 382) of these 637 cities had a municipal housing authority,[17] five per cent (or 32) had consolidated housing authorities, 14 per cent (or 90) had county housing authorities, and one city (Gulfport, Mississippi) had a regional housing authority (see Table 1).

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

The measure used here is the date of the establishment of a community's housing authority, regardless of the type of the housing authority.[18] The communities with no housing authority as of June 30, 1966, were scored 1966. The earliest date any community established a housing authority was 1933; some cities did not establish a housing authority until 1966, and, of course, as noted above, some communities

still have no housing authority. The mean of this distribution was 1949, with a standard deviation of 11.8 years, meaning this distribution was skewed toward the lower end of the distribution because of the truncation at the upper end of the distribution.

2) Number of Years After State Enabling Legislation Was Passed Before a Local Housing Authority Was Established: States varied considerably in the year that enabling legislation was passed which would permit the establishment of a housing authority. Ohio passed such legislation in 1933, and another seven states (Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, New York, South Carolina, and West Virginia) passed enabling legislation the following year. Among the states included here, Minnesota did not pass enabling legislation until 1947. Thus, the date of the establishment of the local housing authority could be seriously affected by the actions of the state legislature, and thus may not reflect mobilization in a local community. Therefore, this measure was constructed by subtracting the year that state enabling legislation was passed from the year that the housing authority for a city was established.[19] The difference is the number of years it took a city to establish a housing authority after it was legally possible. The mean of this distribution was 12.5 years with a standard deviation of 11.7 years. This measure is very highly correlated with the date of establishment measure ($r = .98$) as shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

3) Date Application for First Program Reservation Was Received by the Department of Housing and Urban Development:[20] As described in

the previous section, the first step a local housing authority must take before entering the low-rent housing program under HA 1949 is the submission of an application for a program reservation (the leasing program is an exception to this statement).[21] This application must clearly document that there is a need for such low-rent housing which is not being met by private enterprise. We coded both the year and the month for this and the next five measures.[22] All cities that had not entered the HA 1949 program as of June 30, 1966, were coded 1966.5. The mean of this distribution was 1959.1 (meaning February, 1959), and the standard deviation of this distribution was 7.7 years.

4) Date HUD Approved the First Application for a Program Reservation: This measure is the date that HUD approved the program reservation. It took on the average only one month to get such approval. All cities that did not have a program reservation approved as of June 30, 1966, were coded 1966.5. The mean of this distribution was 1959.3, meaning April-May, 1959, and the standard deviation was 7.6 years. The correlation coefficient between these two measures was 1.00 meaning that they are, at least from a statistical point of view, equivalent indicators of mobilization.

5) Date the First Preliminary Loan Contract was Executed: This is the date that the local housing authority signed its first contract with HUD which provides a loan for surveys and planning by the local housing authority. As indicated previously, it cannot be executed unless the plan has first been approved as a resolution by the local governing body, although as noted previously, this is an optional step. Only 33 of the 380 communities included here that have entered the

HA 1949 program have not executed preliminary loans. This step in the low-rent housing program (if negotiated) clearly reflects a commitment by the local governing body to the low-rent housing program, meaning that some degree of local mobilization beyond the administrative actions of the local housing authority is necessary. This step is of additional importance in those communities which do not have a municipal housing authority, but are supported by a housing authority for a larger jurisdictional area. Thus, it is clear that at this step some degree of mobilization in the local community has taken place. As in the previous two measures, the year and month were coded; all cities which had had their applications for a program reservation approved, but had skipped the preliminary loan stage (33 cities) were coded the median date between the approval of the application and the date the annual contributions contract was signed. All cities that had not entered the low-rent housing program as of June 30, 1966 were coded 1966.5. The mean of this distribution was 1959.5, meaning July, 1959; the standard deviation of this distribution was 7.5. As shown in Table 2, the relationships between this measure and the date of application for a program reservation as well as the date the application for a program reservation was approved are extremely high ($r = .99$ for each variable). Thus, this measure and the previous two are, from a statistical point of view, interchangeable indicators of mobilization.

6) Date of First Annual Contributions Contract:[23] The annual contributions contract between the local housing authority and HUD defines specific contractual obligations and mutual responsibilities with respect to the development, operation, and fiscal aspects of the

Housing Act of 1949. As described previously, the local housing authority cannot become a signatory to this contract unless it has previously signed a cooperation agreement with the local governing body which, among other things, grants a tax-exempt status to low-rent housing projects and assures the provision of municipal services to the project. Thus, at this stage (in addition to the stage of the preliminary loan contract) a degree of mobilization in the local community is clearly necessary, since the local governing body (usually the city council) must legally commit the local community to this activity.

As in the previous measures the year and month were coded; all cities which had not signed any annual contributions contract as of June 30, 1966, were coded 1966.5.

The mean of this distribution was 1960.0 (meaning January, 1960); the standard deviation of this distribution was 7.1. As can be seen in Table 2, this measure is quite strongly related to the previous three indicators of participation in the programs under HA 1949 ($r = .98$ in each case).

7) Date Construction Began on First Low-Rent Housing Project Under HA 1949: This measure is the month and year that construction actually began. As with previous measures, cities that had not yet begun construction on any low-rent housing project under HA 1949 were coded 1966.5. The mean of this distribution was 1960.6 (meaning August, 1960), and the standard deviation was 7.1. As shown in Table 2, this measure is quite highly correlated with the other indicators of participation in the housing programs under HA 1949 ($r = .95$ or higher in each case).

8) Date of Full Availability of the First Low-Rent Housing Project Under HA 1949: This indicator of mobilization is the date of full availability for occupancy of the first low-rent housing project in a community. This measure was coded similarly to the previous measures. The mean of the distribution of this variable is 1961.2 (meaning March, 1961), and the standard deviation is 6.3 years. Again, this measure is quite highly related to the other five indicators of participation in the low-rent housing program under HA 1949 ($r = .95$ or higher in each case).

9) The Number of Low-Rent Housing Units per 100,000 Population as of June 30, 1966:[24] This last indicator of community mobilization is quite different from the previous eight measures. It is a measure that reflects intensity of participation in the program rather than the speed with which a community either established a housing authority or entered and passed through successive stages of the low-rent housing programs under HA 1949. It was constructed by summing the number of housing units in all projects under the Housing Act of 1949 (regardless of the stage of completion of the project), multiplying this sum by 100,000, and then dividing by the population size of the community in 1960. This distribution had a mean of 444.1 and a standard deviation of 570.9. As can be seen in Table 2, cities that established housing authorities early had more (standardized) housing units (the correlation coefficients between this indicator of mobilization and the two indicators of speed of establishing a housing authority is -.39). Similarly, communities that entered successive stages of the low-rent housing program under HA 1949 early also had more (standardized) housing units than did cities that entered later.

It is clear from Table 2 that there are three separable phenomena reflected in this table: the establishment of a local housing authority, the process of participating in the housing program under HA 1949, and the intensity of participation in HA 1949 programs.

The two aspects of establishing a local housing authority, date of establishment and years possible after state enabling legislation was passed, have a correlation coefficient of .98, suggesting that these are redundant indicators of the same phenomenon. Henceforth, we shall use only the years possible measure.

The second aspect of Table 2 is participation in the housing program under HA 1949 as represented by the data of first participation in the programs of HA 1949. The six stages of the process represented here, from the date of submission of the first application for a program reservation to the date of full availability for occupancy of the first project are interrelated with correlation coefficients of .93 or higher, suggesting that once a community has entered the process for the first time, it is likely to proceed in a highly predictable manner through successive stages of the program. The use of any one of these six dates is obviously equivalent with any other.

This point can be illustrated by examining the amount of time on the average it took the 380 communities that had at least one project under HA 1949 as of June 30, 1966, to pass through these stages. As shown in Table 3, the mean date of an application for a program reservation was March, 1954. The average date the application was approved was June, 1954, meaning it took approximately two to three months to obtain approval. The average date of execution of the preliminary

loan was November 1954, meaning a lapse of five months on the average between these two stages. The average date for signing of the annual contributions contract was August, 1955, meaning that nine months elapsed on the average between these two stages. The average date that construction began was August, 1956 (a lapse of a year in these two stages), and the average date of completion was October, 1957, meaning that it took 13 months from the beginning of construction to completion. In all, it took approximately three and one-half years on the average for communities to pass through these stages.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

In the presentations of findings that follow, we shall report only the first date in this sequence, i.e., the date the first application for a program reservation was received by HUD.

The correlation coefficients between these three aspects of mobilization--establishment of a housing authority, entry and passage through the program, and intensity of involvement in the program--are related to one another (as shown in Table 2). Cities that were early to establish housing authorities were early to enter the HA 1949 program, and were also more likely to have a more intense involvement in it (as reflected in the number of standardized housing units built). Similarly, the earlier a city entered the programs under HA 1949, the more units it obtained (again standardized for population size). We shall present findings of zero-order correlations between three indicators of community mobilization--years it took to establish a housing authority, date application for a program application arrived at HUD, and number

of housing units per 100,000 population--and community attributes. But because these three measures of community mobilization are similarly related to various community attributes, we shall present regression equations for only one of them, the date the application for a program reservation was received by HUD.

EMPIRICAL INDICATORS OF OTHER COMMUNITY ATTRIBUTES

We shall use a variety of indicators for the number of centers of power and interfaces in a community, because no one indicator available is a very direct measure. The social heterogeneity of a city is an indicator of the probability that centers of power have developed based upon a diversity of social groups: ethnic, racial, and religious. We use the percentage of persons of foreign stock, the percentage of nonwhite persons, and the percentage of persons in private schools, from the 1960 census, as our measures of heterogeneity. The bureaucratization of the local government is a measure of the degree to which there have developed specialized agencies which can become both communication links between centers of power and such centers in their own right. We use the proportion of city employees per 1,000 population as an indicator of the elaboration of such specialized agencies. (As we show in our study of poverty programs, this indicator is correlated with other measures of bureaucratization: a full-time personnel officer and civil service coverage. We use the former because more complete data are available.)

Certain features of the political structure of a city are logically related to the development of interfaces, particularly those institutions which seem to allow more access to governmental officials: mayor-council form of government, partisan and ward elections, and a relatively larger number of councilmen. These structural arrangements, it can be argued, either arise as a consequence of the existence of many centers of power in a community seeking access to political leaders, or, once in existence, facilitate such access.

Clearly the theoretical variables and their indicators we have just mentioned refer to far more than just the number of centers of power and interfaces in a community. We therefore add two indicators which have quite a different character: the age and size of the city. The larger a city, we argue, the more likely it is to exhibit structural and cultural differentiation, and thus a greater number of centers of power. The older the city, the more likely existing bases of differentiation and organization have had time to establish working relationships or interfaces.

These diverse indicators are themselves correlated, which is important for the logic of the argument. Older cities are also likely to be larger, more heterogeneous, more bureaucratized, and possess political structures presumably providing political access. Older and larger cities also have higher levels of out-migration, leaving a "residual" population which should exhibit the consequences of the historical factors more than cities with recent heavy in-migration.

The community characteristics just discussed were taken from the following three sources: the 1960 Census of Population, the 1962 County and City Data Book, and the Municipal Year Books of 1963 and 1967, published by the International City Manager's Association. The exact source of each variable and transformations or alterations of variables are described as the variables are introduced.

FINDINGS

Table 4 displays the zero-order correlations of each of the indicators we have selected with three measures of mobilization related to housing programs: the speed with which a city established a local housing authority after state enabling legislation was passed, the speed with which a city submitted an application for funds to the Department of Housing and Urban Development under the Housing Act of 1949, and the number of housing units built per 100,000 population by June 30, 1966.

To those already discussed, we have added a series of measures of the need of the population of the city for low-rent housing which are directly or indirectly related theoretically to the existence of centers of power and interfaces between them. The proportion of housing which is dilapidated, the levels of income and education, and the unemployment level, presumably are reasonable measures of the extent to which sheer need influences the city to obtain federal funds for its poor and ill-housed families. It is theoretically important for us to distinguish the effects of need from those of the organizational factors which we are principally concerned with.

At least one indicator within each cluster is significantly related to one or all three of the mobilization measures. City age and size, all of the need measures, the nonwhite composition, and the number of city employees per 1,000 population are all strongly related to all of the mobilization measures. Two of the aspects of political structure are weakly related. Generally, correlations of the various indicators of community structure are higher with the speed of

applying for 1949 Housing Act funds than with the speed of establishment of a Housing Authority, which is intuitively plausible since the decision to establish an authority was usually about ten years earlier, leaving room for considerable change in social and economic structure in that period. But the fact that most all of the significant correlations are in the same direction is an extremely important finding because, as seen in Table 2, the three measures of mobilization are not so highly correlated with each other (.57, -.39, and -.72) that they can be regarded as equivalent. And the very fact that they are separated in time by many years means that quite different actors may have been involved and quite different political and economic situations existed in the cities. We feel justified in concluding just from this one table, therefore, that we have located important characteristics of American cities which contribute to their mobilization potential. Whether or not they contribute independently of each other is a question we shall address later in this paper.

The amount of variance explained by some of the indicators of key theoretical variables is considerable. The age of a city alone explains 19 per cent of the variance in application dates for HA 1949 funds. The size of a city explains 12 per cent, as does the number of city employees per 1,000 population. The weakest need measure (unemployment) explains 8 per cent, while the others range from 16 per cent (dilapidated housing) to 30 per cent (adults with less than 5 years education). The size of the nonwhite population explains 22 per cent of the variance, while the aspect of political structure which is most significantly related, the presence of a city manager

form of government (which reduces mobilization) explains 2 per cent.

We conclude therefore that our several types of indicators of the numbers of centers of power and interfaces between them are indeed associated with mobilization to attain federal housing funds. Heterogeneity, specifically the nonwhite population, bureaucratization, and city age and size, are most important, in addition to the sheer need of the population. But let us explore the interrelationships of each cluster of indicators of a single theoretical variable in more detail before testing for the overall level of explanatory power which we have achieved.

Age and Size of City. An important question is whether these two indicators of the number of centers of power and interfaces independently contribute to the prediction of mobilization. Table 5 presents a multiple regression analysis of these two indicators.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

Both the age of a city and its population size are independently associated with the speed with which a city acted to apply for its first federal low-rent housing project under the Housing Act of 1949, as Table 4 shows quite clearly. The original zero-order correlations of age and size with this mobilization measure are reduced, as one would expect, since older cities are also larger cities ($r = -.54$), from .44 to .32 (age) and from -.35 to -.14. But the T-values remain significant at the .001 level. It seems clear that neither the age of a city nor its size are simply functions of each other, regardless of the theoretical interpretation which can be attached to these relationships.

Together, both the age of a city and its size explain 20.67 per cent of the variance in the mobilization measure. Age of city alone explains 19.33 per cent of the variance; thus size uniquely contributes an additional 1.34 per cent, after the effect of age has been removed statistically. Size alone explains 11.27 per cent; age of city thus explains an additional 9.40 per cent of the variance after size has entered the regression equation. It remains to be seen whether age and size will continue to offer additional explanatory power after we have taken into account the level of need of the population for low-rent housing, which we might assume would be an important factor predisposing a local government and its housing authority to act to obtain these federal funds.

Need for Low-Rent Housing. How much of the variance in the mobilization measure is accounted for by the several indicators of need? Table 6 shows these associations, by means of multiple regression. Since the need measures are relatively highly intercorrelated, our purpose here is not to distinguish between their effects, but rather to show how much total explanatory power they have. In fact, only two of the measures of need remain significant, but this does not mean that the others are not equally causally related.

TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

Together, the seven indicators of need explain 30.91 per cent of the variance in the mobilization measure. The indicator with the highest zero order correlation remains the strongest after the regression analysis: the per cent of persons with less than 5 years of

education, for no obvious theoretical reason. The six additional indicators only explain two per cent more variance than that single one, which indicates something of the redundancy involved in this cluster.

When the age of city is entered into the regression analysis along with these seven variables, the amount of explained variance increases to 37.28 per cent, meaning that age alone can add an additional 6.37 per cent of explained variance in the mobilization measure. When city size is entered into the regression analysis, together with these six indicators of need, the amount of explained variance is increased to 36.63, meaning that city size alone can explain an additional 5.72 per cent of variance. The addition of both age of city and city size adds 7.83 per cent of explained variance in the mobilization measure over and above that explained by measures of presumed need for low-rent housing.

Of course, one could argue that these seven indicators of need do not really exhaust the real need for federal housing programs, and a plausible interpretation might be that city size and age are surrogates for unmeasured aspects of need for better housing. That, of course, is logically possible, but we have argued that city size and age really reflect the number of centers of power in a community and the number and quality of interfaces among them.

Heterogeneity. A multiple regression analysis of our three indicators of heterogeneity is shown in Table 7. The total amount of variance explained is 24.05 per cent, but most of that is contributed by the proportion of nonwhites in the community (the proportion of nonwhites alone can explain about 20 per cent). The proportion of

TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE

elementary school children in private schools, a crude measure of religious diversity, contributes nothing, either at the zero order or partial correlation level. The indicator of ethnic diversity, the per cent of the population of foreign or mixed parentage, remains significant, but at a lower level than the nonwhite composition.

It might plausibly be argued that a high proportion of nonwhites in a city indicates need rather than heterogeneity, particularly since the correlation between this indicator and the proportion of families with incomes of less than $3,000, for example, is .66, and with the proportion of persons with less than five years of education it is .57. While these correlations are relatively high, they do not indicate complete equivalence, and we prefer to interpret indicators in ways which remain as close to their "face meaning" as possible. Clearly, the proportion of nonwhites in a community is a measure of social cleavage and not of need, but we recognize the importance of further theoretical and empirical work on such collective concepts as heterogeneity.

When the age of city is entered into a regression equation, together with the three indicators of heterogeneity, these four variables can then explain 32.98 per cent of the variance in the mobilization measure. This means that age of city alone can add an additional 8.93 per cent of explained variance. Similarly, the variable of city size alone can add an additional 2.51 per cent of explained variance, to that of heterogeneity, and age of city and city size together can add an additional 9.03 per cent of explained variance, meaning that these

five variables can explain 33.08 per cent of the variance in the years possible measure.

These results suggest that the very strong relationships of age of city and city size with the mobilization measure are not simply functions of heterogeneity, as we have measured it, but that both city size and age make an independent contribution to the explanation of the mobilization measure.

Bureaucratization of City Government. The degree to which the city government is bureaucratized is a factor which contributes to the establishment of community interfaces, and, therefore, it should be positively related to the various indicators of participation in the urban renewal program. We have already shown that the greater the number of city employees per 1,000 population, the greater the degree of mobilization for the federal low-rent housing program. That is, as shown in Table 4, the higher the number of city employees per 1,000 population, the quicker the city applied ($r = -.35$).

The question can be raised if the relationships of city size and age of city with the mobilization measure may indeed be due to the greater bureaucratization since the number of city employees per 1,000 population is greater in older cities ($r = -.50$) and larger cities ($r = .26$). The strategy here is to determine whether age of city and city size make a contribution to the explanation of the mobilization measure independent of the degree of bureaucratization of city government.

The indicator of bureaucratization, number of city employees per 1,000 population, can explain 12.49 per cent of the variance in the years

possible measure (this is simply the square of the zero order correlation). Age of city can add an additional 9.18 per cent to the explanation of the mobilization measure, and city size can add an additional 6.34 per cent of explained variance. Together these two variables, city size and age of city, can explain an additional 10.58 per cent of explained variance after the bureaucratization measure has entered the regression equation, meaning that these three variables together can explain 23.07 per cent of the variance in the mobilization measure.

The greater the bureaucratization of the city government, the greater the community mobilization. On the other hand, this attribute of the community is not the same as the age and size of a city. City size and age--indicators of the number of centers of power and interfaces among them--have strong, independent relationships with number of years it took the city to enter the federal housing program.

Political Structure. Older and larger American cities are less likely to have reformist governments, i.e., they are more likely to have mayor-council governments, elections by ward, partisan elections, and large city councils. It could be argued that in non-reform cities there are more political mechanisms that sensitize local governmental officials to the needs of its citizens, and, therefore, such communities would be more responsive to community problems. If this line of reasoning is correct, then the previously observed relationships between city size and age of city may be a function of the type of formal political structure. One could equally argue that reform cities, with a greater emphasis on good government and efficiency, may be both more prone to and more successful in local mobilization efforts to solve community

problems. Although this conclusion is the opposite from the previous reasoning, there is still the possibility that many of the previously observed relationships are simply functions of political structure.

Reformist city governments have city managers, at-large elections, non-partisan elections, and small city councils, the four indicators used here. Non-reformist city governments have just the opposite characteristics. Relationships between these various indicators of the political structure and the measure of early participation in the low-rent housing program are relatively weak. Table 8 gives a regression analysis of the four indicators of the political structure of the cities. Although three of the four measures reach a significant level of association (city manager form, at-large elections for council, and the size of the council), the total amount of variance explained is only 2.46 per cent. But the direction is that hypothesized for two of the three indicators; cities with city manager governments and small councils take more time to apply for federal funds than cities with mayor-council governments and large councils. The at-large measure is in the opposite direction of our expectation here. Thus, the association is small but there is some slight evidence that cities with political structures presumably allowing more access to leaders by groups are more likely to mobilize to gain federal housing funds.

TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE

These four indicators of political structure can only explain 2.46 per cent in the mobilization measure, less than any other cluster. The age of city variable can explain an additional 18.38 per cent of

variance in the years possible variable while city size can explain an additional 9.74 per cent of variance. These two variables together can explain an additional 19.96 per cent of variance in the mobilization measure.

These findings clearly show that the nature of the formal political structure of the community is weakly and inconsistently related to the mobilization measure. Age of city and city size, variables which we have suggested are indicators of the number of centers of power and interfaces among them, are related to the degree of community mobilization independent of the type of formal political structure whether reformist or non-reformist.

Community Structure and Mobilization. In the foregoing discussion we have systematically analyzed the relationships of five clusters of community characteristics--city age and size, community need, heterogeneity, bureaucratization of city government, and the formal political structure--with our measure of community mobilization, the number of years it took for a city to enter the federal low-rent housing program. We examined the interrelationships of the variables in each cluster with the mobilization measures, determined the amount of variance that could be explained by each cluster alone, and then determined the amount of variance that could be explained by city size and age after each cluster alone had entered the regression analysis. In each case we were able to demonstrate that city size and age explained a substantial additional amount of variance in the mobilization measure.

Our general strategy was to determine if the variables of age and size of city were simply surrogates for current states of the

community system, i.e., heterogeneity, need, bureaucratization of city government, and formal political structure, or if knowledge of these two variables could add to the explanation of the mobilization measure beyond these aspects of the current state of the community system. Since the variables of city size and age did account for additional variance, we could argue that these two variables are evidently acting as surrogates for aspects of current state of community systems for which we have no direct measures.

On the other hand, we entered these clusters one at a time with the variables of city size and age, and there remains the logical possibility that if all were simultaneously entered into a regression equation, together with city size and age, these latter two variables would account for no additionally explained variance. In this event the four clusters which reflect current states of community systems would cumulatively account for all the variance explained by age and size of city.

There are thus two additional, but related, questions that can be asked of these data: 1) will there still be a relationship between the age of city and city size and the mobilization measure if <u>all</u> of these factors are simultaneously controlled; 2) and concomitantly can the variables of city size and age explain any additional variance in the mobilization measure after all the variables in these four clusters have first entered the regression analysis? In other words, we are willing to allocate all the variance that is jointly explained by the variables of age of city and city size and any of the other variables to these other clusters to determine if city size and age are capturing

anything additional about the current state of community systems. Of course, we cannot in reality apportion this jointly explained variance among these other variables; rather, we are willing to argue from a theoretical perspective that all jointly explained variance is in reality only reflections of current states of the community system as reflected by the variables in these other four clusters. We are thus granting the possibility that the variables of age and size of city may simply be surrogates for these other aspects of the community structure.

If the variables of age and size of city can explain no additional variance in the mobilization measure after the variables that more directly measure the current nature of the community have entered the regression analysis, then we would conclude that although these two variables may be <u>efficient</u> predictors of the mobilization measure (since they indiscriminately summarize many aspects of the current state of the community system), <u>theoretically</u> they are relatively uninteresting. On the other hand, if they are able to explain additional variance in the mobilization measure, then we shall conclude that they evidently are acting as surrogates for some aspect of the current state of the community system for which we have no direct measures.

Table 9 brings together sixteen indicators in a single multiple regression equation. The indicators of need are reduced from seven to six because of problems of multicollinearity. Our concern here is to see which clusters of indicators remain significant when others are controlled, and whether the apparent effects of centers of power and interfaces are accounted for by the need of the population of the city and these other factors.

Although two indicators of need remain independently related to the mobilization of the city to gain federal housing funds, they do not account for all of the correlations we have already discussed. Both the age of a city and its size are still associated with the mobilization measure at the .001 level even after the "effects" of need and other factors have been removed statistically. And two indicators of heterogeneity--foreign stock and nonwhite composition--remain significantly associated with the mobilization measure. The total amount of variance explained by the sixteen indicators used in this analysis is more than 41 per cent. This means that approximately 59 per cent

TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE

of the variation in this variable is unaccounted for by these factors, suggesting that other factors not measured here are importantly related to the degree of community mobilization.

One way to attempt to understand the variables that are important predictors of the mobilization measure is to determine the unique contribution of each cluster of variables to the explanation of the dependent variable. We do this by determining the amount of additional variance explained by each of the five clusters--age and size of city, need, heterogeneity, bureaucratization, and political structure--after each of the other four has entered the regression analysis. These results are shown in Table 10.

TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE

In the first column of Table 10 is shown the per cent of variance in the mobilization measure that is explained by each cluster alone (these are taken from Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9). In the second column is shown the amount of variance uniquely contributed by each cluster of variables, after the other four clusters have entered the regression analysis. For example, the variables in the clusters of need, heterogeneity, bureaucratization, and political structure explain 38.25 per cent of variance in the mobilization measure, while the addition of the variables of age and city size bring the total to 41.43. This means that age and size of city account for an additional 3.18 per cent of explained variance in the mobilization measure. Evidently these two variables are acting as surrogates for some aspects of the current state of the community system that is not reflected by our measures of need, heterogeneity, bureaucratization, or political structure.

The need of the population explains the greatest amount of variance in the mobilization measures, both alone and in addition to the other clusters. Heterogeneity explains slightly less than age and size. The fact that the indicators of bureaucratization of city government and of its political structure do not make statistically significant unique contributions to the mobilization measure does not mean that theoretically they are unimportant, but rather that their predictive power is jointly associated with other variables. The procedure here allocates this jointly explained variance to variables in the other four clusters. Thus, they are still important variables from a theoretical point of view although they are not particularly efficient independent predictors of the mobilization measure.

There are two imporant points to be drawn from Table 10: 1) the determination of those variables which are the most efficient predictors of mobilization, and 2) the demonstration that city size and age are not simply surrogates for the four community attributes, i.e., need, heterogeneity, bureaucratization, and political structure. Age and size of cities are evidently acting as surrogates for some other properties of the community system. It is the thesis of this paper that these unmeasured attributes are the number of centers of power that the number and quality of interfaces among them. Such interfaces are therefore latent resources of the community system which can be activated and which facilitate successful mobilization efforts in a community.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings of this paper, coupled with those already reported on poverty and urban renewal programs, considerably reinforce the theory that centers of power and interfaces between them are an important factor contributing to the capacity of an American city to mobilize in order to gain external resources. Controlling for a wide range of indicators of types of poverty, dilapidated housing, and low levels of education did not remove the association of the age of a city and its size with the main measure of mobilization we used: the speed with which a city took advantage of the federal funds available under the Housing Act of 1949.

In addition to the factors of age, size, and community need, two aspects of heterogeneity were found to be strongly related: ethnicity (as measured by the proportion of persons of foreign stock) and the nonwhite population. While it could be argued that these top aspects of need unmeasured by the more direct indicators, it is our belief that they are a measure of the diversity of ethnic and racial groups in contemporary American urban areas, and thus, from the point of view of our theory, a social structural base for the emergence of centers of power of a certain type: racial and ethnic neighborhood and interest groups.

Bureaucratized and "non-reformed" city governments were also more capable of securing federal housing funds than less bureaucratized and "reformed" governments, but these effects did not remain independently important after the far more important ones of age, size, need and heterogeneity were taken into account in Table 10. Both of these

factors may be interpreted as intervening variables. Older, more heterogeneous cities are more likely to have the consequences of a wider range of demands from diverse groups comprising their population embedded in a differentiated range of city services administered by a large bureaucratic staff, with a mayor-council form, and a large city council. Such cities thus also have an additional organizational prerequisite for securing federal funds, although it is not of independent or prime importance.

In these concluding pages, we shall concider some other possible alternative explanations for these findings, including another aspect of need, the presence of active leadership and another aspect of the presence of a professional or bureaucratic staff.

The sheer need of the community's population for housing, better incomes, education, or anything else does not explain all of the variation from city to city in their predisposition to get federal funds under these programs. If need, as measured by the indicators we have, is the overwhelmingly important factor, we would expect far higher correlations than we find. (Note that such a high correlation would not mean that the program met the need in any sense, but only that the level of need provoked at least this level of community response.) The level of need by itself does not explain more than about 30 per cent of the variation in the mobilization measure.

Since need is not mechanically translated into a community response, it is clear that there must be some social and organizational factors which intervene between need and the community response. One explanation might simply be the existence of a few persons deeply

concerned about a particular problem and willing to spend their time and energy attempting to solve it. This explanation would be the type favored by Robert Dahl, Nelson Polsby, and Aaron Wildavsky, who stress the small numbers of persons who are actively concerned about their community and the "slack" in the system which allows them to have considerable interest if they become active. Those scholars and others with their point of view assume implicitly that the existence of such a small group of activists is not correlated with any other structural or cultural attributes of the community, and is not therefore predictable. Whether or not a mayor will be a dynamic organizer, whether or not a citizen will emerge as a "meteor," in Wildavsky's metaphor, flashing across the community sky on a particular issue, become major independent variables in their own right.

Activist leaders and citizens undoubtedly account for much of what a city does or doesn't do. If we knew more about the specific actions taken to develop low-rent housing programs in American cities we would understand much more about the limitations and possibilities for effective action by citizens and groups. Yet, from our point of view, such activism can be regarded as explained, not as a possible alternative explanation which would obviate any attention to community organizational structures and relationships. Presumably some citizen or group had to sponsor or initiate action before a housing authority was organized or, for example, before a Model Cities application was formulated. What were the conditions under which this initiating action resulted in success in obtaining federal funds? Obviously in some cases there may have been activism without success. Meetings, consultations, petitions,

campaigns--all might have been tried, but failed. These negative cases are not considered by the theorists who stress the causal importance of the motivated citizen or mayor. But, logically, if their argument is not to be a tautology, it must be possible for activists to fail, and that raises the basic question of the conditions of success of mobilization for a collective action by a community.

Our solution to this problem of lack of data on the immediate or proximate cause of a community decision is, as already suggested, to assume that a successful action required a minimum number of active sponsors (a coalition), and to ask about the structural conditions which precede the emergence of active support for any particular decision or outcome. If the structural conditions are positively associated with the probability of the emergence of active sponsorship of an issue, then presumably we can neglect, for the purpose of our present study, the activists, as part of the necessary process bringing about a community decision and thus part of the dependent variable. If, on the other hand, the structural conditions about which we have data are <u>negatively</u> associated with the presence of active sponsorship of a decision and if we can assume that active sponsorship of a decision is always associated with positive action with regard to that decision, then the statistical effect upon our data would be to reduce our correlations. That is, the worst possible situation would be that a lack of data about the actual activity of groups favoring or opposing a given decision reduces the relationships which we find. But there is no possible way in which our data can be explained away by the absence of data on activists. Either they are a necessary antecedent to the

dependent variable, and therefore part of it in a crucial sense, or else the observed correlations must be reduced in size. In either case, the findings are not spurious.

A second alternative explanation of the factors which might intervene between the need of a community and the community response to that need might be the existence of a professional staff of employees of the city government which is able to write grant applications, organize campaigns, and the like. This alternative explanation has the same character as that of activism. The existence of a staff is either very closely associated with the dependent variable or else the dependent variables are themselves not highly enough interrelated to allow this to be a general explanation of a wide variety of decisions. That is, it could be argued that every application for federal funds requires that somebody write it, that this is usually a member of a professional staff, and that it is not a satisfactory "explanation" of the decision to point to the man who wrote the application as the "cause." This merely pushes the problem back one stage, as it does with the activists. Why does such a capable professional staff exist? What makes the community accept the grant applications which the staff writes?

But leaving this aspect of it aside, one would expect, if the existence of a professional staff was decisive, that the same cities would apply (assuming a need) for all of federal programs. The fact that they do not indicates that such a single factor cannot account for inter-community variations in mobilization. One must look for antecedent structural factors which allow the professional staff to function effectively on some issues and not on others.

The fact that the age and size of a city remain fairly closely correlated with all of the mobilization measures, even though all other independent variables vary considerably in importance from decision to decision, strengthens our inference that the structural properties inherent in the number of centers of power and interfaces are factors contributing to mobilization which do not operate through any other social, political, or economic features of the community. If there was a single causal process which operated through the same set of variables in every aspect of community mobilization, one would expect the same pattern of intercorrelated variables. This is not the case. Therefore, we argue that those aspects of community structure indicated by the age and size of a city have an independent influence upon the capacity of the community to make collective decisions.

TABLE 1

Per Cent of Different Types of Housing Authorities
Among 637 Incorporated Urban Places
of Size 25,000 or More in 1960

Type of Housing Authority	Per Cent	Number of Cities
No Housing Authority	21	132
Municipal Housing Authority	60	382
Consolidated Housing Authority	5	32
County Housing Authority	14	90
Regional Housing Authority	*	1
Total	100	637

*Less than one per cent.

Table 2

Correlation Coefficients Among Indicators of Community Mobilization as Measured by Participation in the Low-Rent Housing Program Under the Housing Act of 1949 Among 637 Cities of Size 25,000 or More in 1960

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
1) Date of Establishment of the Local Housing Authority		.98*	.56*	.55*	.55*	.54*	.52*	.52*	-.39*
2) Number of Years After State Enabling Legislation was Passed before a Local Housing Authority was Established			.56*	.56*	.57*	.55*	.53*	.53*	-.39*
3) Date the First Application for a Program Reservation was Received by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)				1.00*	.99*	.98*	.93*	.95*	-.72*
4) Date HUD Approved the First Program Reservation					.99*	.98*	.93*	.95*	-.72*
5) Date First Preliminary Loan Contract was Signed						.98*	.94*	.96*	-.72*
6) Date First Annual Contributions Contract was Signed							.96*	.98*	-.72*
7) Date Construction Began On First Low-Rent Housing Project under HA 1949								.96*	-.68*
8) Date of Full Availability of First Low-Rent Housing Project under HA 1949									-.70*
9) Number of Low-Rent Housing Units per 100,000 Population under HA 1949									

* $p < .001$

Table 3

Average Month and Year of Entering Various Stages of the Low-Rent Housing Program under the Housing Act of 1949 and Number of Months it took on the Average to Pass through each Stage among 380 Communities of Size 25,000 or More in 1960 that had Entered the Low-Rent Housing Program as of June 30, 1966

Stage	Average Date	Number of Elapsed Months
Date Application for Program Reservation Was Submitted	March, 1954	
Date Application for Program Reservation Was Approved	June, 1954	3
Date Preliminary Loan Was Executed	November, 1954	5
Date Annual Contributions Contract was Signed	August, 1955	9
Date Construction Began	August, 1956	12
Date of Full Availability of Occupancy	October, 1957	14
Total		43

Table 4

Zero-Order Correlation Coefficients Between Community Mobilization (As Measured by Participation in the Low-Rent Housing Program Under the Housing Act of 1949) and Indicators of Community Structure

Community Attributes	Number of Years After State Enabling Legislation was Passed Before the Local Housing Authority was Established	Date Application for Program Reservation Was Submitted and Received By The Department of Housing and Urban Development	Number of Housing Units Per 100,000 Population as of June 30, 1966
City Age and Size[a]			
Age of City (Census Year City Reached 10,000 Population)	.30***	.44***	-.31***
Natural Logarithm of Population Size, 1960	-.35***	-.34***	.12**
Need for Low-Rent Housing[a]			
Per Cent of Housing Dilapidated, 1950	-.17***	-.39***	.47***
Per Cent of Families With Less Than $3,000 Per Year, 1959	-.24***	-.45***	.52***
Median Family Income	.19***	.46***	-.48***
Natural Logarithm of Per Cent of Adults With Less Than 5 Years Education	-.30***	-.53***	.51***
Per Cent of Adults With Four Years or More of High School	.23***	.44***	-.44***
Per Cent of 14 to 17 Years Old in Schools	.24***	.44***	-.41***
Per Cent Unemployed	-.16***	-.28***	.31***

Table 4 (Continued)

Community Attributes	Number of Years After State Enabling Legislation Was Passed Before The Local Housing Authority Was Established	Date Application For Program Reservation Was Submitted and Received By The Department of Housing and Urban Development	Number of Housing Units Per 100,000 Population as of June 30, 1966
Heterogeneity[a]			
Natural Logarithm of Per Cent of Population That is Non-White	-.33***	-.46***	.47***
Per Cent of Native Population of Foreign or Mixed Parentage	-.01	.09*	-.20***
Per Cent of Elementary School Children in Private Schools	-.03	.06	-.12**
Bureaucratization of City Government[b]			
Number of City Employees Per 1,000 Population	-.14***	-.35***	.27***
Political Structure[b]			
Presence of a City Manager Form of Government[c]	.08*	.13**	-.15***
Presence of Non-Partisan Elections[c]	.13**	.07	-.06
Per Cent of City Council Elected At-Large	-.03	.01	.06
Number of City Councilmen	-.04	-.09*	-.07

* $p < .05$
** $p < .01$
*** $p < .001$

[a]Source: U. S. Census of Population

[b]Source: International City Managers' Association, The Municipal Yearbook, 1967

[c]Although each of these variables has a relationship of .08 with one of the indicators of mobilization, one is significant and the other not significant because of rounding of these correlation coefficients.

Table 5

Multiple Regression Analysis of the Mobilization Measure by City Age and Size

Variable	Partial Correlation Coefficient	Unstandardized Regression Coefficient	Standardized Regression Coefficient	T-Value
Constant		1.4384		.13
Age of City (Census Year City Reached 10,000 Population)	.33	.7904	0.3649	8.67***
Population Size 1960	-.13	-1.2466	- .1379	-3.28**
			R^2 = .2067	

** p < .01
*** p < .001

Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1960.

Table 6

Multiple Regression Analysis of the Mobilization Measure by Indicators of Need

Variable	Partial Correlation Coefficient	Unstandardized Regression Coefficient	Standardized Regression Coefficient	T-Value
Constant		45.2462		6.43***
Per Cent of Adults With Four Years of High School Education or More	.04	.0443	.0667	1.01
Per Cent Unemployed	-.01	- .0526	-.0129	- .31
Median Family Income	.00	0.0000	.0043	.05
Per Cent of Families With Less Than $3,000 Per Year	-.04	- .0844	-.0943	-1.01
Per Cent of Housing Dilapidated, 1950	-.03	- .0058	-.0455	- .80
Per Cent of 14 to 17 Years Old in School	.12	.2290	.1412	2.99**
Log N of Per Cent of Adults With Less Than 5 Years Education	-.16	- 3.5180	-.2874	-4.15***

R^2 = .3091

** p < .01
*** p < .001

Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1960.

Table 7

Multiple Regression Analysis of the Mobilization Measure by Indicators of Heterogeneity

Variable	Partial Correlation Coefficient	Unstandardized Regression Coefficient	Standardized Regression Coefficient	T-Value
Constant		67.1795		80.75***
Natural Logarithm of Per Cent of Population that is Nonwhite	-.48	- 3.3932	-.5658	-13.92***
Per Cent of Population of Foreign or Mixed Parentage	-.15	- .1389	-.1832	- 3.77***
Per Cent of Elementary School Children in Private Schools	-.03	- .0225	-.0348	- .78
		R^2 = .2405		

*** $p < .001$

Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1960.

Table 8

Multiple Regression Analysis of the Mobilization Measure by Indicators of Formal Political Structure

Variable	Partial Correlation Coefficient	Unstandardized Regression Coefficient	Standardized Regression Coefficient	T-Value
Constant		60.4943		50.82***
Presence of City Manager Form of Government	.11	1.8605	.1215	2.73**
Presence of Non-Partisan Elections	.02	.3429	.0205	.47
Per Cent of City Council Elected At-Large	-.08	- .0189	-.1033	- 2.00*
Number of Members of the City Council	-.09	- .3945	-.1095	- 2.18*
		R^2 = .0246		

* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001

Source: International City Managers' Association, The Municipal Yearbook, 1967.

Table 9

Multiple Regression Analysis of the Mobilization Measure by Indicators of City Age and Size, Need, Heterogeneity, Bureaucratization, and Political Structure

Variable	Multiple Regression Analysis			
	Partial Correlation Coefficient	Unstandardized Regression Coefficient	Standardized Regression Coefficient	T-Value
Constant		25.7184		1.91
City Age and Size				
Age of City	.14	0.3816	0.1762	3.38***
City Size (Log N)	-.12	-1.1020	-0.1219	-3.00**
Indicators of Need[a]				
Per Cent of Adults With Four Years or More of High School	.07	0.0705	0.1061	1.83
Per Cent Unemployed	.01	0.0480	0.0117	0.28
Median Income	.01	0.0002	0.0268	0.31
Per Cent of Families With Less Than $3,000 Per Year, 1959	-.04	-0.0714	-0.0799	-0.91
Per Cent of Housing Dilapidated, 1950	-.12	-0.0197	-0.1537	-2.89**
Per Cent of 14 to 17 Year Olds in School	.08	0.1443	0.0890	1.96*
Indicators of Heterogeneity				
Per Cent in Private Schools	.07	0.0540	0.0834	1.76
Per Cent Foreign Stock	-.16	-0.1525	-0.2012	-3.92***
Per Cent Nonwhite (Log N)	-.18	-1.3355	-0.2227	-4.65***
Indicator of Bureaucratization				
City Employees Per 1,000 Population	-.07	-0.0797	-0.0691	-1.72
Indicators of Political Structure				
Number of City Councilmen	.05	0.1855	0.0515	1.13
Per Cent Elected At-Large	.06	0.0109	0.0592	1.41
Presence of City Manager Government	-.01	-0.0873	-0.0057	-0.15
Presence of Non-Partisan Elections	-.05	-0.7617	-0.0455	-1.27
		R^2 = .4143		

* $p < .05$
** $p < .01$
*** $p < .001$

[a]The per cent of persons with less than 5 years of education was eliminated from this analysis because of problems of multicollinearity.

Table 10

Comparison Between the Amount of Variance in Date of Application for Program Reservation Explained by each Cluster Alone and the Amount of Variance Uniquely Explained by each Cluster

Cluster	Per Cent of Variance Explained By Each Cluster of Variables Operating Alone	Per Cent of Variance Uniquely Explained by Each Cluster of Variables
Age and Size of City	20.67	3.18**
Need[a]	30.91	6.42***
Heterogeneity	24.05	2.89**
Bureaucratization	12.49	.28
Political Structure	2.46	.35
All Clusters	41.43	

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

[a]See Table 8 for the indicators comprising each cluster. One need measure was excluded in Table 8 and here because of problems of multicollinearity (the per cent of persons with 5 years or less of education).

FOOTNOTES

[1]Robert C. Wood, 1400 Governments, (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1964) (originally published by Harvard University Press in 1961), p. 170.

[2]The correlation coefficient between the amount of urban renewal money obtained by a community as of June 30, 1966 and the year that it submitted an application for a housing project under the Housing Act of 1949 was only .43. See Michael Aiken and Robert R. Alford, "Community Structure and Mobilization: The Case of the War on Poverty," University of Wisconsin, Institute for Research on Poverty, Discussion Paper 29-68, and Alford and Aiken, "Community Structure and Mobilization: The Case of Urban Renewal," unpublished manuscript, 1969, for analyses parallel to that presented in this paper, but which employ different measures of mobilization.

[3]Cf., Paul E. Mott, "Configurations of Power," in Michael Aiken and Paul E. Mott (editors), The Structure of Community Power: Readings (New York: Random House, Inc.), 1969 (forthcoming).

[4]Much of the information in this section has been abstracted from "The Public Housing Program," Section 7, Part 1, Local Housing Authority Management Handbook, Housing Assistance Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D. C.

[5]Lawrence M. Friedman, Government and Slum Housing (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968), p. 100. This book reviews the entire history of these programs. See also the Journal of Housing for many details on the administration of the programs.

[6]Ibid., p. 102.

[7]"United States Housing Act of 1937," Basic Laws and Authorities on Housing and Urban Development (as revised through January 15, 1968), Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, Second Session, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968, p. 177.

[8]Friedman, op. cit., p. 104.

[9]Wood, op. cit., p. 176.

[10]It is, and has been, possible for the federal government to construct and operate low-rent housing projects in states not having state enabling legislation, however. Most often, the federal government has used its authority to build low-rent housing programs on Indian reservations.

[11]"National Policy and Purpose: Excerpt from the Housing Act of 1949," Basic Laws and Authorities on Housing and Urban Development, op. cit., p. 1.

[12]It is not required that all housing authorities participating in the programs as authorized and amended under the Housing Act of 1949 obtain a preliminary loan for surveys and planning. Some housing authorities have sufficient resources to do such surveys and planning on their own. In addition, the leasing program that was established by the 1965 amendments does not require a preliminary loan. For three of the 637 communities in this study, the first program the community developed was a leasing program. Two (Amsterdam, New York, and Lansing, Michigan) had previously executed a preliminary loan with the Department of Housing and Urban Development; the third, Vallejo, California, had not, however. The procedure used for taking this into consideration is described below.

[13]This information was taken from various housing directories of the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, Suite 404, The Watergate, 2600 Virginia Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. Most of the information was taken from the most recent directory, the 1968 NAHRO Housing Directory. However, inspection of earlier directories revealed that the most recent directory was sometimes in error, especially if a housing authority had been deactivated (in such cases only the date of reactivation was usually given). Therefore, the date of establishment of each local housing authority was checked against earlier directories in order to attain greater accuracy. In cases where the information on date of establishment was unavailable, the files of the Housing Assistance Administration were checked, and in a few cases the housing authorities were contacted directly.

[14]There are five states in which state enabling legislation does not require that the community have a local housing authority in order to participate in programs of HA 1949 (Arizona, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, and New Mexico). In these states, the city government is empowered either to participate directly in the low-rent housing program or to delegate its responsibility to a housing authority. In almost every case, however, local governing bodies in these five states have delegated this responsibility to a housing authority.

[15]Three other states now have statewide housing authorities (New Jersey, Delaware, and Vermont). Although the New Jersey housing authority was in existence during the period covered by this study, it has never participated in programs of HA 1949. Delaware (1967) and Vermont (1968) established statewide housing authorities after the cutoff date of this study, i.e., June 30, 1966.

[16]We have excluded from this study 39 of the 676 incorporated urban places in the United States of size 25,000 or more in 1960. These 39 urban places were located in the following eight states: Utah, Wyoming, Alaska, Hawaii, South Dakota, Kansas, Iowa, and Oklahoma. Cities in Utah and Wyoming were excluded because those states had no state enabling legislation as of June 30, 1966. Alaska and Hawaii were excluded because they have only state housing authorities. Cities in the other four states were omitted because state enabling legislation permitting cities to establish housing authorities was enacted after the establishment of the Housing Act of 1949: South Dakota (1950), Kansas (1957), Iowa (1961), and Oklahoma (1965).

[17]Jacksonville Beach, Florida, actually has no housing authority of any type, but is extended the services of a housing authority by that of Jacksonville, Florida. For the purposes of this study, Jacksonville Beach has been classified as having a municipal housing authority.

[18]It might be noted in passing that in most cases local housing authorities are created by the local governing body, usually through a resolution of the city council or comparable governing body. In some states (such as Pinellas County in Florida, Montana, Oklahoma, and Virginia) a referendum is necessary in order to establish a local housing authority.

[19]Information on the date of enactment of state enabling legislation was obtained from the Office of Counsel, Housing Assistance Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C.

[20]This information, as well as the information about the next two mobilization indicators (date of approval of program reservation and date preliminary loan contract was executed), was taken from unpublished report S-115, Statistics Branch, Housing Assistance Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C.

[21]Only three communities among the 637 included in this study had a leasing program as their first program under HA 1949, and each of these had previously submitted an application for a program reservation. It might be added that in twelve states a referendum may be required before a community can initiate, or at least complete, the process described here. These states are: California, Colorado, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia. In other states cities have held referenda on low-rent housing projects, although not required by state law. As of December, 1964, approximately 350 referenda had been held in the history of low-rent housing programs in the United States. Approximately 40 per cent of these were rejected.

[22]The months were coded as follows: 0 - January; 1 - February; 2 - March; 3 - April and May; 4 - June; 5 - July; 6 - August; 7 - September and October; 8 - November; 9 - December.

[23]Information about the month and year the annual contributions contract was signed, as well as the next two measures (date construction began on the first low-rent housing project under HA 1949 and date of full availability of the first low-rent housing project under HA 1949) are taken from Report S-11A, Consolidated Development Directory, Statistics Branch, Housing Assistance Administration, Department of Housing

and Urban Development, Washington, D. C., June 30, 1967. This directory contains additional dates reflecting the progress of projects such as the date the initial land purchase was approved, the date bids for construction were advertised, and date of initial occupancy. Since these dates were so closely linked to the date of the annual contributions contract, the date construction was started, and the date of full availability, they were omitted from our analysis.

[24]Information from which the measure was constructed was taken from Report S-101, Low-Rent Project Directory, Statistics Branch, Housing Assistance Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., June 30, 1966.