COMMUNITY STRUCTURE AND MOBILIZATION:
THE CASE OF THE WAR ON POVERTY

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ABSTRACT

In this study, the number of dollars per capita in Federal poverty programs obtained by a city by June 30, 1966 is an indicator of the capacity of the community to mobilize to gain external resources. For the 676 cities over 25,000 population in 1960, this dependent variable is correlated with a series of independent variables: bureaucratization, political structure, the needs of the population (educational, income, and occupational level) and social heterogeneity (nonwhite composition and ethnicity). Cities with more bureaucratized, "nonreform" governments, and with needy, heterogeneous populations, were found to have secured more poverty dollars. But, the sheer size of a city and its age (as measured by the decade it reached 10,000 population) were also associated with the mobilization measure even after the "effects" of the other variables were removed statistically by means of regression analysis. The argument is advanced that size and age are crude indicators of the number of "centers of power" in a city and of the quality and quantity of exchanges of resources between those centers of power. Such exchange relationships are termed "interfaces." Greater numbers of centers of power and greater numbers of interfaces contribute to the ability of a city to mobilize by increasing the amount of information in the community political system. The literature on interorganizational relationships and community power structure is considered in relation to this theory.
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Studies of community power have had at least two major deficiencies: 1) an excessive focus upon the degree of centralization—whether or not a single group of men makes most major contemporary government decisions, and 2) a lack of concern with the capacity of the community to make decisions—what is actually accomplished by those holding power in providing community welfare, services, innovations in amenities, and the like. We shall call this capacity the degree of mobilization of the community. The two deficiencies are linked in the sense that the parties to the dispute over centralization have implicitly assumed that once they had located those who held power they had also discovered the nature and character of community mobilization. Although it might seem to follow almost by definition that holding power would mean getting things done, the research methods used by all of the elitist-pluralist debaters have not in fact included any systematic measures of policy outputs. Regardless of whether panels of informants were asked "who runs this town," or whether participants in a series of decision-making events were asked what they and others actually did, in almost no case has there been an investigation of the consequences for the community of holding power or making a decision.

In this paper we suggest that quite a different model of community decision making than one based on the dimension of centralization of power may be more appropriate for understanding part of what really happens in American cities. We suggest that when trying to explain
community mobilization, a theory of the mutual coordination of centers of power in a community, developing over time sets of relationships involving exchanges of valued resources, relationships which we shall call "interfaces," is a better starting point. Our data are based on the Federal dollars obtained for poverty programs by the 676 American cities over 25,000 in population in 1960.

POWER AND COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION

While seldom explicitly stated in the literature, the assumption has been that groups holding power could get their way--by definition--and therefore that it was not necessary to test the relationship between power and mobilization. But the controversy over centralization has concealed an implicit and important disagreement. Floyd Hunter (1953) asserted that the "crowds" in Regional City composed of economic leaders could accomplish what they wanted, and that other groups had to work through them or were powerless. But Robert Dahl (1961) found in New Haven that a diversity of groups could participate in decision making, with no single group exercising decisive veto power or alone possessing the capacity to get important things done.

What might seem the plausible inference that centralization of power leads to more decision outputs is thus ambiguous in theory. It is also contradicted by the scanty empirical literature, with one seeming exception, Amos Hawley's (1963) article on urban renewal. Crain and Rosenthal (1967) found that high socioeconomic status populations were more powerful vis-a-vis local governments, which led to "controversy, decentralization of decision-making power, and a tendency toward
immobility on the part of the government." They studied a wide variety of issues: urban renewal, school desegregation, bond referenda, fluoridation controversies, political party structures, Negro voter registration in the South, election contests, and civil rights movements.

Hawley's (1963) study found that a low ratio of managers, officials and proprietors to the total population (the MOP ratio, used as an indicator of centralization of power) was associated with more action on urban renewal; thus centralization was associated with more decision outputs. We shall comment on Hawley's findings later, since this inconsistency is more apparent than real.

On the other hand, Lineberry and Fowler (1967) found that cities with "reformist" political structures—the presumably more centralized institutions of city manager, nonpartisan and at-large elections—were likely to both spend and tax less than unreformed cities, and thus, if we can assume that spending and taxing are appropriate decision-outputs, centralization led to lower outputs.

The ambiguity of the literature is matched by some inconsistencies of theoretical explanation. Terry N. Clark (1968) has hypothesized that decentralization of a community decision-making structure should lead to lower outputs, because there is little coordination between sectors of the community, unless "integrative mechanisms" are established. He finds that the existence of reformist political institutions (city manager, nonpartisan and at-large elections) is highly correlated with centralization of the decision-making structure. Yet he argues that the same political institutions provide the integrative mechanisms which compensate for decentralization, providing some coordination between
sectors of the community. Logically, the same institutions cannot lead to centralized patterns of decision making and also act as mechanisms which offset the negative consequences of decentralization for decision-outputs. It seems clear that an adequate theory of community decision making must explicitly include some factors other than centralization.

It is possible to use the existing studies of communities to develop a qualitative characterization of centralization of power from the data given in the studies themselves. One of the present authors (Aiken, 1969) has characterized the power structures of 31 communities as being either pyramidal, factional, coalitional or amorphous, and has correlated the type of power structure with a variety of policy outputs—the development of poverty programs, urban renewal, and low-rent housing—all financed by Federal funds. Essentially the findings were that the more decentralized the community—the greater the diffusion of power—the more poverty, urban renewal, and low-rent housing funds had been obtained. This contradicts Hawley's interpretation of his data, and is consistent with the pluralist inference about the consequences of decentralization.

But the relationship between decentralization of power and the mobilization of a community is a relatively weak one. Correlations between power structure and indicators of community mobilization ranged from .16 to .43 (Aiken, 1969).

The theoretical and empirical literature has thus not yet brought the question of the consequences of centralization of power into sharp definition. The literature has assumed implicitly that centralization should lead to greater mobilization, but, as we have suggested, the
bulk of the empirical studies contradict this prediction. The problem is whether some new theoretical formulation can encompass the empirical findings thus far, and more adequately describe forms of community structure and their consequences for mobilization.

AN INCIPIENT THEORY OF COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION

By capacity for mobilization we mean the ease with which a critical threshold level of action of community groups can be reached. It must be kept in mind that our unit of analysis here is the community, not a particular group, nor a particular issue, nor a particular actor or goal. We are concerned with structural properties of community organization that will produce a capacity for collective action over and above the idiosyncratic qualities of a particular group, issue, actor or goal. Conceivably most communities might look very much alike with respect to a particular issue, but would differ substantially when a wide range of issues is examined.

The view of community mobilization which we have adopted here is essentially the same as what Banfield (1961: 326) calls "social choice" mechanisms: an outcome or resultant of the actions of two or more actors seeking to attain their own ends. Roland Warren (1967) has elaborated this and other types of "inclusive decision-making contexts" (unitary, federative, and coalitional), distinguished by the degree of coordination or integration of the units involved. The "social choice" context is one in which there are no inclusive goals, authority exists only at the unit level, not at the collectivity level, the division of labor between units is not formally structured, and there is no
commitment to a single set of leaders for all units. These characteristics seem to us to be typical of most American cities.

Our use of the term mobilization differs somewhat from the definitions current in the literature on economic and political development or modernization, although there is no consensus upon any of those concepts. Samuel P. Huntington (1965), for example, distinguishes mobilization in the sense of the broadening of political participation from political development in the sense of the institutionalization of political procedures over a long period of time and the development of capability to adapt. "Mobilization" as we use it is quite similar to his term "political development." But other writers use it in quite different senses. Nettl (1967: 32), for example, defines it as both "attitudinal--a commitment to action--and a means of translating this commitment into action or observed behavior." Etzioni (1968: 243) defines mobilization as a "process in which a social unit gains relatively rapidly in control of resources it previously did not control." Although these definitions seem to overlap and may refer to correlated variables, it seems quite clear that they do not refer to the same phenomena.

The second important concept is that of centers of power (cf. Mott, 1969). By this concept we mean coalitions of interests and/or values which have a relatively high probability of acting as homogeneous political entities with respect to a variety of issues. The structural ingredients of centers of power are most often organizations, such as a corporation, the local medical society, the municipal government, the Chamber of Commerce, a neighborhood group or a coalition of neighborhood groups. The important idea here is that a center of power is a coalition of interests and/or values.
The concept of a center of power is similar to that of an "interest group" in the political science literature. Interest or pressure groups have long been a basic unit of analysis in the classical studies of political processes (Truman, 1951). We prefer the term center of power for several reasons. First, groups may seek to further values, and not merely interests. The term "interest" has connotations which seem to limit the range of political demands to pecuniary and tangible considerations, when in fact political goals may include symbols, representation, morality, or other nonmaterial entities. Second, a variety of social units may seek ends which bring them into issue-arenas, not just "groups." Formerly, the term group may have seemed sufficiently generic to be used in a key concept such as "interest group," but we believe that a group, in the sense of a face-to-face, consensual, primary collectivity which may serve only expressive ends, must be distinguished from an organization—a differentiated, segmented collection of interdependent roles coordinated to achieve formally defined goals. These and other possible social units may become centers of power, and we believe that the nature of interaction within social units, and the nature of the rules and norms which constitute its basic character, should remain undefined by the key term which indicates that the social unit has entered the issue-arenas of a community.

The interest-group literature, more importantly, has not dealt with the phenomenon of interfaces, except in an ad hoc way, in the course of dealing with explanations of particular events and issues. But as a structural property of political systems, systematic consideration of the historical development of contacts between interest groups is not found in that literature.
A center of power must be distinguished from a coalition of centers of power which may be the most visible actor in many public issues. Citizen's Committees, Royal Commissions, and Mayor's Ad Hoc Committees on Urban Violence are examples of groups frequently formed to handle problems which do not fall within the scope of any single existing center of power. Depending on how broad their mandate is, the resources they are given or manage to attract, the functions they perform for centers of power, and the continuing nature of the problem or issue which forms their raison d'être, such coalitions may become centers of power in their own right. Chambers of Commerce may have begun life in many cities as ad hoc committees of businessmen formed to further their own collective interests in the community. The point is that a center of power, by definition, is no longer completely dependent upon other centers of power, but has a measure of autonomous existence.

The number of such centers of power must be distinguished from the number and intensity of exchange relationships or interfaces established between them. An interface is defined as an exchange relationship between two centers of power, either at present or in the past (cf. Mott, 1969). This exchange can be of any valued resource which the centers of power hold: information, personnel, goods, services, money, clients, protection, or promises of future reciprocity with respect to any of these resources. The weakest interface would consist of a single, unique exchange of a single resource between representatives of two centers of power. The strongest interface would consist of many and frequent exchanges of many types of resources at many levels of the two centers of power. A limit would of course be reached if the two centers
of power merged and became one, at least from the point of view of homogeneity with respect to other centers of power and the issues on which they act. It is not necessary here to develop further the theory which explains the emergence and stabilization of different types of interfaces.

An important point here is that we do not limit the use of the term interface to current, ongoing exchanges. The fact that exchanges between two centers of power have occurred in the past, but not recently, does not contradict the fact that an interface exists between these two centers of power. Thus, the idea of an interface involves the accumulation of experience and knowledge about each other among units in a community system.

The development of interfaces between centers of power can thus be regarded as a measure of the state of knowledge of units within the community political system about each other: which group is likely to act on a given issue, which position it will take, which resources it is likely to be willing to commit to a given issue, the conditions under which it will be willing to enter an alliance, what exchanges of resources it will exact in return for a favor, and so forth. These bits of information can be present only if there has been historical experience which allows prediction in the present. Clearly there will be "noise" in the communication system: the officers of a given organization may change, and no one knows exactly where the new ones stand on the question at issue. The membership of a group may have dropped sharply, and thus the financial resources of the group may have changed, and yet its ideological commitments may not have, so that it is difficult to know what
it might do when confronted with a request to act. Gaining information about these changes is costly, and therefore organizations and groups are likely to act upon the information they have, although the probabilities of success are thereby reduced. But this aggregate total information stored up within each center of power about others constitutes an important resource for the community system as a whole.

Interfaces are not mystical, but exist in the present as latent resources available to a center of power. As such, all of them are not visible with respect to any single issue, or at any given time. It would take an extraordinary combination of circumstances to activate any sizable proportion of the interfaces which exist, and the very character of American communities as relatively open, unintegrated, decentralized systems means that the total number and quality of interfaces among centers of power will not be visible at any given time. Thus, the number and quality of interfaces among centers of power becomes an important characteristic that differentiates American community systems. Communities having the same number of centers of power can logically vary on the number and quality of interfaces that exist among them. It is conceivable that one community could have interfaces established among almost every logical pair in the community, while another city may have few interfaces among the same number of centers of power. Such differences in the number and quality of interfaces in communities is an important factor, we suggest, relating to a community system's capacity for mobilization.

Another important concept must be introduced, together with related assumptions about it: the issue-arena. We assume that the whole
community political system does not have to be mobilized with respect to every issue which arises. The number of centers of power which possess interfaces with each other and which must be activated on a given issue in order to effectuate a decision constitutes the necessary arena with respect to a given issue. The dimensions of each issue-arena include: 1) which centers of power are involved, 2) which centers possess interfaces, 3) the substantive position of each center of power on the issue, and 4) the relative weight of each center of power in the community as a whole, and with respect to the particular issue. The weight which each center of power carries depends upon the type of resource which a particular issue requires. Number of supporting members, legal powers, wealth, and information are among the resources which give different centers of power different weights in different issues.

This problem of assessing the character of different issue-arenas is an important one for the overall theoretical problem of building an adequate model of community political systems, but we raise it here only to indicate the unfinished and open-ended character of conceptual development of this question. Our concept of the nature of community systems does not vary greatly from Norton Long's (1958) conception of the community as an ecology of games. Nor is it inconsistent with Charles Lindblom's (1965) concept of coordination in systems through mutual adjustment.

For our purposes in this article, it is necessary only to point out the assumptions that we are making in dealing with one very limited type of community mobilization: Federally supported poverty programs. We assume that the issue-arenas appropriate for applications for poverty
programs are probably quite different from those appropriate for programs which require substantial reallocations of local resources, such as a bond issue for schools, but the theory here by no means applies only to this one issue-arena.

But just what factors do affect a community's capacity for mobilization? Our thesis here is that the more centers of power there are and the more interfaces established among them, the higher the probability that a collective decision will be successfully implemented. There are several reasons for this assertion. First, the greater the accumulation of knowledge in a community system (i.e., the greater the number of interfaces), the greater the probability that centers of power most relevant for a given issue will have a history of prior contact. The center of powers that are both the most relevant and also the most likely to be favorable to a given issue can be activated first and brought into a coalition in the issue arena. Second, the greater the number of centers of power, the less likely that any one center of power can dominate in an issue-arena (assuming that community differentiation means fragmentation of power). Third, under such conditions centers of power are more likely to know which other centers are potential opponents. They can then take steps to either avoid that center of power or artfully co-opt it.

To be more specific, consider the example of two communities each with ten centers of power. Of the mathematically 45 possible interfaces (i.e., in this example, the logical 45 pairs of ten units taken two at a time), let us say that in community A 35 long-standing interfaces exist, while in Community B, which has the same number of potential
interfaces, only 15 have been activated. For a given issue such as a new zoning ordinance, let us say that four centers of power are in the issue-arena in each community. It is more probable that interfaces exist among the four centers of power in the arena in Community A than Community B. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that for this given issue more interfaces exist among the four centers of power in Community B than in Community A. The model developed here is thus intrinsically comparative and refers to the probabilities of success in mobilizing resources. The degree of mobilization on a given issue in a given community could not be predicted without knowing the nature of the interfaces among the centers of power in that issue-arena. Thus, the fundamental idea here is a comparative model, best used to predict a large range of issues in a large number of cities.

To illustrate the importance of the number of centers of power, let us take another example of two communities with the same number of interfaces, but with differing numbers of centers of power. In Community C there are 10 centers of power while in Community D there are 25 centers of power, but each has the same number of interfaces, perhaps 20. The argument here is that Community D would be more successful in a mobilization effort than Community C. This is because organizations that are potential allies of a given cause, but are not located in the immediate issue-arena, may be recruited on a given issue, thus furthering the cause.
Of course, the quality of interfaces in each of these examples is also important. So, not only should mobilization be greater in communities with many centers of power and with many interfaces among them, but it should also be greater if the interfaces are extensive and have been established over a long period of time. We have no indicators of the quality of the interfaces between centers of power. Probably detailed case studies of the histories of particular cities would be required to establish such qualitative relationships.

INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AS A CLUE TO COMMUNITY STRUCTURE

The literature on interorganizational relationships provides a clue to the way to conceptualize the nature of interfaces among centers of power in a community, but only a clue, because communities are much more open systems than are organizations. Most of the literature on interorganizational relationships assumes that an "organization-set," in William Evan's (1966) term, can be defined with some precision: i.e., the network of organizations which provide the environment of any given organization. Evan's key unit of analysis is the "focal organization" (any particular organization within an organization-set), not the characteristics of organization-sets themselves, except insofar as there are consequences for the focal organization. If the city government were regarded as the focal organization, his article provides some useful hypotheses about the ways in which it would be affected by certain configurations of community organizations.

The term interface has been used to refer to the forms of interaction of the boundaries between organizations, but little attention
has been paid to the consequences for future relationships of past interactions (cf. Guetzkow, 1966). With regard to the consequences of conflict between organizations, Guetzkow (1966: 30) notes that "future interactions among organizations may be powerfully influenced by ...earlier struggles." The kinds of institutionalization of interaction with which he deals, such as union-management collective bargaining, certainly take place among many community organizations, and yet, although the past interactions between a number of community groups may have been intermittent and fleeting, and thus failed to lead to sustained contacts, real connections may exist which can be drawn upon by a group or an organization. Such contacts or connections probably do not justify the term "institutionalized" because they are not continuous and regularized.

The concept of exchanges between organizations as an important element of interorganizational relationships has recently been developed. But the consequences of those exchanges for the development of community interfaces in the sense that we mean the term have not been assessed (cf. Levine and White, 1961). Exchanges have been defined as "voluntary activity between two organizations which has consequences...for the realization of their respective...objectives" (cf. Levine and White, 1961: 588). These authors are mainly concerned with the internal consequences of exchanges and emphasize exchanges of clients, labor services, money, equipment and information. They do not emphasize the kinds of exchanges of concern to us such as agency council meetings and cooperation in fund raising.
A recent study has resulted in some suggestions about the nature of the development and character of the organizational interfaces in a community (Aiken and Hage, 1968). A study of 16 welfare organizations in Milwaukee (Wis.) found that the number of joint programs between the agencies was associated with the occupational diversity of the organization. It was argued that this brought about a greater need for resources, which led to a search for external resources. One manifestation of this was the establishment of joint programs with other organizations. The internal consequence for these interorganizational involvements was a high number of committees and frequent committee meetings. The reason for the development of joint programs are irrelevant in the present context, but the consequences are relevant, because welfare organizations can be regarded as independent centers of power, and a joint program as an interface.

The "attachments" of community members to groups and organizations are the other side of the coin of centers of power and their interfaces. Citizens are attached to groups, but the aggregate of those attachments constitutes one of the basic resources defining the very existence of a center of power. The willingness of citizens to commit their votes, their contributions, their time, and their support to specific groups or organizations is a fundamental resource. But the term is too abstract and general to suffice as a description of either the consequences or the causes of those attachments. The process of becoming attached to a group or to a community and of remaining attached or severing an attachment may be an important variable, but it does not substitute for either a description of the centers of power which
are the object of those attachments or an analysis of the conditions under which centers of power can utilize those attachments as political resources (cf. Coleman, 1957; and Pinard, 1963).

AGE, SIZE, AND COMMUNITY STRUCTURE

We shall use the size of a city and its age (as measured by the decade in which it reached 10,000 population) as the gross indicators of the numbers of centers of power likely to exist and the number and development of interfaces between them. In this section, we shall justify our choice of these indicators. See Schnore (1965), Schnore and Evenson (1966) for other studies of correlates of the age of U.S. cities.

The size of a city measures the probability of the existence of greater numbers of centers of power. Larger cities are more structurally differentiated in a great variety of ways, and we assume that this structural differentiation creates a base for the expression and organization of political and social demands upon authoritative agencies. The age of a city is an indicator of the probability of historical development of interfaces between centers of power. We assume that the longer a population has been established on a given territorial site, the more chances of positive interactions between centers of power. Age and size are themselves closely related characteristics of cities \( r = .54 \), and for purposes of our argument we shall assume that they operate jointly to indicate the numbers of centers of power and the interfaces between them, because we shall not attempt at this point to distinguish empirically or theoretically between these two aspects.
of community structure. It is conceivable that a community with few centers of power but many interfaces might function very much the same as one with many centers of power but few interfaces, but we shall neglect that complication in this paper.

The credibility of age and size as indicators of the number of centers of power is enhanced by their correlates with a number of other socioeconomic and political characteristics. We can summarize these factors as those relating to the heterogeneity of a city, the amount of political access allowed by its political structures, the level of governmental bureaucratization, and the level of population stability.

The greater the social heterogeneity of a city—the number of ethnic groups residing in a city, the number of class homogeneous neighborhoods, the number of distinct industries with varying levels of union and business organization—the greater the number of centers of power that are likely to exist. Larger cities are likely to have a greater diversity of social and economic composition, and therefore more of a structural basis for the development of centers of power. We do not assume that the presence of a large number of foreign-born persons, for example, necessarily means that a center of power must exist, but only that there is a significant probability that one will develop with such a social base present in the city.

Ethnic and religious diversity may be regarded as sources of centers of power distinct from income, educational and occupational diversity, although in many cities the same groups may hold the same occupations, have similar levels of income, and share similar ethnic and religious backgrounds or memberships. Despite high demographic correlations of
these characteristics, they may contribute quite independently to the existence of separate centers of power. The fact that the social base of an Irish Catholic, union-organized, working-class community is composed of exactly the same people does not rule out the probability that there are four separate structural sources of centers of power involved: ethnic organizations, religious organizations, unions, and neighborhood groups. This point is important because it indicates that gross census statistics may be an inadequate clue to the structural sources of centers of power in a community.

Thus, we would hypothesize that a young, small, middle-class, residential suburb would have fewer centers of power than any other type of city. Because it is middle class, and therefore relatively well-off, its population has fewer incentives to develop centers of power which can be used for political and economic ends. Because it is residential, it lacks the sources of cleavage between commercial, industrial, and neighborhood interests which would result in the development of independent centers of power based upon those cleavages. Because it is a suburb, it cannot become the focus of those special political interests which focus upon the government of an entire urban area or its central city, and which we regard as yet another independent center of power. Because it is young, those potential sources of social, economic and political cleavage which do exist have not had time to develop internal cohesion, communication, and that definition of their values and interests which we essentially mean by a center of power. Because it is small, it lacks the basic structural differentiation of economic interest groups which provides the basis for the organization of centers of power.
At the other extreme, an old, large, industrial, central city would be expected to have the greatest number of centers of power, for just the reverse reasons. And we find that the correlations of the age of American cities with other socioeconomic and political characteristics are consistent with this general picture. The decade in which a city reached 10,000 population is associated with its having more children in private schools (a crude indicator of religious composition, $r=.34$), more persons of foreign stock and foreign birth ($r=.13$), a population with lower median education ($r=.44$), lower median income ($r=.37$), fewer professionals ($r=.32$), and with its being a central city rather than a suburb ($r=.45$). The correlations of the size of a city with these characteristics are similar in magnitude.

But the mere existence of greater numbers of centers of power is not enough to be able to predict the mobilization of a community. The interfaces between centers of power at some time in the past produce a state of affairs in the community which may not be visible at any given time, but it may be a vitally important structural property of the community political system. We have already noted that we do not mean simply the contemporary contacts of officials or activists in one organization with those in another, but rather the potential for contacts based on the history of such contacts and shared experiences in past political battles. Such shared experiences lead to "reputations" for reliability, participation, possession of certain resources, and principled or unprincipled positions, which come to be properties of a center of power independent of who the incumbents of offices happen to be at the present time (Gamson, 1966). Incumbents may change the
character of established relationships by their actions, but from our vantage point, we are interested only in the probabilities that such interfaces exist, not in the probabilities that incumbents can alter them.

The age of a city is an important indicator of the interfaces as well as the number of centers of power. The sheer length of time a city has been in existence is probably directly related to a high probability that centers of power have established relationships with each other which have become resources upon which they can draw when deciding how, when, and what to act upon in decision-making situations. Again, the age of a city is related to other characteristics which themselves should have the consequence of increasing the number of interfaces between centers of power.

Population stability is another such characteristic. The less mobile the population of a community, the more likely there is to be historical continuity of the relationships between its structural units. Highly mobile cities probably have, to put the point the other way around, a high turnover of key personnel in important centers of power, with the consequence of inadequate socialization of replacements into the network of interorganizational communications. Discontinuities and breaks of interfaces thus are more likely in highly mobile cities.

In the United States, older cities experienced a high level of out-migration between 1950 and 1960 (r=.46). During the same period, these cities also experienced lower rates of in-migration, and therefore lower rates of population growth. (The decade in which a city reached 10,000 population is correlated .48 with its increasing or
decreasing in population between 1950 and 1960, Older cities are thus those which possess a "residual" population which, we assume, are more likely to exhibit continuity of attachments to centers of power and a greater number of interfaces between those centers of power. We shall not consider population stability as a separate variable in the empirical analysis to follow, because almost all of its effect is subsumed under that of age and size.

Political structures which allow easy establishment of interface relationships are another characteristic of cities which may be associated with the age of a city. If we are correct in our argument thus far, cities with more centers of power and more interfaces between them should possess channels of access of groups to each other. The causal relationship is probably one of a feedback. If centers of power exist over a long period of time, the political structures which come into existence are probably those which serve to facilitate their exchanges and contacts. But once in existence, those political structures would sustain the interface relationships by providing established and institutionalized channels of access.

Some literature exists on the political functions of various aspects of the governmental structures of American cities which allows us to infer that the "nonreform" institutions are those which allow maximum access of centers of power to each other. Cities which have a high number of councilmen, elected by wards, which have a mayor-council rather than council-manager form of government, and which have partisan elections, are probably those whose structures most readily facilitate the establishment and the institutionalization of interfaces between centers of power. Our reasoning is as follows.
The city council may be regarded as a broker between various centers of power in a community. When elected, members of the council are direct representatives both of single centers or of coalitions of centers or they become representatives after being elected, even if they originally won on the basis of appeal to city-wide interests or on the basis of their personalities. The more councilmen there are, the more sources of contact there are between centers of power who wish to negotiate arrangements or bargains or to form a coalition. Although a given councilman may leave office, the interface established between two centers of power will not be broken by his departure, but either will be maintained by other means, or new contacts will be sought with another councilman. Even if no direct connection is maintained, the fact that at some point in the past such an interface has been established remains a structural property of the relationship between two centers of power. The crux of our argument is that such seemingly latent relationships constitute perhaps the most important property influencing the aggregate potential for mobilization of a community.

Election of councilmen by wards rather than at large is another structural property which may be conducive to the elaboration and reinforcement of interface relationships between centers of power. Where councilmen are regarded as representatives of neighborhoods, a wide variety of interests which have territorial significance in a community may regard him as an agent for contact and communication of their wishes or demands. If he is regarded only as an instrument of city-wide public interests, or, to put it another way, as a member of a board responsible to autonomously defined goals for the city as a
whole rather than to member constituencies, then his person and his office are less likely to become intervening links in a chain of interface relationships.

The mayor-council rather than manager form of government performs a similar function. Although a city manager may perform brokerage functions, as is now popular to assume in the public administration literature, by professional training and attachments he is less likely to be the agent for contacts between centers of power than the mayor, who is expressly elected to represent a number of constituencies.

Partisan elections may provide a double source of interface establishment and maintenance. On the one hand, the fact that candidates bear a party label provides an additional clue about their potential policy positions and alliances which may cause community groups to communicate with them about their own policy preferences, and through them, to other groups who may, on a given issue, form a coalition around a single councilman or a number of them. On the other hand, partisan elections may stimulate the development of party organization (or vice versa—we are not concerned here with the direction of causation). The party organization is, at the same time a center of power in its own right and also a source of contacts and communication between groups which seek to use the political parties as vehicles for the achievement of their goals. Political parties are, in American society at least, the essence of a brokerage institution, and the existence of features of political institutions such as partisan elections increases the probability that organizations which provide channels of access and communication between groups will come into existence.
The relationship between the age of a city and a variety of these different indicators of political structure is consistent with our argument. Older cities are more likely to have a large number of councilmen \((r=.41)\), councilmen elected by wards \((r=.16)\), a mayor-council form of government \((r=.27)\) and partisan elections \((r=.24)\). Regardless of whether these cities adopted their political structures in an historical era in which they were the fashion, or whether these structures were adopted by communities with many centers of power seeking contact with each other, it is clear that cities with the greatest historical continuity, with stability of a residual population, and with social and economic heterogeneity, are also more likely to have political institutions conducive to the maintenance of a large number of interface relationships between their centers of power.

The level of bureaucratization of the local government is a last major factor which we shall consider among those likely to increase the number of interface relationships between centers of power in a community. As we use the term, bureaucratization refers to the number of specialized agencies within the local government, and to the size of the governmental labor force. From the point of view of centers of power and their interfaces, we assume that the extension of bureaucratization both establishes new centers of power within a community and increases the probabilities of interfaces between those centers. Bureaucratic agencies and professional specialists constitute an interest group in their own right within a local government. Such agencies are not merely instruments of policy established by the city council, but exert an independent influence upon policy formation. In
this important sense, they constitute one or more centers of power. But local bureaucrats are also part of the system of interfaces between other centers of power. They serve as brokers between social and political groups, receiving demands, negotiating between competing groups, and formulating compromises. These functions are the consequence of their strategic location in local government, as they are (by definition) the only full-time officials of that government. But most crucial for our present argument, a further consequence of their activities is to establish contacts between themselves and other groups in the community, and through them, between other groups directly. Thus, regardless of their own interests, local bureaucrats serve to establish and strengthen the interfaces between various centers of power.

Although it is not obvious why this should be the case, and it is beyond our scope to treat this question here, older cities are more likely to be bureaucratized, according to the measures we employ. Older cities have more civil service coverage ($r=.12$) and more city employees (regardless of population size, $r=.48$), and are more likely to have a capital budget ($r=.09$) and a full-time personnel officer ($r=.25$). All of these characteristics can be regarded as causes, consequences, or direct measures of bureaucratization. Given our previous argument and findings, bureaucratization may flow from the greater numbers of centers of power in a community making demands upon local government. Once a process of bureaucratization has begun in such a community, it may be a self-generating phenomenon. If bureaucratic officials do serve as contacts and channels of access between
groups and government, the availability of such channels may serve to generate new demands, resulting in the expansion of government to respond to them. We have no data directly bearing on such processes, but the data we do have are consistent with these inferences.

To summarize, we have found that a large number of correlates of the age and size of American cities are consistent with an assumption that larger and older cities are likely to have a greater number of centers of power and a greater number of interface relationships between those centers. Greater size in and of itself means a probability of greater diversity and structural differentiation, along many dimensions. Older and larger cities are more likely to be industrial central cities with socially and economically heterogeneous populations. All of these characteristics, we have argued, are likely to lead to the emergence of more centers of power. But in addition, older cities have a more stable residual population and have political and administrative structures that are conducive to the elaboration and maintenance of contacts and communications between the centers of power—more conducive, that is, to the development of interfaces.

The model of historical development of centers of power and their interfaces in American cities which we are suggesting is theoretically analogous to the concept of a "cohort" (Ryder, 1965). Cities which developed at a certain period may be regarded as having undergone a distinctive set of experiences, associated with the state of technology, ethnic and religious origins of its population, and legitimate political forms characteristic or dominant at that particular time. Future cities, even if similar in size and industrialization, may differ in systematic
ways just because of their exposure to a different set of "experiences." We do not know at this point, and it is irrelevant to our present argument, to what extent that dates of establishment and early development of American cities stamped them with a character not likely to be reproduced later when newer cities reach the same age. But even given the few factors already mentioned such as changing technology, social origins of the population, and shifting legitimacy of political structures, it seems likely that the sheer age and size of a city alone do not account for the distinctive interrelationships of many city characteristics. We are unable with our data to distinguish the truly historically unique effects of developing in a certain epoch from those effects which take place over time as cities grow larger and older (and are therefore "historical" effects) but are not rooted in the soil of particular places at particular times.

THE WAR ON POVERTY AND COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION

We have chosen as our measure of a community's capacity to mobilize its resources for a collective decision the per capita dollar amounts allocated to each city from the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) during the first two years of the program, August 20, 1964, to June 30, 1966. Sargent Shriver, Director of the OEO, announced the first 120 projects on November 24, 1964. During these first two years of the program, a total of approximately $2.6 billion was appropriated by the United States Congress, $0.8 billion during fiscal 1965 and $1.8 billion during fiscal 1966. The bill creating the OEO permitted the governor of a state to veto Job Corps camps in his state and those
anti-poverty projects contracted between the federal government and a private agency. The following year, however, the Director of OEO was given the authority to override any veto by a governor. Thus, the state government had little opportunity to veto decisions made in a local community.

Federal poverty dollars include allocations for a variety of programs: Neighborhood Youth Corps, Community Action Programs, Headstart, and others initiated by a wide variety of community groups. In most cases, these programs did not require, at that stage, the active concurrence of the local government. We have chosen this measure because it is most easily quantified, shows a wide distribution from city to city, and summarizes the general level of participation by the city in all of the poverty programs. But we may note that the presence or absence of any poverty programs at all in a community and the numbers of such programs per 10,000 population show basically similar relationships with all of the factors considered in this paper. We are thus dealing with a general predisposition of the community which is not created by some arbitrary choice of a measure of participation in Federal poverty programs.

We have eliminated Job Corps programs because these were largely initiated and organized by Federal officials. Other types of poverty programs may have been encouraged by Federal officials, but a certain degree of independent initiative was required by community groups before any program could begin. This is particularly true in the first two years of OEO's existence, before a network of officials and agencies was established which made the job of applying for money much easier,
after model applications were available and after a corps of Federal and state officials committed to developing programs within their own jurisdictions came into existence.

The sum total of poverty programs and money obtained or established by a community corresponds to what Banfield (1961) called a "social choice" outcome. Although a particular program might well have been initiated by a particular organization, the level of program development in the entire community, in the case of this particular type of Federal program, cannot be regarded as the outcome of the efforts of a single organization, but must be viewed as the result of the collective actions of a number of groups. In many cases (perhaps most) individual groups may well have acted without knowledge of what other groups were doing. A group of mothers applying for Headstart money may have known nothing about the activities of a corporation sponsoring a Job Corps program, a YMCA seeking a Neighborhood Youth Corps project, or an NAACP chapter organizing a Community Action Program. Because none of these poverty programs had to be channeled through the local government, at least in the period of time we refer to, little direct and immediate coordination of efforts was required. To use Warren's term (1967: 400-01), the kind of "community decision organization" exemplified here is concerned with solving a common community problem which may manifest itself in a variety of ways, but not with producing an overriding set of leaders able to at least partially influence the behavior of subordinate organizational units.

That the processes about which these theoretical comments are made are actually central to the decision-making situations in poverty
programs is illustrated by several of the case studies beginning to be published. However, none of the authors present theories explaining their observations. One such case study is of the establishment of a poverty program in Topeka, Kansas (Zurcher and Key, 1968). Neighborhood committees were established in "target neighborhoods." In addition to Study Committees consisting of residents from target neighborhoods, other residents, and relevant professionals, there was also created a Board, consisting of representatives of neighborhood committees, Study Committees, and local agencies. The authors quote the chairman of one of the neighborhood committees as saying that "...we don't know what's going on, what's available; we just don't know the techniques for using community services and local government like other people do" (Zurcher and Key, 1968: 93). They describe the consequences of face-to-face contacts of poor groups with city officials. Such contacts were intended to establish confidence and provide necessary information which would enable the poor groups to use available political resources effectively. Clearly the authors are describing the development of interfaces, although they are not labeled with separate concepts (cf., Zurcher, 1967).

Participation by American cities in poverty programs has significance both in its own right, as a significant object of investigation, and also as an instance of the general capacity for mobilization of a community. The latter, more general perspective is the one which is of most theoretical relevance, but the substantive focus on poverty programs leads us to consider a number of specific factors which may be associated with the participation of a city in such programs, most
obviously, the need of the population. To our knowledge, no studies exist of the factors related to participation in poverty programs, although some descriptions of the various programs have been written (Kravitz, 1968; Hallman, 1968).

SOURCES OF DATA

The community units included in this analysis are the 676 incorporated urban places of population size 25,000 or more in 1960. Thus, this analysis is based on the population of these cities.

The number of poverty dollars per capita was taken from Information Book as of June 30, 1966, Office of Economic Opportunity, Washington, D. C., 1966. The number of poverty dollars in each community unit was abstracted from this book, and this total was then standardized by population size. City scores varied from 0, i.e., some cities had received no poverty dollars, to $48.02 per citizen, with a mean of $3.62 and a standard deviation of $5.59. Since this measure was so skewed toward the upper end of the distribution, we transformed the distribution into its natural logarithm (adding a constant of one cent), yielding a distribution slightly skewed toward the lower end of the scale. This distribution varies from zero to 8.48 with a mean of 4.01 and a standard deviation of 2.57. Relationships between the independent variable and the transformed variable yields results quite similar to the natural logarithm transformation, although the magnitude of some variables is changed somewhat.

The other community attributes included in this study were taken from the following three sources: the 1960 Census of Population, the
1962 County and City Data Book, published by the U. S. Census, and
The Municipal Year Books of 1963 and 1967, published by the International
City Manager's Association. For three of the independent variables in
this study that were also skewed toward the upper end of the distribu-
tion (population size, per cent of total population that is nonwhite,
and per cent of the adult population with less than five years educa-
tion), were also transformed to their natural logarithm. These trans-
formations and other information about the construction or alteration
of variables are described as the variables are introduced.

FINDINGS

Age and Size of City. If the previously developed reasoning is
correct, the variables of age of city (a gross, but nevertheless appro-
priate, indicator of the number of interfaces among centers of power)
and city size (an equally gross indicator of the number of centers of
power in a community) should be strongly related to our measure of
community mobilization; the average number of poverty dollars per
capita in a community.

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Table 1 About Here
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The age of the city is measured by the census year the city reached
10,000 population. Some of the youngest cities did not reach that size
until the decade between 1950 and 1960; such young cities would be
given a score of 1960. Other older cities were already that size by
1790. Thus, a high score on this variable means a young city; a low
score means an old city. As shown in Table 1, there is a very strong
negative relationship between the age of the city and the number of poverty dollars per capita (r = -.48). This means that it is the older cities—that is those which we have argued have more interfaces—which have been more successful in mobilization efforts to obtain this type of external resource.

We have argued previously that the size of a city is an indicator of the number of centers of power. We have made a natural logarithm transformation of the variable of population size of these cities in 1960, and have used this transformed variable in regression analyses here since this variable is unusually highly skewed toward the upper end of this scale. That is, the few very large cities in the United States yield unusually extreme values for this variable. While the natural logarithm transformation reduces this unusual skewness considerably, there is still considerable skewness toward the upper end of the distribution even after the transformation. There is a strong positive relationship between city size and the number of poverty dollars per capita (r = .37). That is, the larger cities, those with more centers of power, have more successfully mobilized themselves to get federal poverty money.

Since the data in this study are based on a total universe of cities, i.e., there were only 676 incorporated urban places of size 25,000 or more in the United States in 1960, one may question our use of statistical tests of significance. Statistical tests are still appropriate and are used in this paper since there is the possibility that the observations here were produced by errors of measurement (cf., Stinchcombe, 1968: 23).
These two variables, age and size of city, can together explain almost 25 per cent of the variance in the dependent variable of poverty dollars per capita. This raises the question of the relative contribution of these two variables in explaining this dependent variable. The age and size of city are themselves interrelated \((r = -0.54)\), that is older cities tend to be larger cities. If we square the zero order correlations with the dependent variable of each of these two variables, then we find that age of city alone can explain 22.8 per cent of the variance in poverty dollars while size alone can explain 13.8 per cent of the variance. These two variables together explain 24.66 per cent of the variance in poverty dollars. Size uniquely accounts for another 1.9 per cent of the variance after age has entered the regression analysis, while age uniquely accounts for another 10.9 per cent of the variance after size alone has been entered. Clearly, the unique contribution of age of city in explaining the number of poverty dollars per capita is far greater than that of city size, and clearly age of city is something quite different from city size. These findings are presented in two additional ways in Table 2: partial correlations and a multiple regression. The partial correlation coefficient between age of city and poverty dollars per capita is \(-0.35\) after city size is controlled; the partial correlation coefficient of city size with the poverty measure is only \(0.16\) when age of city is partialed out, however. Similarly the \(t\)-tests for the regression coefficients also show that both variables make statistically significant and thus independent contributions in explaining the dependent variable, number of poverty dollars per capita. (See Table 1).
The question could be raised of whether these relationships, especially that of age of city with poverty dollars, simply reflect regional differences and would be removed if region were somehow taken into account. As shown in Table 2, there are quite striking differences in the mean age of city as well as in the mean poverty dollars per capita by region. Cities located in the Northeast are older and have more poverty dollars per capita while those located in the Far West are on the average the youngest and have the fewest poverty dollars per capita. There are also some large differences in average size of cities by region, although the effect of region on the relationship between city size and poverty dollars is less obvious.

As shown in Table 2, the strong association of age of city and city size with the number of poverty dollars per capita is also strong among cities within each of the four regions. These data show that the previously observed relationship between city age and size and the mobilization measure is not a function of regional differences in these variables.

In computing the correlation coefficients in Table 2 we used the natural logarithm transformation of city size and number of poverty dollars per capita, although we have shown the means of the untransformed variables since the transformed variables have less intuitive meaning. The regional means of the transformed variable of poverty dollars shows similar regional differences, although there is little difference in the means by region of the logarithm transformation of city size.
Our indicators of the number of centers of power (city size) and the nature and quality of interfaces among them (age of city) both have strong relationships with our mobilization measure, but the measure of the nature of those interfaces is a much more powerful predictor.

Need for Poverty Programs. A plausible interpretation of the previous finding might be that older and larger cities are more successful in mobilization efforts relating to the problems of poverty precisely because they have a greater need for such poverty programs. And indeed these older, larger cities do have a greater need using the following six indicators: (1) per cent of families with incomes of less than $3,000 per year; (2) median family income; (3) per cent of adults over 25 years of age with less than five years of education (the natural logarithm was taken after adding a constant of one per cent, since the distribution is so skewed); (4) per cent with four years of high school education; (5) per cent of 14 to 17 year olds in school; and (6) per cent unemployed. According to these indicators the larger and older cities have more poverty families, more poorly educated adults, more unemployment, fewer adolescents (ages 14 to 17) in high school, lower median family income, and fewer with a high school education. The younger, smaller cities have just the opposite characteristics.

Looking at the relationship of each of these six indicators of need to the mobilization measure, we see that in each case the greater the need, the higher the mobilization; the lower the need, the less the mobilization to obtain poverty funds (see Table 3). Each of these six indicators of need is significantly related to the mobilization measure. When partial correlations are computed, controlling for the other five
indicators of need, the relationships are somewhat attenuated, and in two cases—per cent of families with incomes of less than $3,000 per year and per cent with four years of high school—the partial correlations are reversed.

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Table 3 About Here
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A multiple regression of these six indicators of need with the mobilization measure is also presented in Table 3. Together, these six variables can account for 19.29 per cent of the variation in poverty dollars per capita, and each of the six variables makes an independent contribution to the explanation of poverty dollars, i.e., the t value of each of the six regression coefficients is statistically significant. Thus, each of these six need variables independently helps to explain the mobilization measure to some extent.

Such findings as these raise the possibility that these indicators of need, either jointly or individually, might account for the previously discussed relationships between age and size of cities and the mobilization measure. However, if we compute the partial correlation between each of these two variables and the mobilization measure, controlling simultaneously for the six indicators of need, the zero-order relationships shown in Table 2 are only slightly reduced. That is, the partial correlations between the mobilization measure—number of poverty dollars per capita—and age of city and size of city controlling for the six indicators of need, are only slightly less than the zero-order relationships shown in Table 2 ($r_p = -.42$ and $r_p = .34$, respectively).
The variable of the age of city, our indicator of the quality of community interfaces, alone can explain an additional 13.22 per cent of variance in the mobilization measure after the six indicators of need have explained all they can. That is, the indicators of need can explain only 19.29 per cent of the variance in poverty dollars per capita, but these six indicators of need together with the age of the city can explain 33.51 per cent of the variance in this variable. In a similar way, the city size can explain an additional 8.29 per cent in poverty dollars per capita, and these two variables together, i.e., age and size of city, can explain an additional 15.59 per cent of the variance in our dependent variable after the six indicators of need have operated.

Thus, the relationships between both age and size of city and the mobilization variable are hardly functions of the need for poverty funds as measured by these indicators. We conclude that while the need for poverty funds is clearly an important factor in accounting for a community's success in mobilization efforts, it is hardly a sufficient explanation of mobilization successes. The age of a city and its size are factors that are importantly related to successful mobilization, and they are not surrogates for the need measures that we have introduced here.

Heterogeneity of Community Systems. In the discussion at the outset of this paper we indicated that older and larger cities were also more diversified and heterogeneous. There are three aspects of heterogeneity that are used here: degree of ethnicity, prevalence of Catholics and other religious groups, and race. The first indicator of heterogeneity is the percent of the native population that is of
foreign or mixed parentage (referred to hereafter as foreign stock). This is essentially a measure of the prevalence of second generation and older ethnic groups in a community. This measure was used in preference to foreign born because of its higher frequency in American cities at present (the mean for the 676 cities is only 5.5 per cent foreign born) and because it is more likely to represent the presence of ethnic elements than the foreign born measure. The second indicator of heterogeneity is measured by the per cent of elementary school children in private schools. Most private schools in the United States are Catholic parochial schools, although other religious groups likewise have private schools. This measure reflects the degree to which there is some segmentation of religious groups in a community, and, of course, more often this is a gross indicator of Catholic influence. Finally, the last measure of heterogeneity is the per cent of population that is nonwhite. In other words, this measure reflects the preponderance of Negroes in a community. Since this variable is highly skewed toward the upper end of the scale, we have transformed the variable into its natural logarithm. This transformation yields a distribution that is approximately normal.

Of the three measures of heterogeneity, only the per cent nonwhite is strongly related to the mobilization measure. The greater the proportion of nonwhites in a population, the higher the poverty dollars per capita in a community \((r = .35)\). There is no relationship of the variables of per cent in private schools and per cent foreign stock with the mobilization measure.
When partial correlations are computed for each of these three indicators of heterogeneity, controlling for the other two, we find that the magnitude of the partial correlations is greater than of the zero-order relations for each of these variables, although the per cent of nonwhite is clearly the most strongly related to the mobilization measure. In the multiple regression analysis, these three measures explain 15.68 per cent of the variance in poverty dollars, but most of this is contributed by the nonwhite measure. However, the beta coefficients of each of the three indicators of heterogeneity attain either significance or near significance. This suggests that the absence of a zero-order relationship of per cent in private schools and per cent foreign stock with poverty dollars per capita does not mean a lack of a relationship, but rather a disguised one. At the same time, it is clear that it is the heterogeneity of race rather than that of ethnicity and Catholicism that is most importantly related to the mobilization measure.

Returning to the question of the key variables of age and size of city, the relationship between each of these variables and the mobilization measure is not simply a function of heterogeneity. That is, while the per cent nonwhite, per cent in private schools, and per cent foreign stock is greater in the older and larger cities, the previously observed relationships between each of these two variables and the mobilization measure remain strong when the effect of heterogeneity is removed. That is, the partial correlations between poverty dollars
and age of city and city size remain strong when these three indicators of heterogeneity are simultaneously controlled ($r_p = -.40$ and $r_p = .25$, respectively). Concomitantly, age of city can explain an additional 13.48 per cent of the variation in poverty dollars and city size can explain an additional 5.46 per cent of variance in the mobilization measure. Together they can explain 14.13 per cent of the variation in this measure. Thus, the very strong relationships of city size and age with mobilization is not simply a function of greater heterogeneity in such cities, although heterogeneity, especially the proportion nonwhite, is a factor importantly related to mobilization. Clearly city size and age make contributions to the explanation of successful mobilization efforts independent of the degree of heterogeneity in a community.

**Bureaucratization of City Government.** We have previously argued that the bureaucratization of city government both establishes new centers of power within communities and increases the probabilities of interfaces. Therefore, the measures of bureaucratization should be positively related to our mobilization measure. There are three measures of bureaucratization of city government used here: (1) the number of city employees per 1,000 population; (2) the absence or presence of a full-time personnel officer in city government; and (3) the absence or presence of a capital budget for the city government. The first is a measure of the extensiveness of the city bureaucracy; the more extensive the city bureaucracy, the more likely that it can serve to establish interfaces among various power centers. The presence of a full-time personnel officer and a capital budget are important since they suggest an elaboration of the bureaucratic structure.
Each of these three indicators of bureaucratization is positively and significantly related to the amount of poverty dollars obtained. That is, cities with more city employees per 1,000 citizens, with a full-time personnel officer, and with a capital budget have been more successful in mobilization efforts than cities having less bureaucratization as measured by these three indicators.

Only in the case of the number of city employees per 1,000 do we have complete information for all of our cities. In the case of the variables of absence or presence of a full-time personnel officer and of a capital budget, data are missing on a large number of cities (see Table 5). Thus, a multiple regression analysis which enters these three independent variables is inappropriate unless we include only those cities for which we have complete information. The question of the representativeness of the remaining cities would be sufficiently questionable to justify foregoing such an analysis. Therefore, we do not present a multiple regression analysis for this set of measures.

We did compute partial correlations between the age and size of city and the mobilization measure, controlling for the number of city employees per 1,000, however. As in previous instances of such partial correlations, the partial correlation coefficients of age of city and city size with the mobilization measure are only slightly reduced when this indicator of bureaucratization is controlled ($r_p = -.38$ and $r_p = .32$, respectively).
Another way to examine this question of independent effects is to examine the amounts of variance that can be explained by these variables. The measure of city employees per 1,000 population alone can explain 11.12 per cent of the variation in the poverty dollars measure. This is simply the square of the zero-order relationship between these two variables. The age of the city can explain an additional 12.98 per cent of the variation in poverty dollars to that explained by city employees per 1,000, and city size alone can explain an additional 8.93 per cent of the variation to that explained by city employees per 1,000. Together age and city size can explain an additional 14.93 per cent of the variation in the mobilization measure to that explained by number of city employees per 1,000.

The degree of bureaucratization of city government is positively related to the number of poverty dollars per capita (even when city size and age are controlled), but the relationships of age of city and city size with the mobilization measure also remain when the indicator of bureaucratization is controlled. We conclude that each of these factors makes some independent contribution to the explanation of the mobilization measure, although these measures themselves are clearly interrelated.

**Political Structure.** Older and larger American cities are less likely to have elements of reform government, i.e., they are more likely to have mayor-council governments, elections by ward, and large city councils. Again logic would suggest the possibility that these factors may be strongly associated with our mobilization measure and that the reason for the previously observed relationships of age of city and
city size with the mobilization measure is simply that a nonreformed city government may be more likely to need resources to distribute as patronage, and, therefore, more likely to be cities in which mobilization efforts are successful. One could equally argue for just the opposite point of view, i.e., that reform city governments are more efficient and therefore more likely to achieve mobilization in order to attempt to solve local community problems.

There are four characteristics of the political structure that we examine here: (1) the absence or presence of a city-manager form of government; (2) the absence or presence of nonpartisan elections; (3) the per cent of the city council elected at large; and (4) the size of the city council. Reformist city governmental structures have smaller city councils, nonpartisan and at-large elections, and a city manager.

The first line of reasoning outlined above seems to be supported by the data here, i.e., it is cities with "nonreform" municipal governments that have higher rates of success on the mobilization measure, i.e. have more poverty dollars per capita. That is, there are negative relationships between presence of city manager government (r = -.12) as well as nonpartisan elections (r = -.12) and poverty dollars and a positive relationship between the number of city councilmen and the mobilization measure (r = .19). The per cent of the city council elected at large has a weak, negative relationship with the output measure (r = -.06).
When partial correlations between each of these attributes of the political structure and the mobilization measure are computed, controlling for the other three, we find that the relationships of city-manager government as well as presence of nonpartisan elections with the mobilization measure are reduced somewhat, the previously observed relationship between number of city councilmen and the mobilization measure is unaltered, and the relationship between per cent elected at large and the mobilization measure is reversed (see Table 6).

The multiple regression analysis of these four indicators of political structure with the mobilization measure is also shown in Table 6. Taken together, these four indicators of political structure can account for only 5.35 per cent of the variation in the number of poverty dollars per capita. Thus, this cluster of indicators is the weakest of all those we have examined here, i.e., this cluster can explain less variance in the mobilization measure than need, heterogeneity, bureaucratization of city government, and city age and size.

The age of the city can account for an additional 17.51 per cent in the explanation of poverty dollars after the political attributes have entered the regression analysis. City size alone can account for an additional 10.25 per cent of variance in poverty dollars. And together city size and age can account for an additional 19.43 per cent of the variation in the mobilization measure after the indicators of political structure have entered the regression analysis. Thus these attributes of the political structure are not particularly strongly related to the mobilization measure in comparison to other factors, especially those of city size and age, and, at minimum, the
characteristics of the formal political structure are neither very efficient nor very powerful predictors.

Naturally, when the partial correlation coefficients between age of city and city size and poverty dollars are computed, controlling simultaneously for these four characteristics of the political structure, the previously observed zero-order relationships are only slightly reduced ($r_p = -0.43$ and $r_p = 0.33$ respectively). Thus, age of a city and city size are not surrogates for indicators of the formal political structure, although these factors are clearly related.

Community Structure and Mobilization. In the previous discussion we have systematically examined the relationships of five clusters of community attributes—city age and size, need for poverty funds, heterogeneity, bureaucratization of city government, and the formal political structure—with the number of poverty dollars per capita, our measure of community mobilization. In each case we examined the interrelationships of the variables in each of these clusters with the mobilization measure, determined the amount of variance that could be explained by each of these clusters alone, examined the relationships of age of city and city size to poverty dollars after each cluster was partialled out, and determined the additional amount of variance that could be explained by city age and size after each cluster alone had entered the regression analysis.

The strategy was to determine if city size and age were nothing more than surrogates for current states of the community system as measured by heterogeneity, need, bureaucratization of city government, and the formal political structure. In each case, city age and size
could explain some additional variance in poverty dollars that could not be accounted for by each of these clusters alone. In other words, city size and age seem to act as surrogates for some attributes of the community system for which we do not have direct measures. On the other hand, there is still the logical possibility that if all of these factors which reflect current attributes of the community system were simultaneously controlled, they would exhaust the surrogate potential of the variables of city size and age. Thus, there are two additional, but related, questions that we must ask about these data: (1) Is there still a relationship between the age of the city and the city size and the mobilization measure if all of these factors are simultaneously controlled? (2) Can the variables of city size and age explain any additional variance in poverty dollars after all of these factors have first entered the regression analysis? In other words, all the variance that is jointly explained by the cluster of city size and age and the other clusters is being allocated to these other clusters to see if city size and age are capturing anything additional about the current state of the community system. City age and size are thus considered to be surrogates for any number of aspects of the current state of the community system. If the variables of city size and age can explain no additional variance in the mobilization measure after the variables that reflect more directly the current state of the community system have entered the regression analysis, then we would conclude that city size and age are perhaps efficient predictors of the mobilization measure (since they indiscriminantly summarize many aspects of the current state of community system), and that, theoretically, they are
helpful but not essential. On the other hand, if they are able to explain additional variance in the mobilization measure, then they are acting as surrogates for some aspects of the current state of the community system for which we have no very direct measures.

We attempt to answer these questions with a regression analysis in which indicators of city size and age, need, heterogeneity, bureaucratization, and political structure are included, as shown in Table 7. One of the six indicators of need for poverty funds, the per cent of adults with less than five years of education, is omitted from this regression analysis since it is linearly determined by the other fifteen independent variables. Under such circumstances it is impossible to invert the correlation matrix and thus complete the regression analysis.

The regression coefficients for both age and size of city are significant, even after the other fourteen variables are simultaneously controlled, but this does not necessarily prove our theoretical point (cf. Gordon, 1968).

These two variables are among ten variables in Table 7 whose regression coefficients are significantly related to the mobilization measure. That is, city size and age, the five indicators of need, two indicators of heterogeneity, and the indicator of bureaucratization make independent and statistically significant contributions to the prediction of the number of poverty dollars per capita among the set of variables included in Table 7. Only in the case of the cluster
of variables reflecting formal political structure is there no variable for which the regression coefficient reaches statistical significance. In other words, knowledge of the political structure is relatively unimportant for the prediction of mobilization, if we have information on these other variables. Of course, it is still of some importance for understanding the process involved from a theoretical, rather than a statistical, point of view.

What is particularly important here is that there is no single factor, or cluster of factors, that alone maximizes the prediction of mobilization success. Indicators of city size and age, need, heterogeneity, and bureaucratization provide information that is important for the prediction of success in obtaining federal poverty dollars. These findings suggest that a multi-factor causal model is necessary for understanding this type of mobilization.

With this multiple regression analysis we do not intend to imply theoretical unimportance for the variables which have regression coefficients that do not attain statistical significance, but which had zero-order relationships strongly associated with the mobilization measure. There simply is no way to allocate jointly explained variance to one variable or another. Therefore, just because a variable happens not to be a good predictor of a given dependent variable in their regression analysis does not mean that that variable is necessarily any less important in a theoretical sense--assuming that it has a zero-order relationship that is meaningfully related to the dependent variable. Perhaps this point can be better understood by looking at the amounts of variance explained by the different clusters of variables.
All together the 15 variables shown in Table 7 can explain 37.98 per cent of the variation in the mobilization measure. This means, of course, that over sixty per cent of the variation in poverty dollars is left unexplained by these fifteen factors, suggesting that there are other factors not included here which may be very important in relation to this phenomenon. But our task here is to try to understand the phenomenon that is represented by these 15 variables. One way to do this is to determine the unique contribution of each cluster of variables--city age and size, need, heterogeneity, bureaucratization of city government, and formal political structure--to the explanation of number of poverty dollars per capita. That is, we shall determine the additional amount of variance explained in the mobilization measure after the other four clusters have already entered the regression equation.

These results are shown in Table 8. In the first column of this table we show the amounts of variance explained by each cluster alone and by all five clusters together (which are taken from Tables 1 and 3 to 7). In the second column we show the amount of variance uniquely contributed by each cluster. That is, each of these per cents of variance is the amount of additional variance accounted for by each cluster after the other four have entered the regression analysis. For example, the four clusters of need, heterogeneity, bureaucratization, and political structure explain 33.31 per cent of the variation in the mobilization measure. If city size and age are entered into the
regression together with these variables, the explained variation is raised to 37.98 per cent (cf. Table 7), an increase of 4.67 per cent of explained variance. In other words, for this set of variables, city age and size uniquely contribute almost five per cent of additionally explained variance. This means that these factors are indeed acting as surrogates for some aspect of the current state of the community system that is not captured by the 13 variables in the other four clusters. The question then becomes: What does this mean? Our interpretation is that these factors are acting as surrogates for the number of centers of power and the nature of community interfaces--variables for which we have no direct measurement.

At the same time these two factors alone can explain 24.66 per cent of the variation in the mobilization measure, meaning that 19.99 per cent of explained variation in the mobilization measure (the difference between 24.66 per cent and 4.67 per cent) is jointly explained variance, that is, variance that is jointly explained with some, perhaps all, of the other 13 variables shown in Table 7. As previously indicated, there is no way to apportion this jointly explained variance among city size, city age, and variables in the other clusters. They are inextricably bound together. Thus, city size and age may be very efficient predictors of the mobilization measure, but they are not causally separate from many of these other variables.

This buttresses our earlier argument that these factors together reflect various aspects of the creation and development of interfaces among centers of power in communities. The fact that we have utilized the strategy in our discussion of "allocating" jointly explained
variance to the clusters that more directly reflect the current state of the community system, and then looking at the residually explained variance of city size and age, does not mean that the age and size of cities are unimportant or inoperative. Even if these other four clusters had exhausted all the variance that could be accounted for by city size and age, it would not mean that the process that we have discussed previously is necessarily inoperative; it would simply mean that we had captured all of the process reflected in city size and age with these other indicators of community structure.

Not only do city age and size make significant, unique contributions to the explanation of poverty dollars, but so too does the cluster of variables reflecting need and heterogeneity. Need makes a larger unique contribution to the explanation of the mobilization measure than do city size and age, although the cluster of need variables alone cannot explain as much variance in the mobilization measure. The cluster of variables reflecting heterogeneity makes less of a unique contribution to the explanation of the mobilization measure. The other two clusters—bureaucratization and political structure—do not make unique contributions to the explanation of the mobilization measure that are statistically significant. The fact that bureaucratization and political structure add insignificant increments of explained variance does not mean that theoretically these variables are unimportant, especially the former, but rather that almost all of the variance explained by them is jointly explained with variables in the other four clusters.
The value of Table 8 is twofold: (1) to suggest which clusters of variables are the most efficient predictors and (2) to suggest that city size and age are surrogates for some attributes of community structure other than those directly measured here. And it is our contention in this paper that they are surrogates for the number and nature of interfaces among centers of power in the community. At the same time, we do not rest our argument solely on the amount of variance uniquely explained by these two variables, but rather on the interrelationships among all these factors, for as we have argued at the outset, each of the community attributes discussed in this paper is in some way related to the existence of community interfaces.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LITERATURE

In the budding literature on community decision outputs, a few published articles such as those by Greenstone and Peterson (1968) and Turk (1967) deal with poverty programs. The unpublished study by sociologist Herman Turk (1967) has results very similar to ours, but using a slightly different dependent variable. Using the population of the 130 cities over 100,000 in 1960, Turk analyzed the correlates of various community characteristics with whether or not the city established a Community Action Agency (CAA) before July 15, 1965, or after and whether or not there was a Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC). He found that those cities which had established CAA's earlier or which were more likely to have an NYC were those with slowly growing or declining populations, with higher proportions of nonwhites or ethnic groups, with more of their income gained from intergovernmental sources, with a previous history
of higher welfare expenditures, and with larger overall populations. As we have seen, these findings, based on a subset of the population of cities included here and using different dependent variables, are consistent with our own.

Furthermore, it is important to note that although the two dependent variables were found to covary in cities, the CAA and the NYC were independently initiated and established in the cities studied by Turk. This shows that despite quite different sets of decision-processes and participants, similar outcomes were observed. This supports our assertion that the structural properties of a community have independent influences upon decision outputs, and do not rest entirely upon the organization of a contemporary structure of centralized leadership.

Most of the scanty literature on decision outputs of cities has dealt with expenditure patterns, but the main findings are consistent with our argument, although the same sets of explanatory factors have not been used. One article found, for example, that a variety of socioeconomic characteristics of cities (ethnicity, private school attendance, owner-occupancy, median education) were correlated more highly with taxes and expenditures among nonreformed cities (those without a city manager but with partisan and ward elections) than among reformed cities. The authors argue that the "greater decentralization of commission and of mayor-council governments permits a multiplicity of access points for groups wishing to influence decision-makers. It may also increase the possibilities for collaboration between groups and a bureaucratic agency... As a result of this decentralization, group strength in local governments may be maximized" (Lineberry and
Fowler, 1967: 716). The authors here, although they only deal with centralization per se, seem to be arguing really that the level of centralization is probably correlated with something else, which they call a "multiplicity of access points," the "possibilities for collaboration," and "group strength." But they do not elaborate this distinction or recognize the possible independent existence of such characteristics—which we are terming the number of centers of power and their interfaces—from the sheer level of centralization of the decision-making system. Their findings are certainly consistent with ours, but the interpretation might be a little different. From our point of view, the local government structures with which they deal are only one of a number of centers of power, and taxes and expenditures are only one form of decision-output. The fact that there is a higher correlation of taxes and expenditures with various forms of social cleavages in nonreformed than in reformed governments is only a single instance of what we are suggesting is a general process in American communities.

Clark's (1968) data are also consistent with our interpretation, although his inferences from the data are not. He measured decentralization in 51 cities by the overlap of actors from one issue to another and the total number of actors involved in the four issues of urban renewal, the election of the mayor, air pollution and anti-poverty programs. He found that greater decentralization was associated not with lower but with higher decision-outputs, in the form of general budget expenditures and urban renewal expenditures. As we have already seen, he had no explanation for these findings, which were contrary to his hypotheses.
The apparent contradiction of Amos Hawley's (1963) findings to the other literature has already been mentioned. Yet the contradiction is only at the theoretical level, not the empirical. Hawley found, as we would predict from our theory, that older cities, mayor-council cities, manufacturing cities, large-plant cities, low-education cities, and cities in the Northeast were likely to have low MDP ratios (low proportions of managers, officials, and proprietors) and also more likely to have reached the execution stage in an urban renewal program. Thus, his findings are consistent with the rest of the literature, including this article.

But we believe that the data can better be interpreted by a theory which is just the opposite of Hawley's. Rather than indicating a high degree of centralization of power, a low MOP ratio is correlated with the existence of a large number of centers of power and interfaces between them, which facilitate community mobilization. While our theory starts from some of the same premises as Hawley concerning the importance of functionally differentiated units as the units of a community which contribute to the mobilization of power, he neglects the historical aspect of the development over time of a network of communication of information and of resources which contribute to the capacity of the community to make collective decisions.

A forthcoming work by one of the present authors (Alford, 1969) on four Wisconsin cities suggests that cities that are more bureaucratized and have greater citizen participation are more likely to be able to mobilize themselves for collective action. Both bureaucratization and participation can be regarded as less abstract and less general terms
for centers of power and their interfaces. The development of specialized agencies for decision making (bureaucratization) and the development of institutions and norms encouraging the participation of groups are important aspects of community structure about which we are generalizing in this paper.

A community with a greater number of centers of power and more interfaces between them is, by definition, one in which there is a considerable amount of active communication of political messages, attempts to organize support for policies, and organization of more-or-less shifting alliances. We would expect that a greater involvement of the social base of the various centers of power might result, if only because a more structurally differentiated system would have many more channels of access to the population and support for its positions could be better mobilized. Thus, we might expect that a number of indicators of political involvement would be higher in communities with more interfaced centers of power. Unfortunately, the only indicator we have available is local voting turnout. But this is consistent with our hypotheses. Cities with high voting turnout are larger, older, more heterogeneous, and have greater population stability (Alford and Lee, 1968). Cities with high voting turnout also have more dollars for poverty programs.* High political participation may be another link in the chain of causal political and social processes connecting the historical emergence of centers of power and diverse relationships between them with the capacity of cities to mobilize for collective action.

*The correlation of poverty dollars per capita with the proportion of adults voting in the last local election before (April) 1962 was .14, with the proportion of registrants voting .20, both significant.
The fact that high voting turnout in referenda usually leads to their defeat may seem to contradict our theory that high voting turnout functions to support coalitions of centers of power. But we probably should distinguish between routinely high turnout and exceptionally high turnout. In the latter case, a large turnout indicates an issue which draws opposition, and is the case dealt with by Pinard (1963) and Crain and Rosenthal (1967) in their studies of fluoridation. But routinely high turnout indicates structural rather than situational sources of participation, and may be consistent with our general argument about the beneficial consequences of many centers of power on the mobilization of support.

A study by Crain and Rosenthal (1967) of the impact of educational levels upon decision making found that the better educated the city, the more "immobilized" it was. The authors argued that better educated people participated more, which raised the level of conflict, and which had the consequence of preventing the government from exercising the authority to make decisions. Unfortunately, they had no data directly bearing on the key association of education with participation, which was the central theoretical link in their argument. Although thorough studies of this question have not yet been done, data on voting turnout indicate just the opposite finding, that better educated cities have lower turnout than more poorly educated city population (Alford and Lee, 1968).

We may thus reinterpret their findings more in line with our present data and argument. It is consistent with our theory that better-educated cities are less likely to have urban renewal programs,
to have carried out desegregation programs, to have adopted fluoridation, and to permit Negro registration, but not for the reasons that the authors suggest. It is because cities with highly educated populations are more homogeneous, that there are both fewer sources of policy initiatives (centers of power) and fewer interfaces between them, and that there is less mobilization for community action in those respects. The authors also argue that conflict is more likely in highly educated cities, which is finally what immobilizes the cities. We are not prepared to comment on this assertion, since we have no reason to predict more conflict in one type of city than another.

Our findings and theoretical perspective may also be linked to the burgeoning literature on urban political cultures or political "ethos." Some of the existing literature relies on inferences from public expenditures or referenda outcomes in ethnic and working-class urban neighborhoods (Banfield and Wilson, 1963; Wilson and Banfield, 1964). There have, of course, been criticisms of this perspective (Wolfinger and Field, 1966). From this same perspective commitments to certain general "roles of government" (amenities, economic growth, procedures, arbitration) have been inferred from consistencies in patterns of policies in a wide variety of substantive areas (Williams and Adrian, 1963). In neither of these cases have norms and values been directly measured, only inferred.

Our study does not measure the values and norms of community groups either. But we may have located some of the political processes through which such values and norms are generated. The historical contacts of centers of power in a community with each other must produce norms
governing their communication with each other, the legitimacy of certain issues and not others, and rules guiding the formation of coalitions and the appropriate tactics to be used in debates, public hearings, news releases, and the like. In short, it seems likely to us that the substantive and procedural norms which constitute the content of a political culture are likely to be shaped by the historical processes of the creation of centers of power and interfaces among them. Thus, rather than necessarily contradicting such studies of political "ethos," we would hope that the theoretical ideas represented here would suggest some structural accompaniments of such value systems.

CONCLUSIONS

The logic of our empirical argument has been as follows. The indicators of the current state of community structure—heterogeneity, need, bureaucratization, and political structure—are related to the dependent variable of participation in the federal poverty program. We have also argued that each of these factors is related to the number of centers of power and their interfaces. That is, cities which are more diverse in their social composition are more likely to have the social structural bases for the formation of centers of power; cities with greater poverty have more incentives to activate those centers of power to produce political demands; cities which are more bureaucratized have both more channels of access for those demands and more government officials with the specialized capability of applying for federal money; and cities with "nonreformist"
political structures have public officials in political situations which provide access to citizen groups making demands. Thus, each of these factors can be regarded as independently contributing to the contemporary set of political and social characteristics that are conducive to a community structure that facilitates the expression of political demands and attainment of decision outcomes.

But these aspects of community structure do not exhaust the relevant characteristics of American communities which must be taken into account. In particular, we have shown that city size and age add substantially to our ability to predict decision outcomes. We have interpreted these findings by suggesting that there are additional properties of the current state of the community system for which these empirical indicators are surrogates. We have argued that those additional properties are the number of centers of power and the number and quality of interfaces among them. That is, the accumulation of information and experience in a community system historically is an important aspect of the current political and social structure.

This assumption, of course, returns us to a more general theoretical elaboration of our data. From this perspective we would argue that as cities grow and become older, their economic base diversifies and a variety of community organizations are established and elaborated. Both processes lead to increasing structural differentiation of the community or, from our point of view, the emergence of more centers of power: coalitions of interests and/or values which have a relatively high probability of acting as homogeneous political entities with respect to a wide variety of issues. We have distinguished the number
of such centers of power from the number and intensity of the exchange relationships or interfaces established among them.

Our model of a community political system is thus neither one of a fully integrated organization, in which all parts are fully coordinated in a hierarchy of dominant and subordinate units, nor an unintegrated one in which exchanges take place as in a market between freely deciding and participating actors. The concept of "integration" is in many ways as one sided as that of "centralization." The latter model, which corresponds to the monolithic image of decision making in the community power literature, is essentially a bureaucratic model. The former is the bargaining or pluralistic model, which assumes that community actors have freedom to enter and leave the political arena on a particular issue at any time. Neither of these models are historical, because they fail to take into account: first, the range and scope of issues which are only potential at a given time; second, the range and number of centers of power and interfaces which have been historically established, but may not be visible at any given time; and third, the numbers of relationships established among them.

There are a number of questions that could be raised about our assumptions as well as our conclusions. One such factor is that new cities might have a higher proportion of migrants from rural areas who are less likely to be linked to stable, settled groups and thus less likely to have developed channels of access to governmental officials, resulting in their inability to organize to make political demands. This demographic factor may lie behind some of these findings, but rather than contradicting our overall argument, it actually is
quite consistent with it since it would follow that such cities probably have fewer interfaces.

Similarly, one could argue that newer cities may be devoting more of their leadership resources to building a substructure of urban services: streets, police forces, schools or sewers. It might be argued that the relationship between community structure and mobilization is different for poverty programs than for other decision outputs studied in the recent literature, because they are decisions of private, nongovernmental groups, and because they do not involve the reallocation of local resources, but only the securing of funds from the Federal government. The fact that Crain and Rosenthal (1967: 970) found that decentralization of decision-making power was associated with higher performance in the areas of fluoridation, school desegregation, and Negro voter registration indicates that the second objection is probably invalid. And on the first point, our own data show that the same factors presented in this paper are also associated with decision outputs in the area of urban renewal and low-rent Federally supported housing programs. We conclude therefore that the choice of this particular community decision did not determine our findings.

Finally, it is conceivable that our failure to measure the social needs of communities adequately accounts for much of our findings. The populations of older and larger cities may be poor, ill-housed, and ill-educated in ways which our crude indicators do not tap. We doubt that this is the case. It is also possible that the correlation of the age and size of a city with poverty programs can be accounted for by other factors than the ones we have hypothesized: the number of centers
of power and their interfaces. We believe that we have taken into account most of the available indicators on the correlates of age and size which are also correlated with poverty programs, and have shown that the apparent effects of age and size are not eliminated.

There is at least preliminary evidence that something besides social needs, social heterogeneity, bureaucratization, and government structure is at work in the processes through which communities obtain Federal money for poverty programs. But this does not answer the still perplexing problem of whether we have interpreted the factors of age and size correctly. We cannot think of any other theoretical explanation besides the one we have defined, but some other may be more appropriate.

At minimum we have suggested that existing frameworks for understanding community mobilization are both ill-developed and probably faulty. Hopefully the discussion here will stimulate the consideration of other theoretical approaches. We are quite confident that a theoretical structure that bridges the literature of community structure and interorganizational relationships is one of the most promising avenues for the future, and refinements on the approach developed here may clearly be appropriate.
Table 1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AVERAGE NUMBER OF POVERTY DOLLARS PER CAPITA AND AGE AND SIZE OF CITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Zero Correlation</th>
<th>Partial Correlation</th>
<th>Multiple Regression Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25.4937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of City (Census Year City Reached 10,000 Population)</td>
<td>- .48**</td>
<td>- .35</td>
<td>- .3022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Logarithm of Population Size, 1960</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.5299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2 = .2466$

*** P<.001
Table 2. MEANS OF CITY AGE, CITY SIZE, AND POVERTY DOLLARS PER CAPITA WITHIN REGION AND CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN CITY AGE AND SIZE AND NUMBER OF POVERTY DOLLARS PER CAPITA WITHIN REGIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of Cities</th>
<th>Age of City</th>
<th>City Size</th>
<th>Number of poverty Dollars per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>143,680</td>
<td>$5.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>97,476</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>102,320</td>
<td>2.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far West</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>108,480</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Cities</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>111,920</td>
<td>$3.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correlation Coefficients between Number of Poverty Dollars Per Capita (Log n) and:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of Cities</th>
<th>Age of City</th>
<th>City Size (log n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>-.44***</td>
<td>.42***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>-.33***</td>
<td>.36***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>-.42***</td>
<td>.36***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far West</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>-.61***</td>
<td>.42***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Cities</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>-.48***</td>
<td>.37***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** P<.001

The states included in each region are as follows:

**Northeast:** Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, and District of Columbia.

**South:** Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee.

**Midwest:** Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Montana, Idaho, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, New Mexico.

**Far West:** California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Alaska, Hawaii.
Table 3. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN AVERAGE NUMBER OF POVERTY DOLLARS PER CAPITA AND INDICATORS OF NEED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Zero Correlation Coefficient</th>
<th>Partial Correlation Coefficient</th>
<th>Multiple Regression Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>13.8832</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>5.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent of Families with Incomes of Less than $3,000 Per Year</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.1238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income of Families</td>
<td>-.38***</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>-.0012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Logarithm of Per Cent with Less Than 5 Years of Education</td>
<td>.33***</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.2650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent with Four Years of High School</td>
<td>-.26***</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.0664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent 14 to 17 Year Olds in School</td>
<td>-.31***</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.0740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent Unemployed</td>
<td>.24***</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.1777</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = .1929

** P<.01
*** P<.001

Source: U.S. Census of Population: 1960
Table 4. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN AVERAGE NUMBER OF POVERTY DOLLARS PER CAPITA
AND INDICATOR OF HETEROGENEITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Zero Correlation</th>
<th>Partial Correlation</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficient</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficient</th>
<th>Regression Coefficient</th>
<th>Regression T Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.5097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Logarithm Per Cent Nonwhite</td>
<td>.35***</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.9687</td>
<td>.4529</td>
<td>11.11**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent in Private Schools</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.0199</td>
<td>.0871</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent Foreign Stock</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.0398</td>
<td>.1470</td>
<td>3.04**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = .1568

** P < .01
*** P < .001

Source: U.S. Census of Population: 1960
Table 5. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN AVERAGE NUMBER OF POVERTY DOLLARS PER CAPITA AND INDICATORS OF BUREAUCRATIZATION OF CITY GOVERNMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Zero Correlation</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of City Employees Per 1,000 Population</td>
<td>.33***</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Full-Time Personnel Officer in City Government</td>
<td>.19***</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of a Capital Budget in City Government</td>
<td>.15***</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** P<.001

Table 6. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN AVERAGE NUMBER OF POVERTY DOLLARS PER CAPITA AND INDICATORS OF POLITICAL STRUCTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Zero Correlation</th>
<th>Partial Correlation</th>
<th>Unstandardized Regression Coefficient</th>
<th>Standardized Regression Coefficient</th>
<th>T Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.0427</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of City Manager Government</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.4086</td>
<td>-.0754</td>
<td>-1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Nonpartisan Elections</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.4032</td>
<td>-.0676</td>
<td>-1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent Elected At Large</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.0084</td>
<td>.1306</td>
<td>2.66**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of City Councilmen</td>
<td>.19***</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.2944</td>
<td>.2307</td>
<td>4.83***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = .0535

** P<.01  
*** P<.001  

Source: Municipal Yearbook, 1963
Table 7. MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF INDICATORS OF CITY AGE AND SIZE, HETEROGENEITY, BUREAUCRATIZATION, AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE WITH POVERTY DOLLARS PER CAPITA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Multiple Regression Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unstandardized Regression Coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>23.5436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>City Size and Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of City</td>
<td>-.1833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Size (Log n)</td>
<td>.3765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicators of Need</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent of Families with Incomes of Less than $3,000 Per Year</td>
<td>-.0859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Family Income</td>
<td>-.0012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent with Less than Four Years of High School</td>
<td>.0821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent Unemployed</td>
<td>.1733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent 14 to 17 Year Olds in School</td>
<td>-.0517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicators of Heterogeneity</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent Nonwhite (Log n)</td>
<td>.5470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent in Private Schools</td>
<td>-.0032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent Foreign Stock</td>
<td>.0535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator of Bureaucratization</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Employees per 1,000 Population</td>
<td>.0336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicators of Political Structure</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of City-Manager Government</td>
<td>.0768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Nonpartisan Elections</td>
<td>-.2974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Cent Elected At Large</td>
<td>-.0013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of City Councilmen</td>
<td>.0341</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2 = .3798 \]

* P<.05

** P<.01

*** P<.001
Table 8. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE AMOUNT OF VARIANCE IN POVERTY DOLLARS PER CAPITA EXPLAINED BY EACH CLUSTER OF VARIABLES ALONE AND THE AMOUNT OF VARIANCE UNIQUELY EXPLAINED BY EACH CLUSTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Per Cent of Variance Explained by Each Cluster of Variables Operating Alone</th>
<th>Per Cent of Variance Uniquely Explained by Each Cluster of Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age and Size of City</td>
<td>24.66</td>
<td>4.67***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need</td>
<td>19.29</td>
<td>7.39***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneity</td>
<td>15.68</td>
<td>3.36***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratization</td>
<td>11.16</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Structure</td>
<td>5.35</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Clusters</td>
<td>37.98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** P < .001
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