ETHNIC CONFLICT, COMMUNITY-BUILDING, AND THE EMERGENCE OF ETHNIC
POLITICAL TRADITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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ABSTRACT

While ethnicity continues to be a force in contemporary American politics, ethnic consciousness has not been equally important in shaping the political capabilities and perspectives of the different ethnic groups. This paper is an attempt to explore historically some of the forces making for different degrees of strength of a contemporary ethnic political tradition among the Irish, Germans, Jews, Italians, Poles, and blacks.

Ethnic political development seems to have occurred in three stages: economic adjustment, community-building, and political consolidation. A strong ethnic political tradition today seems to be a function of having 1) experienced some sort of group trauma during the economic adjustment period; 2) invested heavily in a relatively few community resources, like the Catholic Church, as a route to community-building; 3) engaged, themselves, in some form of aggressive assertion at this second stage; and 4) established highly visible, symbolic footholds in urban politics during political consolidation.
Ethnicity has been and continues to be a remarkably persistent influence on the organization and animation of American politics. The ethnic factor has survived not only the transition from a rural to a metropolitan society, the experiences of industrialization and postindustrial adjustment, and the waning of the great age of immigration, but also a series of radical changes in the ethnic composition and origins of the actors in the political drama of the Republic over its 200 years. With few exceptions, the consciousness, at some level, of one's own and of others' ethnicity, defined in terms of national origin or race, has been a compelling force in American politics for most Americans in most historical periods.

While ethnic consciousness has been persistent and widely recognized, however, it has not by any means been equally important in shaping the political capacities and perspectives of the different ethnic groups. Even the most cursory examination of the contemporary scene suggests that some ethnic groups have been more reliant upon and more capable of exploiting ethnic bonds for political mobilization than have others. For some groups ethnic identity—that is, the sense of commonality among members of a social subgroup based on real or putative common ancestry and the presumption of a shared historical past and cultural focus—has provided a critical context for the development of collective political capacities. Among these groups there has emerged what we may call an
ethnic political tradition. Other groups, however, have exhibited little capacity, desire, or need to exploit ethnic ties for the purposes of collective political assertion. Where a group's members have generally sought other bases of political identification, denying the bonds of ethnic obligation as a guide to political action, that group cannot be said to possess an ethnic political tradition. The question that must occur to the student of ethnic politics is why such variations in the use of ethnicity have occurred.

While it is not entirely clear how precisely the strength of an ethnic political tradition may be measured empirically, it is possible nevertheless to pass judgment on the relative presence or absence of such a tradition among the array of American ethnic groups. An ethnic political tradition has several components. First of all, there is a group political mystique comprised of self-images and myths about the group's political character. This mystique is widely held by members of the group itself. The Jewish affinity for liberalism and the Irish gift for party politics are examples of quasi-mythic elements of ethnic group political mystiques. We can also see similar elements developing among blacks over the past 15 years, in particular a distinctive racial pride and a special sense of the black potential for communitarian and participatory politics. The group mystique serves the ethnic political tradition by differentiating the ethnic group from others and by endowing it in the eyes of its members with special political qualities. In contrast to the Jews, blacks, and the Irish, Americans of German, Italian, or Slavic descent have no such well-developed or easily characterized political mystique. The self-image of the Germans in politics has long since been submerged by more general patterns of
identification. Italian political self-images are poorly formed and fragmented, while a Polish-American political mythology is, if anything, in its most nascent stages. For all three groups, ethnic political character is ill-defined.

A second component of an ethnic political tradition is the demonstrated political cohesion of the group. This may be measured with some precision. It may be manifested in voting behavior, in party identification patterns, and in political attitudes and opinions. Thus, for an ethnic group to possess an ethnic political tradition, it is not enough that members of the group believe they are distinctive in politics; they must also act and think similarly in politics. Indeed, if we examine survey data on party identification by ethnic group we find that Jews, blacks, the Irish, and Poles stand apart in their allegiance to the Democratic party, while Germans and Italians are just as likely to identify with the Republican party as with the Democrats. 4

An ethnic political tradition also requires the existence of ethnic defense or interest groups and political leaders. Classic examples of ethnic defense groups include the various Jewish and black organizations dating from the early part of this century, which have no rivals in strength or status among the other ethnic groups. Ethnic leaders are figures who are clearly identified as ethnics and who speak, with the approval of some significant number of their co-ethnics, for their community. These spokesmen are not simply political leaders but ethnic examples and defenders of the group's particularly ethnic interests. Hence the Irish politician who intervenes in abortion controversies, who reserves summer patronage jobs for seminarians, 5
and who sides vocally with the Catholics of Northern Ireland clearly marks out for himself a special political role, even if he is in fact vested with wider formal responsibilities and authority in the service of a broader constituency. Jews and blacks, perhaps more than the Irish, also have a vigorous ethnic leadership. Less is heard presently from southern and eastern European ethnic leaders and nothing at all from German-Americans acting as ethnic spokesmen.  

Finally, an ethnic political tradition involves the use of ethnic cues by nonethnic as well as ethnic leaders to establish feelings of political obligation among other leaders and among the led. Such cue-giving devices as ticket-balancing, ethnic patronage appointments, and campaigning specifically for the ethnic vote are designed to meet what politicians believe to be the expectations of certain ethnic groups and to win their gratitude. Such activities, however, must be seen not simply as responses to ethnic expectations but also as factors that help to nourish an ethnic political tradition. Thus nonethnic actors in the society at large, to the extent that they employ ethnic cues, may do as much as ethnic leaders to sustain an ethnic political tradition.

The expectations of some ethnic groups are assumed to be so well established that patronage spoils and places on the party ticket are awarded with unquestioning regularity. In modern New York state and city, for example, the Irish, Jews, Italians, and blacks are accorded recognition implicitly,  while other groups that represent a major portion of the upstate New York population, like the Poles, are seldom included in patronage and ticket-balancing considerations. The Germans
are virtually never courted by these strategems. Patterns of patronage and ticket composition are not widely different outside of New York except that in most places they are less sanctified.

Chart I offers a summary of rough estimates of the relative strength of the elements of ethnic political traditions for the six largest ethnic groups in the United States.\(^9\)

While the concept of an ethnic political tradition, the dependent variable, cannot easily be subjected to precise quantification, we may nevertheless conclude that there are clear variations among the six ethnic groups. These are evidently unrelated to the time of arrival in this country or to the size of the group at any moment in time. In seeking to explain the sources of this variation there are two possible strategies. One is to focus principally on the historical and cultural experiences of each group in its country of origin to explain the nature of its adaptation to American politics. This has been the predominant mode of explanation.\(^{10}\) The other strategy is to explore the experiences of different groups in this country as those experiences bear on their political development. The latter is the focus of this essay, for while it seems apparent that neither explanatory strategy could stand alone, no significant effort has yet been made to compare the experiences of the major ethnic groups in this country as a way of explaining the presence or absence of an ethnic political tradition.

II

Everyone who came to America as an immigrant went through a process of adjustment to the dominant society. Because individuals tended to come at the same time and for the same reasons as their co-ethnics and
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because they tended to settle with others who spoke their language and practiced their religion, the particular circumstances of an individual's adjustment experiences tended generally to characterize the adjustment experiences of his group of ethnics. Thus, even though many immigrants coming to America initially had no sense of nationality (identifying rather with more particularistic entities such as the village or region), it is possible to speak of the general adjustment experience of any given ethnic group.

Naturally, since the different ethnic groups tended to come to this country at different times, the particular historical and economic forces that shaped each group's collective adjustment experience differed from group to group. Nevertheless, there was to a very large extent a common pattern in the various collective adjustment experiences in the sense that each ethnic group tended to go through the same stages of adjustment in the same sequence. This similarity of pattern makes it possible to compare the various ethnic groups at each stage of their adjustment. In doing so it becomes apparent not simply that the historical circumstances faced by an ethnic group at a particular stage often differed from those faced by other groups at the same stage, but also that the capacities of the groups for dealing with the problems of adjustment posed by these forces in any given stage also differed.

Ethnic groups in their immigrant and later periods were concerned, of course, with more than the adjustment to a new political system. But many of the strategies of adjustment the various groups pursued as well as the historical forces they confronted had a particularly important bearing on their political development.
To focus on the political development aspect of the more general adjustment process is to concentrate on those "stages" or "successive transformations" that lead to the creation of collective political capabilities. It is possible to argue that to the extent to which these successive transformations involved sharp interethnic conflict and the self-conscious definition and delineation of ethnic group boundaries, there emerged a strong ethnic political tradition. Not all ethnic groups, of course, experienced sharp interethnic conflict, and some sought to merge with the larger society. For these groups political development as a collective experience, that is, political development as an ethnic unit, did not occur or occurred incompletely. But for other groups the political development process was a differentiating experience leading to the emergence of an ethnic political tradition.

To suggest this is hardly to assert the obvious. On the one hand, the traditional view of the immigrant adjustment process, first asserted by Park and sustained most strikingly by Dahl, was to see it as a predominantly assimilatory experience. Both of these scholars understood adjustment to be an essentially linear process during which differentiating features, such as language or disproportionate lower-class status, progressively vanished. On the other hand, by those who have rejected the assimilationist argument, the persistence of ethnicity in politics has been explained by the failure of ethnic groups to gain equal access to and rewards in the institutional life of the larger society. These scholars argue that while acculturation has been "massive," structural assimilation has been incomplete. The persistence of ethnicity in politics, from this perspective, is understood primarily as a response to these various social inequalities.
that these existing inequalities help to sustain an ethnic political tradition, I suggest that we cannot fully understand the development of such a tradition without turning also to the prior experience of political development.

Ethnic political development in America can be viewed as having proceeded in three broad stages. In the ideal or "classic" model of development proposed here these stages were experienced sequentially, but in reality the boundaries between the stages tended to overlap to a greater or lesser extent depending on the group. For some groups the combination of historical forces and group responses at each stage was such that political development led to the diffusion of group energies. For others, however, the experiences in the political development process had a cumulative effect in building political cohesion and led to the creation of a vigorous ethnic political tradition.

The three stages of political development are (1) economic adjustment, (2) community-building and leadership development, and (3) political consolidation. In the remainder of this essay we shall examine the nature of each stage of the development process as an ideal, the forces that typically occurred at each stage and affected ethnic group political capacities, and the degree to which the experiences of six American ethnic groups conformed to the classic model.

**Economic Adjustment**

Economic adjustment marked the period from the time of arrival of significant numbers of a particular ethnic group to the time at which they became a stable part of the permanent economy. While
the term "significant numbers" appears imprecise, it is in fact possible to identify those periods in American history during which the curve representing numbers immigrating from any given country suddenly turned sharply upward. The pattern of sudden surges of immigration rather than gradual, steady buildups was a common one for nearly all of the groups that came to America in the nineteenth century. The case of blacks involves unique difficulties, but since the pattern of black political development is prototypical of ethnic political development in America, it must be examined here. To speak of "black immigration" is, of course, inaccurate. The purpose of speaking of immigration trends at all is to specify the moment at which a particular group first presented itself for absorption as free labor in the economy in significant numbers. For white groups we can identify this moment by examining immigration trends; for blacks we can identify an analogous period, namely those years from around the turn of the century to World War I, when southern industrialization and black northward migration were just beginning.

The end of the economic adjustment period of any given group is marked by its inclusion in the economy as a stable and permanent contributing element. At this time the group's work force, or a major part of it, has emerged from a tenuous existence as unskilled or day labor and is no longer migratory. By the end of the economic adjustment stage, members of the group have achieved some minimal level of economic security. This by no means implies that they have developed a middle class of meaningful proportions but only that their survival is no longer a matter of day-to-day coping. For the group as a whole there is now sufficient capital accumulation to
support the beginning of commercial activity. Economic adjustment probably does not last as long as the life of the first generation; in most cases it is certainly over, as it has been defined here, by the time the second generation enters the work force. Second-generation ethnic workers exhibit much higher levels of occupational prestige than their fathers. Indeed, Duncan and Blau showed with 1962 national data that second-generation Americans of northern, southern, and eastern European stock have all achieved mean occupation prestige ratings nearly equal to those of native-born whites with native parents.\(^{18}\) Hutchinson found similar high levels of upward mobility among second-generation workers of foreign stock in the entire period from 1850 to 1950.\(^{19}\)

During economic adjustment, members of an ethnic group were engaged in a struggle for survival. As Handlin has written,

The most pressing concern of all newcomers on landing was to obtain employment. . . . Thousands of poverty-stricken peasants, rudely transported to an urban commercial center, could not readily become merchants, or clerks; they had neither the training nor the capital to set up as shopkeepers or artisans. The absence of other opportunities forced the vast majority into the ranks of an unemployed resourceless proletariat. . . .\(^{20}\)

In the face of this struggle the immigrants could think of little beyond the economic well-being of their families. Their energies were devoted almost wholly to survival. Thus, their efforts in this period were intensely individualistic in character, and their focus was turned inward on their families. What is important for the political development of the ethnic group in this initial stage is that, a decade or so into economic adjustment, there generally occurred an experience of "group trauma."\(^{21}\) This experience was normally not a single discrete event but a series of events or historical forces that caused collective suffering among members of the ethnic group. It was important as an
element in political development because it stimulated the emergence of collective ethnic consciousness. While this sense of collectivity took the form of a defensive response, at this stage it seldom gave rise to a search for or implementation of collective political strategies.

The strength and duration of the traumatic experience varied among the different ethnic groups. While it is not possible to measure these phenomena precisely at this point, it may be taken as a working proposition that the strength and duration of the trauma, subjectively considered, varied positively with the cohesion and sense of grouphood among members of the group. The nature of the trauma ethnic groups experienced, then, is one source of variation in the political development experience that helps to determine the presence or absence of an ethnic political tradition.

The group trauma was the product of one or both of the following phenomena: violence against the ethnic group or stigmatization. The events or forces leading to trauma, which were imposed on particular ethnic groups by members of the dominant society, typically began to appear as ethnic group members began to make a place for themselves in the American economy. While neither collective violence nor stigmatization was always directly precipitated by particular instances of economic conditions, it can scarcely be coincidental that these forces appeared in their most virulent form during the economic adjustment stage and diminished and eventually vanished altogether as each target ethnic group moved into the community-building stage.

Thus, the first stage of ethnic political development marks the emergence of a sense of collectivity based in large measure upon the experience of collective suffering.
Four of the six currently largest ethnic or racial groups had major experiences of group trauma during their economic adjustment periods. These four groups are the Jews, blacks, Irish, and Italians. The other two of the largest groups, the Poles and the Germans, were never subjected to comparable levels of hostility by the dominant society, although neither group was entirely free from Anglo-Saxon antipathy. Whatever hostility was focused on all six groups by the larger society occurred principally during economic adjustment, and to this extent the experiences of these groups were similar. In most cases hostility diminished after those groups established themselves economically in the minimal way that marks the end of this first phase of development. The Polish and the German experiences deviate from the model, however, to the extent that hostility toward them never reached the level it did for the other groups. This difference, which is clearly evident, begins to lay a basis for understanding the absence of a well-defined contemporary political tradition within those two groups.

Immigration by the various groups surged at different times. The Irish Catholic presence in America was already substantial by the early 1830s, and it increased sharply during the rest of that decade and the next. The German migration was essentially a mid-nineteenth-century phenomenon. While German settlements in Texas and Wisconsin were established in the 1830s and 1840s, the period from 1845 to 1854 marked the clearest surge of German immigration. By 1860 there were 1.3 million Germans in the United States. Italians, Jews, and Poles all constituted what came to be called the "new immigration," which
began after 1880. At that date there were only 44,000 Italians in
the country. More than 12,000 came in 1880, however, and the numbers
climbed sharply until 1907, when 287,731 Italians entered in that
single year.26

Polish immigration tripled in every decade between 1870 and 1910,
but the key decade in the surge was that of the 1880s. Nearly 14,000
Poles came during the 1870s, but more than 48,000 came in the 1880s.
Prior to 1880 Jewish immigration was largely from Germany; the Jewish
presence in America amounted to 280,000 persons at that time.28 After
1880 the flood from eastern Europe began, quickly inundating German
Jewry. In the 1870s, 40,000 Jews from eastern Europe came, and in the
1880s more than 200,000 arrived, most of them settling in the narrow
confines of New York's Lower East Side.29 The last of the groups with
which we deal, the blacks, began their great northward migration to
the cities after Reconstruction, but the great surge in this population
movement occurred in the decade of the First World War. Increased
labor needs in northern industry brought on by the war and by the
drying up of the foreign immigrant labor pool provided unprecedented
economic opportunities for blacks.30

Marking the periods in which immigration first surged for each
of these groups serves to establish the starting points at which their
economic adjustment phase began. While evidence seems to suggest that
immigrants did not actually "displace" native workers,31 foreign laborers
were certainly perceived by the emergent organized labor movement as
a direct threat to jobs and wage levels.32 This perception, which did
not develop until these immigrant groups were present in substantial
numbers, formed the context in which the new groups struggled to achieve
minimal levels of economic security.
The length of time the different groups took to establish themselves in the permanent economy varied slightly depending on the skills they brought with them and the period in which they came. On the average, economic adjustment took about 30 years. The Irish, who generally arrived on the Atlantic seaboard destitute and without skills, initially established a tenuous existence either in menial occupations or in the construction camps inland away from their families. It was not until the 1850s that the Irish began to establish themselves as permanent workers in a stable sector of the economy. In Boston this was the decade in which shipbuilding, shoe making, and especially the garment industry began to develop, and the Irish found their place as factory operatives. As Handlin wrote of the Irish, "Before their arrival the rigid labor supply had made industrialization impossible. It was the vital function of the Irish to thaw out the rigidity of the system. Their labor achieved the transition from the earlier commercial to the later industrial organization of the city." With the coming of the Civil War, the demand for labor began to outstrip the supply. The end of the Irish economic adjustment period may be marked by this conflict.

The Germans, who came in the same period as the Irish, had a significantly different experience. Many arrived with craft and industrial skills, and they quickly came to dominate certain sectors of the economy of the midwestern cities in which many settled. By midcentury, for example, German workers virtually controlled brewing, tanning, cigar making, and grocery wholesaling in Milwaukee. German commercial activity, predominantly in small shops, burgeoned after 1850, and by that date they were dispersed, unlike the Irish, throughout the skilled-occupation
Many Germans, of course, went into agriculture or settled in German rural enclaves that achieved early self-sufficiency.

Italian labor relied heavily until the turn of the century on the padroni, or labor bosses, who controlled perhaps two-thirds of Italian workingmen in New York at the turn of the century. Iorizzo notes that the padrone "was the primary distribution agent for temporary laborers throughout the United States," but he was far less important in filling the needs of America's permanent labor supply. Reliance on the padroni diminished rapidly in the first decade of the twentieth century as Italians began to move into skilled work and business and commerce. Indeed, the swiftness of the Italians' drive into the business sector set them apart from other immigrant groups. It is possible to argue that by 1915 the Italians were established economically.

Jews and Slavs moved quickly too, the Jews overwhelmingly into the garment industry and the small shop sector, and the Poles into heavy industry, mainly coal mining in the Pennsylvania anthracite fields and later into the iron and steel mills and meatpacking. Black economic adjustment, by contrast, was slow and cannot be said to have been achieved until World War II. Between 1940 and 1944 the number of blacks in skilled jobs doubled, as wartime industrial mobilization spurred another great migration off the farms and opened up major opportunities.

Table I summarizes the boundary dates of the economic adjustment periods of the six groups under examination, with a few years allowed for consolidation.

The most obvious reasons for native antipathy toward these six ethnic and racial groups, which led to what we have called group trauma,
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<td>Poles</td>
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<td>Blacks</td>
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varied widely. To the extent that these may be distinguished, anti-Catholicism, anti-Semitism, antiradicalism, cultural revulsion, racism, and plain xenophobia all played their separate parts in isolating the various groups at different periods in American history. Yet these motive forces were similar in certain important ways. Not only did they tend to occur, indeed to peak, during the economic adjustment phases of these different groups, but they also seemed to have a galvanizing effect for most of the target groups in question.

The decade of the 1850s saw the growth and consolidation of nativist sentiment in America emerge in the form of the Know-Nothing Party. Know-Nothing violence erupted against the Irish in a host of cities and, in a few cases, against the Germans. The surge of anti-Irish feeling especially was foreshadowed by a series of violent episodes dating back at least to the sacking of an Ursuline convent in Charlestown, Massachusetts, in 1834. While both the Germans and the Irish were the targets in this violent period, most observers seem to agree that feelings toward the Germans were both less intense and more ambivalent. In rural areas, in particular, Germans were more often viewed as industrious, honest settlers than as economic competitors or religious subversives. It is entirely reasonable to argue, then, that the unmitigated hostility with which the Irish had to deal, which often took the form of job discrimination as well as violence, had a profoundly more traumatic impact on them than the experiences the Germans faced had on the Germans as a group.

The religious stigma placed upon the Irish in this period, Levine has argued, became a potent symbol of Irish-American identity and alienation. While nativism had a similar effect on the Germans, it
was certainly less permanent because it was less strongly and less
generally felt. Nevertheless, Hawgood argues that

Nativism and Deutschtum had, in fact, an almost parallel growth
in the United States, and from about 1835 onward they very success­fully provoked each other to higher and higher flights. 45

Besides the Irish, among the white ethnic groups only the Italians
experienced concerted violence of high intensity. Beginning with the
famous lynching of 11 acquitted Italian murder suspects in New
Orleans in 1891, native white American mobs slew and maimed Italians
in cities and towns in the South, the West, and the Middle West in a
series of incidents that lasted until 1920. "(D)iscrimination and mob
violence against Italians in the United States," DeConde writes,
"aroused in the immigrants an awareness of their Italianata that the
[philanthropic and cultural] societies had failed to stimulate." 46

Neither the Poles nor the eastern European Jews, who immigrated
in the same period as the Italians, were major targets of collective
violence. The latter, however, experienced a group trauma with the
rise of anti-Semitism, but that development had no analogue in the
Polish-American experience. Thus one may argue that the Poles in
this country were never subjected to the pain of a traumatic stigma
as Poles; while the Poles generated hostility in the Pennsylvania
coal fields, where they were used as strikebreakers and where they
later became involved in early union violence, 47 native hostility
at the turn of the century was focused much more on the Italians and
the Jews. 48

Anti-Semitism developed slowly in the 1880s and 1890s, but it
reached virulent proportions in the decade of World War I. One interesting
consequence of anti-Semitism was its driving of the assimilated German Jews, who preferred to call themselves Hebrews, together with the more exotic newcomers from eastern Europe. There can be no doubt that anti-Semitism was critical in the forging of American Jewish identity. As Fuchs points out, "Jewish doctors, lawyers, laborers, peddlers—all were made conscious of their Jewishness whether they wanted it or not." Anti-Semitism became a unifying force, counteracting the divisive effects of assimilation in the first several decades of this century.

The black experience in America includes the most extreme forms of both violence and stigmatization. Jim Crow laws developed during the same period in which anti-Semitism was on the rise, and lynchings and other forms of mob violence were commonplace. What seem especially important for our purposes, however, are the urban riots that occurred in the years surrounding the two world wars. Not only were these riots associated with increased black-white economic competition, but they seemed to foster, according to some observers, an unprecedented readiness on the part of blacks to fight back when they were attacked.

To summarize, four ethnic groups experienced sufficiently intense hostility to justify calling the impact traumatic. For all of these groups these experiences occurred in the economic adjustment stage, and for all of them the result was to strengthen group identity. The hostile native response to the Germans, in contrast, was less sustained, and generally feelings toward the Germans were substantially mixed, although what hostility was expressed did seem to contribute to the Germans' sense of grouphood. Only in the case of the Poles can it be said that there is no evidence to suggest that native antipathy was significant or that it played a role in forging Polish-American identity.
Community-building, the second stage in the political development process, refers to the development of institutional resources and leadership whose purpose is to assert and serve the ethnic group's varied collective interests. Such efforts began in earnest for most groups when sufficient capital accumulation and manpower development had occurred to permit reinvestment in and attention to community concerns.

Even the earliest arrivals of nearly every immigrant group in the United States established some communal institutional life immediately. Later immigrants, who came at the crests of the immigration waves, found some church organization and a few mutual aid societies already organized. But the major efforts to establish national churches (or to take over existing church organizations, as the Irish did), aid societies, an ethnic press, ethnic-controlled trade unions, commercial and financial institutions that provided jobs and credit, and ethnic defense organizations occurred after the bulk of the group had moved out of its marginal economic status.

Community-building efforts were important to the definition of the ethnic group as a collective entity. In delineating the outer boundaries of the group, which marked the limits of ethnic obligation (To whom did the ethnic press speak? Who should tithe to the church? Who was eligible to receive help from the mutual aid society?), the institutions and emergent leadership of the group performed a differentiating function, helping to mark the group, as a group, off
from others in the society. Thus, in the first instance the community-
building stage was important in the political development process to
the extent that it established the mechanisms for defining and dif-
ferentiating ethnic group interests.

Several other developments occurred in the community-building
phase that bore on the group's political capacities. One was the
achievement of legislative representation at various levels of govern-
ment. The appearance of ethnic representatives in the Congress, in
state legislatures, or on city councils may be taken as the signal
that an ethnic group had begun to exploit politically the gains of
community-building efforts.53 Gaining ethnic representation in
legislative bodies, however, generally requires little political
sophistication. Given the pattern of ethnic residential concentration,
district and ward boundaries can easily be drawn to guarantee the
election of ethnic representatives, even if voting turnout is low and
organization rudimentary. In addition, ethnic breakthrough to
legislative positions is not likely to meet with opposition in the
larger society as a matter of principle. As Holden writes, "ethnic
newcomers to elective offices may be admitted into legislative bodies,
even though their entry into executive positions would be resisted.
[Executive positions] permit their holders to acquire bargaining parity,
rather than clientship, because these holders are able to exert some
control over the claims which other people would wish to make."54
For these reasons—namely the relative ease and the lack of skill
required—the initial achievement of legislative posts by ethnic
representatives was a sign of nascent political leadership development
rather than of established strength.
Another common development in the community-building stage was a period of aggressive self-assertion by the group or by certain significant segments of it. One such form of assertion was violence. Another was adherence to revolutionary or radical ideologies. Such modes of assertion, not always explicitly directed toward political goals, were products both of frustration and of a desire to test the larger society. What gave rise to both forms of aggressive assertion was the failure of the larger society to grasp the extent to which an ethnic group had begun to gain a sense of its collective interest. The group's internal political development, manifested by the emergence of leadership and collective political expectations, simply tended to proceed at a faster pace than the large society's willingness or ability to incorporate the group into the polity. Thus at some crucial point the realization that the group as a political interest group was virtually invisible, or that it counted at best for very little, was intensely frustrating. The larger society in effect could be made to notice the emergent group by force or at least by radical iconoclasm.

Aggression by an ethnic group at this particular stage of its political development was important in several other respects. For one thing, it culminated a transition from victim or object in the political system (a role the group played as the target of violence or nativism during its economic adjustment) to subject. For another thing, it represented a way of strengthening and at the same time of testing the new solidarity of the group developed through its community-building efforts in conflict and postconflict situations. Perhaps the major functional effect of aggressive self-assertion for the group
was to further strengthen group identity and solidarity. As Joseph Himes has written regarding the case of contemporary blacks,

- collective conflict had an almost magical although unanticipated effect upon group cohesion and sense of identity among Negroes. . . . The distinction between member and nonmember is sharpened. Individuals who stood indecisively between groups or outside the fray are induced or forced to take sides. . . . Internally, the conflict groups become more tightly unified and the positions of members are clarified and defined more precisely. Further, conflict facilitates linkage between the individual and his local reference group as the agent of conflict.56

The timing of such aggression in the development of an ethnic group was critical; for aggression to serve this essentially mobilizing function, the members of the group had to be capable of being mobilized. Community-building—the forging of communal information networks and the development of leaders and institutions that defined collective interests—prepared the way. An additional effect of aggressiveness at this stage of political development was not only to test but probably also to intensify certain community-building efforts. While the evidence is too sparse to permit more than speculation, it is likely that the experience of aggressive conflict aided the emergence of new leaders.57 Some leaders probably discovered their gifts in conflicts; others arose to redirect what they believed to be energies badly or futilely spent in violence.

Both community-building efforts themselves and the experience of collective aggressive assertion bolstered group political capabilities. Ethnic groups differed, however, in the nature of their community-building and in the degree to which they engaged in assertive actions at this point in their political development. These variations further
help in explaining the presence or absence, relatively speaking, of a contemporary ethnic political tradition.

In characterizing the community-building efforts of the various ethnic groups, several initial distinctions must be made. One distinction rests on what we may call the autonomy-integration dimension. The efforts of some groups to establish an institutional life were directed principally toward communal self-sufficiency and isolation. Other groups, however, sought to build institutional bastions from which they could enter as groups into the social processes of the larger society from a position of strength.

A second distinction is designed to characterize the community-building process as concentrated or fragmented. Some groups focused their energies on a relatively few institutions and displayed high unanimity in their commitment to the support and purposes of those institutions. Other groups dispersed their energies, engaging in highly individualistic and often mutually conflicting efforts. Using these two dimensions, the following matrix may be derived to summarize the character of community-building among the six different ethnic groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>autonomy</th>
<th>integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fragmentation</td>
<td>Germans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>concentration</td>
<td>Poles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Those groups that pursued concentrated community-building efforts aimed at some degree of integration as a group with the larger society were those that were more likely to develop a viable ethnic political tradition.

The community-building efforts of some groups were hindered by the persistence of divisive old-country attachments within the group. In the case of both the Germans and the Italians, provincial and village loyalties tended to exercise a much more powerful grip on the spirit than did any sense of national collective identity. The Germans were also riven by religious cleavages among Catholics, Lutherans, and the numerous evangelical sects, a situation that worked against the sort of concentration of religious and organizational energies that characterized the Irish investment in the Catholic church. Finally, German immigrants were divided on ideological grounds with the small but influential band of Forty-Eighters on the one hand and the largely apathetic, conservative mass on the other.

The Italians presented, perhaps, an even more chaotic panorama. Writing of the Italians in New York in 1925, Arthur Mann offers the following view:

Properly speaking, there was as yet no Italo-American community. There were unnaturalized immigrants, naturalized citizens, and the native born, living in compact neighborhoods, true, but scattered from borough to borough and within boroughs. There were moreover differences in dialect and customs and centuries-old prejudices which separated Sicilians, Calabrians, Neapolitans, Genoese, Piedmontese, Turinese, Abruzzese, and miscellaneous others. There were Republicans but also Democrats, Socialists, Anarchists, and what we might call apathetics. Cutting across all these divisions was the explosive issue of whether one was for or against the regime that had come to power in Italy in 1922.
One consequence of Italian fragmentation was that no Italian-American newspaper succeeded in reaching more than a small segment of the immigrant community. Constrained not only by high illiteracy rates but also by major dialect differences, the ethnic press never succeeded in establishing the wide-ranging communication network so critical to the establishment of communal loyalties and bonds. 60

Italian fragmentation in the second stage of development was manifested in a variety of ways. Italian energies went principally into business activity rather than into more communally oriented enterprises such as the church. The hold of the family, to the exclusion of outsiders and outside concerns, undercut Italian organizational efforts, 61 while the absence of a tradition of philanthropy meant that the Italian upper classes set up fewer institutions to help their own kind than did the wealthy of any other ethnic group. 62

While Italian efforts in the business sphere, particularly, had the consequence of integrating Italians into the larger society as economic actors, much German community-building was pursued with a strong separatist bent. 63 Similarly, the Poles, whose efforts to establish community were highly concentrated on building a Polish church and the Polish National Alliance, also sought some measure of isolation from the larger society. 64

For all three of these groups, Germans, Italians, and Poles, it is possible to argue that the community-building process was either too fragmented to support the development of widespread communal identification and resources or too preoccupied with the life of the group as an autonomous entity to build avenues along which the integration of the group could proceed.
The experience of the other three groups was vastly different. The Irish built community on the church and used its organization and resources as a major element in the base from which to forge a place in urban politics.\textsuperscript{65} The eastern European Jews poured their organizing energies into the trade unions, the most substantial of which, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, became a significant force in the socialist movement in the decade of World War I. Jewish political education and mobilization relied heavily on the socialist trade union movement, which eventually served to introduce Jewish immigrants to the issues of American politics and led them in 1932 to the support of Democratic party candidates.\textsuperscript{66} National Jewish defense organizations were also formed in this period: the American Jewish Committee, the oldest, in 1906; the Anti-Defamation League in 1913; and the American Jewish Congress in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{67} Black community-building efforts seemed fragmented initially, by virtue of the pattern of small investments of resources and leadership in numerous church and defense organizations. Much of the basic organization of these institutions occurred during the long economic adjustment period. But the mid-1950s saw the beginning of an extraordinary concentration of black energies as most of the various organizations in the national black community began to work in concert toward the goal of integration.\textsuperscript{68} The concentration of the movement probably peaked at the March on Washington in 1963, well after the economic adjustment stage. In the case of each of these ethnic groups, energies and resources were not only relatively concentrated but also geared toward integration of the group as a group into the larger society. Notably, most of the community-building efforts of these
groups occurred after or toward the end of their economic adjustment, suggesting that the establishment of institutions and the emergence of leadership proceeded on a firm base.

All three of these groups also engaged in aggressive manifestations at this stage of development. The Irish draft riots of 1863 in New York, as well as other lesser riots on this issue in other places, the post-Civil War Fenian invasions of Canada, and the Molly Maguires of the 1870s served as occasions for the release of aggression and the testing of the society as well as of Irish solidarity.

Black collective violence was much more concentrated in time, occurring principally from 1964 through 1968 in the nation's cities. None of the other four groups had major experiences in the perpetration of mass violence against other ethnic or native groups. There were minor German draft riots in several small Wisconsin towns. The Poles in the anthracite fields engaged in much labor violence, but this was, as often as not, against other Poles who were strike-breaking. There were no episodes of Italian collective violence except for a minor disturbance in Hoboken in 1909. The Jews, who also have no history of collective violence in America, did provide the backbone of the socialist movement in the early twentieth century, in terms of both membership and intellectual leadership. As a violent ideology, American socialism left much to be desired. Nevertheless, the heterodoxy of a socialist movement in the American context represented served as a modest surrogate for collective violence as a means of testing the society and the solidarity of the group itself. To the degree that socialism provoked American fears and sensibilities in the period around World War I, it may be argued that Jewish socialism was a mild form of aggressive assertion.
Political Consolidation

In the classic pattern of ethnic political development, episodes of aggressive assertion died out, and soon thereafter the ethnic group achieved some sort of highly visible breakthrough in the conventional political system. For most groups a watershed period can be identified either by the election of big city ethnic mayors, who came quickly to symbolize the ethnic group's coming of political age, or by sudden dramatic advances in other areas of politics. In most cases the watershed period was preceded by gains in legislative representation at all levels of government and by successful efforts to establish footholds in party organizations.

Where ethnic groups had built a concentrated resource base during the community-building stage and had developed a widely-held sense of collective identity, this breakthrough led to a period of political consolidation. In the case of some groups, ethnic politicians gradually used their newly won status to distribute power and resources to fellow ethnics. Thus successful consolidation is marked in part by the honing of the art of ethnic patronage. Consolidation is also characterized by the sudden collapse of opposition to ethnic politicians on the grounds of their ethnicity, the burgeoning of widespread social acceptance of the ethnic group as a legitimate competitor and holder of power, and the emergence of the ethnic group as an actor of national consequence. These developments merge imperceptibly into what we have called an ethnic political tradition.

The classic case of consolidation involved the Irish. In the post-Civil War period the Irish made steady inroads in urban Democratic
parties, establishing hegemony in many cities on the Atlantic coast by the turn of the century. The first Irish Catholic mayor, William Grace, was elected in New York City in 1880. In many cities Irish rule was established shortly after that date (Boston and New Haven, for example) and remained firmly entrenched up until recent times. Blacks achieved an equally dramatic breakthrough in the late 1960s with mayoral victories in Cleveland, Gary, and Newark. Black political consolidation is, of course, still in its infancy. In the Irish and the black cases national political power and acceptance both accompanied and were spurred by these achievements at the urban level.

The breakthrough of the Jews is less sharply evident. Never extremely active as candidates in electoral competition, the Jews were nevertheless involved at the highest levels of government in cities, states, and the nation, especially as advisors and ministers, well before the turn of the century. Observers agree, however, that the early 1930s constituted a watershed period for American Jewry in politics. As Fishman writes, with the election of Franklin Roosevelt, "Jews appeared in politics with unprecedented prominence: one cabinet member . . . , three Supreme Court justices . . . , four governors, and several hundred mayors, judges of lower courts, and high appointive officials." In New York City, the center of American Jewry, Mayor Fiorello La Guardia (1933-1945) was doubling Jewish patronage over previous levels. With the recognition of Israel in 1948 the legitimacy of American Jewish claims and sensibilities was firmly established as a central feature of domestic politics.

For all three of these groups--Irish, black, and Jewish--the experience of political development saw a convergence of forces stimulating
and building on ethnic identity as a politically functional organizing framework and symbol. For the other three groups, however, the political development process, in both its early and its later stages, was marked by a host of countervailing forces. Both the Italians and the Poles eventually elected city executives. Mruk of Buffalo (1949) never achieved prominence, but La Guardia, elected mayor of New York in 1933, was a major symbolic "first" for Italian-Americans. While the Italians did indeed proceed to dominate or play a major role in city politics in several places, it was, typically, a fragmented course they pursued. In some places Italians rose through the Republican party, as in New Haven and Providence. In other places they achieved prominence locally as conservative Democrats, only to be disavowed by the larger Democratic party, as was the case in Philadelphia and New York in recent years. The Italians had, as we have seen, a fragmented community on which to build. This splintered tradition undoubtedly also helps to account for the slow entry of Italians into national politics, their low level of representation in the upper echelons of municipal bureaucracy, and their relatively low level of voting cohesion in presidential elections. The Italian experience, then, might best be characterized as a failure to achieve consolidation.

The Polish breakthrough in electoral politics in Buffalo carried with it none of the drama or national glory that La Guardia's triumph as an Italian did. Without luster, the Polish breakthrough failed to provide the impetus for a broader Polish-American politics. In addition, built as it has been on the insular base of the Polish community, Polish politics has remained a highly localized phenomenon
in cities like Buffalo, Detroit, Cleveland, and Milwaukee. Polish influence in patronage politics has been limited, and the presence of Polish names in governments beyond the confines of heavily Polish cities is rare. Thus, unlike in the Italian case, there was little in the Polish community to consolidate in the pursuit of a broader politics of ethnicity.

The Germans never experienced a political breakthrough in the sense in which the other groups did. While German working-class voters in Milwaukee at the turn of the century supported the development of the Social Democratic party, which succeeded in electing a German-American mayor in 1910 and in controlling the city council, this was an isolated and rare example of the assertion of German political power. In other cities where Germans constituted a major segment of the population, like Cincinnati, the fragmentation of their community precluded concerted political action. This was the more common pattern. The Germanophobia that erupted with World War I all but destroyed the possibilities of German-American ethnic identity.

Conclusions

The summary of political development experiences offered in Chart II serves as a point of departure on which to build some conclusions.

1. It seems apparent that an ethnic political tradition arises out of the impact of cumulative experiences and cannot be traced back to any single event or period. Political development may now be understood as a progressive process of consciousness-raising, strengthening, testing, and reinforcing. If the forces generated by the larger society
that serve these ends, such as nativistic movements, fail to materialize, or if the group fails in its efforts at collective self-definition and assertion, then an ethnic political tradition will not emerge. By viewing the process of development in these cumulative terms, it is unnecessary to weight the relative importance to an ethnic political tradition of any single stage or experience. The experiences build on one another; the absence of any one experience diminishes the strength of the tradition, the end result. Thus it is possible to speak of "complete" and "incomplete" ethnic political development patterns.

2. Collective interethnic violence does not occur randomly in the national experience of ethnic groups. Violence against a group by members of the larger society is largely confined to that group's economic adjustment phase. Such violence diminishes as the group achieves economic viability. Violence by the group occurs mainly in the community-building stage and appears to be a form of testing. It, too, vanishes as the group achieves a breakthrough in electoral politics and begins its political consolidation. One important implication of this pattern for contemporary American life is that it suggests that collective violence by any one group is not cyclical or recurrent. Thus the black urban violence of the 1960s was an aspect of the particular stage of black political development. Given the subsequent political breakthrough and consolidation now in progress, black collective violence is unlikely to recur.

3. Collective interethnic violence has been functional rather than damaging for ethnic groups insofar as such groups have sought to maintain cohesion as political actors. It has served to strengthen
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Economic Adjustment</th>
<th>Group Trauma</th>
<th>Stage I</th>
<th>Stage II</th>
<th>Stage III</th>
<th>Relative Strength of Ethnic Political Tradition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>1830-1860</td>
<td>extreme violence and stigmatization</td>
<td>concentrated and integrated</td>
<td>violence</td>
<td>1870-1880: strong</td>
<td>strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>1835-1855</td>
<td>mild stigmatization</td>
<td>fragmented and autonomous</td>
<td>isolated mild violence and isolated radicalism</td>
<td>1910: isolated</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>1880-1915</td>
<td>extreme violence and stigmatization</td>
<td>fragmented and integrated</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>1930: fragmented</td>
<td>moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>1880-1915</td>
<td>extreme stigmatization</td>
<td>concentrated and integrated</td>
<td>socialism</td>
<td>1930: strong</td>
<td>strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>1880-1915</td>
<td>mild stigmatization</td>
<td>concentrated and autonomous</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>1949: isolated</td>
<td>weak/none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>1915-1950</td>
<td>extreme violence and stigmatization</td>
<td>concentrated and integrated</td>
<td>violence</td>
<td>1967: strong</td>
<td>strong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
identity, to test the integrity of the group, and to test and warn the larger society.

4. Violence and radical assertion by ethnic groups are not necessarily viewed, then, as alternatives to other, more conventional political strategies. They have served for several groups as a prelude to entry into the mainstream, losing their attractiveness or necessity as breakthroughs into less costly realms of political action are made.

5. Those groups that were most successful in developing an ethnic political tradition were concentrated in cities. Germans and Poles, many of whom were rural settlers or coal miners, lacked the high urban concentration of the Irish, Italians, and Jews. Blacks who came north are also an overwhelmingly urban people. Ethnic political traditions, then, seem to have emerged from an urban base.

6. The first dramatic political successes of most ethnic groups involved the capture of urban executive offices. It has been the mayoral office especially that has served as a highly symbolic focus for subsequent consolidation and the achievement of national visibility.
As Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan point out in a recent essay, the survival of ethnic divisions in politics in modern societies thoroughly violates sociological expectations. "Why Ethnicity?" Commentary 58 (October 1974): 33.


Abraham H. Miller has compiled party identification figures by ethnic group using University of Michigan Survey Research Center survey data on a pyramided sample covering the period 1952-1964.

The following are the percentages of given ethnic groups identifying with the Democratic party:

- American Jews: 92%
- Irish Catholics: 81%
- Blacks: 76%
- Poles: 75%
- Italians: 64%
- German Catholics: 51%
- German Protestants: 44%


On ticket-balancing, see ibid., pp. 301-310. On ethnic factors in patronage, particularly the groups named, see Theodore Lowi, At the Pleasure of the Mayor (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964); and Daniel P. Moynihan and James Q. Wilson, "Patronage in New York State, 1955-1959," American Political Science Review 58 (June 1964): 286-301.
8 This is true not only in New York but also in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. Charles A. Baretski, "How Polonia Reacts to Inadequate Recognition in the Political Arena," Polish American Studies 28 (Spring 1971): 43-53.

9 The means of determining the size of ethnic groups vary. U.S. Census Bureau surveys have been used to ask people whether they identify with an ethnic group, which yields one estimate. Another method has been simply to count foreign born and foreign stock, but this leaves out all those beyond the second generation. In any event, by either of these methods the six groups under consideration are the largest except for the Canadians, the "Spanish," and the English. Perry Weed, "Components of the White Ethnic Movement," in Joseph Ryan, ed., White Ethnics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 18-19.


33 Handlin, *Boston's Immigrants*, p. 82.


42 Wittke, *The Irish in America*, p. 115.


45 Hawgood, *The Tragedy of German-America*, p. 236. See also p. 253.

47. Greene, *The Slavic Community on Strike*, pp. 95ff.


55. That such feelings of frustration, deprivation, and invisibility were critical ingredients in the mind-set that gave rise to the black urban riots of the 1960s has been amply demonstrated, among other places, in David O. Sears and John B. McConahay, *The Politics of Violence: The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).


57. Ibid.


Comparing the Irish and the Germans, Nesbit has written that "When American nativism was at its height in the 1850s, the Germans and the Irish made common cause, but their reactions were different. Many Germans were confirmed in their separatism. The Irish on the other hand fought back belligerently and often effectively against being consigned to second-class status in American society." Wisconsin p. 352. (Italics mine.) One way, incidentally, of marking the beginnings of German community-building is to date this second phase of political development from the founding of the first Turner Hall, which occurred in New York in 1850. Richard O'Connor, The German-Americans (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), p. 284.

Joseph A. Wytrwal, America's Polish Heritage (Detroit: Endurance Press, 1961), ch. 6. Polish community-building occurred simultaneously with economic adjustment in the 1880s and 1890s. None of the other groups experienced such a concentration of economic and community-building energies at the same time. One might speculate that such a heavy concentration of energies left little left over for political exploits.

The formation of the American Labor party, an outgrowth of the socialist movement in the garment industry and a forerunner of the Liberal party, had the effect of making it possible for eastern European Jews to support Franklin Roosevelt without voting for him on the Democratic party line. The party served as an integrating bridge between the old-line socialist movement and the mainstream Democratic party.

The profusion of civil rights groups in the late 1950s and early 1960s lends itself to an interpretation of the black community as highly fragmented. But appearances can be deceptive. Survey data collected in that period reveal the extraordinarily high concentration of trust in and support of one figure alone, Martin Luther King.


Iorizzo and Mondello, The Italian-Americans, p. 167.


72 Lowi, At the Pleasure of the Mayor, p. 41.


74 Hawgood, The Tragedy of German-America, p. 296.