WHO GETS DRAFTED?
NATIONAL DEFERMENT POLICIES AND
THEIR ADMINISTRATION BY THE
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

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The full cooperation of the Wisconsin State Selective Service System, under the direction of Col. Bentley Courtenay (with the permission of Lt. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey) made this study possible. The careful and helpful critiques of an earlier draft of this paper by officers of the State Headquarters, by Dr. John Folger, Research Director of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, and by Professor Rufus Browning, have saved us from factual and analytical errors. For the judgments expressed, none of these parties bears any responsibility.
Introduction

Under the present Selective Service law and regulations, all men must register with Selective Service when they become eighteen, and all men are considered subject to call.¹ But from Korea to Vietnam we have required military service from only one-quarter to one-third of our young men.² Both policy and practice have dictated that, in some circumstances, military service be deferred. In practice, certain men, because they qualify for a series of deferments, never see service.

This situation raises many questions: Who bears the burden of military service? Who gets deferred and who does not? What are the effects of current selection and deferment policies? We are concerned, of course, with supplying descriptive answers to these questions. But, beyond that, we are concerned with supplying prescriptive answers to other questions: Who should serve when not all must serve? And what values should be given priority in designing our conscription system?

Other studies have addressed themselves to particular aspects of military manpower procurement, but none has attempted empirical evaluation of existing national deferment policies. The National Advisory Commission on Selective Service has made the most comprehensive study of Selective Service ever attempted in the twenty-six-year history of the System, but, more for lack of data than for lack of time, could only suggest interpretations regarding the impact of deferment policies.³ A study conducted from 1964 to 1966 by the National Opinion Research Center for the Department of Defense⁴ offers an informative profile of certain characteristics of men in service, veterans, and nonveterans.
It was part of the Defense Department Draft Study of 1964, and both
were directed chiefly at the problem of whether sufficient numbers of
men could be attracted to military service without conscription. Some
other studies have sought to use rejection at the preinduction physical
examinations as a basis for social analyses of the population, but the
use of Selective Service data for evaluation of the social impact of
the draft has been carried no further.

The dearth of information about the effects of national deferment
policies is due at least as much to lack of data as to lack of interest
or oversight. Neither Selective Service nor the armed forces keeps
records of the socioeconomic characteristics of registrants, draftees,
or enlistees. There exists, therefore, no ready way to compare those
who serve with those who do not, nor to ascribe reasons for such patterns.
Problems are also introduced by some of the special features of Selective
Service operations: because men may still enlist after passing their
preinduction physicals or even after being ordered to report for induc-
tion, analysis of those actually inducted would reach only one-half to
one-third of the men ordered for induction, probably producing a skewed
picture of Selective Service actions. Similarly, analyses of mental
and physical rejections must provide for the Defense Department's changes
of standards in response to manpower needs. Selective Service record-
keeping is limited to those few items of information that concern a
registrant's availability for service, and, in any event, files are
confidential by law. Under these conditions, only individualized inquiry
addressed to a national sample of men in the eligible age group would
support a definitive evaluation of deferment policies.
In the absence of better data, we have used Selective Service data showing numbers of men in each classification category on a month-by-month and board-by-board basis for the eighty local boards of the state of Wisconsin. The actions of each board were correlated with the Census Bureau's 1960 analysis of the socioeconomic characteristics of the board jurisdictions, their enlistment and induction experience, and the background and attitudinal characteristics of board members. The obvious limitation of this approach is that the registrants actually affected may not be representative of the general characterization of their area. For example, inductions may appear to be high in an area with high proportions of low income persons, but it may be the higher income registrants of the area who are actually being inducted, and our data do not permit us to distinguish such eventualities. Perhaps the best support for our approach here is the lack of any other practical means of determining what the effects of present deferment policies have been; we will supplement our somewhat tenuous correlations of aggregates with enough other evidence to make a defensible case for the policy changes we recommend.

I

THE STRUCTURE OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM AND THE EXTENT OF VARIATION IN ITS IMPACT

The framers of the original Selective Service statute in 1940 were committed to the principle of maximum local participation and control. To draft men for World War II, local boards were established and staffed in accordance with plans developed and executed by a Selective Service
section in each state's National Guard. The National Guard itself provided the staff for a Selective Service Headquarters in each state. Subsequent extensions and amendments of the original 1940 act did not alter this reliance on local boards supervised by a headquarters in each state.

National Headquarters makes a virtue of necessity by consistently stressing local discretion, not only by scrupulously avoiding efforts to standardize local board performance across the country, but also by reminding each local board, when national guidelines for deferment policy are issued, that the standards are "advisory only." The individual state headquarters are left to establish more specific interpretations of national deferment and induction policies (if they are so inclined) for the guidance of their local boards. Some do this, but the substance of the interpretations varies widely. In fact, it is clear that the state headquarters themselves are an important cause of interstate variation. This paper, however, examines in detail only variation within a single state. Local boards alone may classify a man (subject to appeal) or order him inducted. In this respect they are autonomous, applying national and state guidelines as they see fit. These conditions appear to make variation in the System almost inevitable; interstate variation seems assured, intrastate variation highly probable. Our analysis of the extent and causes of variation in Wisconsin reveals that national deferment policies do create systematic variation along socio-economic lines, but that relatively little other variability exists within this state's Selective Service System.

Variation within the state nevertheless is substantial. Table 1
Table 1
Percentage of Eligible Age Registrants in Major Selective Service Classifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Description of Classification</th>
<th>Fiscal 1965</th>
<th>Fiscal 1966</th>
<th>Lowest</th>
<th>Highest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-A</td>
<td>Available for service</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-C</td>
<td>Now in service</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-Y</td>
<td>Available in emergency</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-D</td>
<td>In Reserves</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-A</td>
<td>Occupationally deferred</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-C</td>
<td>Agriculturally deferred</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-S</td>
<td>Student deferments</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-A</td>
<td>Hardship and Dependency</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>deferments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-A</td>
<td>Completed service</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-F</td>
<td>Unfit for service</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Enlistments)</td>
<td>(2.1)</td>
<td>(3.3)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Inductions)</td>
<td>(.7)</td>
<td>(2.0)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
shows the median percentages of eligible age registrants in each major Selective Service classification of the local boards of Wisconsin in fiscal years 1965 and 1966. As induction calls increased during the Vietnam buildup, the greatest changes occurred in the available for service (I-A) and student deferment (II-S) categories; at a time when inductions and enlistments were rising and the I-A pool was declining, II-S deferments increased almost 40 percent. The last two columns in the table show the ranges in proportions of registrants in each classification between the highest and lowest boards in 1966. Figure 1 presents the same data in graphic form, indicating how far the highest and lowest boards vary from the state median.

By combining range of variation with state medians, we establish a general profile of Selective Service in the state. The largest deferment classifications are dependency/hardship (III-A), unfitness (IV-F), and student deferment. There is a great range among boards with respect to proportions of men in some categories. The highest board has ten times as many registrants in II-S and I-D (Reserves) as the lowest board; in both cases, the highest board is in a wealthy urban area and the lowest in a low income, Negro area. The norm is for the percentage of the highest boards to be two to three times that of the lowest boards in a classification. These preliminary findings confirm our expectations of variation and suggest directions for further inquiry.

II

THE EFFECTS OF INCOME ON VARIATION

The present structure of national deferment policies places greater liability for military service on lower income areas than on higher
Figure 1

Variation of Local Boards From State Median
Selected Classifications, 1966
(Highest and Lowest Boards)

Percent of eligible age group
32
30
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

I-A I-C I-Y I-D II-A II-C II-S III-A IV-A IV-F
(Available) (Fit) (Reserves) (Occup.) (Farm) (Stu-
only Deferred) deferred (Hardship, (Com-
emergency) deferred) service)

Key:  
Extent to which highest local board exceeded state median.

Extent to which lowest local board fell below state median.

State medians in each classification.
income areas. Larger proportions of all registrants in low income areas see service, despite the fact that they have higher proportions of unfit men; this means that physically acceptable men in such areas have considerably higher liability than their counterparts in higher income areas. These conclusions emerge from comparison of the socioeconomic characteristics of the jurisdictions of boards at the upper and lower reaches of variation from the state medians in each classification. Because we knew Wisconsin to be a state with low variation, we used a measure that accentuates variation: our analysis is directed at all boards more than 1 percent above or below the medians.

Table 2 shows the relationship between proportions of men who have been or are now in service and the income levels of the boards' jurisdictions. Boards in the lowest income areas tend to be above the median (53%), while boards in the highest income areas tend to be below the median (53%). The proportion of boards that are above the median decreases sharply as one moves from the lowest to the highest income areas, with only 11 percent of the boards with over $6000 income jurisdictions being more than 1 percent above the median. These data suggest that more men see military service in low income areas than in high income areas.

The relationship that we seem to be identifying is far from a simple equation between income and military service. Several factors, including some countervailing effects, are involved in setting the pattern identified above. We must also enter certain qualifications, such as that

*Proportionately, not necessarily numerically, because there are more low income boards and the higher income boards have more registrants.
Table 2
Service in Armed Forces by Income of Board Jurisdictions
(in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Median Family Income of Board Jurisdictions</th>
<th>$3000-$4000</th>
<th>$4000-$6000</th>
<th>over $6000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More than 1% above state median</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within 1% of state median</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 1% below state median</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=19</td>
<td></td>
<td>N=42</td>
<td>N=19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (a) "Service in armed forces" includes classifications I-C (in service) and IV-A (completed service).

(b) Median family income data based on U.S. Census, 1960. In the case of boards comprising less than an entire county (11 boards), census tracts were allocated geographically to construct socioeconomic profiles of each board jurisdiction.
income differences may have varying effects, depending on the level of draft calls—with higher calls considerably reducing the discrepancies. We have so far established only that income levels relate to the proportions of men who will see service; we have still to explore the nature and reasons for this relationship.

**Student deferment.** The primary explanation for the income effect seems to be the student deferment classification. According to the 1960 Census, the incidence of college attendance is closely related to family income; only 19 percent of persons aged sixteen to twenty-four from families with incomes under $5000 reported some college attendance, while 33 percent of persons in the $5000 to $7500 range, and 49 percent of those in the $7500 to $10,000 range had the same experience. Table 3 shows that student deferments follow this same pattern.

**Table 3**

Student Deferments by Median Income of Board Jurisdictions (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal 1966 II-S Levels</th>
<th>Boards in low income areas (below $5000)</th>
<th>Boards in high income areas (above $5000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More than 1% above state median</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within 1% of state median</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 1% below state median</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=46</td>
<td></td>
<td>N=34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The scatter diagram presented in Figure 2 shows how closely income levels are related to student deferment proportions. Some special features are always present, of course, such as the proximity of colleges and universities or the varying proportions of relatively wealthy persons in each board jurisdiction; but in general the distribution follows the proportions of families with incomes under $3000 per year. The urban boards (which include the only boards with more than 10 percent Negro populations) show a particularly wide range in proportions of student deferments, without having great differences in proportions of low income families. The implication is that other factors are operative, and we will analyze these boards in a separate section.

Perhaps men presently deferred as students will see service in the same proportion as others, but it seems more likely that substantial numbers of them will acquire entitlement to occupational or dependency deferments and, as a consequence, will never see military service. This depends partly on the level of calls at the time of graduation. In periods of low calls, some boards may not be obliged to order these relatively older men for induction even when they have no further claim to deferment. For these reasons, we are inclined to view the II-S deferment as an important factor in producing the income effects previously identified.

Another important by-product of the student deferment classification reinforces our impression of its inherent discrimination. The United States has been engaged in actual shooting wars for only relatively brief periods in recent experience; at other times service in the armed forces entails little danger of loss of life. The II-S deferment offers the higher income registrant an opportunity to avoid service during the critical years of a shooting war, and, in effect, to choose the time...
Figure 2
II-S Deferments by Income Levels

Percent of eligible age registrants in II-S

Key:
• Local board in rural area
X Local board in urban area
O Local board with more than 10% nonwhite population

Percent of families with income under $3000 per year
when he will serve. (Note the almost 40 percent increase in student deferments between 1965 and 1966 documented in Table 1.) This option is not available to the lower income registrant.

**Mental and physical deferments.** The lower income areas have somewhat higher proportions of men in the physically and mentally unfit classifications. This contravenes the income-based reduction of liability created by the student deferment, and implies that the liability of men in lower income areas who do meet the physical and mental standards for service is much higher. To test this hypothesis, we subtracted the "fit only in emergency" (I-Y) and "unfit" (IV-F) classifications from the totals of eligible age registrants in each board, and then computed registrants' actual service liability by taking the ratio of the two service categories (I-C and IV-A) to the total. The resulting service liability ratios ranged from 1 to 3.2 in the wealthier urban boards, to 1 to 2.5 in the relatively low income, most heavily Negro board, and 1 to 2.3 in a very low income rural board. This means that actual military service was experienced by one in every 2.3 physically and mentally qualified men in the low income rural board, but by almost 50 percent less, or one in every 3.2 men, in the wealthier urban boards.

**Enlistment experience.** So far, we have been working with data that include all men currently or previously in service, without regard to their avenue of entry. This leaves open the possibility that the lower income registrants may have enlisted in disproportionate numbers, thus in effect voluntarily creating the pattern we have discerned. In order to test this possibility, we have to distinguish enlistments from inductions and compare both with the income levels of board jurisdictions. The results of such an analysis are presented in Table 4.
Table 4
Enlistments and Inductions, by Income Level of Board Jurisdictions, 1966 (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Boards in Low Income Areas</th>
<th>Boards in High Income Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enlistment Rate:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=39</td>
<td>N=41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Induction Rate:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=39</td>
<td>N=41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (a) "Low Income": More than 20% of families earning less than $3000 per year.
(b) "High Income": Less than 20% of families earning less than $3000 per year.
(c) Enlistment Rate based on percent of eligible age group enlisting during fiscal 1966. (Low=less than 3%, Medium=3% to 3.99%, High=over 4%).
(d) Induction Rate based on percent of eligible age group inducted during fiscal 1966. (Low=less than 2%, Medium=2% to 2.49%, High=over 2.5%).
Perhaps surprisingly, the enlistment rate tends to be lower in the lower income jurisdictions and relatively higher in the high income jurisdictions. Conversely, the induction rate is higher in the low income areas and lower in the high income areas. This suggests, in response to our original inquiry, that the higher service experience of the low income boards is not due to enlistments, but, quite the opposite, is due to the heavy weight of inductions there. The high income areas, with their apparently higher enlistment rates, would, in accordance with the formulae for allocating induction calls, receive lower calls for induction from the State Headquarters; induction calls would be proportionately higher in those areas that did not provide men through enlistment. This seems to be the case here, with perhaps some additional impact on the lower income areas deriving from the availability of men there.

Some further inferences may be drawn from these enlistment and induction patterns. Higher enlistment experience in higher income areas (assuming, of course, that it is in fact the relatively higher income men who are enlisting in those areas) indicates that such individuals enjoy another advantage: they are able to select their branch of service and type of specialized training. The lower income area residents, through lack of awareness or motivation, are less likely to receive the training and upgrading of skills which the armed forces may offer and are probably more likely to end up in Army jobs that are less conducive to subsequent civilian mobility. It may be that there is a threshold of perception and imagination, not attained by relatively isolated low income persons, short of which men do not take advantage of potential
opportunities to acquire the tools for advancement. Some further support for this hypothesis is found in the fact that unemployment levels, insofar as we were able to update them on a draft board-jurisdiction basis, do not correlate with enlistment levels. Indeed, the higher unemployment areas were lowest in enlistments. Unemployment-induced enlistments probably come disproportionately from men who have established expectations of employment—in short, from those men who are well above that threshold of awareness.

It has been argued that poor persons have much to gain from military service, and even that the armed forces' standards should be adjusted to take in larger proportions of such men.14 This argument might be tenable when there is no shooting war. It would require that the armed forces develop special training and education programs sensitive enough to cope with the probably unique problems of low income persons. This would involve the services in distinctive new functions, and not merely remedial basic infantry training. We do not yet have evidence that service in the armed forces actually contributes to mobility, and we have previously seen that the lower income areas do not have the higher enlistment rates. We have found no data to indicate that poor persons perceive the armed forces as an attractive alternative to their present status. It appears that any program to use the armed forces as an agent for elevation of the status of the poor would require either intensive education and preparation of the poor, or coercion in the form of deliberately disproportionate induction calls, and probably both.

Reserves enlistments and service. We have not included men in classification I-D (Reserves) in our computations of men who have seen
military service, because we have defined military service as active
duty. While some I-D men are former service personnel, most are six-
months or no-prior-service men. As of March, 1967, no organized Reserve
units have been called up, and only a small proportion of those men
who have had no training at all have been activated during the Vietnam
period. Under these conditions, and despite the extended liability of
Reservists, this classification is another advantage open primarily to
the higher income, better educated registrants. Figure 3 shows how the
highest income boards differ from the lowest income boards in percentages
of eligible age group registrants in classification I-D.

Defense Department comparisons of the educational attainment of
men entering the Reserves with men entering the services via induction
reveal sharp disparities\textsuperscript{15} consistent with our contention that service
in the Reserves is another income-related advantage. The rise in
Reserve proportions between 1965 and 1966 shown in Table 1 occurred
chiefly in the higher income areas. Once again, a deferment policy
provides a means for the more fortunate registrant to avoid active ser-
vice in a time of maximum danger.

Income differentials probably affect other classifications, such
as occupational deferments (II-A), but this category is too small for
meaningful analysis; in any event, the relationship of income to
occupational deferments might well be offset by an inverse relationship
to agricultural deferments (II-C). Dependency and hardship deferments
(III-A) appear to reflect chiefly the childbearing patterns of an area,
because the number of hardship deferments is so small that the virtually
automatic dependency deferments determine the proportions of registrants
Figure 3
Reserve Classifications, Highest and Lowest Income Areas

Key:
- Lowest income boards (More than 20% of families with incomes under $3000; N=39)
- Highest income boards (More than 15% of families with incomes over $10,000; N=13)

Number of boards:
- 12
- 10
- 8
- 6
- 4
- 2

Percentage of Eligible Age Group in I-D (Reserves)

- Below 2%
- 2 to 2.99%
- 3 to 3.99%
- 4 to 4.99%
- 5 to 5.99%
- 6 to 6.99%
- Over 7%
in that classification.

Low income rural boards. To conclude the study of the income-related impact of national deferment policies, we examined the record of thirty-seven boards, all in rural areas, where more than 20 percent of families had incomes under $3000 per year and less than 10 percent of families had incomes over $10,000 per year. Their classification patterns are the same as those previously described, but now in exaggerated form (Table 5). These lowest income areas are dramatically low in II-S deferments, distinctly high in mental and physical unfitness, and high in hardship and dependency deferments. The combined effect of the presence of all these factors is a rate of service experience above the state median, which is not due to high enlistments. We conclude that the absence of the student deferment has overcome the countervailing factors and has exposed these registrants to greater liability. These findings reinforce our doubts about the equity of the student deferment.

Table 5
Classification and Enlistment Characteristics of Low Income(a) Boards (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification and Enlistment Characteristics</th>
<th>Completed Service &amp; In-Service (I-C &amp; IV-A)</th>
<th>Student Hardship &amp; Dependency Deferments (II-S)</th>
<th>Mental &amp; Physical Unfitness (III-A)</th>
<th>Enlistments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More than 1% above state median</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within 1% of state median</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 1% below state median</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=37</td>
<td>N=37</td>
<td>N=37</td>
<td>N=37</td>
<td>N=37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) "Low income" boards here include the 37 boards with jurisdictions in which more than 20% of families had incomes under $3000 and less than 10% had incomes over $10,000.
III

URBAN AND NEGRO AREAS

Ten local boards in Wisconsin are located in areas that are more than 95 percent urban, according to the 1960 Census. This is not a very large number from which to generalize, but the difficulty of obtaining socioeconomic and classification data on a larger number seems to us to justify cautious analysis from this base. First we will examine the features that resemble our general findings, and then the distinctively urban characteristics.

Income levels are highly significant within the urban context, but a new factor—the heavier concentration of Negroes—now enters the equation. Table 6 ranks these ten boards in the familiar categories, with by now predictable results. Rank in median family income (col. 1) is almost perfectly correlated with rank in student deferments (col. 2). It is closely associated (though inversely, of course) with rank in mental and physical rejection rates (col. 3): the five highest in income are the five lowest in rejections, and the five lowest in income are the five highest in rejections. Income rankings are related to service experience (col. 4) in a somewhat more complex way: generally, income is inversely related to service, i.e., the higher the income, the lower the service experience. The three boards highest in income level are among the four lowest in service experience, while two of the four boards lowest in income are among the four highest in service experience. The three exceptions to the general income "rule" we have postulated are the three boards with the highest percentage of Negroes in their jurisdictions. (In fact, they are the only three boards with any significant proportion of Negroes, Board B having about half, Board E about a third, and Board F about 15 percent.)
Table 6
Ranking of Urban Boards by Income(a) and by Selected Classifications(b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Board</th>
<th>(1) Rank in median family income</th>
<th>(2) Rank in percent of student deferments</th>
<th>(3) Rank in mental &amp; physical rejections</th>
<th>(4) Rank in combined in-service &amp; completed service</th>
<th>(5) Rank in proportion of Negroes in population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (a) Median family income based on 1960 Census.
(b) Rank in Selective Service classifications based on percentage of eligible age group represented by each classification during fiscal year 1966.
Thus, in the urban context, in general the higher the income, the lower the service experience, and the higher the proportions of Negroes in the population, the lower the service experience. This is due to the markedly higher rejection rates of the boards with high proportions of Negroes. We know from other studies that Negroes have much higher mental and physical rejection rates than whites, and this seems to be the explanation for the patterns observed here. The high income areas and the high Negro areas thus share the attribute of low service experience. How such seemingly antithetical characteristics of different boards can produce similar results may be seen from a comparison by classification of two geographically contiguous boards in Milwaukee (Figure 4). A comparison of nine classifications reveals essentially the same extent of variation as the scatter diagram (Figure 2) showed for the II-S deferments.

We should reiterate our previous assertion that, as far as we can tell, this difference is rooted in the socioeconomic character of the two areas, and not in the idiosyncratic behavior of board members. We supplemented our data analyses with personal interviews with forty board members and another thirty other officials and employees at various levels within the state Selective Service System, and we are confident that there has been no discrimination, intentional or otherwise, other than that created by national deferment policies.

The differences between these two boards in the categories of student deferment and mental and physical unfitness are both dramatic and predictable; also predictable by now are the similarities in percent of eligible men in service (I-C). Perhaps less readily anticipated
Figure 4
Comparison of Proportions of Registrants in Selected Classifications, Two Boards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Variation From State Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent Below Median</td>
<td>Median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-A</td>
<td>Available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-D</td>
<td>Reserves</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-A</td>
<td>Occupational Deferment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-S</td>
<td>Student Deferment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-A</td>
<td>Hardship &amp; Dependency Deferment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-C</td>
<td>In Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-A</td>
<td>Completed Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-Y</td>
<td>Unfit except in Emergency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-F</td>
<td>Unfit for Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: Board B, Table 8: Median family income $4900, approximately 50% Negro.
Board G, Table 8: Median family income $8500, approximately 1% Negro.
are the hardship/dependency deferments (III-A). Both boards are well below the median, but the Negro board is only one-third as far below. We can speculate with some confidence that males in the higher income area may delay the assumption of family responsibilities somewhat longer than the average young man while engaged in higher education or because of middle-class norms.

Conspicuous differences between the two boards also exist in the I-D (Reserves) and II-A (occupational deferment) classifications. The high income, predominantly white area has a relatively high proportion of men in both I-D and II-A, while the proportion of registrants in those classifications in the lower income, Negro area is quite low. It is clear that residents of the two areas have radically different opportunities to claim Reserve or occupational deferments.

Together all of these characteristics suggest strongly that the low service experience of the Negro board is due almost entirely to its startling unfitness rates, while that of the wealthy white board is due to the multiplicity of alternatives open to its registrants, and exists in spite of relatively low rejection rates. Once again we see that, for those registrants in the Negro board who are physically qualified, liability for military service is high indeed. With a much smaller pool of acceptable men, the Negro board provides nearly the same percentage of men to the armed forces. Nor is the explanation to be found in enlistment rates, for once again the Negro board proves to be particularly low in percentage of enlistments. The white board is high in enlistments, and we think it is safe to say that many, if not most, of these enlistments are in the officer category. The conclusion would
seem to be inescapable that present deferment policies operate to draw into the armed forces a disproportionate number of those Negroes who are physically qualified. It may still be argued that this is to their (or the nation's) ultimate benefit, of course; but determining what values are to be maximized in the selection of those who should serve when not all will serve is an issue of public policy about which citizens may differ.

IV

OTHER SOURCES OF VARIATION WITHIN THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

Our analysis of the Wisconsin Selective Service System did not bring to light any systematic variation that was not correlated with the socio-economic character of board jurisdictions. We have reported elsewhere on the background and attitudinal characteristics of board members which we gleaned from mail questionnaires. We were unable to discover any effects of such characteristics on the performance of these boards. This is not to say that there is no variation within this state, for random or individualized decision-making probably does exist; there simply is no systematic variation related to such potential independent variables as the number of veterans on boards or the personal attitudes of board members toward the Selective Service System.

Board attitudes and socioeconomic context. The only instance in which we were able to find any attitudinal or background characteristic correlation with performance—note-worthy for its very rarity—is probably a post-hoc relationship: We did find that board members from low income areas were more likely to agree with the proposition that "Registrants
from wealthier families are less likely to be inducted, under present policies, than registrants from less favored families." On 48 percent of the low income boards, a majority of members agreed, while in high income areas the proportion dropped to 30 percent. A more decisive correlation is visible in Table 7, where the student deferment performance is shown to be correlated with the beliefs of board majorities on this question. Among low income boards, those whose members agree that "the wealthy get off" are likely to have lower proportions of student deferments. Among high income boards, there was no relation between II-S classifications and this attitude. The connection here also may well be post-hoc, in that a board that receives few requests for and is unable to grant many II-S deferments may come to believe that the wealthier registrant is thus favored.

Substantial variation among the local boards in the state does exist, apparently almost all of it attributable to the application of national deferment policies in varying socioeconomic contexts. These boards are located in counties of widely varying characteristics. They include timber and vacation counties with low income levels, dairy farmland counties among the richest in the country, urban Negro neighborhoods, and "gold coast" suburbs. Indeed, what may be surprising is that there is not more variation than there is. What features of the state system affect the extent of variation among boards?

The political culture of Wisconsin stresses adherence to uniform rules of behavior and to a high ethical standard of public service. The State Headquarters, moreover, is sensitive to the damage to the image of the System that might result from wide variations in the
Table 7
Student Deferments by Median Income of Families and Board Members' Opinions of whether "The Wealthy Get Off" (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Median Income of Families</th>
<th>Low (below $5000)</th>
<th>High (above $5000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fiscal 1966 II-S Levels</td>
<td>Board believes &quot;wealthy get off&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 1% above state median</td>
<td>More than 1% below state median</td>
<td>More than 1% above state median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within 1% of state median</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 1% below state median</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=22</td>
<td>N=24</td>
<td>N=11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Board members' attitudes measured by agreement/disagreement with statement, "Registrants from wealthier families are less likely to be inducted, under present policies, than registrants from less favored families." Where more than 60% of board members agree with that statement, the board is included among those "believing wealthy get off." All others are reported as seeing "no distinctions."
performance of local boards. Every effort possible is made to reduce idiosyncratic board behavior and to achieve consistent application of national and state policies. But this is not to say that a great deal can be done. The instruments for achieving uniformity that are at the disposal of the State Director are few and informal. Moreover, though he may desire uniformity, he knows that local boards are autonomous and are staffed by volunteers. He must request, explain, and persuade; he cannot command.

Personnel. Aiding the State Director are the clerks of local boards, and a field staff from State Headquarters ("auditors"). It should be made clear that the clerk serves both the local board and the State Headquarters. The State Headquarters selects and trains the clerks, supervises them, regulates their salary scales, and calls them in for conferences and training sessions from time to time. The clerk is imbued with loyalty to the State Headquarters, and is responsible for notifying it of any possibly questionable board actions, so that, if necessary, it can dispatch a trouble-shooting mission to the board. Regular and frequent communication also is maintained between the clerk and State Headquarters. She submits to State Headquarters a summary of each board meeting, which records what cases were considered and what disposition was made; a monthly report listing the numbers of men in each classification; and a report of any unusual action that is taken (for example, a postponement of induction).

As a source of information and a channel of communication, the clerk is a force for standardization. In some respects she represents State Headquarters. But we should emphasize that the clerk is not the
main decision-maker. The role of the clerk has of late been misunderstood, and this distinction should be stated explicitly: the **board** classifies registrants in cases in which classification is discretionary.

At each meeting a board may handle from 75 to 400 classification questions, depending on its number of registrants and the current calls. From 10 percent to 30 percent of these questions may involve major issues of discretionary judgment, and consume most of the board's time. The remainder of the cases are sufficiently routine (a man has entered the service, or has reached his thirty-fifth birthday, or has been discharged from the service, or has been rejected by the Armed Forces Examining Station) that the board merely spot-checks recommendations made by the clerk. Except for these routine classifications, board members insist that they are the sources of judgement. Our interviewing convinces us that this is the case. The clerk does function as an agenda-organizer and information-provider. These are not insignificant matters and we know they are sources of influence. But clerks do not make final decisions. Some board members, indeed, have on occasion resented what they regarded as the unwarranted intrusion of the clerk into the discussion of a case. Board members do not willingly divest themselves of their power of judgment and discretion.

Another source of standardization is the field staff, made up of men and women called auditors. These personnel, often experienced former clerks, supervise the clerks and, through both formal inspections and unannounced visits, ensure that uniform practices are followed. They also instruct clerks in policy changes, and they may meet with local boards. Regular conferences of auditors at State Headquarters make it
possible for common problems to be resolved consistently throughout the state.

State Headquarters personnel themselves make occasional visits to local boards for consideration of particular problems or simply to maintain contact and size up the board's personnel. Members of different boards, however, are rarely brought together for conferences, partly because of time and cost, but also probably because it is easier to deal with one or two deviant boards separately than with many boards together.

There are several bases on which the concept of using boards of local men to administer conscription laws and regulations might be challenged. Those that rest on allegations of unrepresentativeness, insofar as they involve expectations concerning performance, seem to be undermined by our data. They may still be valid in symbolic terms, of course, for in many states minority groups are indeed poorly represented; but our data regarding performance suggest that such differences in background and attitudes as exist in Wisconsin's state System do not create systematic variation.

The idea that local men are best able to decide who should be drafted because they know registrants better has also been challenged. Responses to our mail questionnaire to board members show that urban members have little contact with registrants, implying that they neither know registrants (which they uniformly confirm in interviews) nor are known by them. Table 8 presents the evidence that contact—in the form of telephone calls or personal visits—is very low in urban areas. These data suggest strongly that the local board concept is vulnerable on this score, at least in the urban areas. Another argument against
Table 8

Differences Between Urban and Rural Local Board Members in Contact with Registrants (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Urbanization</th>
<th>Large City (95% urban)</th>
<th>Small City (40%-70% urban)</th>
<th>Small Town (20%-39% urban)</th>
<th>Rural (below 20% urban)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact with Registrants (a)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Frequent</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Occasional</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Rare, none</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=39 N=91 N=100 N=84

Notes: (a) Measured by response to question, "Some local board members frequently see registrants or get phone calls from them. Others hardly ever have contact with registrants except at board meetings. Would you say that you have contact with registrants (either in person or by phone) Rarely - Occasionally - Frequently - ?"

(b) Includes negligible number of nonresponses, which are taken to be negative answers. Responses were obtained from 314 board members, or 81% of all board members.

Local boards is that they cannot effectively make decisions concerning registrants who have moved away since their original registration. We know from our interviewing that, due to increased urbanization and mobility, boards frequently are obliged to classify men who work or live hundreds of miles away.

Perhaps the most often heard criticism of the local board concept, however, is that it leads to idiosyncratic variation. We cannot speak to this issue as regards other states, but we can say from our Wisconsin experience that it need not. Again, of course, we refer only to systematic variation, and take no account of individual, perhaps even spectacular,
exceptions. We have seen variation resulting from differing interpretations of national policies by the State Headquarters and appeal boards in the System. But almost all of the variation that we found within our single state (as contrasted with interstate variation) was due to socioeconomic differences among local board jurisdictions. This finding has important implications for the validity of the local board concept, for it suggests that the local boards themselves contribute little additional variation.

Appeals. The appellate process within the Selective Service System, designed as a means of redress for individual grievances, adds to the variability within the System. Appeal boards are established for each Federal Judicial District, and are made up of five members representing major professional and industrial groups. The appeal process is activated by the registrant contacting his local board within ten days of being sent a notice of new classification. The appeal may be as informal as a letter, and no attorney is permitted to take any formal part in the proceedings. The appeal boards classify the registrant anew on the basis of the case file. The registrant does not appear, and they see only the local board's report of the registrant's personal appearance (if there was one) before the local board. Their practice is to classify each file individually and then to reveal their actions in group meetings, with discussion following in instances of disagreement.

Appeals may be made by the registrant's employer or dependent as well as by the registrant; the State and National Directors of Selective Service as well as the local government appeal agents also are entitled to appeal. The registrant, his employer, or dependent may carry his
appeal to the Presidential Appeal Board in cases in which the appeal board is divided in its vote, and the State or National Director may do so at any time.

Our concern here is with the standardizing effects of the two appeal boards in Wisconsin. Local Board members pay close attention to the results of appeal board action on cases appealed from their own board, and most follow the lead of the appeal board in similar subsequent cases. The decisions of appeal boards, however, are not circulated. A local board learns about appeal board decisions only on cases appealed from it, not from other local boards; nor is there any opportunity for one appeal board to learn of the decisions of another.

A comparison of sources of appeals shows that appeal boards are passive instruments of standardization, in the sense that no representative of the government—neither the State Director nor the government appeal agents—appeals cases. While some appeal agents, who are theoretically assigned to protect the interests of both the registrant and the government, are active and conscientious, most apparently lost their sense of function during the period of low calls between 1954 and 1964, and the office has not been successfully revived since. The finding regarding the State Director is more significant, since it suggests the possibility that he is unwilling to undertake the direct confrontation with a local board that would result from his appeal of its classification. Even more likely, however, it is a tribute to his capacity to achieve his wishes in other ways: so close is the scrutiny of board actions that the State Director's preferences are made clear before an appeal becomes necessary.
A substantial number of appeals are brought by registrants' employers, suggesting that appeals also represent a means by which the economic interests of the area receive consideration. The great majority of successful appeals turns out to be those seeking occupational deferments. Part of the underlying rationale for this is the fact that local boards are frequently obliged to classify men who are no longer living in their jurisdiction and who may be working in industrial centers at jobs about which the board of original residence knows little. The appeal board provides a means for introducing a broader view of economic needs into the System's decision-making. This fact also accounts for the registrant's right to appeal to an appeal board in his present state of residence if he has moved out of the state in which he originally registered for the draft. Our evidence indicates that appeal boards in the new state of residence act with sympathy on appeals from out-of-state boards.22

The results of appeal actions during fiscal 1966 are shown in Table 9. Once again we must enter reservations on the issue of the

Table 9
Results of Appeals, Fiscal 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Appeal Board A</th>
<th>Appeal Board B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Appeals</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From within state</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% New classifications</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From outside state</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% New classifications</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
effectiveness of the appeal boards as agents of standardization. It seems unlikely that the local boards in the area covered by Board A are distinctly different in performance from those in Board B's area. Yet the proportion of new classifications assigned by Board B on appeals from within the state is 70 percent higher than those granted by Board A. Board B also reversed out-of-state local boards more than twice as often as did Board A. It may be that the local boards of the two areas are idiosyncratic, so that the performance of the appeal boards is simply a reflection of errors and arbitrariness below. But this pattern of performance on appeals was maintained over a period of several years. Hence, the more persuasive conclusion appears to be that one is simply more responsive to the claims of registrants and/or employers than the other. If this is so, the appeal boards do not act as statewide agents of standardization.

Some local boards feel the weight of appeal board actions much more heavily than others. The number of appeals and appeal board reversals sustained varies sharply among local boards. The incidence of appeals is not related to the number of registrants or to the reversal record of the appeal boards. It appears to be a reflection of a particular policy departure by a local board, such as classifying all teachers I-A, or taking a particularly hard line with engineers or students. Interestingly, the ten urban boards of the state were very low in incidence of appeals. If the local board ideal of familiarity with the registrant is measured at all by the incidence of appeals, this finding would appear to be another refutation of the concept. In fact, anonymity may actually promote consistency of decisions and conformity with guidelines, with
resulting lower incidence of appeals.

Actions of the appeal boards are highly individualized, and they fill no national standardizing function. Individuals and the economy receive a modicum of consideration from appeal boards, but not much attention seems to be paid to consistency of application of policy in the state as a whole. Extrapolating from this experience, it seems clear that the nation's 115 appeal boards are an important source of variation in the performance of the Selective Service System. 23

This brief review of the operation of the state System suggests that efforts toward standardization have been made within the limits of the decentralized structure and ethos of the organization. Substantial variation remains, but most of it seems due to socioeconomic differences among jurisdictions.

V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We do not intend this final section to be a full critique of military manpower procurement policies or of their administrative application. Our evidence and the focus of our inquiry preclude such an ambitious undertaking. Because we have found the principal source of the differential impact of conscription to be deferment policy rather than organizational structure or behavior, we will not discuss modification of the administrative apparatus. Accepting the existence of conscription for the present, we will seek merely to determine whether the discerned effects of current deferment policies (as they are applied by Selective Service) are so undesirable that they mandate change. In subsequent
papers, we shall consider Selective Service and military service as potential instruments of assistance to the poor, but, under present conditions, we cannot envision the military serving this function. For now we shall view military liability exclusively as a burden.

The original statutory intent of rendering all men liable for military service was followed by the establishment of an elaborate system of deferments. Men are "deferred" from induction because they are physically or mentally unfit, or are in school, in the Reserves, in "critical" occupations, are overage, or because they have children. Some of these bases of deferment, such as age or physical condition, are beyond the control of the individual registrant; but others are manipulable by men with the requisite resources. Our findings indicate that such relatively large proportions of higher income men qualify for deferment that the Army is disproportionately staffed by lower income men.

One might claim that this imbalance is merely a reflection of the existing distribution of advantages within the society, and that many more opportunities are open to persons with greater resources. While true, this is nevertheless hardly a defensible argument: government policy should not accentuate inequities by design, unless other results are so necessary or desirable that they require it. One might also argue that the nation's interest with regard to efficient use of available manpower requires that some men with particular skills and capacities be employed where they are most needed, and not be drafted into the Army. This rationale is inherent in the original Selective Service Act, and permeates the administration of deferments today; the Selective Service System actually takes pride in its role in "channeling" men into school
and into particular occupations (and perhaps into fatherhood).

We think that to make maximizing efficiency the primary value in Selective Service is, under conditions short of total mobilization, both illusory and, in many respects, undesirable. It is illusory because so few of the available men are needed in the services that deferments must be generously administered. Thus they are made readily available to those who can place themselves within the broad deferment criteria. The services prefer younger men, so there is no pressure to induct men who have gone through the years of II-S deferment without attaining dependency deferment entitlement. Many such men are by then candidates for occupational deferment; others have entered the Reserves or the National Guard, which will probably not be called up except in case of total war. College education is not the precious or rare national resource it was when the statute was framed in 1940. Nor is there any real assurance that educational experience is being used for the national interest (however that may be defined) after college.

The lack of rational consideration of what sort of channeling is most in accord with the national interest is one of the most undesirable aspects of the stress on "efficiency." The current standards seem to contemplate chiefly military necessities, such as scientific and defense production requirements, with only limited recognition of social or humanitarian needs. Under today's conditions, however, the national interest would seem to dictate equal consideration for Peace Corps, VISTA, Teacher Corps, Job Corps, or other public welfare activities. The unrecognized extent of control over lives and careers, including indiscriminate deferment on fatherhood grounds and determent of young
persons from pursuing educational fields such as the arts, literature, and the social sciences, are equally undesirable—and often unconsidered—aspects of current policy. Most of all, it is undesirable to so disproportionately burden the economically less favored elements of society when such discrimination is neither necessary nor unavoidable.

We are a nation with abundant resources, and we have never maximized efficiency in use of resources with respect to any public problems; it would seem strange to insist upon efficiency alone in the design of military manpower procurement policy. We are not prepared, however, to replace "efficiency" entirely, nor do we advocate irrational assignment to the military services. But a better balance should be achieved between efficiency and equity, and our data suggest several ways that these two values can be harmonized.

We propose three steps that would remedy the greatest inequities in conscription and establish a rational balance between efficiency and equity: the elimination of all but the most essential deferments, induction at an early age (between eighteen and nineteen), and randomized selection of men who are to serve.

Those deferments that are equally available to all, and that are necessary to the maintenance of an armed force, would remain unchanged. We have no quarrel with the setting of physical or mental requirements, though we are not confident that the present ones reflect minimum standards for all military tasks, and we suspect that standards are in part a reflection of the Army's needs for men. We do challenge almost every other deferment as it is presently applied.

The student deferment is in our eyes the most discriminatory and
the most vulnerable. We would eliminate it entirely, rather than attempt to limit its duration or prohibit its eventuation into other forms of deferment; under either of these alternatives, the deferment is still available to the higher income registrant, permitting him alone to choose his time of service and avoid the years of maximum danger. Because the services obtain most of their officers from ROTC programs, we would defer ROTC students, as well as medical and dental students, who would be subject to a post-degree draft, just as they are now.

The elimination of fatherhood, occupational, and Reserve deferments is not as drastic as may at first appear, when it is realized that we advocate earlier service. Not many men will have claims for such deferment at age eighteen, but we oppose them for those who might. The act of becoming a father should not bring deferment from service, and no injustice would result if the rule is clear and is not retroactively applied. The increased cost to the government in the form of dependency allowances seems a small price to pay to close this path of escape from military service. Some hardship cases would probably still have to be granted deferment, although we would want them scrutinized objectively and without regard to the relative costs to the government.

Occupational deferments should not be numerous, for few men can be truly irreplaceable in a critical occupation at age eighteen. We propose to use Selective Service to provide men for the Reserves on a free and open basis. We will be charged with jeopardizing the integrity of the Reserves, but this course will eliminate the economic biases, as well as potential favoritism and, in some states, racial discrimination, that
exist in the present Reserve selection procedures. The Reserves and
the National Guard should be freed of their attributes of a private
association, and we see no way to accomplish this other than by requiring
them to obtain their no-prior-service personnel through conscription
processes.

The second part of our three-step proposal is induction between
ages eighteen and nineteen. We think this desirable because it
involves the least interference with careers and education, and provides
the greatest certainty for individuals, educational institutions, and
employers. Once a registrant has passed his year of liability, he would
no longer be subject to service except in time of great national emergency.
With reduced numbers of deferments, the manpower pool of eighteen-year-
olds should be large enough to meet service requirements each year.
When men emerge from service they should receive some form of govern-
ment educational assistance if they wish. After the first two years
of transition to such a system, therefore, the colleges should be able
to count on a steady flow of probably greater numbers of students than
under the present system.

The larger pool of men and the earlier age of service enhance the
general desirability of instituting equitable selection procedures. Our
third step, therefore, calls for a random selection to be made at age
eighteen. This would involve randomized, possibly computerized, ordering
of all eligible men to establish a priority of call for the year.
Registrants would know in advance whether they were likely to be inducted
or not, a probability dependent chiefly on world conditions. If their
situations changed during the year in such a way as to raise a claim
for one of the limited possible deferments, they would have recourse to appeals. Students deferred from one round of randomized selection because of their ROTC status would, in the event of failure to maintain good standing, or at their own option, enter the next subsequent selection group for a year of liability.

These three proposals, as a package, would go a long way toward eliminating unnecessary and unproductive biases in military manpower procurement. We recognize that problems remain in each proposal, but we are convinced that they are relatively minor and that they can be resolved, in the interest of reconciling efficiency with equity. We consider these proposals beneficial to the armed forces and to society as a whole. But we are not so naive to think that they will be welcomed by those who are advantaged by the present system. Indeed, perhaps one of the most important reasons conscription policies have remained unaltered for so long is the difficulty of obtaining agreement on specific changes.
NOTES

1 The Universal Military Training and Selective Service Act of 1948, now in effect as amended in 1951, is essentially the same law that was first passed by the Congress in September, 1940. The present Act and Regulations, together with annotations and a description of the Selective Service System, may be found in the Appendices to Hearings, Review of the Administration and Operation of the Selective Service System (Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 89th Congress, Second Session, 1966)--hereafter cited as Hearings.

2 In fiscal year 1966, which is the year examined here, Selective Service inductions provided 340,000 men for the armed forces, while another 353,000 enlisted "voluntarily" after they had passed their pre-induction physical examinations. Only 490,000 additional men entered the armed forces during this period, and there is no way of ascertaining how many of these enlistees were prompted by contemplation of the likelihood of being drafted. (Source: National Headquarters, Selective Service System; compilations developed for the House Armed Services Committee, June, 1966, and reported in Hearings, 9626.)


4 Albert D. Klassen, Jr., Military Service in American Life Since World War II: An Overview (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1966). The research was supported by the Department of Defense and contains data from self-administered questionnaires from 102,000 men then in the armed forces, plus 3,000 veterans and 6,000 nonveterans reached through the facilities of the Bureau of the Census. The thrust of the investigation was toward motivations for entering the armed forces and comparisons of satisfactions derived from service and from civilian life, in keeping with the Defense Department's then-existing hope that the draft might soon be terminated. A major subarea of interest turned out to be the development of accurate estimates of the proportions of men unfit for service.

5 The data developed for the report are presented in the Hearings.

6 Some suggestive data bearing on our primary focus nevertheless emerged from the NORC study, but they are not complete enough to permit conclusions about deferment policies. For example, the study found that some 15 percent to 20 percent of respondents neither served in the armed forces nor were judged unfit; this percentage was said to be "deferred," but this was otherwise unexplored. The most relevant data are those
pertaining to relationships between level of education and service experience; in general, the lowest and highest levels of education correlated with the lowest service proportions. The study's emphasis on education as a primary correlate is not inconsistent with our finding that income is the primary factor. However, as we were unable to introduce education levels into our analysis, and the NORC questionnaire included no questions concerning income, we are obliged to leave the matter in this form.


8 See the statement of Lt. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, Director of the Selective Service System, Hearings, pp. 9620-9627, especially pp. 9623, 9624.

9 See the statement of Gen. Hershey, Hearings, p. 9623, and the local board memoranda which regularly transmit policy guidelines to local boards.

10 See the Report Appendix, section VI, for an analysis of the variations in instructions issued by the various state headquarters on key deferment policy questions. For a similar but less systematic presentation of the same interpretation, see the comparison of statements made by state directors of Selective Service compiled from Associated Press questionnaires and reported in The Washington Post of January 9 and 10, 1967.

11 Our computations are based on percentages of "eligible age group" registrants in each board. This is a figure that requires careful definition. We reach it by subtracting classification V-A (over age) from the total registrants; it would therefore seem to represent the number of men who have some remaining liability for service. But V-A is assigned to men who have never had a deferment at age twenty-six, and to men who have held some form of deferment at age thirty-five; this is because a deferment before age twenty-six creates liability until thirty-five, and therefore some men holding deferments now are in the twenty-six to thirty-five age group. Induction is still possible at those ages, though it is not frequent. This base has seemed to us to be better (even if less than an accurate indicator of men aged eighteen to twenty-five) than using a base of the total number of registrants, because such a total would include men up through age forty-five.

12 See the Report Appendix, section II, for an analysis of relative variability among boards in various states. Our interviewing and data surveying had alerted us to the probability of low variation before thorough data collection began.


16. For an explanation of the intricate method by which responsible socioeconomic data on the jurisdiction of a draft board of less than whole city or county size must be developed, see Table 2, Note (b). The task was much too time-consuming to be attempted by the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service in the time it had available, and this is one of the major differences between that study and the present one.


20. For an analysis of the extent of this unrepresentativeness, see the Report Appendix, section I. Wisconsin has had Negro board members for 17 years, and maintains minority group representation on boards in rough proportion to their share of the population of the board's jurisdiction.

21. It is clear that appeal boards, if they were to operate autonomously, could introduce further variability into local board performance by enforcing particular interpretations of the advisory guidelines established by National Headquarters and interpreted for the state's local boards by the State Headquarters. Evidence developed in the National Commission's research confirms what is intimated here, that appeal boards are indeed one of the major sources of variation within the System.

22. The extent of this protectiveness is documented in the Report Appendix, section IV.

23. See the Report Appendix, section IV, for the data.