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THE POLITICS OF POOR RELIEF:
A Study in Ambiguities

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ABSTRACT

The essay addresses both the question of poverty and the scope of political science. The study of poverty demands a trans-economic approach because the act of making an economic choice is political in its most fundamental sense. But the act is likely to be ambiguous and that ambiguity is peculiarly revealed in the politics of poor relief. While the idea of "welfare" implies an underlying concept of "rights," "poor relief" actually reflects policymakers' judgments about which parts of the population can be left over when the most important economic choices (macro-economic policy) are being made.

Poor relief is simply the provision for those who are left over. In the United States, it is a form of aid accruing to those who are jobless and whose joblessness is not their own "fault," using the social estimation of fault. Its chief form is public assistance. Public assistance is ambiguous, both as to loci of decision and to policy content. The ambiguity as to loci of decision is an expression of (a) federalism and (b) the changing administrative-legislative relationship as policy once more becomes open to debate, hence "legislativized." The ambiguity as to policy is expressed (a) in the variety of "welfare 'reform'" proposals and the inability to secure approval for any, (b) the inversion of reform symbolism since the early 1960s, so that it now has a restrictive tone, especially as regards AFDC, but (c) the fact that the conservatizing trend has also been exaggerated.

Although the conservatizing trend has been exaggerated, it is a reality--especially when applied to AFDC. AFDC is politically vulnerable not because it is driving the states "bankrupt," but rather because it has the following features adverse to political strength: (a) the rapid rate of increase in number of recipients and the rise of dollar expenditures which have outstripped the expensive programs that legislators use for their own comparison shopping, (b) it serves populations held in disesteem--partly because they are ethnic minorities held in contempt and partly because of public sexual fantasy, (c) the parties whose interests are most at stake are not present for pragmatic bargaining, but are represented by surrogates who deal in doctrinal terms. As a result, there is a constant political tug-of-war between the more affluent and the less.

Finally, as a matter of theory, the poor relief experience points to two problems of interest to political science: the ambiguity of "citizenship" revealed by the treatment of AFDC recipients and the ambiguity of "government" inherent in the disjuncture between policy systems as political systems and territorial political systems.

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PREFATORY NOTE

This essay addresses, simultaneously students of "the poverty problem" and students of "the political system." It assumes the importance of a trans-economic approach to issues of poverty. Economic issues are central to the "poverty problem." But policies on this subject do not begin with economic choices. Instead, the act of making an economic choice is political in its most fundamental sense, that is, a deliberate exercise of power about human alternatives. This understanding permits us to speculate seriously--if not to explain finally--why some policies are open to consideration while other policies, theoretically conceivable, are not discussed seriously. To think seriously about policy is also to think about purpose, and it is this reflection on purpose that leads us to prefer the old-fashioned language of "poor relief" to the newer language of "welfare." As a part of this discussion of policy, we are forced anew to face the problem of ambiguity, both in the loci of decisions about policy and in the content of policy itself. We conclude with some brief comments on the kind of ambiguity more interesting to political scientists: the ambiguity of the concept both of citizenship and of government.

"WELFARE" AND "POOR RELIEF"

The conception of "welfare" may be justifiable normatively. That is, it indicates an intent to direct policies to satisfy needs that people have merely because they are human. The welfare conception then refers to those aspects of "citizenship" that T.H. Marshall describes as "social rights: a modicum of economic welfare and security..., a share in the full social heritage..., and (the right) to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society."¹ However, the language of welfare does not capture the empirical meaning of this policy area as well as does the older language of "poor relief." The politics of poor relief take place around one key problem: providing divisible economic benefits to people who are unable, on their own resources, to sustain the minimum level of activity that policymakers deem suitable.²

Poor relief (welfare) is thus but one variant of the political contest over, and decisions about, economic benefits.³ Primary economic policy decisions concern the macro-economic policy choices meant to influence the overall size, composition, direction, and growth rate of the economy as well as the distribution of benefits to the groups that decision-makers take to be "essential," "productive," or "influential." Primary economic policy thus expresses policymakers' judgments that certain groups can be "left over" until "later." (As an example of being "left over," one might say that any group that is at the top of the unemployment figures over a long time is "left over" if most or all economic policy decisions

are calculated on the rule that some other, and more favorably situated group, must have its interests preserved.) Poor relief (welfare) is a form of provision for those who are "left over" when primary economic decisions have been made.

The basic U. S. policy judgment is that poor relief accrues properly to those who have inadequate incomes, if the reason for the inadequacy is that the possible recipient cannot work. But it further depends on unemployability that results from being physically unable (too young, too old, or too handicapped), or from the fact that the only available job prospects are beyond the capacity of the possible employee. (demands too much schooling, for instance), or should not be taken by the employee because it would take the employee away from other socially useful functions (a mother away from a very young child), or even because it might exploit the possible employee beyond the limits decreed by policymakers (pay far too low a wage or impose intolerable working conditions.)

Beyond this, however, interpretation of the poor relief programs is extremely difficult, not merely because the programs are complex, but also because they are affected by certain profound ambiguities inherent in the society and the political process: ambiguities as to loci of decision, program purpose and beneficiaries, the meaning of "citizenship", and ultimately to the very nature of "government" itself. We may examine these ambiguities more fully after a brief description of the background and structure of the main programs.

The development of a federal poor relief role was a function of the Great Depression, that extreme economic crisis wherein unemployment rates escalated from 3.2 percent in the first year of President Hoover's term, 1929--

the year of the Great Crash, to 8.7 percent in 1930⁴, 15.9 percent in 1931, 23.6 percent in 1932 (the year of Franklin D. Roosevelt's first election).⁵ The Depression was so important an event that it probably penetrated American society more deeply even than the Viet-Nam War has done.*⁶ And Depression politics thoroughly changed the old manner of handling poor relief issues.

Prior to the Depression, official doctrine--and possible official practices--left most of the relieving of the depressed poor to private charity.** Insofar as public (governmental) relief existed before then, the idea was not to permit the poor to live well, but merely to permit them to live. The family was expected, and legally obliged, to provide support for its members, while public relief could come only if family resources were not available. These principles could be traced back at least to England under Elizabeth I.⁷ In their adaptation here, the actual government that carried responsibility was not the

*This is clearly a debatable judgment. I offer the following grounds: (1) The Depression quickly reversed the relative positions of the Democratic and Republican parties. The Viet-Nam War has not yet had a similar effect, although it has had some pro-Republican effect. (2) The Depression quickly caused major changes in domestic policy calculated to relieve the people of the burdens of the Depression. The Viet-Nam War has had no such effect, unless possibly it has led indirectly to an increase in the policing capabilities of the Federal Government. (3) Consequently in the long run we may discover that the Viet-Nam War did not really change American politics all that much--except to invent some new emotional symbols. Indeed, I am reasonably sure that this will turn out to have been the effect, unless (the constant exception) it should turn out that the War leads to the expansion of the military role in domestic policymaking.

**By now, we have enough experience with historical data to be very skeptical of too-easy generalizations about the past. It is quite possible that the dominance of private charity is more ideology than reality, and should be considered another myth of the same character as the judiciary that does not make policy, dual federalism, and government noninterference in economic life.

federal government nor, most often the state, but the city, the county, or other local government.

The new Roosevelt Administration, however, moved quickly to provide a large amount of emergency relief, with no pretense to any justification that the claimants had no other income.⁸ Large amounts of general relief from the federal government could not, however, be sustained politically and might even have been dubious from the viewpoint of the President. But some substitute had to be developed quickly. Senator Huey P. Long* then rose over the national scene like a political skyrocket, with a populist "Share the Wealth Plan" that seemed more threatening to Roosevelt's 1936 chances by far, than would a Wallace candidacy have been to President Nixon's 1972 chances.⁹ And beyond the Long phenomenon, widespread agitation for making payments to the elderly created other political waves. The most important, perhaps, was the Townsend Movement-- a campaign to cure the Depression by giving each elderly person \$200 a month on the condition that it all be spent each month.

"Long-ism" and old-age politics both were crucial in forcing the Roosevelt Administration toward a new national role before the end of the first term and reelection campaign of 1936 should begin. The perceived political demand for old-age assistance provided the political "capital," so to speak, out of which the new national policy was "funded".¹⁰ Against this background of economic crisis and electoral need, the Roosevelt Administration arrived at the essential outlines of the present combination of social insurance and public assistance, under the Social Security Act of 1935.

*Senator Russell B. Long (D. Louisiana), Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, through which social welfare legislation is presently processed, is the son of Senator Huey P. Long.

By "social insurance" we mean payments based upon the theory that the recipients are drawing upon a common fund into which they have made some prior payments, which prior payments are theoretically based on actuarial principles. Thus, it is as if those individuals were paying on private insurance policies. In theory, then, each individual is limited to a certain pre-determined scale of benefits, and is eligible for those benefits only if he or she has before been paying a "premium" which, in the case of our national social insurance policy, is the Social Security tax that both individual employees and employers must pay. Old-age support was extended by Congress in 1939 to cover dependents and survivors of workers,* in 1956 to provide coverage for disabled workers and their families, and in 1965 to include Medicare. The major current social insurance program is the Old Age, Survivors', Disability and Health Insurance (OASDI) programs, although unemployment compensation is also substantial.

Social insurance lies largely outside "poor relief" as we consider that term here. Poor relief is accomplished partly through some veterans' programs, through public housing and in various other ways. But the heart of poor relief is public assistance, expressed in four important programs: Aid to the Blind (A/B), Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD), Old-Age Assistance (OAA), and Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC). Each of these categorical programs--in contrast to "general assistance"***--depends on initial federal decisions that are implemented by the states.

*The general principle was already applied, to a limited degree, to railroad employees' retirement benefits and to some state unemployment insurance programs. But the extent of application was still narrow, and, among many people, politically doubtful before the Social Security Act.

***"General assistance" provides aid to people without their having to meet these categorical tests, and is a function exclusively of the state governments.

The smallest program, both in actual number of persons served and in money expenditure, is Aid to the Blind (A/B). In the fiscal year 1972 (FY72) the number of blind persons served was 80,000 and the dollar expenditures were at the annual rate of \$103,680,000. The next program in size is Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD). APTD covered about 1,100,000 persons at an annual expenditure rate of about \$1,346,000,000. Old-Age Assistance provided help for about 2,027,000 persons at an annual rate of \$1,896,000,000. Finally, the largest program--Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC)--covered 10,900,000 persons at an annual rate of \$7,063,200,000.

THE AMBIGUITY OF LOCI OF DECISION

A. Federalism

When we say that the loci of decisions are ambiguous, we mean that it is very hard to find a final place of authority, although the formalities of the law purport to establish such. The first important element of such ambiguity is that basic feature of American government: federalism. Public assistance is federalist, not in the sense of a strict division of powers between national and state-local governments, but in the sense of a continuous interchange and continuous set of incentives and constraints between the national decision-makers and the state-local decision-makers.¹¹ The principle federal role in these programs is to declare some broad policy or objective-- through some combination of statute and administrative regulation. Such declared policy is then administered mainly through the states. In public assistance, in contrast to social insurance, the federal government does not itself directly administer programs to the eventual client. The only way that the client in North State (a hypothetical state) receives the services is through contact with the welfare agency as prescribed in North State's laws.*

*In pursuance of the 1972 Amendments to the Social Security Act, this may change by 1975 as the federal government takes over direct financial responsibility for the adult categories (blind, disabled, and aged). It is possible, though by no means assured, that the federal government will set up its own administrative machinery for the purposes of this new legislation.

The central federal administrative unit is the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), although other agencies have some role-- notably the Labor Department which administers certain work programs, the Housing and Urban Development Department which is responsible for low-income housing programs, and the Office of Economic Opportunity. HEW undergoes fairly frequent reorganizations, but the agency chiefly responsible for poor relief matters at present is the Social and Rehabilitation Service (SRS). It is SRS that issues the guidelines, directives, and regulations to the states and receives from the states comments, objections, and reports. The federal courts also are relevant from time to time, since they have the responsibility and opportunity to interpret both requirements of the Constitution and the requirements of the specific federal statutes that govern poor relief.¹²

The federal-state relation is based on the grant-in-aid principle. If a state chooses to adopt a public assistance program, the federal government will grant funds which, when added to state funds, provide for the benefits to be divided amongst individuals and for the costs of administering the program.¹³ But there is no legal requirement that a state participate in any public assistance program, except to the extent that such a requirement is written into a state's own laws. Moreover, as Steiner points out, it is "expensive (but not) impossible" for a state to go it alone.¹⁴ For example, federal legislation makes it possible for a state to adopt an AFDC program in which the family will be supported, even if an unemployed father remains in the home. This program (AFDC-U) is partly a response to the view that AFDC otherwise encourages family breakup. However, states have varied widely in their willingness to accept AFDC-U, even when they have accepted the

main AFDC program. That is, accordingly, at least a partial case of nonparticipation. (One colleague suggests, as well, that an examination of state adoption of Medicaid and of APTD would be similarly instructive.) But the political realities do make across-the-board state nonparticipation nonexistent. If a state rejects federal aid altogether, it must accept very high costs for itself alone or it must set benefits at very low levels. Even in the most restrictive states, the political leadership probably does not seriously contemplate letting its poor go under altogether. And, once a state accepts the idea of supporting the poor in some way, then it must meet fairly substantial costs. For this reason, the common procedure, then is for the state to seek to participate in the joint relationship with the federal government, but to exercise its influence in order to modify federal policy in what the state believes a satisfactory direction.

The framework for such action is the "state plan." Each state must submit such a "state plan" showing how and for what purposes it will expend federal funds under the categorical assistance programs. North State can secure the needed financial support--which it passes on to Mr. Smith or Mrs. Jones--only on the basis of such a "plan" filed with, and agreed to by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.

The theory is that the state plan sets a standard to which the federal government can hold the states, on pain of having federal funds terminated. In reality, the states have a great deal of latitude, as may be indicated by two well-known cases. In 1960, the State of Louisiana excluded some 20,000 black youngsters from the public assistance rolls, on the ground that being illegitimate they were living in

unsuitable homes. This was a direct redemption of a campaign pledge that the governor had made. These youngsters apparently were off the rolls for about two years, because the federal government did not feel politically free to challenge Louisiana directly in the context of the 1960 campaign, fearing that it might lose Southern votes for the Republican party. Nor did it feel free merely to accept the Louisiana decision, since that might alienate black voters in the North and provide an opportunity for attack by the Democratic campaigners. The result was a ruling so structured that Louisiana would not have to comply until well into 1961. The other case involved an attempt by Governor George Romney (Michigan) to establish a plan in 1963 under which AFDC-U was limited to persons "eligible for unemployment compensation (which Michigan [at that time restricted] to persons employed by employers of four or more employees) or who had drawn unemployment compensation after January 1, 1958."¹⁵ After a dispute in which the issue moved from the reasonableness of the particular standard to the right of the federal government to overrule state decisions, the state eventually gave in and started a new plan based on what it knew HEW would accept.

Most of the federal-state interactions are more prosaic, but the general point is the same. Federal influence is present. But controls by the federal grantor are far less than the theory implies.¹⁶ In part, federal officials themselves operate with ideological commitments to "persuasion" rather than "coercion" or themselves believe that "persuasion" is the only "practical" way to achieve results that depend, in the end, on the active cooperation of state officials. In part, coercive measures are politically risky because the state officials against whom they are directed have independent access to Congress, and are able

to exert pressures through that channel against the federal bureaucracy.¹⁷

Thus, ever since the beginning of the public assistance programs, under the 1935 Act,¹⁸ the states have had a good deal more autonomy than a literal reading of the federal administrators' powers would suggest.

The "details" of welfare administration remain, in most states, with local (city or county) agencies that operate under the general guidance of the state agencies. If the rules laid down by state or federal agencies were automatically complied with by local authorities, then local administration would make relatively little difference in what was available to different sorts of people. But, in fact, there is a constant deviation from the state or federal standards, partly because local people do not always know what the state or federal standards are, partly because they do not have the time and competence to comply, and partly because they may disagree with those standards and reject or evade them in particular cases.

In 1969, the Wisconsin Legislature also undertook restriction of benefits. Wisconsin is one of the higher benefit states in the country, but the 1969 legislature provided that the states would pay no more than 120 percent of the national standard in AFDC, the existing rate being closer to 140 percent. This cut caused some debate and pain in the state. In at least two cities, Milwaukee and Madison, the city governments for a while undertook special subsidies by making general assistance payments to people who were already receiving AFDC benefits. From the viewpoint of the state welfare agency, this was troublesome because it purportedly violated the requirement that a program be uniform throughout a state.

B. The Changing Administrative-Legislative Relationship

The politics of poor relief also indicates the powerful pressures toward administrative dominance in contemporary governance, and administrators' uncertain relation to legislators. For most of the

past three and one-half decades, public assistance has existed within a sufficiently strong legislative consensus to facilitate administrative dominance over the issue that did have to be decided. Once the Social Security Act was on the books, the Congress did very little about the categorical programs except, from time to time, to raise the maximum payments that the federal government would make, to expand coverage a little bit, or to increase the share of individuals' payments that the federal government would take (vis-a-vis the states). Despite conservative criticism, Congress was not reexamining the philosophy of the programs nor, on any substantial scale, their administration. Even with AFDC, which I regard as the most vulnerable program, Congress raised payments maxima five times between 1946 and 1960, added the AFDC-U program to allow states to extend coverage to unemployed fathers of AFDC families in 1960, increased the federal share of the payment to any family or recipient at least five or six times, and added other useful features.

Nor were the states deeply engaged in poor relief controversy, despite occasional dramatic speeches by members of state legislatures. One might have expected state legislative watchfulness on AFDC, particularly because that program has long been the object of so much criticism and suspicion. Although some states did not match all the federal dollars that they could have matched (for example, Illinois) they nonetheless operated some more or less automatic procedures for upward adjustments. Others (for example, California with Republican and with Democratic governors) actually overmatched the federal dollar even down into the 1950s. Others were more conservative. Within this long-standing consensus, the administrative staff clearly have had (and still have) the right to decide which claims will

be accepted and which will not. (Governors and legislatures have, largely, abdicated authority to state welfare departments or state welfare boards).

The fact that elected officials have played so small a role leads us to notice, as well, the nature of professional activity in poor relief. Professional social workers have long been critical in generating ideas and in administering programs for which legislation already exists. Policy leadership has for many years been provided by a fairly small group of deans of social work schools, of federal administrative officials, of private persons playing entrepreneurial roles, and of state-local welfare commissioners. This group apparently is centered in the American Public Welfare Association--the administrators' lobby. But it is also connected to the National Association of Social Workers--which is more nearly the caseworkers' organization--the National Conference on Social Welfare and a few other bodies.

The members of this group often are skillful and persistent lobbyists, and so have much effect on how legislators think about poor relief issues. (They were, for instance, particularly influential in 1962 when the Kennedy Administration was looking for a new and not-very-costly approach to "solving the welfare problem". From that, came the concept that social services--provided to recipients by professional social workers--would improve the self-images and self-reliance of recipients. From which, as it was then argued, it followed that the recipients would become more employable and unemployment and relief rolls would decline.)

The social work professionals are important for another reason. Administrative discretion exists and the social workers are the people in whose hands discretion is placed. As a result, their approach affects actual policy results, even when they are not themselves conscious of such effects. In the hands

of dedicated social workers, even the more routine and technical-appearing practices may turn out to have very important consequences for the whole program.

Consider, for instance, a dispute in New York over the "declaration (or affidavit) of need" in contrast to "case-by-case" investigation as a basis for granting relief. Under the declaration procedure the potential recipient simply goes to a welfare office and makes out a declaration of need. No detailed proof of need is required. The declaration-of-need actually is required by federal statute for Old-Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, and Aid to the Disabled. Administratively, the federal authorities encouraged its use in the Aid to Families With Dependent Children program, but it is not required there. Case-by-case investigation is basically what is expected in the usual handling of money transactions, whether for scholarship aid, home loans, bank credit, or most other purposes. It involves filing a detailed application which, in turn, is open to detailed investigation by a social worker who then recommends approval or disapproval.

The declaration system--which, remember, the federal authorities have encouraged--has been adopted by some local agencies, on at least two grounds. (1) Social workers, who have to spend their time approving or disapproving applications on this detailed case-by-case basis, do not have sufficient time to keep their work up-to-date. Thus, many people are "backlogged" without proper aid while some decision on their case is pending. (2) Much of the detailed investigation is clerical, and requires skills that do not demand a trained social worker (whatever the social worker's skills may be), so that the investment of the social worker's time and effort is unprofessional and adverse to the fulfillment of

counseling and other needs that a social worker can meet. The obvious defense of case-by-case acceptance is that it controls fraud and other forms of improper acceptance of relief claims, while the advocacy of the simplified procedure rests on the judgment that--as a matter of probability--improper aid is no greater than, or even less than, improper aid under the more conventional system.

These are surely "administrative" questions if any such ever exist. But they have been deeply entangled with "policy" issues at times. Consider some issues raised in the apparent role of the Inspector-General of Welfare in the State of New York. The Inspector-General's office is a position created in 1971, as part of a "reform" package, and filled by gubernatorial appointment outside the structure of the Department of Social Services. In the time that the position has been operative, the Inspector-General's chief emphasis has been to discover fraud, cheating, and maladministration particularly in the City of New York which is the biggest welfare area in the state.

The Inspector-General was specifically called for a return to the case-by-case system, which had been abandoned under state law as of 1971, saying that the declaration system was a "complete failure". On what basis did he justify this? Apparently, on the grounds that his investigators had found too many ineligible cases and had actually seen acceptances in which the applicant gave only a name and signature, and no justifying statement. But it does not follow that superior results would have been achieved by insisting on a justifying statement, unless the norm is "raise as many paper barriers as possible so as to keep down the acceptances." A person who does not provide the appropriate justifying statement is automatically ineligible, but it is quite possible that such a person would have been

eligible had the facts of his or her case been known, and put in the proper form. In this sense, one of the problems of administration is achieving "equitable" treatment, even if there is a substantial element or procedural incorrectness in the treatment. For example, in the situation just cited, suppose the caseworker handling the problem already knew enough about the applicant to judge his or her situation. Common sense--and rapport--might well dictate a quick (but procedurally dubious) decision, in contrast to a protracted (but thoroughly correct) decision. The case might be more to the point, still, if it were extreme or an emergency. Suppose that the applicant had no food or money, and no prospects, and were faced with a week's cold weather and no place to live. One might note that the acceptances being criticized by the Inspector-General were being made in January. In that event, it is quite possible that the only sensible decision would be to make an immediate decision to extend aid.

But whatever side of the issue one might take, it does drive home the extreme importance of what would appear to be only "administrative minutiae". (There are other versions of the same situation. Controls may be imposed to assure that people who are on the rolls have remained eligible since the time of their admission. This might mean verifying their incomes anew, or it might mean imposing on them tighter eligibility requirements [such as registering for work] and imposing further administrative controls to make sure that they do present themselves before some supervisory welfare person, for example, requiring them to pick up their checks in person rather than to receive the checks through the mails.)

There are those who see amongst social workers a professional resistance to restrictive policies, a commitment to "helping people" that works against restriction, and a lack of "managerial" competence. Two directors of welfare "centers" (local area offices) in New York City testified along these lines in 1972.* One explained rises in the caseload saying:

Some staff members are highly motivated by social and ideological considerations and are intensively sympathetic and uncritical in accepting the client's perception of his needs.

Others, some of whose backgrounds are similar to the clients' and who live in proximity to them, sometimes in the same building, are hostile to the clients and suspicious of the honesty of the statements on the declaration.¹⁹

The other center director said that the staff had become more and more indifferent to ineligibility during the 1960s, and that this had been "encouraged by the administration."

Such views--from social work administrators--probably were quite congenial to a legislative committee. For legislators seem sometimes to complain that the reason policies to get the poor off the welfare rolls and into employment do not work is that the social workers persist administratively "coddling" the poor. This view is illustrated here by an important Republican legislator in New York who criticized Governor Rockefeller's reappointment, of George Wyman as Commissioner of Social Services in the State of New York in summer 1971.** The legislators had just

*Presumably, the views of these two directors must have met with the approval of the city administration for the newspaper story (see footnote 20) made clear that these directors had been chosen by the city government to go to Washington and testify before a Congressional committee as to the "nitty-gritty" of poor relief administration.

**As an illustration, see the discussion of his role in the preparation of the 1962 Amendments as reported in Gilbert Steiner's work.

passed a bill moving the appointment power from the State Board of Social Welfare to the Governor personally, and apparently had anticipated that Wyman--a member of the nation-wide leadership nexus--would not be reappointed. He said that concerning social welfare "there is probably nobody in the country more experienced than Mr. Wyman" but that the agency lacked executives "with sound business experience".

I am disappointed in Mr. Wyman's reappointment [because] up to this point, he has not acted on any of [the recent legislative] reforms [in welfare policy]. There was obviously a clear-cut desire by the people for changes in our welfare system, and the Legislature took swift action to make these changes possible. The commissioner, however, has not seen fit to carry out these changes yet....

If I do not see some evidence of the commissioner's willingness to expedite the welfare changes which are now law, I will urge members of the Senate to vote against confirmation. We must put the state's welfare system on a sound financial and administrative basis. That was the whole point in the changes we made.²⁰

It is self-evident that such charges are true. Their intent is contradicted by the case which is sometimes argued that contemporary poor relief is less influenced by the economic and psychological needs of poor relief claimants, and much more influenced by the professional (status and pay) needs of the social workers themselves.²¹ The making of such charges is a clue to the importance and to the limited standing--that is, to the ambiguity--of the social work role in poor relief. And the ambiguous social work role is contained within another ambiguity: whether the long-standing policy consensus and administrative dominance are any longer in effect.

THE AMBIGUITY OF "POLICY"

A. "Reform": or, the Re-Legislativization of Poor Relief Issues

The presumption of ambiguity is nowhere better validated than in the recent discussions of "welfare reform". Poor relief issues have once more become controversial in legislatures and legislators have once more become critical decision makers on poor relief issues. This trend toward re-legislativization can be seen to have come to strength during the Kennedy Administration. By that time a wide agreement that the welfare system was a "mess" seemed to exist, and "reform" became a symbol good in itself. For some people "reform" means that the number of dollars spent on welfare should decline, or that the number of people receiving dollars should decline, or both. This is perhaps the most "conservative" view of a desirable welfare policy. Others have, however, accepted the idea of money payments and merely propose to change to some basis other than that which now prevails. Three major sorts of proposals have been advanced on the basis of believing that money payments are to some degree inevitable. The first is that certain programs (public assistance "categoricals") that are partly financed by the states and partly by the federal government should have completely federal standards of payment and should receive their finances entirely from the federal treasury. The second is the form of guaranteed annual income proposed in President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan in 1969. The President recommended a scale beneath which any family would be aided by the federal government--regardless of the income status of the family head--and a cutoff at which no further aid would be granted. The chief function of this proposal would have been to extend aid to the working poor.

The third is the concept of a demogrant or a certain amount per head to be paid each person. The universal demogrant would be a payment

to each person, while the partial demogrant would be paid to persons fitting in with some specific population category. The proposal advanced by some of the McGovern advisors in the 1972 presidential campaign was for a universal demogrant, that is, each person would be paid the sum of \$1,000 per annum from the federal treasury. As a corollary, the existing categorical programs would have been abolished. This proposal was coupled with a proposed thorough-going reform of the tax system for the purpose of distributing more of the tax burden to higher income persons.

It might be reasonable to think that "everybody agrees" on the goal and that only means are open to debate. But the diversity of reform proposals plus the fact that a legislative majority has been available for none, suggest that the consensus for "reform" is more illusory than real. This illusory consensus actually covers three very different approaches that, thus far, have worked against each other. "Liberal" doctrine--broadly associated with the ~~Democratic~~ party--is that welfare should be "reformed" in order to minimize the "indignities" that it inflicts upon poor people, and in order to provide for the psychological and material comfort of such poor people. "Conservative" doctrine--broadly associated with the Republican party--is that welfare should be reformed to improve its efficiency, to reduce the number of people who seek such aid, to reduce the presumed disincentives to work, and above all to reduce the actual dollar expenditures on behalf of people who do not "deserve" such assistance. Technocratic doctrine provides another basis for welfare "reform" proposals.

The technocratic doctrine is focused primarily upon reducing administrative inequities between different sets of welfare recipients, as technocrats perceive such inequities. Consider, thus, rents.

If an AFDC family (Family "A") received \$250 a month and lived in a public housing project, the public housing authority could charge no more than \$62.50 a month for rent. That is because the Brooke Amendment imposes a ceiling on rents that may be charged in federally-supported public housing. That ceiling is more than 25 percent of income or \$62.50 out of \$250 per month. Suppose, however, that there were no space available for a family (Family "B") otherwise similar in every respect, and that Family B thus had to pay \$72.50 a month to a private landlord. Family B would thus be receiving, for its nonhousing uses, \$10 a month less than Family A. From a purely technocratic view, this would violate the principle of "horizontal equity" (that people in similar circumstances should receive similar benefits). Technocrats would seek ways to reconcile these disparate benefit levels.²²

Similarly, technocrats are likely to worry if some beneficiaries appear to be getting "too much" due to coverage under more than one program. In the same way, the problem of cheating and fraud will loom large in technical discussions. Finally, the technocrats are likely to be especially concerned if the welfare poor are at the same level as-- or better off than--the "working" poor. Technocratic approaches can be assimilated either into "liberal" or into "conservative" approaches. But in the past few years, they have more often been assimilated into the conservative approach. One reason appears to be that there are many people who compare their own situation unfavorably with the situation of poor relief recipients. Divorced women with children, working at clerical jobs, for instance, may well think that they themselves are no better off than other women on the poor relief

rolls.* Similarly, trade union leaders--whose organizations have been an essential part of any successful redistributive coalitions in the past--often appear to believe that poor relief recipients are getting too much money relative to their own members' incomes and possibly from their own members' income taxes. It is possible for such reasons as these that "technocratic" proposals have tended recently to be more easily assimilated into "conservative" than into "liberal" politics concerning poor relief.**

B. The Inversion of Reform

"Reform" was the liberals' symbolism in the early 1960s,²³ but by the late 1960s it had taken an independent existence, and by the early 1970s provided a rationale for a conservative politics of welfare restriction, both in national and in state politics. In national politics, the inversion can be seen in the unfolding politics of AFDC "social services" since 1962. The term "social services" can mean anything from job training to home budgeting techniques, from advice on how to sue an extortionate merchant to discussions of child care problems. "Services" were made part of the public assistance programs under the 1962 Amendments to the Social Security Act, at the urging of the Kennedy Administration. The official rationale was that they would "strengthen family life and

*If popular attitudes toward poor relief are worth studying at all, then questions should be coded by sex of respondent as well as in other ways. For it is very likely that the attitudes of women toward other women will be a significant variable in the whole complex of issues discussed as policy. Moreover, to take one (possibly insignificant vignette), one of the strongest Congressional critics of AFDC is Congresswomen Martha Griffiths, who seems to argue that the dependency program violates the essential principle of equal rights for women. (My colleague Robert Lampman first drew my attention to the Griffiths' attitude.)

**This applies not only to such matters as "horizontal equity", but to such matters as "systematic evaluation" of social policies. Curiously few technocrats seem to notice that their proposals for evaluation have a recurrent tendency to be absorbed into the political language of those whose main purpose is, in any event, to oppose redistributive policies.

the social and economic capacities of individual family members."²⁴
The underlying concept is that people are on poor relief not merely because of shortages in the job market, but because they lack appropriate training or personal competence (such as emotional stability). Under this view, "professional social workers" would administer services "to" or "work with" the "dependent" welfare recipients. The training, self-confidence, and capacity of the welfare recipients would improve. As a result of the predicted improvement more and more of these people would go out and get jobs in the normal markets. And the noticeable increases in the relief rolls--mainly AFDC--would slow down, come to a halt, and possibly then decrease.

By 1967, it was apparent that nothing of the sort was happening. The AFDC rolls continued to rise. The idea of "services" was retained, but it was somewhat conservatized. The Work Incentives Program (with the appealing acronym of WIN) was established to provide work training for women on welfare, and Congressional support for day care programs for the children of such women--while they were away from home--was established. But the intent was to make the program a bit more coercive, to compel women to take the appropriate training in the expectation that this would get them off welfare.

Chairman Mills, in presenting the WIN bill to the full House, made the aim of the WIN program clear: "in 1972, the Department tells us, in all probability they expect 400,000 fewer children on the rolls than there would have been under the existing law." The WIN program was thoroughly transformed in spirit by the "Talmadge Amendments" adopted in 1971.. The essential feature of these amendments is that they imposed still more severe requirements for active work-seeking by AFDC parents (which

means chiefly mothers), cut the federal funds authorized for job training (thus reducing private incentives to cooperate and emphasizing that applicants should be more malleable in their self-definition of job needs), and moving the administration of the said program entirely from the state welfare agencies to the state employment agencies. The presumptive reason for this is the belief that the welfare agencies are "soft" on the clients, and so do not insist enough on their finding jobs. The state employment agencies, it is commonly believed, are more oriented to the needs of employers.²⁵ Thus, they are thought more likely to emphasize job placement, even if the recipients are uncomfortable with the particular jobs in which they are placed. It is not yet clear that the Talmadge Amendments will have the effect desired by sponsors, and feared by the critics. But the passage of the Amendments may be regarded as part of the "conservatizing" tendency in the national politics of AFDC. "Social services" had become entirely a control mechanism.

The conservatizing trend was also reflected in the political failure of the Nixon reform proposals for some guaranteed annual income scheme, even at fairly low levels. The main effect of the Nixon proposal would have been to extend income support to the "working poor," noticeably the white working poor in the South! But in the complex politics of 1972, the proposal was rejected (at least for the time being).*

*A measure of the complexity of the politics is that there were many other options intended to raise the possible levels of benefits and options to lower to possible levels of benefits. Among these was Senator Russell Long's "workfare" proposal--a proposal to eliminate some aspects of public assistance and to put people into the private employment market. (However, aid would have been retained for mothers with children under 6.) Long's proposal also called for a federal corporation to provide work and thus absorb those whom the private market cannot absorb.

The conservative inversion of reform is perhaps more strikingly indicated by the restrictive tendency in state AFDC politics since the 1960s, and particularly since 1969. We must, of course, be careful not to exaggerate the amount of restriction that has taken place. For even our preliminary review of what the states have done--and not merely of melodramatic proposals--indicates some drastic changes in some states, quite modest changes in a number of others, and no change in another large group. It is possible, in short, that the conservative "tide" is really a tide of newspaper reporting more than a real change.²⁶

Please note that I do not doubt that there has been some change toward restriction. The question is whether the media have not exaggerated the matter.*

However, it is quite easy to see that many proposals--gubernatorial, legislative, administrative--are predicated on the assumption that "welfare" is "driving us bankrupt," and that "reform" accordingly is urgent. It should be noted that this fear of "welfare bankruptcy" seldom, if ever, applies to the adult categories (A/B, OAA, and APTD). These categories are, politically, much more secure. Their special status is reflected not only in the fact that no one is proposing to cut them, but in that their recipients seem to be more generously supported. In fact, the dollar amounts per person on AFDC are less than the comparable amounts on general assistance or on any of the other federal programs. Indeed,

*A serious investigation of the amount and direction of state change in public assistance policy since 1969 would be a feasible, an intellectually interesting, and a practically important project. Readers will note that the discussion of recent state changes, in the next few pages, is rather impressionistic because it has been so difficult to pull together the necessary information.

as of August 1971, the AFDC payment per person was about two-thirds (\$50/\$76) of the next lowest categorical, namely OAA.²⁷ The special advantage of the adult categories is reflected in the fact that new federal legislation (Social Security Amendments of 1972) now sets minimum payments to which recipients are entitled, and further provides that within three years the federal government will take over all the adult categories entirely.*

The real target of criticism is not public assistance or poor relief in general but AFDC in particular. This point is notably illustrated in the 1969 action of the Wisconsin Legislature.²⁸ The State of Wisconsin has had a long history of generating social services well before the national government undertakes them. Although Wisconsin has fairly low recipient rates, it has in recent years been among the top five states in the nation for its payments under the federal categoricals--exceeding such richer neighbors as Michigan and Illinois. The state at that time faced a prospective biennial budget deficit of \$50 million and at the same time, faced a prospective rise of about \$71 million in all welfare services. One of the chief points of attack, in the legislative effort to balance the budget, was AFDC in which the increase over the previous biennium was budgeted at about \$8 million. Thus, the legislature was led-- in an action that divided Republicans and Democrats almost completely-- to set Wisconsin AFDC payments at no more than 120 percent of the national

*Further we might note that at least one state (Michigan) has specifically cut its AFDC authorization and adopted legislation to transfer those funds to the adult categories. (New York Times, Sunday June 18, 1972, 59.) Still further, at least one state (Texas) has administratively cut its AFDC benefits (which most of its black and Mexican recipients receive) while holding up adult categories, and has been sustained in this--against a challenge of discriminatory action--by the Supreme Court.

average (which was then 140 percent), to eliminate AFDC-U, the program under which families with unemployed fathers in the home could be subsidized, to count a step-father's income against support for the wife's children from a previous marriage, to eliminate payments to dependent children over 18, and to impose sharp limitations on medical payments.

Wisconsin's legislative action anticipated what would become a more widely advertised packet of constraining actions, in a number of other states in 1971. Up to July of 1971, eighteen states had made no changes. Of the remaining thirty-two, eight had adopted some legislation to curtail benefits, one had legislation to this end pending, and four had defeated or failed to pass such legislation. Some degree of reduction had been undertaken, or was seen as likely, in another dozen states. Administrative increases in benefits had been undertaken, or were seen as likely, in another seven states, while reduction recommendations and increase recommendations were being made to each of the legislatures.²⁹

State actions to constrain public assistance expenditures have apparently been of four sorts:

The first is fiscal control by direct decision about the level of benefits that the state will attempt to provide. This is self-explanatory. The number of direct legislative reductions of payments was very small, apparently occurring only in New York and in South Dakota. Legislation to reduce AFDC benefits was still pending in California, had even been rejected or not passed in three other states, had been rejected via referendum in Texas, and had been passed in Rhode Island, but was still tied up in litigation.

The second is fiscal control by indirect or impersonal measures.

One indirect or impersonal method is known as the "ratable reduction." States set their benefit levels on the basis of some standard of what they calculate that recipients will need for a suitable standard of living. Each state is free to determine its own standard of need. But, Congress, by the 1967 Amendments, required the state to upgrade their previous standard in order to reflect changes in the cost of living. However, the states were permitted to curtail their actual increases in expenditures by reducing the proportion of the standard of need that they will actually pay. If a state were paying 80 percent of its standard of need and reduced the same to 75 percent, that would be a "ratable reduction," and a permissible practice under existing interpretations. Thus, a ratable reduction does not change the amount specified in the basic law, but it does change the amount that actually is paid to the recipient. It is thus a real change in the benefit formula.

The other indirect fiscal control is the "closed end" appropriation. Many state governments have followed federal practices in which no specific sum is appropriated for public assistance payments. Instead, the legislation sets the standard on the basis of which people are to be supported, and obligates the government to pay out whatever sums are necessary to meet this standard. Naturally, this means that the public assistance expenditures are, in principle, infinitely expansible. If a state decides, as some have done within recent years, to make its appropriations on a "closed end" (rather than "open end") basis, and to set in advance the absolute ceiling on total expenditures, then it follows that the level of benefits must come down if the number of recipients increases.

The third control applies to the expected behavior of the recipients themselves. States attempt to control costs by controlling the number of people on the caseloads, rather than the amount of money per person or per family. One way of controlling costs is to change the actual definition of eligibility, or to use administrative procedures so as to scrutinize very strictly those who claim to meet the eligibility tests, in effect demanding of claimants that they seek nonpublic support or that they accept greater public constraints. Thus, one such constraint is the demand (put forth in actual or proposed legislation in California, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania) that family resources be exhausted before a person can apply for public assistance. (This return to Elizabethan principles is not so simple as may first appear. What, for instance, is the appropriate degree of relationship that X must have to Y in order to make X responsible for Y's support? Must X expend all his money, so that he and Y are both ready for public assistance before Y can be aided--or will Y be turned away so long as his "responsible" relative X still has some money?)³⁰

Another constraint of the same genre is the expectation that the proposed recipient will either accept work that the public authorities find for him (on the public service or by referral to a private employer), or, at minimum, enroll in some program to train him for possible employment.

Straightforward changes in eligibility arose chiefly out of legislative action, but only in a couple of states (Maine and New Jersey) where AFDC-U was eliminated. Changes in administrative procedure were more common. Alabama did not change its benefit level, but it dropped 20 percent of its previous caseload (6000/30,000). South Dakota reduced its benefits by 10 percent, taking \$30 a month off the income of a four-person family.

And New York took off about 11 percent of the standard previously set for New York City and seven metropolitan areas.

The fourth control is more obviously restrictive and sometimes punitive. The aspect of this control of the repeated effort to establish some minimum period of legal residency. The basis for this effort is the claim that public assistance recipients move from low-benefit states to high-benefit states, thus unfairly overloading the taxpayers in the latter. In addition, other eligibility constraints may be imposed (such as the stepfather rule in the aforementioned Wisconsin case). Finally, there are the various rules that purport to increase detection and punishment of fraud and cheating.

THE SPECIAL VULNERABILITY OF AFDC

A. How does AFDC compare to other state expenditures?

Although it is possible to exaggerate the special vulnerability of AFDC, it is not possible to deny that there is some special vulnerability. Why should AFDC be especially vulnerable? The obvious explanation for vulnerability is often cited by governors and legislators. The program is expensive and is driving the state governments bankrupt. Is this true? It is not possible to answer the question definitively on the basis of any analysis here, but a cursory examination suggests that the answer probably is "no". If AFDC took a large share of the state budgets, then we might believe the bankruptcy argument. But it is apparently not true that AFDC takes a large share of the state budgets. Table 1 indicates that as of late 1970, in the thirteen states containing cities

of one-half million people or greater*, there was not one state in which contribution reached 6 percent of the total state budget.

Six percent is not trivial and it is noticeable. But it is not sufficient to create anything like the imagery of bankruptcy.

Could there be a fiscal explanation of the vulnerability of AFDC? Yes. The incremental theory of budgeting would predict that each agency or program would tend to increase about the same proportion from year to year.³¹ We need only add the expectation that any agency or program that becomes conspicuous for exceeding this rule will also become the target of pressures for retrenchment. AFDC is politically vulnerable because the rapid rate of increase, in the number of recipients and in the dollar expenditures since 1960, has noticeably outstripped the increase in programs that legislators would use for comparison. There is, at present, no evidence that permits a confident test for this hypothesis, although the hypothesis is not self-evidently absurd. The increase in dollar expenditures may be suggested in various ways, one of which is to compare AFDC with other important state expenditures.

For convenience, compare the ratio between highway expenditures--a notably important state governmental activity--and welfare expenditures. Table 2, shows this comparison as of 1962 and again seven years later in 1969-70, for the same thirteen states.

*I made an impressionistic judgment that the bulk of the AFDC population would be in large cities, and on that basis looked at the states containing those cities. (Originally, I was working with 1960 data--and did not update when the 1970 data became available. Accordingly, the list does not contain those states with cities of 500,000 or greater under the 1970 Census.) I doubt that it would change the interpretation to add them, although it will be simple to do so if the reader wishes.

TABLE 1*
AFDC PROGRAM FEATURES, SELECTED STATES**

STATE	AFDC Caseload	Caseload/ State Population (%)	AFDC Caseload in State/ U.S. AFDC Caseload (%)	State Contribution to AFDC/ State Budget (%)	Total AFDC/ State Budget (%)	Federal AFDC \$ in State/ Federal AFDC \$ Total (%)
California	1,542,000	7.2	15.9	2.4	6.1	15.0
Illinois	484,000	4.3	5.0	4.6	4.4	4.5
Louisiana	254,000	7.0	2.6	1.0	3.1	1.8
Maryland	161,000	4.1	1.6	2.6	3.7	1.6
Massachusetts	256,000	4.5	2.6	5.4	8.2	2.5
Michigan	445,000	5.0	4.6	3.9	3.7	3.6
Missouri	175,000	5.7	1.8	1.5	2.8	1.6
New York	1,226,000	6.7	12.6	3.6	6.7	19.2
Ohio	339,000	3.2	3.5	2.2	2.8	3.1
Pennsylvania	565,000	4.8	5.8	4.0	5.4	7.1
Texas	331,000	3.0	3.4	0.8	1.8	2.4
Washington	150,000	4.4	1.5	3.1	4.6	1.7
Wisconsin	96,600	2.2	1.0	0.9	2.5	1.1
SUB-TOTAL	6,027,600	...	62.9	62.2
U.S. TOTAL	9,657,000					

Sources:

1. National Center for Social Statistics (NCSS), Public Assistance Statistics (December 1970).
2. Ibid.
3. Bureau of the Census, Pocket Data Book 1971 (Table 81) Data is for 1970. NCSS Report F-2 (Fiscal Year 70) "Source of Funds Expended for Public Assistance Payments and for the Costs of Administration Training and Services"
Figures include payments to medical vendors.

Notes: *Prepared by John R. Davis.

**This Table shows urban-industrial states containing cities of 500,000 population or more.

TABLE 2

HIGHWAY AND WELFARE EXPENDITURES, AMOUNTS AND
RATIOS OF HIGHWAY TO WELFARE EXPENDITURES,
1962 AND 1970*

	1962 (in millions)			1969-70 (in millions)		
	Highways	Welfare	Ratio	Highways	Welfare	Ratio
California	\$954.1	\$652.9	1.4	\$1618.7	\$2961.4-	.5
Illinois	501.2	328.4	1.5	711.9	639.1-	1.1
Louisiana	204.4	178.0	1.1	342.8	250.2+	1.3
Maryland	167.3	48.7	3.4	272.8	213.1-	1.3
Massachusetts	248.3	210.6	1.1	411.4	755.9-	.5
Michigan	489.6	191.1	2.5	560.1	593.7-	.9
Missouri	221.2	146.6	1.5	377.4	259.9+	1.4
New York	907.5	541.9	1.6	1280.7	2459.0-	.5
Ohio	539.4	256.3	2.1	832.5	462.0-	1.8
Pennsylvania	504.5	270.0	1.8	1021.5	818.0-	1.2
Texas	573.3	207.1	2.7	889.9	532.5-	1.7
Washington	185.7	101.0	1.7	346.1	232.3+	1.4
Wisconsin	302.6	103.1	2.9	416.8	302.5-	1.4

Note: *Prepared for Matthew Holden, Jr. by John R. Davis and Peter Bachrach on basis of Statistical Abstract 1964, 425, Table 565 and Statistical Abstract 1972, 422-423, Table 666.

Predictably, both sets of expenditures had increased markedly over the seven years. Only in Louisiana did highway expenditures increase somewhat relative to welfare expenditures. For every welfare dollar, Louisiana spent \$1.15 for highways in 1962 and \$1.37 in 1969. The other states showed some decline in the ratio, sometimes a lot, for example, more than sixty percent in such states as New York and Washington. In the minds of decision-makers, accustomed to thinking of highways as a very big deal, such a relative decline might well be noticeable. It would be even more impressive, to the legislator, in view of the increases in the absolute amounts of welfare expenditures and in terms of the percentage increases.

If the costs of a program increase, or are perceived to increase, out of proportion to the costs of other programs, then that program is likely to become the object of adverse political comments and decisions. They seem burdensome because they appear to the public decision-makers to be "marginal costs", which then do not appear to yield the marginal return that the decision-makers think necessary. It is assumed that all other parts of the state budget are unalterable, and on that assumption AFDC is the "cause" of fiscal pain, since without AFDC the budgets would be easier to balance. It is the straw that breaks the camel's back, and the significant fact about the straw is not its own weight by itself, but the fact that the camel was already loaded.

B. Whom Does AFDC Serve?

If such a program serves, or is perceived to serve, a population that is held in disesteem, it will receive even more political criticism. This is the significance of the demography of the program. The AFDC reservoir is composed, to a nonrandom degree, of subordinate ethnic groups, which include Indians, Mexicans in the Southwest, Puerto Ricans, and blacks--all people held in varying degrees of disesteem in most of American culture. Thus, blacks comprise just short of 44 percent of the national AFDC population (43.3 percent), which is four times the random distribution. Their proportion is slightly higher in the thirteen states (see Table 1), taken as a group: 48.3 percent where the black percent of total population is 11.1 percent. In the same thirteen states, the lowest percent of total black population was Washington, 2.1 percent, while the percent of black AFDC population in that state was 9.6 percent, while the highest percent of black AFDC recipients was in Louisiana with 86.7 percent and the highest outside the South or Border region in Illinois with 65.2 percent.

In a group of Southern states (Kentucky plus Old Confederacy except Arkansas and the Carolinas) percent of black AFDC population ranged from the low of 27.7 percent in Kentucky to a high of 90.5 percent in Mississippi. Kentucky was the only Southern state in this group in which AFDC was less than 50 percent black and but one of three in which AFDC was less than 70 percent black! Blacks are the largest, most-studied, most-talked-about-nonwhite group in the U.S., so their AFDC status is particularly noticed. But the same general position that AFDC is a program that receives subordinate groups in our society, is indicated by the Indian position. Indians constitute only about 0.4 percent of the U.S. population. But, in proportion, their 1.2 percent of the AFDC caseload makes them three times as numerous on AFDC as would be indicated by random choice. Their "overconcentration" is more specifically indicated if one looks at the states that have Indian populations. The range amongst states with noticeable Indian populations varies from California, with its 0.5 percent Indian population and its 0.8 percent Indian AFDC population (about half again as much as would be predicted by randomness) to the state of Washington with only 0.1 percent of its population Indian, but 3.8 percent of its AFDC population Indian.

Consider, as well, the two Spanish-speaking populations (Mexican-American or Chicano, and Puerto Rican). These populations may or may not be considered "white," but they clearly are not members of the predominant Anglo-Saxon (or even Western European) population group. The Mexican-American population figures largely in three states, California, Texas, and Washington with respective proportions of 15.5 percent, 18.4 percent, and 2.7 percent of the state populations. In California, the Mexican-American population's share of the AFDC caseload is only a small proportion of its share of the total population (16.4 percent) which suggests either substantial socioeconomic

equality for the California Mexican-Americans, a disinclination on their part to seek welfare, or some operating procedure that excludes them from the rolls. In Texas, Chicanos are well above the random prediction, with 31.9 percent of the AFDC caseload, and similarly in Washington where their 4.0 percent is relatively modest but is well above their 2.7 percent of total state population. Similarly, the Puerto Ricans range from 3.8 percent of the caseload in Pennsylvania, where they are but 0.4 percent of the total population to 28.4 percent in New York, where they are 4.8 percent of the population.

Ethnocentric contempt probably plays a large role on the ordinary person's judgment of AFDC. But so does the fact that the "real" constituents--the adults whose reactions are watched and whose behavior can be criticized--are women whose children are often "illegitimate". The discussion of illegitimacy in AFDC is chiefly used by conservative opponents to argue that the program should be restricted or curtailed, that it subsidizes "sin" and "immorality". It is even argued, sometimes, that women deliberately become pregnant in order to assure themselves of larger incomes through the AFDC programs. Because this issue embarrasses the advocates of welfare, there is very little information. The social workers who are, after all, the "friends of welfare" do not collect such information and publish it. One hint of some possible dimensions is contained in a six-county Wisconsin

study, carried out in the late 1960s and published in 1971. The range of families in which there was at least one illegitimate child ran from 21 percent in rural Dodge County, to 31 percent in Dane County (Madison), to the 48 percent in urban Milwaukee County.³³ Unless Milwaukee has an unusually high proportion, we can translate these numbers as follows.

Almost half the AFDC women are in urban areas, and are mothers of at least one illegitimate child. This does not mean that half the AFDC children are illegitimate, nor that the illegitimate children were conceived and born while their mothers were on AFDC. But the urban resident, to whom such women are highly visible, is not likely to make such distinctions without having someone call them to his or her attention.

These women are peculiarly likely to be held in disdain. In the minds of many other people they carry about the "scarlet letter" and carry it cheerfully, willing to have it embroidered again and again, as long as others will pay the costs. It seems probably that if one understands the popular myths about ethnic groups and their sexuality, one can understand better the explosive quality in the politics of poor relief. It is not merely that whites view nonwhites with a peculiar and irrational fear-and-contempt.³⁴ It is also that peoples generally tend to create myths about the sexuality of the peoples with whom they contend, and particularly the peoples over whom they are presently dominant but by whom they feel threatened. Around such subordinate peoples, they create images of the sexual license to which they themselves aspire, if they--unlike the subordinate--did not have to pay the "price" of "responsible" conduct. That is, one suspects that the white population not only experiences some sense of economic cost, it also projects its sexual fantasies, imagining that AFDC permits its recipients to indulge in unrestricted

passions while other people have to pay the bills. This mode of interpretation would explain far more of the envy and anger that common people can be found to express.³⁵

C. Who Represents the AFDC Recipient?

There is, moreover, a feature of poor relief politics that may be different from much of American domestic policy conflict. The parties whose interests are presumably under consideration are seldom on the center stage, and at times may be quite unaware of the disputes purportedly conducted on their behalf. Indeed, why should it be otherwise? The politics of poor relief often depends upon administrative minutiae that are not trivial, but are obscure and little known except to those with long and subtle experience of the administrative process. The AFDC women recipients are unlikely to come into this process very knowledgeable--although many may have learned a lot as a result of the recent involvement in politics.

Despite the emergence of "welfare rights" groups, there is usually very little overt evidence that these poor people are active in their own interest. (Indeed, the National Welfare Rights Organization--created and sustained by two male professors of good incomes!--is an illustration of this problem.

It is very hard to make and keep this constituency active in the politics of poor relief. (Women's activity--at any level--has carried relatively little power and prestige in politics until recently. And it has become trite, but true, to say that most of this is directed to the interests of well-educated, upper-middle-class women.) The AFDC women are peculiarly unlikely prospects for bridging the very gap that obstructs the common agreement of welfare losers--that is, unlikely

to bridge the racial gap. What is even more interesting, they may not feel some stigma or embarrassment about being on welfare. But they are probably inhibited in making their claims more fully in the legislative process because they, like others, hold an image of the "work ethic" as what the country has to "return to". All this may indicate why the group politics in behalf of poor relief is not more focused. This lack of interest group focus diminishes the common pattern of pragmatic bargaining between interested parties,³⁶ and contributes to an air of vigorous doctrinal controversy. The doctrinal quality of poor relief politics comes about, in large part, through the formulation of desirable goals as articulated by the social work professionals. For instance, social workers have long argued that the so-called "means test"--the standard that an applicant for relief should be able and willing to show that he or she lacks other resources--is "degrading," "demeaning," or "humiliating" in and of itself. But they have yet to show that this test is demeaning in principle, any more than a means test for favorable tax decisions, scholarships or bank loans, procedure we would regard as simple prudence is inherently demeaning. Moreover, some data now exist which show that the means test does not, in and of itself, bother the recipients. As realists, the recipients might possibly worry about who would administer the test how, but they do not show any belief that it is inherently demeaning.³⁷ My guess is that there is a similar difference between the recipients and the professional advocates on other matters of relief policy.

The recipients' lack of political capacity, and the vested interest of surrogates, has been particularly disadvantageous in recent years. The professional advocates of the poor have chosen to formulate their

case in intense ideological terms and to express extremely large demands for redistribution. Nothing could seem further from a realistic politics of reform. To suggest, as has often been done, that a vastly larger population should be receiving a vastly larger sum of money is to alarm not merely the rich, but the middle-class and the blue-collar workers, all of whom become then parts of the same unnatural political attitudinal coalition. Similarly, nothing more energizes conservative politics in the United States--and brings forth reactions of bitter-end, political trench-fighting--than to challenge not some pragmatic arrangement but the very symbols of virtue by which the middle-class American conservative lives. Precisely because that is what has been done, the tendency is to strengthen a politics in which the pressure is not to improve poor relief but to diminish it, and to impose more severe and more rigid work tests upon the poor.

The doctrinal quality also influences the decision-makers' response to conservative politics. Despite many claims that people are "fed up" with "welfare costs" there is very little evidence--except newspaper editorials and politicians' speeches--of the active role of conservative averse to public welfare. Since there are few real conservative interests actively engaged in the fights, governors and legislators appear to take more action than they do. In a few cases, as the New York City area, they actually reduce the amounts of money that individuals may collect. And in a few cases, they actually reduce the number of individuals or families that collect money. But mostly they adopt measures that are not enforced--and usually not enforceable--on any notable scale, such as more rigorous pursuit of "cheaters," or changes in procedures that seem to admit too many people to the caseloads.

The poor relief system operates as if it were designed to provide modest payments for recipients, but at the same time to deny these recipients any claim to "dignity" comparable to the claim that a man might make if he received exactly the same amount of income from stocks and bonds and had no other means of support.*

Poor relief involves a tug-of-war between the more affluent people (or their putative spokesmen) and the less affluent (or their spokesmen). The less affluent seem to win sometimes by activating politicians who are responsive to their numbers, to their superior moral claims, or sometimes to the presumptive threat to the public order. The objective of the less affluent is to claim bigger benefits. However, the less affluent do not necessarily succeed in this. For the poor relief system operates as if it were obliged to reassure conservatives that the "mess" will not be permitted to get out of hand or will be brought under control. The affluent often "win," by putting the less affluent on the defensive. When the less affluent (or their spokesmen) are forced to spend time and energy protecting existing benefits, it is apparent that they cannot also pursue significant new benefits.

Many of the actions so taken have bad consequences for individuals affected by them. But as public policy decisions they have virtually no effect in reducing the proportion of the population that collects its income through the poor relief subsidy or the proportion of income that is distributed in that way. Symbolic politics is not merely a

*Thus a person receiving but \$3,000 a year from stocks and bonds, and having no other income, would be in rather tight straits. Selling off part of the portfolio would not help much. That would just bring him nearer total poverty. But we would not expect to see such a person treated with contempt!

snare to the Left or a sop to the poor. It is a fundamental practice that is some part of stabilizing the political order, and it works upon conservatives no less than on others.

THE AMBIGUITY OF "CITIZENSHIP" AND OF "GOVERNMENT"

We may argue, in the end, that the poor relief issues have a further significance for political science. They suggest to us the very ambiguity of citizenship and of government itself. Citizenship in the contemporary democratic state is usually conceived of as having the three facets emphasized in the writing of T.H. Marshall:

(1) "civil" rights (or the right to take legal action); (2) "political" rights (or the right to exercise power inside the system); (3) and in the "social" sense previously mentioned: "a modicum of economic welfare and security..., a share in the full social heritage..., and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society."³⁸

But when we observe policy systems, it is easier to discover membership than to determine citizenship. Policy systems are bounded by the fact that their members are those likely to have something to do with its decisions and its results. In this way, we can see membership limited to those who are recipients of the system's benefits, those administrative staffs that have something to do with deciding on claims or rules, the legislators and executives (and sometimes judges) who act chiefly as goads or constraints on the administrative staffs, and those nonrecipient, nonofficial persons or groups who try to make some "input" into the decisions.

Membership in a political system does not necessarily entail citizenship in the sense of having full rights, status, and prerogatives.

this is especially true in the policy system. To be a member does not have to mean more than being a partially determinate factor in the exercise of power by others, as an inmate of a maximum security prison is a member of the political system of that prison. Some members of policy systems, thus, may be less participants than mere objects of action.

When we consider poor relief, the ambiguity of citizenship becomes somewhat clearer. Poor relief participants are members of the system, that is, encompassed within its power relationships. But whether they are "citizens" is much less clear.

Whether poor relief recipients, who obviously do meet the membership tests, are "citizens" is by no means clear. Certainly, they were not "civil" citizens in Marshall's sense, to any extended degree, until the past decade when the courts began to render a large number of favorable decisions in the welfare law area. Nor are they "political" citizens with an understood right to exercise political power over poor relief issues. In recent years, poor relief recipients, or those who claimed to be their advocates, have made substantial efforts to achieve for the recipients the sort of participant rights that farmers have in the agricultural policy system³⁹ and that industrialists have in many aspects of the regulatory policy system.⁴⁰ But this has not been settled, and may now be in partial reversal.

Finally, the emphasis on the poor relief system should push us to understand the very ambiguity of "government" (or "the political system") itself. We all talk about "the political system" these days. The term "political" refers to some pattern of control within human groups. The term "system" refers to some observable interdependence

amongst the members of a group. Our usual emphasis is on territorial systems. Most of the time, thus, we find ourselves talking about "the politics of Israel", "the politics of India", "the politics of China", and so on. There is much sense to this. People are located in specific units of physical space, and control is--as we usually think of it--organized within territorially defined units. The territorially-defined government that possesses legal authority, and the officials of such territorial governments are those whom we call decision-makers. But the usual participant, except when he is an official of the territory, relates to the territorial unit itself most uncertainly.⁴¹ The usual participant acts and lives much of the time, instead, within the policy system. If the usual participant is a baseball player, "Oakland" is much less important to him than the array of relationships that constitute power and influence within the world of baseball. If the participant is a high school music teacher, "Milwaukee" is not the focal system, but the musicians' union and the ability of that union to prevent or expedite the high school orchestra's playing in a public place. If the participant is a copper company, the focal system is not "Nevada" (although it does business there), but the congeries of firms owning deposits throughout the world, the lines that carry the ore, the customers with whom they deal, and the governments that might expropriate its properties. But within the nation state⁴²--and often across the nation state⁴³--it is probably the several policy systems, sometimes disjoint and sometimes intersecting, that allocate the advantages and disadvantages that concern most people. Whether, then, there is any single system that--in real life-- finally allocates values authoritatively is most seriously open to question. This suggests that "government" itself is a very ambiguous process, system, or institution.⁴⁴

FOOTNOTES

¹Thomas Humphrey Marshall, Class Citizenship, and Social Development (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1965), 78.

²See Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 52. Divisibility merely refers to the fact that government itself can divide the benefits specifically between different persons or groups. The government can determine how much Mr. Jones shall get in his Old Age Assistance check and does not have to give anything to Mr. Smith because Mr. Jones is benefitted. On the other hand, if the government does something that raises the general level of the economy, it cannot separate all of Mr. Jones' benefits from all of Mr. Smith's benefits. Most forms of economic benefits are allocated to people who are prosperous, well-to-do, or even rich. But poor relief allocates divisible benefits to those who are on the lower end of the scale. For a brief discussion of the divisibility-indivisibility problem in politics.

³See James E. Anderson (ed), Politics and Economic Policymaking (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1970), for a collection of articles that deals with some of the political questions, chiefly in relation to specific industries. For any student interested in this issue, the best single exercise (though a somewhat laborious one) would be to read for one three month period Business Week, FORTUNE Magazine, and the Sunday New York Times financial section. This would acutely highlight the politics of economic policy.

⁴John K. Galbraith, The Great Crash (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961).

⁵Based on table prepared for author, by Peter D. Bachrach, from Historical Statistics, Statistical Abstract, and other U.S. Census sources. Some other clues to the starkness of the situations are found in the fact that agricultural production fell 15 percent between 1929 and 1934, while prices fell 40 percent. Industrial production fell 42 percent while prices fell 15 percent. (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), 174. One might get some perspective on the Depression by comparing it to the recent economic pinch that college students have clearly felt. Liberal arts graduates in 1970, 1971, and 1972 have found a very tight job market. Some have had to take "just any job" (e.g., clerking in a liquor store as one of my former students was doing recently). Others have decided to keep going to school, hoping for a better job climate later. This is clearly uncomfortable. But it is nowhere near as difficult, if one can still get fellowships or raise the tuition money, in an economy where "crisis" means a rising level of production, a level of unemployment that has not exceeded 6.8 percent since World War II, a high rate of inflation and a balance of payments problem.

⁶Since the Depression occurred more than forty years ago, many professors teaching American government courses will not have been born yet; nor will many of the parents of the students taking such courses; nor above all, will more than a small handful of the students. Students will find great profit in Studs Terkel, Hard Times. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970). Terkel's book is based upon a series of oral

interviews with long verbatim quotes as to what people felt and did at the time. It is a moving and revealing human document.

The social science and historical literature is less satisfactory, precisely because it is also emotionally much committed to a Democratic liberal orientation, which means that we do not very well understand the Republican and conservative side of the situation. Still, with that reservation in mind, students may find it useful to consult John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961); and, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. The Crisis of the Old Order (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957). A readable account that places the Depression in international context is Goronwy Rees, The Great Slump: Capitalism in Crisis, 1929-1933 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970). Since the Depression was the political seedbed for application of Keynesian ideas to policy, students may also find it useful to study Donald F. Winch. Economics and Policy (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969); and Herbert Stein The Fiscal Revolution. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

⁷The Elizabethan principle was briefly interrupted by the "Speenhamland" system of having local government appropriate to subsidize the purchase of bread when wages should be insufficient. Cf., Sir John Clapham, An Economic History of Modern Britain (Cambridge: The University Press, 1930). 2d.ed., I. 130-131; Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957) Ch. 7; and Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, Regulating the Poor (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), 29-32.

⁸Arthur W. Macmahon, John D. Millett, and Gladys Ogden, The Administration of Federal Work Relief, Published for the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council by Public Administration Service, 1941.

⁹T. Harry Williams, Huey Long (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1969).

¹⁰Gilbert Y. Steiner, Social Insecurity (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), 19-21; and Charles McKinley and Robert W. Frase, Launching Social Security (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970).

¹¹Morton Grodzins, "The Federal System," in Aaron Wildavsky (ed.), American Federalism in Perspective. (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1967), 256-277. Also see, Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A View From the States. (New York: Thomas J. Crowell Company, 1972).

¹²Stephen L. Wasby, "The Supreme Court and Welfare Policy: Nationalization or Something Less?" Public Welfare, 30 (Spring 1972), 16-27

¹³Deil S. Wright, Federal Grants-in-Aid (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, 1968).

¹⁴Steiner, Social Insecurity, 7.

¹⁵Ibid., 101.

¹⁶ David O. Porter and David C. Warner, "How Effective Are Grantor Controls?: The Case of Federal Aid to Education," (unpublished draft made available by courtesy of David O. Porter, 1971).

¹⁷ The constraints on federal bureaucratic supervision of the state governments, under the grant-in-aid programs, are very similar to those that limit the action of public regulatory agencies against private business firms. Cf., Matthew Holden, Jr., "Political Bargaining and Pollution Control," in Anderson, Politics and Economic Policymaking, 433-452.

¹⁸ McKinley and Frase, Launching Social Security, Ch. 4.

¹⁹ Eugene Slade, quoted, New York Times, Wednesday, April 12, 1972, 49.

²⁰ Quoted in, Buffalo Courier-Express, Tuesday June 22, 1971, 18.

²¹ Steiner, Social Insecurity, Chs. 1, 6, and 7.

²² Public Income Transfer Programs: The Incidence of Multiple Benefits and the Issues Raised by Their Receipt, (Study prepared for the use of Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress) (Washington: Government Printing Office, April 10, 1972).

²³ Alvin Schorr, Exploration in Social Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1966), does not seem to use the term "reform," but his book admirably expresses the spirit of the liberals who thought about welfare questions in the early 1960s. It will be apparent, however, to those who read Chapters 2 and 3 of this book that Schorr's approach to AFDC is quite far removed from that of most recent critics.

²⁴ U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means. Report of Findings of Special Review of Aid to Families With Dependent Children in New York City, Transmitted to the Committee...by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the New York State Department of Social Services (Committee Print) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), 1.

²⁵ There has been an up-and-down history of struggle by the business interests and trade union interests to control the employment services. Cf., Francis E. Rourke, "The Politics of Administration: A Case History," Journal of Politics 19 (August 1957), 461-478. On the basis of Rourke's study, one might argue that business interests have tended to dominate the employment services most of the time. Whether this justifies the fears that pro-AFDC people have about the Talmadge Amendments is uncertain. The present author himself has observed these fears, even within the state civil service of one state where he has served as a member of oral examination boards for the state personnel agency. At one point, in 1972, one candidate came before the board seeking a job that was--in rank and

responsibility--no improvement over the one he had in the state employment service. When questioned about his reasons for a lateral move he said that the employment service was being coopted into a coercive role in the WIN program, while he had gone into his line of work "to help people," so he no longer felt comfortable.

²⁶Chicago Tribune, Thursday, June 24, 1971; and Monday, August 23, 1971, Sec. 2, 8.

²⁷Clyde W. Franklin, "The Stringency of Welfare Legislation in 1971," Unpublished manuscript prepared for the Joint Center for Political Studies, March 1972, Table 1, generously made available to the author by the Joint Center.

²⁸In this section, I have benefitted by papers from two of my former undergraduates, Mr. Neil Palmer and Mr. Richard Binder (now a law student at the University of Wisconsin).

²⁹Based upon Memorandum to the Under Secretary (HEW), from Assistant Secretary for Community and Field Service, on "Trends in AFDC Benefits," 1971.

³⁰Sophonisba P. Breckinridge, The Illinois Poor Law and Its Administration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), 4, says "there were questions not too easy to answer in connection with (this) principle... For example, which relatives (should support which others)? Parents and children only? Or grandparents and possibly grandchildren? And what about brothers and sisters?"

³¹Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964).

³²Figures prepared by Peter D. Bachrach on basis of Findings of the 1971 AFDC Study, Part I. Demographic and Program Characteristics (Washington: DHEW Publication No. (SRS) 72-03756). NCSS Report AFDC-1971.

³³Joel F. Handler and Ellen Jane Hollingsworth, The "Deserving" Poor (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971, 60, 66).

³⁴Matthew Holden, Jr., The White Man's Burden (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing Company [An Intext Publisher]), (In press).

³⁵This interpretation is something that I borrowed from Walter C. Kaufman, a sociologist who was one of my colleagues at Wayne State University. I offer it as the reasonable speculation, but not as demonstrated fact. In reality, something of the same theme present--though less explicit?--in Steiner, Social Insecurity.

³⁶This observation might lead students to consider the variety of processes by which legislative initiatives are formulated and put into motion. At one end is the kind of legislative problem that legislators handle almost entirely by themselves. Cf., H. Douglas Price, "Theories of the Public Interest," in Lynton K. Caldwell (ed.), Politics and Public Affairs (Bloomington: Indiana University, Department of Government, Institute of Training for Public Service, 1962), 141-159. Somewhere else on the scale

would lie the legislative measure that is almost completely dependent on prior agreement between the parties, outside the legislative framework, which is then presented to the legislature for more or less formal ratification. Gilbert Y. Steiner, Legislation by Collective Bargaining: The Agreed Bill in Illinois Unemployment Compensation Legislation, (Urbana: University of Illinois, Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, 1951).

³⁷Handler and Hollingsworth, The Deserving Poor, 82-85, esp. Table 32., 83.

³⁸Thomas Humphrey Marshall, Class Citizenship, and Social Development.

³⁹Ross B. Talbot, and Don F. Hadwiger, The Policy Process in American Agriculture, San Fransisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1968.

⁴⁰Henry J. Steck, "Power and the Policy Process: Advisory Committees in the Federal Government," A paper prepared for delivery at the 1972 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 5-9, 1972.

⁴¹This is true even in the process of representation. Observe thus that, in the United States, a member is likely to develop connections and relationships to particular groups of interests across the country, even though he still finds it essential to cultivate some territorial interests (his "state" interests) in order to secure election or re-election. In the late 1890s and in early 1900s, newspaper cartoonists used to represent this idea by caricaturing senators as associated with "The Beef Trust," "The Sugar Trust," "The Oil Trust," and so forth. These are all organized economic interests and not territorial populations. Something of this still remains. See the comments in Randall B. Ripley, Power in the Senate (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1969).

⁴²In international relations, people are substantially constrained by the nation-state that claims their "loyalty" and has great ability to coerce them. Nonetheless, we can perceive many policy systems that are trans-national, and that may at times, set their national decision-makers at nought. J.E. Hartshorn, Oil Companies and Governments: An Account of the International Oil Industry in Its Political Environment (London: Faber and Faber, 1963); 2d (revised) ed., (London: Faber and Faber, 1967). Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971); and, Zeev Schiff and Raphael Rothstein, Feyadeen (New York: David McKay and Company, Inc., 1972).

⁴³The ultimate ambiguity of government has at times been an issue in political theory (notably in the tradition of pluralism associated with Gierke), but it has not played much of a role in recent empirical analysis. One piece of work which is interesting for its foreshadowing an empirical recognition of the ambiguity phenomenon is Thomas J. Anton, The Politics of State Expenditure in Illinois (University of Illinois Press, 1966).