The research project I sketch here had its origin in some facts about the performance of the U.S. economy. During the five years 1995–2000, the U.S. economy grew faster, maintained a lower unemployment rate, and experienced less inflation than in the quarter-century from 1970 to 1995 (Table 1). No serious macroeconomist that I know would have thought in 1990 that the U.S. economy could go through a five-year period of rapid growth, drive the unemployment rate steadily down to 4 percent in the fifth year, and still find the inflation rate steady or falling. This would have been regarded as an impossibly optimistic scenario; and I would have agreed.
Yet the years 1995–2000 were not quite an economic miracle, as Table 1 also shows. The decade of the 1960s exhibited equally good performance. By the end of the 1960s, however, the Vietnam War was driving the U.S. economy. We now think of that period as the prelude to the inflation of the 1970s. So far, the prosperity of the 1990s does not seem to have that consequence. So we are talking about a remarkable five years.

Two lively and interesting New York foundations—the Russell Sage Foundation and the Century Foundation—were provoked to try to understand this surprising episode. Their interest was not purely scientific. They remembered that “full employment” had once been a primary goal of national economic policy. In those days, that meant a state of affairs in which inflation did not threaten, and the measured unemployment rate was very close to the inevitable amount of frictional unemployment. ¹

Full employment, in that sense, was expected to bring with it many social benefits: lower crime, better health, improved family structure, wider access to education. The foundations were aware that over the years, the goals of macroeconomic policy had receded to the acceptance of unemployment rates much higher than the frictional level; the avoidance not merely of inflation but of accelerating inflation had become the overriding objective of macro-policy. Now suddenly the United States had achieved something very like the old ideal of “full employ-ment.” They wondered what factors had permitted this to happen, and whether such conditions could be sustained as a normal outcome. Nothing could be more important for the well-being of the least advantaged part of the population. Even those who are necessarily out of the labor force profit from full employment, if only because governments find themselves flush with revenue and better able to support transfer payments relatively painlessly.

The two foundations asked Professor Alan Krueger of Princeton University and me to design and organize a research project that explored the causes and likely permanence of these changed economic relationships. The findings from this research have been published as a volume, The Roaring Nineties: Can Full Employment Be Sustained? by the Russell Sage Foundation (see box, p. 4). It did not occur to me until this project was well under way that it had an unusual aspect. We were trying to understand a single episode in one country. One might think that there is nothing special about that: we just have to see how it fits into some more general “covering” theory. But that is much too simple. Any event that is singled out as an “episode” is almost by definition atypical or peculiar. Otherwise it would not be dignified with that label. There are always exogenous events occurring, and it is rarely clear how they are to be integrated into a coherent story about the episode. Except very rarely, one cannot intelligently compare one episode with another, because the other will have been influenced by a different collection of exogenous events and different historical antecedents. After all, it is over two hundred years since 1789, and right now someone, somewhere, is writing another book about the causes of the French Revolution.

It was not our goal to reform macroeconomic theory, so we approached our question in the vocabulary of the theoretical consensus of the time: roughly speaking, the expectations-augmented, accelerationist Phillips curve (although I, personally, have always had my doubts about that theory). This consensus view presumed the effectiveness of two constraints on macroeconomic performance. (For an explanation of the Phillips curve, see box, p. 3.)

First, the trend growth rate of potential GDP in the United States was widely believed to be somewhere near 2.0–2.5 percent a year, and to be limited mainly by the slow growth of productivity, at a rate of 1.0–1.5 percent a year. Of course, the economy could grow faster than that after a

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Performance, by Decade, 1960–2000</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP growth (%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990s (second half)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2 (4.0)</td>
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<td>1980s</td>
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<td>3.3</td>
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<td>1960s</td>
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<td>4.4</td>
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<tr>
<th>Unemployment rate (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1990s (second half)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.8 (5.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
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<td>6.2</td>
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<td>1960s</td>
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<td>4.8</td>
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<th>Inflation rate (%)</th>
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<td>1990s (second half)</td>
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<td>2.9 (2.4)</td>
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<td>1970s</td>
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<td>1960s</td>
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The Phillips curve and inflation

The Phillips curve is named for its originator, New Zealand economist A. W. Phillips, whose studies of unemployment and the rate of inflation in Britain between 1861 and 1957 led him to conclude that there was a predictable inverse relationship between the two. The “Phillips curve” graphically describes this observation: Whenever unemployment is low, inflation tends to be high. Whenever unemployment is high, inflation tends to be low.

In the 1970s, however, higher inflation in the United States was associated with higher—not lower—unemployment. The average inflation rate rose from about 2.5 percent in the 1960s to about 7 percent in the 1970s, and average unemployment from about 4.75 percent to about 6 percent, calling into question the validity of the relationship posited in the Phillips curve and raising serious issues for policymakers. If the relationship between unemployment and inflation was not predictable in the way the Phillips curve assumed, then the inflation cost of targeting a particular unemployment rate was not clearly identifiable. As Robert Solow discusses in the accompanying article, the years 1995–2000 also challenge the conventional understanding of the inflation-unemployment relationship.

Inflation is considered low or high relative to the expected rate of inflation. Unemployment is considered low or high relative to the so-called “natural rate” of unemployment, a concept first presented in 1968 by Milton Friedman in his Presidential Address to the American Economic Association. In Friedman’s view, which is accepted by many macroeconomists, the “natural rate” is determined by the microeconomic structure of labor markets and household and firm decisions affecting labor supply and demand. Many, however, prefer to call this the “nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment” (NAIRU), because unlike the term “natural rate” it does not suggest an unemployment rate from which the economy may temporarily shift but to which it inevitably returns, which policy cannot alter, and which is somehow socially optimal.


recession had opened up some slack that could be eliminated in the next upswing. But that could be only a temporary, unsustainable burst.

Second, a good sign that the economy had reached its potential output, and was thus on the verge of tipping over into ever-increasing inflation, would be a reduction of the unemployment rate to 6.0–6.5 percent. This was widely believed to be the “inflation-safe” unemployment rate in the United States (the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment, or NAIRU, what economists call the natural rate). The inflation-safe unemployment rate does what it says—it looks only for an unemployment rate just high enough to keep inflation from worsening. One does not have to accept a whole theory of a “natural rate of unemployment”—though most macroeconomists do so—to believe that too much pressure of the economy against its productive capacity (measured, for instance, by too low an employment rate) would cause wages and prices to rise unacceptably. Because I have some doubts about the accompanying theory, I shall consistently call this the “neutral rate.”

The 1995–2000 episode plainly violated both these folk-beliefs emphatically. Were there identifiable changes in economic institutions or behavior patterns that relaxed those earlier constraints or made them go away? Or were there instead some favorable random events that improved economic performance beyond normal expectations? Must 1995–2000 be regarded as a one-time, nonrepeatable episode, a single piece of good luck, or have the macroeconomic rules changed more nearly permanently? Are there policy choices that would make it possible to sustain the performance of 1995–2000 for the long term?

Because we wanted to know how best to sustain a high-employment economy, we assigned each of the topics to be covered to a team consisting of (at least) one microeconomically and one macroeconomically oriented person, wherever it seemed reasonable to do so. Part of the exercise was to determine whether this single episode falls easily into some standard category, although, as I have noted, there are bound to be historical peculiarities, chance events, one-time deviations from the norm, and other such factors whose influence is hard to understand and evaluate. Certainty about conclusions was probably too much to expect, and that will be seen to be the case here. But we can provide a better sense of where to look to understand what made the decade so successful.

To begin with, we decided to take the faster growth of potential output for granted, as an exogenous event. We chose to focus on the employment (or unemployment) story itself, which is complicated enough. The research as we conceived it consists primarily of investigations into one aspect or another of the labor market. In every case, it is the macroeconomic implications of labor market devel-
opments that are the main concern. Our basic question is: Why was the inflation-safe unemployment rate so low between 1995 and 2000? In this article I have space only to glance briefly at the most explicitly macroeconomic analyses—they are the first three chapters of our book—and at some of the interesting questions and ambiguities that emerge.

Even to ask that question implies that the neutral rate of unemployment is not constant from place to place or from time to time. An important first step toward an answer is provided by a careful econometric analysis of the period since 1960 by Douglas Staiger, James Stock, and Mark Watson, in which they incorporate one very substantial element of flexibility by calculating a “trend unemployment rate” that is essentially a moving average of the series of observed unemployment rates. The rate they construct reaches a minimum of somewhat over 4 percent in 1970 and a maximum of nearly 8 percent around 1980. It then falls steadily and dramatically until it is below 5 percent in 2000. Estimating a Phillips curve with a neutral rate that is not constrained to be constant for long intervals, they find that the inflation-safe unemployment rate so estimated is always very close to the trend unemploy-
ment rate. (To a natural skeptic like me, it is too close for comfort; but that is what the econometrics tells us.) The implication is that the very good years 1995–2000 could afford to be so good because both the trend rate and the neutral rate were below where they had been in the 1970s and 1980s, and were still falling. The authors argue that we need invoke no other causal factor—no exogenous events or “good luck” in the form of favorable supply shocks that happened to counteract any tendency for price inflation to take off.

Here there is a very important ambiguity to be resolved. Alan Blinder and Janet Yellen, who were policy insiders during this period (both served on the Federal Reserve Board and in the Council of Economic Advisers during the Clinton administration) disagree with Staiger and his colleagues. They attach quite a lot of importance to favorable supply shocks, in particular the surge in productivity growth that I have already mentioned.

On the wage side, they point to the deceleration of employers’ benefit costs. The main components were the effect on the costs of employer-provided health care of the shift to “managed care” and the boom in the stock market that enabled many employers to reduce or eliminate current contributions to pension funds (because rising stock prices increased the value of the funds and kept them actuarially sound). On the price side, they emphasize the appreciation of the dollar after 1995, the resulting fall in the prices of imports other than oil, and then the drastic drop in the world oil price, which fell by half between late 1996 and early 1999. Finally, adjustments in

the way the Consumer Price Index measures product quality correctly lowered the reported rate of inflation. Blinder and Yellen argue that these supply shocks explain the drop in inflation, which otherwise would have risen into the 5 percent range by the end of 1998, according to some econometric models.3

This sounds as if we can account for the combination of low unemployment and low inflation twice over, once without supply shocks and once with nothing but supply shocks. Then the puzzle about 1995–2000 would not be to understand why inflation was so low, but why it was not even lower. I am not sure that I fully understand how to deal with this situation. It is part of the intrinsic difficulty of trying to “explain” a single historical episode.

But one formulation that avoids any inconsistency is to realize that favorable supply shocks actually lower the inflation-safe unemployment rate. When the price of oil is falling, for example, it is possible to live with a tighter, more fully employed economy, without overall inflation picking up. Rising wage costs could be offset by falling fringe-benefit and energy costs, leaving prices more or less insulated. Then if opportunistic policy (or chance, for that matter) keeps the economy close to the new, lower, safe unemployment rate, the observed trend unemployment rate will also be lower. Then these two different explanations could really be two ways of doing the same calculation.

The apparent fall in the inflation-safe unemployment rate to a very low figure by the end of the 1990s is a fact—I
think it is a fact—in search of a theory. And Staiger and his colleagues offer us another fact that offers a broad hint about a possible story. Figure 1 shows two trends—the smoothed unemployment rate trend already discussed and a similarly smoothed trend rate for productivity growth. The negative correlation between the two leaps to the eye, with productivity growth apparently leading unemployment by a little at the turning points.

Another piece of our project, by Laurence Ball and Robert Moffitt, joins this observation to a story that associates fast productivity growth with slow cost growth, and therefore with low inflation. (Blinder and Yellen list the surge in productivity growth as perhaps the most importantly favorable supply shock.) They start from a fairly conventional “real-wage” Phillips curve. If productivity growth were not increasing, the growth of real wages would depend negatively on the unemployment rate (i.e., as the unemployment rate falls, wages rise). But plausibly, if productivity is rising, workers will aim at a real wage that grows with productivity, not necessarily year by year, but on the average. Employers will be driven by competition to go along. If you add to this story the same old rule for prices—a more or less constant markup on unit labor costs—it is easily seen that the rate of inflation is independent of the rate of productivity growth. This is because productivity growth is fully offset by wage increases; there is nothing left over to affect inflation. Faster or slower productivity growth would then be accompanied by faster or slower wage increases, leaving inflation untouched.

Now Ball and Moffitt introduce a new concept. They want to model an inertial or persistent component in workers’ wage aspirations. They do so by defining an “aspiration” standard for real-wage growth; they choose to make it a weighted average of past rates of real-wage growth. Wage increases are habit-forming, both for workers and employers. The conventional model says that what drives real wages upward is the growth of productivity; Ball and Moffitt say that real wages are driven upward by productivity growth and customary real wage growth. In a steady state, real wages grow in line with productivity; then the aspiration standard will grow at the same rate and so will any average of the two. In that case, the refinement of the aspiration standard makes no difference, but in all other cases it does, and in the historical case that we are examining it makes just the right difference.

Here is one plausible story. (There are others, and they are discussed in the book.) Start from a steady state and imagine that productivity accelerates, as it did in 1995–2000. Faster productivity growth feeds into real wages, but not one-for-one; in fact, it is only about one-half-to-one in the early stages. This is because the aspiration standard is sluggish; it looks back over past wage increases. So real wages lag behind productivity, unit labor costs slow down or fall, and inflation does the same. As long as this gap lasts, it can be used either to run the economy at a lower unemployment rate with the old rate of inflation, or at the old unemployment rate with lower inflation. In other words, the “safe” unemployment rate is temporarily lower.

The implication for our period is that the surprise acceleration of productivity beginning in 1995, by running ahead of the aspiration standard, allowed unemployment to fall while inflation continued to hover around 2 percent. A conventional Phillips curve would have translated the low unemployment rate—which fell from an already dangerous 6 percent at the beginning of 1995 to 4 percent at the end of 2000—into a forecast of runaway inflation. A forecast using Ball and Moffitt’s refinement gets the inflation forecast essentially right, and without bias.

To sum up: In our study, we formulated the basic question in the way current mainstream macroeconomics would frame it. How was it possible in the years 1995–2000 to reconcile low and falling unemployment with low and stable inflation? In the standard jargon, how did the NAIRU—the inflation-safe unemployment rate, what I am calling the neutral rate—get to be as low as perhaps 4 percent, when only a few years earlier it was generally thought to be 6 percent or even higher?

The possibility emerges that the fall of the neutral rate was a stage in a longer-term process. The careful estimate of Staiger and his colleagues suggests that the neutral rate peaked near 8 percent in 1980 and then fell fairly smoothly to near 4 percent at the end of 2000. This time pattern would certainly have implications for our understanding of the underlying causal mechanism.

The most striking candidate for this role is probably the acceleration that lifted the annual growth rate of productivity from less than 1.5 percent in the 25 years after 1970 to some 3.5 percent in the 5 years after 1995. An extra 10 percent of productivity meant a direct 10 percent contribution to the general standard of living; there is no mystery in that. The indirect effects are less obvious. There is some reason to believe that real wages adjust only slowly after such an event; before that adjustment is complete, real wages grow temporarily less rapidly than they will later. That lag keeps unit costs from rising much, and thus part of the payoff from faster productivity growth appears temporarily in the form of lower inflation and higher employment than otherwise expected.

The reality and expectation of faster productivity growth also tends to induce higher investment. Increased investment—also a characteristic of the second half of the 1990s—has two kinds of effects. As a contribution to aggregate demand it helps to keep an expansion going. On the supply side it helps to prolong the acceleration of productivity. And this, in turn, by minimizing the danger of inflation, allows the expansion to continue, and to achieve lower rates of unemployment than normal. All
this requires a rare combination of good luck, skill, and courage in both monetary and fiscal policy, and these were present in the second half of the 1990s.

Cheerful optimism is not in order, however. This mechanism works only because an unanticipated acceleration of productivity leaves habitual targets for wage growth behind. Even if the higher rate of productivity persists—by no means a sure thing—targets for wage growth will eventually take them into account, and then the neutral rate will revert to its previous level. The only way to avoid this is by repeated accelerations of productivity. But that is too much to ask; a more likely outcome is a deceleration back toward the old rate of productivity growth. This mechanism can provide only a temporary fall in the neutral rate.

The neutral rate that emerges from our research is a more changeable, less slow-moving phenomenon than it is in Milton Friedman’s original conception. The neutral rate is affected by the speed of productivity growth, by the degree of real wage inertia, by persistent exchange-rate movements, by policy-induced shifts in the cost of fringe benefits to firms, by the sentencing habits of the courts, by demographic and sociological changes in the labor force, and no doubt by many other forces that did not happen to be prominent in the 1990s. Many of these factors are discussed further in *The Roaring Nineties*.

These forces can move either favorably or unfavorably. In our period they were mainly favorable, and some of the favorable ones—like accelerated productivity growth—cannot last indefinitely. Without being portentous or profound, I want to suggest two lessons to be drawn. One is that the success of the roaring ’90s was probably not the beginning of a new era with altogether new rules of the game; we have to be prepared for a two-way street. The other is that policy matters; and on a two-way street, policy has to exercise intelligence as best it can, using every bit of information and analysis it can find. ■

1The idea of “full employment” evoked an unemployment rate low enough to leave little more than the minimal amount of inevitable frictional unemployment, i.e., the amount of unemployment necessary to lubricate a labor market in which firms can hire and fire, and people can quit and take jobs or enter and leave the labor force at will.

2We know that the productivity trend in the United States accelerated from 1.0–1.5 percent per year in 1970–95 to something like 3 percent per year in 1995–2000; others are engaged in asking why that happened. See, for example, K. Stiroh, “Information Technology: Productivity Payoffs for U.S. Industries,” *Current Issues in Economics and Finance* 7, no. 6 (June 2001), New York Federal Reserve Bank.

3There is no room here for the details of fiscal and monetary policy decisions in the 1990s, as recounted by Blinder and Yellen. But a lesson emerges from their analysis that is too important to omit. They emphasize that a series of mostly successful policy decisions, mainly monetary but also fiscal, were not made as part of the deliberate carrying-out of a preordained program or rule. On the contrary, they were essentially adaptive decisions, often reactions to ongoing events and surprises, made by the protagonists after much informed discussion, but often surrounded by uncertainty and self-doubt. If you are looking for comfortable reinforcement of any single-minded or rule-bound approach to macroeconomic policy, you will not find it in the story of the American prosperity of the 1990s.

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The right (soft) stuff: Qualitative methods and the study of welfare reform

Katherine S. Newman

Quantitative studies drawn from administrative records are essential to capture the “big picture” of the welfare reforms that have seen many poor women move from cash assistance to work. Large-scale surveys or panel studies are equally important as officials seek to understand and predict the dynamics of welfare caseloads when Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) is retooled and reauthorized.

Yet the story that emerges from existing, large-scale studies contains many puzzles and unanswered questions. The rolls dropped precipitously nationwide, but not everywhere. Millions of poor people have disappeared from the system altogether: they are not on TANF, but they are not employed. Where in the world are they? Are the benefits of work for parents—increased income, the psychological satisfactions of joining the American mainstream, or the mobility consequences of getting a foot in the door—translating into positive trajectories for their children? And if they are not, can mothers stick with work when they are worried about what is happening to their children?

These kinds of questions are unlikely to be resolved through administrative records. States and localities rarely collect data on mothers’ psychological well-being. They cannot tell us how households reach collective decisions which deputize some members to head into the labor market, others to stay home and watch the kids, and yet others to remain in school. Nor can they necessarily help us understand the consequences when the burdens of raising children collide with the constraints of the low-wage labor market.

In this article I suggest that qualitative research is an essential part of the research tool kit, capable of adding deeper understanding to the information and the trends observable in administrative records and panel studies. Particularly when embedded in a rigorous survey design, qualitative research can illuminate some of the unintended consequences and paradoxes of the historic about-face in American social policy represented by welfare reform. The “right soft stuff” can go a long way toward helping us to:

- Understand people’s subjective responses, belief systems, and expectations, and the relationship to their labor market behavior;
- Uncover underlying patterns of response that are overlooked or not easily measured in rigidly structured survey questionnaires;
- Focus attention on the behavioral dynamics of households and communities that are not easily addressed through data on individuals.

Used properly, in other words, qualitative research can pry open the classic “black box” and tell us what lies within. And it has the power to capture the real consequences of major policy changes in individual and family histories that represent patterns we know to be statistically significant.

The content of the tool kit

Open-ended questions embedded in survey instruments

The great value of survey research lies in its large sample sizes, its representativeness, and the capacity it provides for statistical analysis and causal inference. Typically, survey questions are closed-ended, with fixed-choice responses that require respondents to rank their reactions on set scales. But survey studies may include a limited number of open-ended questions designed to learn a bit more about a respondent’s answers. For example, “Were you very happy, moderately happy, moderately unhappy, or very unhappy with the quality of your child’s care last week” might be followed with “Why?” It is difficult for researchers’ fixed-choice categories to anticipate all possible responses. The categories generated by the analysis of open-ended questions are essentially those employed by the respondents themselves, and they may more adequately capture respondents’ experiences and understanding. Such open-ended questions can help illuminate complex patterns while preserving the strength in numbers that survey research provides. Particularly in pilot

In-depth interviews with a subsample

Collecting and analyzing open-ended answers for an entire survey population is prohibitively expensive, and it is more feasible to draw a smaller, random subsample of a survey population for longer interviews. Such interviews can, for example, explore people’s experiences looking for or adjusting to work, managing children’s needs, coping with transportation and with other work expenses, and a host of other aspects of the transition from welfare to work. If the subsample is representative, the researcher can extrapolate from it to the experience of the survey population as a whole.

A good example of the value of this approach is the longitudinal study of the New Hope experiment in Milwaukee. New Hope provided generous child care, earnings supplements, and access to health insurance to guarantee participating families sufficient income to bring them above the poverty line and make it easier for them to stay in the labor force.

One of the most important and initially puzzling effects of New Hope concerned the achievement and behavior in school of preadolescent children, as reported by teachers. Boys, but not girls, in the experimental group were significantly better behaved and higher achieving than their counterparts in the control group, which consisted of similar families not receiving the subsidies and services. The survey data offered no explanation. But qualitative interviews suggested that mothers felt that gangs and other neighborhood pressures were more threatening to their sons than their daughters, so they channeled more program resources (for example, child care subsidies for extended-day programs) to the boys. Further quantitative analysis of both New Hope and national survey data supported this important finding about family strategies in dangerous neighborhoods, which are unlikely to have been discovered from the quantitative data only.

Focus groups

Focus groups consist of small gatherings of individuals, generally selected on the basis of demographic characteristics, who engage in collective discussion following questions or prompts from a researcher facilitating the conversation. These groups are a popular technique for exploratory research, an inexpensive and rapid way to gather information on the subjective responses of program participants (and as such, of course, they are frequently used by politicians and businesses to “test the market”).

A large flaw in focus groups is the contamination of opinion that occurs when individuals are exposed to the views of others; such contamination can render the data hard to interpret. When particularly forceful individuals dominate a discussion, the views of more passive participants can easily be squelched or brought into conformity in ways that distort their true reactions, although a strong facilitator can make sure that all have a chance to participate. People may also be hesitant publicly to air their opinions on sensitive subjects such as domestic violence or the misbehavior of employers. Difficult matters like these may best be addressed by carefully drawing together people who have experienced a common dilemma to lessen any discomfort; thus focus groups may often be assembled along racial, ethnic, gender, or age lines. But it is hard to make groups so constructed representative of the population in any meaningful sense.

Focus groups are, therefore, probably best used to gather data on community experience with and opinions toward public assistance programs, such as the problems associated with enrollment in the state children’s health insurance programs. They provide information that is far more textured and complete than fixed-choice questionnaires and can, for example, help public officials address deficiencies in outreach programs.

Qualitative longitudinal studies

Welfare reform is a process unfolding over a number of years. Families pass through stages of adaptation as their children age, new members arrive, people marry, jobs are found and lost, and new requirements (work hours, mandated job searches) exert their influence. Thus it is critical that at least some of the nation’s implementation research follows individuals and families over a period of years rather than merely taking a cross-sectional slice.

Anthropologists and sociologists have developed longitudinal interview studies in which the same participants are interviewed in an open-ended fashion over a long course of time. I have been a principal investigator in two such studies, one on the long-range careers of workers who entered the labor market in minimum-wage jobs and another assessing the effects of welfare reform on working poor families.

In each project, a sample of approximately 100 families was interviewed at three- to four-year intervals for a total of six to eight years of data collection. In these projects it has proven possible to capture changes in perceptions of opportunity, detailed accounts of changing household composition, the interaction between the lives of parents and children, and the effects of neighborhood change on the fate of individual families.

Qualitative panel studies are, however, labor-intensive and expensive. Participants typically have to give up several hours of time for which they must be reimbursed. Tape-recorded interviews must be transcribed and possibly translated. Given the nature of the data that studies of this kind are seeking, it is imperative to have interviewers who are matched to the race and gender of those interviewed and staff who are fluent in the languages of the
subjects. Unless budgets are overflowing, the sample to be tracked over time is inevitably quite small.

Nonetheless, the quality of the data that can be obtained in this manner makes the effort worthwhile. Qualitative panel studies are probably most valuable when they are embedded in panel studies using a survey design to yield additional information on the “objective” and measurable consequences of reform captured in the survey itself—hours worked, income earned, jobs acquired and lost, health insurance enrollment. Such studies are able to illustrate statistical trends with representative, systematically selected examples of the dilemmas and success stories of welfare recipients—especially important when one wants to engage in public discussion of welfare reform.

**Participant observational fieldwork**

Administrative records can provide an objective method of measuring enrollment patterns or recidivism rates. Interviews can provide the research community with a window on the self-reported state of mind or experience of those undergoing the transition from welfare to work. But when subjects are unaware of the reasons for their conduct, inclined to conceal some aspects of their behavior, or unable to recall critical details, puzzles may remain.

To explain such puzzles, anthropologists and sociologists often combine interviews with a relatively large number of people and direct observation of behavior (generally called “participant observation”). Among other things, such fieldwork, particularly if it takes place over time, provides regular contact and allows us to check what survey informants say in interviews about their state of mind, their survival strategies, relations with others, and the conditions of their neighborhoods.

For some years now, for example, colleagues and I have been conducting a study of the impact of welfare reform on the working poor of New York City. This is a longitudinal impact study involving 100 families, all in the labor market and all poor. Three waves of interviews over six years have provided a detailed sense of the difficulties families have encountered finding child care, securing work that dovetails with family responsibilities, and managing strained family budgets. But the data provide only a sketchy sense of how these dilemmas surface at the neighborhood level and how, in turn, the community context affects the families. Thus we developed a community study—a year’s worth of intensive fieldwork in three different ethnic communities, tagging along beside police officers, sitting in classrooms, visiting with community and church leaders, talking with local employers, and spending a lot of time with 12 families drawn from our interview sample. We have witnessed the dilemmas of poor, working mothers who cannot easily control sons when they reach adolescence, and how they try to adjust their work lives to provide more supervision. The perspectives of community workers and local officials have been equally valuable, for they can look beyond the immediate concerns of particular families to assess the consequences of reform for neighborhood institutions that must absorb and implement new policy demands.

Participant observation in TANF offices and welfare-to-work programs is also an important tool in determining how the new goals of TANF offices are being absorbed into a bureaucracy designed for entirely different purposes. Qualitative research of this kind on job retention programs has thrown light on the disjunction that has plagued some programs that try to build up participants’ self-esteem, only to discover that their graduates expected much more from the labor market than the jobs accessible to them actually offered, and are correspondingly frustrated.

**Sampling issues in qualitative research**

The data derived from interviews and participant observation can be used as an end in themselves or to generate hypotheses that might be turned into survey research questions for use with a much larger representative sample. But vexing questions of representativeness invariably arise with very small samples—the only affordable possibility for most qualitative research.

**“Nested” sampling**

My own approach to the problem of representativeness has been to embed the selection of informants within a larger survey design. For example, in 1995–96 we undertook a survey of 900 middle-aged African Americans, Dominicans, and Puerto Ricans in New York City; from this population, a representative subsample of 100 respondents was chosen for more extensive interviews at three-year intervals. Finally, 12 individuals, 4 from each ethnic group and neighborhood, were selected for observational studies. This nested design made it possible to generalize with a reasonable degree of confidence from the families we came to know best to the population with which we began.

A similar approach was adopted by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation in the Project on Devolution and Urban Change, a study of the impact of devolution and the time limits of the TANF system on poor families in Philadelphia, Cleveland, Miami, and Los Angeles. Families were chosen for this part of the study by selecting three neighborhoods in each city with moderate-to-high concentrations of poverty and welfare receipt, and recruiting 10 to 15 families in each. This had to be done without drawing from lists provided by the local TANF offices, since one of the objectives of the project was to investigate behaviors that are technically disallowed. Instead, the researchers posted notices, knocked on doors, and requested referrals from community leaders and local institutions, using no more than two recruits.
from any one source to guard against overrepresenting a particular social network.

A strategy of this kind probably overrepresents people who are higher in social capital—people who are socially connected. A strict sampling design from an established list may tell us more about people who are less connected to private safety nets and who are confronting welfare reform from a more socially isolated vantage point. But it is much harder to dissociate from official agencies when pursuing a sample generated randomly from, say, a TANF office caseload.

The “Cadillac” of such studies, in terms of its resources, is Welfare, Children, and Families, an intensive study of welfare reform and its consequences for 2,400 families in three cities: Boston, Chicago, and San Antonio (it is frequently referred to as the Three-City Study). The study comprises longitudinal surveys, embedded developmental studies of 700 families whose children were between 2 and 4 years old when the project began in 1999, and contextual, comparative ethnographic studies of 215 families, some of them including children or adults with disabilities. The ethnographic sample is, therefore, nested within a large research project that can analyze neighborhood variables and state and local employment data, that has the statistical power of a large survey sample, and that has repeated interviews and assessments of families and their children’s development.

“Snowball” sampling

Snowball samples attempt to capture respondents who share particular characteristics (e.g., low-wage workers or welfare-reliant household heads) by asking those who meet the eligibility criteria to suggest friends and neighbors who also meet the criteria. Some well-known poverty studies that have used snowball samples are Tally’s Corner (1967), a study of relationships and attitudes among African American men who frequented a Boston street corner, and Making Ends Meet (1997), which explored the income sources of mothers receiving welfare and the ways in which they managed budgets. The defining feature of a snowball sample is that it gathers individuals who are already acquainted with at least one other person in the network. In snowball samples tightly bound to a particular network, as was the case with Tally’s Corner, it is important that the key informant be representative, for thereafter there is nothing random about the study participants, who will be selected from the primary informant’s trusted associates. Making Ends Meet, in contrast, is an example of a partial snowball strategy that put together a heterogeneous set of prospective respondents using neighborhood block groups, housing authority residents’ councils, and churches and other community organizations, then made a determined effort to complement these socially connected respondents with others less likely to be tied into networks.

Practical realities

There can be little doubt that qualitative research is essential to understanding the real consequences of welfare reform. Equally, though, it is a complex and expensive undertaking not easily suited to the resources of local TANF officials, who may nonetheless rely on such research to understand the dynamics of their caseloads or to improve service delivery. Qualitative research becomes even more important in dealing with the most disadvantaged, who now constitute a large share of the cash assistance caseload. Meeting their needs will not be easy if we all know is that they have not found work or have problems with child care or substance abuse. Qualitative research can tell us how their households function, where the gaps are in their child care, and about the difficulties they have in accessing drug treatment.

Given the complexities of this style of research, partnerships between state agencies and local universities are a logical response. Sociologists, demographers, political scientists, and anthropologists can be drafted to assist state officials in understanding how welfare reform is unfolding. With proper planning, long-term panel studies that embed qualitative samples inside a large-scale survey design can be conducted in ways that will yield valuable information to policymakers and administrators. Students are a good source of research labor and are very often interested in the problems of the poor.

Research units of state agencies might also invest in in-house capacities for qualitative research, as the federal government now does. For example, the Census Bureau has employed linguists and anthropologists to study household organization in order to frame better census questions. Ethnographers for the Bureau have conducted multicity studies of homeless populations to check underrepresentation of the homeless in the census. As devolution progresses, it will be important to replicate this expertise at the state level.

Whichever approach is chosen, the fusion of quantitative and qualitative methods provides greater confidence in the representative nature of the qualitative samples, and the capacity to move back and forth between statistical analyses and patterns in life histories gives us a more complete and nuanced understanding of the radical transitions now occurring in the U.S. social safety net.

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2Ethnographic studies from New Hope are reported in J. Romich, “How Families View and Use the EITC: Advance Payment Versus Lump Sum Delivery,” National Tax Journal 53, no. 4 (December 2000): 1245–64. See also H. Bos, A. Huston, R. Granger, G. Duncan, T. Brock, and others, New Hope for People with Low Incomes: Two-Year Results of a Program to Reduce Poverty and Reform Welfare,
Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, New York, April 1999.


Publications currently available from this research project can be found on its Web site at <www.jhu.edu/~welfare>.

Expectations about marriage among unmarried parents: New evidence from the Fragile Families Study

Early data from the Fragile Families Study, a nationwide study of low-income, unmarried parents that began in 1998, produced an unexpected finding: about half of these unmarried parents were cohabiting. Fully another third considered themselves romantically involved. Furthermore, over half—both men and women—affirmed their belief that marriage was important and expected that they would marry in the future. Was there, observers speculated, a window of opportunity here? Does the birth of a child constitute a “magic moment” at which the “right” policy interventions could confirm and strengthen the relationship of poor unmarried parents and set the family on a path to stability and economic self-sufficiency?1

But at the same time, researchers raised warning flags—large proportions of these parents have low education and few skills, unstable work histories, and poverty-level earnings. Indeed, a number of studies have established that low-income, unmarried parents face formidable barriers to forming stable relationships. For example:

• Only about two out of five mothers who had a nonmarital birth married their child’s father or anyone else within five years of the birth.
• Cohabiting relationships are less stable than marital relationships—only about one in ten lasts five years or longer.
• Relationships between unmarried parents, and between unmarried fathers and their children, decline significantly in the first few years after the birth.2

What circumstances are likely to drive unmarried parents apart, what keep them together? Representative, longitudinal data exploring this issue have been meager, especially for fathers. Now, a study of young unmarried parents in Oakland, California, that is part of the Fragile Families project examines changes in relationships between unmarried parents during the year after their child’s birth.3

The study draws upon two waves of surveys of new unmarried parents and open-ended interviews with a smaller number of these parents. Survey participants include unmarried women who gave birth in the two Oakland maternity hospitals between February and June 1998 and fathers of those children who were also willing to participate; there are 248 mothers and 189 fathers.4 Twelve months later, researchers were able to reinterview 85 percent of the mothers and 71 percent of the fathers. During this year, Maureen Waller also completed interviews with 37 unmarried parents drawn from the larger sample; this smaller group included 14 couples.5 At times, information in the surveys was confirmed by the interviews; at other times, the picture was less clear.

Table 1 provides demographic and socioeconomic information on the Oakland and national Fragile Families samples. The Oakland sample members were more likely than the national sample to be black, and almost a third were immigrants. More of them also had other children. They were more disadvantaged: almost half had less than a high school education and over half had incomes below the poverty line. Only 35 percent of mothers had earnings from work in the year before their baby’s birth; about a third of fathers in Oakland were unemployed the week before their child’s birth and just under 30 percent were unemployed a year later.

What difference does a year make?

At the child’s birth, as noted earlier, all but a small minority of the Oakland fathers had some involvement with both mother and child. One year later, many relationships among parents who were not cohabiting at the time of the birth appear to have rapidly deteriorated. The proportion of the sample without any romantic relationship rose from 15 to 40 percent, and the proportion not cohabiting but romantically involved shrank from 35 percent to 7 percent. This, of course, means that about half the parents in the sample were still cohabiting. Yet even here is a puzzle—despite the avowed commitment of so many of these parents to marriage and the relative stability of their cohabiting relationships, only 7 percent had married.
These findings suggest some mismatch between expectations about relationships and actual outcomes that is surely worth closer examination.

**Challenges to relationships in the first year**

At the time of the birth, marriage was very much on parents’ minds; a third of all unmarried mothers—over half of those actually living with the father—and nearly half of the unmarried fathers thought that they would almost certainly marry the other parent.6

A year later, there is a clear and statistically significant relationship between those hopes and early outcomes. About 82 percent of unmarried parents who reported an almost certain chance of marriage were married or, by far the greater part of them, still cohabiting a year later. Conversely, 83 percent of those who reported little or no chance of marriage were no longer involved. Because parents were asked about their expectations for marriage “in the future,” not simply in the first year, more transitions will likely take place.

Probing more deeply in the qualitative interviews, Waller explored some of the challenges to stability or increased commitment in these early months. What factors contributed to the dissolution of relationships between unmarried parents? Why might couples who are still romantically involved be reluctant to marry?

**Breaking up**

About one in three of the relationships among the parents who were no longer romantically involved were never established to begin with or had ended before the child’s birth. The rest fell apart within the first year.

Parents gave a number of reasons for the breakup. If violence or abuse, or alcohol and drug problems, existed, they are a significant factor in explaining parents’ outlooks on marriage, but these problems are reported by

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**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Oakland Sample Mothers</th>
<th>Fathers</th>
<th>National Sample Mothers</th>
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<tr>
<td>Age (%)</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have other children (%)</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<td>Poverty status (%)</td>
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<td>15</td>
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Total no. of respondents at baseline: 248 Mothers, 189 Fathers, 2,670 Mothers, 2,047 Fathers.


Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding. The table includes some parents who were unmarried at the time of their child’s birth but were married at year one.
less than 10 percent of parents in the survey. About 5 percent cite drugs and 11 percent violent or abusive episodes as reasons for ending their relationship in the first year. Also frequently cited are the problems created by distance (about 11 percent say that the relationship foun-
dered for this reason).

Almost three-quarters of the mothers who ended the relationship after the birth and before the 12-month interview said that “relationship reasons” were very important. The qualitative interviews make it possible to unpack this last category—they point to questions of trust, fidelity, and commitment. The interviews also add context by bringing up other issues, frequently including financial and housing instability, that played a role in the breakup. The difficulties of one couple, for example, were compounded by the fact that they could not afford an apartment and lived separately with other family members:

We were supposed to be getting married last month. We postponed it cause we had no money. How can we be married if he lives there and I live over here? . . . He [does] not know what I’m doing and I don’t know what he’s doing. We don’t know how to trust each other. And we got a lot of he said/she said interactions going between us. A lot of conflicts.”

This rocky relationship ended when the father, an illegal immigrant, was deported.

**Postponing marriage: “It’s never the right time”**

It seems clear from interviews that the marriage topic is well-traveled territory for low-income unmarried parents. But somehow, the time never seems to be quite right:

We want to have a real good marriage. . . . It’s never going to be good enough once you start having kids. It doesn’t matter. They’re in school, they’re out of school. . . . It’s never the right time. Sometimes, maybe, it is a bad time. There’s a lot of bills . . . all the time. You still got to budget and get through it.

Only one of the Oakland couples in the qualitative interviews married between the child’s birth and the 12-month follow-up. This couple had lived together nine years, and already had two children when this baby was born. A convergence of interventions when they “bottomed out” on drugs—from family, Child Protective Services, their church, and their drug rehabilitation program—prompted the marriage. The reasons given by the father help explain why so many couples in impoverished and complicated circumstances may have postponed marriage:

We’ve always wanted to get married, you know. From day one, you know. But it took us this long to finally get married, you know, because of financial reasons . . . . We’ve never really been financially stable. You know. Bank account, things like that . . . and then we had another child, and then another child. And we kind of put that off. . . . Something was always going on in our life at that time, and it just never happened. I think when we finally got our acts straight last year, then we decided to set things right. But it was never, you know, like I told people, it was never a thing of I didn’t want to marry her or she didn’t want to marry me.

Although waiting appears to be a rational decision for couples experiencing multiple challenges to their relationship, low-income, unmarried parents may have trouble ever reaching a point where they feel economically prepared for marriage. And more doubts may arise as they wait.

**High hopes, high expectations**

Beyond the high hopes that permeate conversations with the new parents are a set of very high expectations for marriage. Oakland parents often talked about being ready for marriage, making sure things are “right,” wanting to avoid divorce, and making sure their relationship lasts “forever.”

A study by Christina Gibson, Kathryn Edin, and Sara McLanahan, also based on Fragile Families data, finds similar attitudes. This study, “Time, Love, Cash, Couples, and Children” (TLC3), explores marriage expectations through qualitative interviews with 75 couples, 25 each from Chicago, Milwaukee, and New York; all were romantically involved, married, or, most often (77 percent), cohabiting. Almost half of the respondents were black and about a third were Hispanic. Average incomes were around $30,000, but about a third of the families had received welfare at some time.

All but three couples in the TLC3 study reported that they had previously discussed marriage, many of them quite often. Only two couples did not plan to marry. As with the Oakland parents, many of these parents saw marriage as a lifetime commitment; one father stated, “I’m going to marry her, you know, ‘cause I want to be here for the rest of my life, I tell you.” Hesitation to marry reflected in part the seriousness with which the commitment was viewed, in part generalized fears that marriage might destabilize the relationship: “A lot of people say the relationship is good before they married, and when they get married everything changes, so I don’t know.”

One important reason for the postponement of marriage is apparent in both the Oakland interviews and the TLC3 study. Couples seem to be demanding that their expectations be met before they marry, rather than seeing them as common goals toward which the couple will work after they marry. TLC3 parents in particular expressed unusually high expectations about the level of financial security (living standards) they would need to achieve before they marry.
Marriage, for the couples in the TLC3 study, is also a decision based upon the quality of the relationship between the adults, rather than upon the fact that they have a child together. But most parents have only a vague notion of when the marriage might actually occur; it is a long-term goal, as one couple explained:

She: Basically usually say we, like, married, because it’s all coming together now. One day we will get married. Not now.

He: ... I don’t [want] to rush into everything yet.

She: Right. And we don’t want to go to the City Hall.

He: Get myself situated.

The obstacles to marriage

Many relationships among the young parents in the Fragile Families sample are beset by multiple problems, both economic and emotional, that make marriage seem a distant goal.

Financial issues

Among the Oakland families, financial difficulties were rarely mentioned as a primary cause of instability in the relationship, perhaps because they are universal, and in the statistical analysis they were less prominent than relationship issues. The qualitative interviews, however, show that many unmarried parents were experiencing serious financial problems that made them feel less secure about the future of the relationship and more hesitant about marriage.

Some parents advanced an extensive list of goals linked to finances that needed to be met before marriage. A young Oakland mother had a large set of prerequisites:

My mom say, “I think you guys can make it. You all be a happy family.” ... I think we might make it. ... We talk about that [getting married] a lot. ... First I want to get in school, get me a nice job, find me a nice apartment where I can [be] set and not worry about nothing. ... The best thing for us would be [if] James [the baby’s father] would find a good paying job, and they would be willing to help us out so everybody has the benefits—dentist or whatever—and for us to have a nice house. [And] for little James to have child care. ... There’s a lot of jobs out there, but it’s like you gotta have a lot of things in order to get that job. Like a high school diploma or GED. Or you gotta have some experience in that job. I think that would be best for us. [p. 49]

One reason for delay is often the mother’s doubts about the father’s sense of financial responsibility. Another Oakland mother said:

He has a good job, now ... but I want him to be on the job for a while. Not to say, “OK, I have a good job,” or then when I’m tired, or “I quit, I’m gonna get another job.” I just want him to be stable, you know. ... Once you’re married, you take on their problems ... as far as financial and otherwise. [p. 57]

Most cohabiting parents in the TLC3 sample would face no financial changes if they married; very few were on public assistance and only one couple mentioned the loss of assistance as a disincentive to marry. Yet many of these couples were reluctant to consider marriage until they were able to pay the bills, accumulate some savings, and achieve a stereotypical American family life—the two-car garage, the white picket fence,” as one father put it. And compounding these longer-range concerns was the dream of being able to afford a large wedding, with bridesmaids, groomsmen, reception, the works, as a public expression of their established status. “Going to City Hall” was a second-class option, an echo of the old “shotgun marriage.” Said one father, previously divorced: “When I do it again, I want to have a very nice wedding and a big wedding, and that takes a lot of planning. And a lot of money.”

Expectations of this sort are clearly important, as the close correlation between Oakland couples’ expectations and their status a year later shows. But limited economic resources, complicated lives that often include children by former partners, unpredictable employment, and unstable housing compounded the immediate stress of being a new, unmarried parent and certainly presented formidable practical obstacles to marriage. For example, several Oakland parents noted the difficulty of marrying and raising children when they could not afford an apartment together, and about 45 percent of parents had moved since the child’s birth. Some had moved several times.

Employment and education

A large body of research shows a positive connection between male employment and marriage. In the Oakland sample, unmarried mothers who reported that their baby’s father was employed in the week before the interview have 38 percent higher odds of reporting an almost certain chance of marriage than those whose partners were not working. Fathers themselves see a clear relationship between their own employment status and marriage. One father explained that he had lost his job and could not afford an apartment for the three of them:

I feel like if you take a woman’s hand in marriage, you should at least have a place for that woman to go stay. ... We got a kid involved in this. I want to be able to take care of them. [p. 69]

For the mothers, who all reported no or low earnings during the year before the child’s birth, education is likely to be a better measure of expectations than employ-
ment. In Oakland, more education is tied to significantly greater expectations of marriage, and both mothers and fathers showed clear consciousness of the importance of education. The following comment is typical:

I’d rather take my high school diploma than my GED cause most of these jobs tell me to go get my diploma, then they give me a call back... [By next year] I want to be out of school and I want to be able to work. [p. 59]

Race

Race is a factor in parents’ expectations about marriage. In the general population, blacks are less likely to marry than whites or Hispanics.\(^1\) Predictably, in the Oakland sample white mothers are twice as likely, and Hispanic mothers 1.5 times as likely, to report a high chance of marriage as are black mothers. Black fathers similarly report lower odds of marriage than white or Hispanic fathers.

One factor in the low marriage expectations among the black families may be the presence of children by multiple partners. A broad range of evidence confirms that having a child from a previous union reduces a mother’s marriage prospects. Ronald Mincy and C.-C. Huang, using data from the Fragile Families sample, report that 46 percent of black mothers, compared to under 30 percent of nonblack mothers, have children by more than one partner; almost 20 percent of black mothers have two or more children by someone other than the father of their newborn.\(^11\)

Cohabitation and marriage

It is hardly unexpected that cohabitation should prove to be a significant predictor of parents’ expectations about marriage. Unmarried parents in the Oakland and the TLC3 studies clearly perceive cohabitation to be a step toward marriage, whether or not this transition eventually occurs. Moreover, most of the couples who remained intact were living together. It is likely that they had established closer emotional or financial ties than couples who were not; this increased interdependence may also inhibit breakups in the future.

Negotiating the obstacles to marriage

What differentiates the parents in Oakland who had separated by the time their child was a year old from those who stayed together? Both groups mentioned many of the same kinds of problems—financial and housing instability, frequent conflict, trust issues, and drug problems. Material hardships clearly exacerbated common relationship problems and introduced new ones.

Parents’ general attitudes about the other sex play an important role in whether they stay together. Over a third of unmarried mothers in Oakland do not believe that men can be trusted to be faithful; only about 14 percent of fathers hold this view. Among both sexes, this distrust results in significantly lower expectations of marriage.

I ain’t getting married. Cause if you can’t commit, if you gonna cheat on me, if you cheated on your woman, you’ll cheat on me... I’m not saying with him [the father]... just in general. That’s what I’m saying, just in general. [p. 61]

It is possible that couples who stayed together had less severe or immediate problems in their relationships than those who broke up. It is also possible that they were better able to negotiate these problems during trying times in the first year. But whatever the proximate causes of the fragility of the relationships between low-income unmarried parents, the results of these studies suggest that efforts to strengthen two-parent families should probably target cohabiting parents, whose relationships seem to have the best chance of providing stable families and a transition to marriage.

References


3. Nationally, the Fragile Families study sample is drawn from 20 U.S. cities with populations over 200,000. It includes approximately 3,600 children born outside marriage and a comparison sample of 1,100 children born to married couples. Most of the families have low incomes. See <http://crcw.princeton.edu/fragilefamilies/index.htm>. The Fragile Families project is also described in Focus 21, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 9–11.

4. All women who gave birth were asked to participate; 90 percent agreed.

5. Waller is also following a comparison group of 23 married parents, including 11 couples.

6. The more optimistic expectations of fathers interviewed may reflect the higher selectivity of the sample; these fathers are more involved in the relationship with the mother and child than fathers not interviewed.

7. In this sample with a high proportion of immigrants, legal and illegal, two relationships ended when the fathers were deported. Another relationship ended because the father was incarcerated.

This conclusion is reinforced by quantitative evidence from the national Fragile Families Study by R. Minic and C.-C. Huang, “The Determinants of Multiple-Partner Fertility,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, Atlanta, GA, May 2002. Minic and Huang report that the focal child (i.e., the child selected as the focus for the study) is the only child for 31 percent of married mothers and 39 percent of unmarried mothers, and that almost a third of both married and unmarried mothers in the national sample have three or more children. And they note: “Norms about marriage as a prerequisite for childbearing appear to be inoperative among respondents in our data.”

B. Tucker and C. Mitchell-Kernan, eds., The Decline in Marriage among African-Americans (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995). The Oakland study found no significant differences between native-born and foreign-born parents in the fraction with high expectations about marriage. Nor did the study find any significant differences according to age or the existence of other biological children.


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The economic circumstances of fathers with children on W-2

Maria Cancian and Daniel R. Meyer

Maria Cancian is Associate Professor of Public Affairs and Social Work and Daniel R. Meyer is Professor of Social Work at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. Both are IRP affiliates.

In drafting the 1996 welfare reform legislation, Congress included substantial changes to the child support system. It did so for two main reasons: a recognition that mothers moving from welfare to work might be unable to earn enough to support their families, and a strong conviction that some nonresident fathers were not providing what they could for their children, leaving taxpayers to foot the bill. If these “absent” fathers paid, mothers who could not earn their way to self-sufficiency might be able to achieve it for their families by combining work and child support payments.

There are several reasons to be skeptical that this could happen. First, women tend to partner with men like them; if mothers have low levels of education and little work experience, we may suspect their children’s fathers are likewise unqualified and thus unable to pay much support. Second, the women remaining on welfare are likely to be those least able to achieve economic self-sufficiency. Are the fathers of their children in the same bind? Finally, these changes followed on the heels of two decades of reforms to national and state child support systems that were largely intended to increase the amount of support collected from absent fathers. Have most of the gains already been achieved, leaving only those cases in which there is little potential for collecting support?

This is a fairly pessimistic view, but it turns out that we know surprisingly little about the economic circumstances of the fathers of children currently receiving welfare. Research looking at the ability of all nonresident parents to pay support has come up with median incomes ranging from about $24,000 to $28,000 (1999 dollars). The best income estimates we have for welfare fathers date from the 1980s and range from about $11,000 to $16,000 (again in 1999 dollars). The large changes in child support policies and practices and the welfare policy changes of the last five years make it especially important that we obtain recent data, for the population of nonresident fathers today may be very different from the population on which earlier research is based. But it is quite difficult to collect accurate and complete information about the fathers of children receiving welfare. One approach—asking the mothers—was tried in the first national survey on the subject, the Current Population Survey – Child Support Supplement of 1980, but the information obtained was so sparse and dubious that these questions were dropped in later years.

Other approaches are equally flawed. One might estimate the characteristics of the fathers on the basis of the characteristics of the mothers receiving welfare, but that involves a lot of assumptions. One might use the administrative records of the child support and other government agencies such as unemployment insurance, but these records are very incomplete for many fathers, perhaps because they are working out of state or off the books, or are in prison. One might examine the characteristics of men who claim to be fathers, but that encounters yet another difficulty: the number of men claiming to have fathered a child is much smaller than the number of women who have had children. In general, moreover, the standard surveys tend to undercount low-income men, often men of color, especially if they are only loosely attached to more than one household.

Since 1998 we have been principal investigators of a project evaluating the innovative child support policies instituted in Wisconsin as part of the Wisconsin Works (W-2) welfare reforms. This project, the Child Support Demonstration Evaluation (CSDE), has produced an extensive body of recent information regarding nonresident fathers. This article is drawn from the final report of the nonexperimental analyses in that evaluation.

The CSDE research makes use of three main bodies of Wisconsin administrative data: CARES, a Department of Workforce Development system that provides information about the demographic characteristics and program participation of women receiving W-2; KIDS, the statewide child support database that contains information on fathers, support orders, and payments; and the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system. From these sources we have data on over 13,000 fathers. In the analysis these data are combined with data from the Survey of Wisconsin Works Families, administered in two waves in 1999 and 2000. The survey contains demographic information on over 570 fathers—family background, education, health, earnings and income, and households.
Who are nonresident fathers?

The fathers in the CSDE sample were relatively young men—nearly half were not yet 30 years old. In Table 1, which draws upon the administrative data, we set out separately information regarding two groups: (1) legal fathers of children enrolled in W-2, and (2) African American fathers in Milwaukee, the group that yielded the sample for the ethnographic research reported in this Focus by David Pate. About half of the fathers had more than one child and, overwhelmingly, their children were born outside marriage. The number of children is likely to be an undercount, because only children in families currently receiving W-2 are included; even so, Table 1 suggests a high proportion of fathers faced obligations to support multiple children.

The majority of these fathers were partnered with long-term welfare recipients, whose educational levels provide a crude indicator of the men’s education (information about fathers’ education is not provided in the administrative data). Over half of these women had no high school diploma. Furthermore, they had very complicated families, including children by more than one father and children for whom no legal father has been established. (See Table 2.)

Nonresident African American fathers in Milwaukee had more children than the average nonresident father in Wisconsin, and the children were more likely to have been born outside marriage. Their partners tended to have longer histories of welfare receipt, somewhat lower education, and even more complicated families than the sample as a whole. (See Table 2.)

In Table 3, we use information from the Survey of Wisconsin Works Families to put meat on the bones of these administrative data. The survey data confirm the inference from Tables 1 and 2 that these fathers had substantial barriers to employment and earnings. In the survey, only about one father in five had education beyond high school, and about one-fifth reported a health problem that deterred work. A high proportion had parents similarly disadvantaged (not shown); notably, over half had not lived with both parents through age 16.

Table 1
The Characteristics of Nonresident Legal Fathers of Children Participating in Wisconsin Works: Administrative Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African American Fathers</th>
<th>All Fathers (%)</th>
<th>Milwaukee (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger than 20</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–24</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–29</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–39</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 and over</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marital vs. Nonmarital Child</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only nonmarital children</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>91.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only marital children</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least one of each</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Children</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three or more</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall N</strong></td>
<td>13,339</td>
<td>4,144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KIDS, CARES data from the Child Support Demonstration Evaluation.

Note: Table shows percentages of fathers with known information. Information is missing on age for 112 fathers and 1 African American father. Information is missing on marital status for 34 fathers and 1 African American father.

Table 2
Characteristics of Mothers Associated with Legal Nonresident Fathers and Participating in Wisconsin Works: Administrative Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Fathers (%)</th>
<th>Milwaukee (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mother’s AFDC Receipt in 2 Years Preceding W-2 Entry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–18 months</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19–24 months</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>72.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education of Mother</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than high school</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school diploma</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some beyond high school</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mother Has Children Who Don’t Belong to This Father</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several legal fathers</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One legal father, other unestablished paternities</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One father</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall N</strong></td>
<td>13,339</td>
<td>4,144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KIDS, CARES data from the Child Support Demonstration Evaluation.

Note: Table shows percentages of fathers with known information. Information is missing on education for 245 fathers and 117 African American fathers. Where fathers were associated with more than one mother, we show the characteristics of a randomly selected mother in these panels.

Information missing for 1.8% of all mothers and 2.8% of mothers associated with African American fathers.

Information missing for 1.7% of all mothers and 2.6% of mothers associated with African American fathers.
however, masks substantial instability. For example, 9 percent of fathers saw earnings drop by over $5,000 between 1998 and 1999; 13 percent saw similarly large increases.

The survey data show that earnings are by far the largest though not the only source of income for nonresident fathers (see Figure 1). Seventy-eight percent of fathers reported earnings averaging $14,600, whereas the UI data showed only 62 percent with earnings. About 30 percent reported other income, which might include unemployment compensation, Social Security Disability, Supplemental Security Income, or similar benefits. For those fathers, this income was worth, on average, about $2,600 for the year. Fewer than a third of fathers were living with a partner who had earnings, but the partner’s earnings contributed, on average, around $12,000—no small amount. Average incomes mask substantial income diversity, as Figure 2 shows.

Is child support impoverishing these fathers?

How well does the child support system respond to the diversity of fathers’ incomes? Are some fathers being impoverished by their obligations? Are high-income fathers paying more than those with lower incomes?

Our evidence shows that fathers with the least income are, indeed, the least likely to pay. But among higher-income fathers, those with incomes over $30,000 are no more likely to pay than those with lower incomes, despite their greater ability to do so. Nor do they pay, proportionately, more (see Figure 3).

In 1998, the proportion who were poor before paying child support was quite high—43 percent. Though circumstances improved in 1999, still 34 percent of nonresident fathers were poor. Paying child support does not appear to push many near-poor fathers over the line into poverty. After child support was subtracted, 45 percent were poor in 1998, and 38 percent in 1999.

These figures do not, of course, reflect the impact of support payments on the incomes of fathers who were already poor. In 1998, 30 percent of poor fathers paid an average of $1,860; in 1999, 44 percent of poor fathers paid, but the average payment among those paying decreased to $1,550. Fathers reported fairly high levels of personal hardships—for example, 16 percent said gas or electricity had been turned off for nonpayment, 17 percent had moved in with others because they could not pay the rent, and 35 percent had spent some time without a phone—but only a small proportion (13–15 percent) reported receiving help from charities, churches, or community groups.

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### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of Nonresident Legal Fathers of Children Participating in Wisconsin Works: Survey of Wisconsin Works Families</th>
<th>All Fathers (%)</th>
<th>Milwaukee (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than high school</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school diploma</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some beyond high school</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health Problem That Deters Work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lived with Both Parents until Age 16</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Housing Status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renter</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in friend’s house</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in relative’s house</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeless/living on street</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does Not Own a Car</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has No Credit Card</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>86.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has No Checking or Savings Account</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>572</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Father’s responses in the first wave of the survey, fielded in Spring 1999.

**Note:** Table shows percentages of fathers with known information. Information is missing on housing status for 20 fathers and 4 African American fathers. Information is missing on car ownership and credit cards for 1 father. Information is missing on bank accounts for 4 fathers and 1 African American father.

In many ways these fathers—as, indeed, are many low-income families—appeared to be outside the larger economic and especially the financial mainstream of the United States, with consequent disadvantages. Only about half had a car (though more had “access” to one), and lack of reliable personal transportation is a serious employment constraint in the United States. Very small proportions had the essential financial backup provided by a credit card or by checking and savings accounts. African American fathers in Milwaukee differed from all fathers primarily in their greater degree of disadvantage.

### Economic status

Unemployment Insurance records show very low formal earnings for nonresident welfare fathers in the sample. In 1998, no earnings were reported for 38 percent of the fathers. Another third earned less than $10,000, and only about 5 percent earned over $30,000. Between 1998 and 1999, there was very little improvement overall, though the earnings of fathers who had any rose from a median of $8,600 to a median of $9,800. This overall increase,
Figure 1. Fathers’ average family income.

Source: D. Meyer and M. Cancian, W-2 Child Support Demonstration Evaluation, Report on Nonexperimental Analyses, University of Wisconsin–Madison, March 2002, Figure 3; on the IRP Web at <http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/irp/csde/nonexptl-tocs.htm>. Excluding cases for which information was incomplete, the sample of fathers was 460 for 1998 and 504 for 1999.

Figure 2. Distribution of fathers’ family income before they paid child support.

Source: D. Meyer and M. Cancian, W-2 Child Support Demonstration Evaluation, Report on Nonexperimental Analyses, University of Wisconsin–Madison, March 2002, Figure 4; on the IRP Web at <http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/irp/csde/nonexptl-tocs.htm>. Excluding cases for which information was incomplete, the sample of fathers was 460 for 1998 and 504 for 1999.
Figure 3. Fathers paying child support. A. Percentage who paid; B. Mean child support paid, among those paying.

Should we expect more in child support from fathers of children receiving W-2?

We asked fathers how many biological or adopted children they had who were not living with them, and then estimated how much child support they would be liable for if the Wisconsin standard were applied to their personal incomes. In 1998, the median personal income of nonresident fathers in the sample before paying support was $8,000. Fathers paid an average of $700, for a median income of $7,300. If all fathers had paid the maximum amount for which they were potentially liable, median income would have declined to $6,640; thus the gap between actual and potential support payments is $660. If all fathers had paid the full amount, poverty rates would have risen to 48 percent in 1998. In 1999 the gap between actual and potential payment was larger—$1,253—but poverty rates would have risen only from 38 to 39 percent.

With so limited a potential for substantially raising payments, is increased child support enforcement a reasonable strategy? Now that poor mothers and children have no entitlement to cash assistance, more support from nonresident fathers may be essential, even if those fathers are poor themselves. And although poverty rates for nonresident fathers of children receiving W-2 are high, the rates for mothers are substantially higher, even when any child support they have received is included. Poverty rates were 66 percent in 1998 and 63 percent in 1999 among those mothers who entered W-2 with legally established paternity for their children—that is, mothers who would be most immediately eligible for support.

The difficult economic circumstances of resident mothers may make child support a continued focus, but it is important to recognize its limitations. Even if the Wisconsin standard were applied to all orders, and even if all orders were paid in full, the median monthly payment would be only about $100 a month. This may be a useful contribution to self-sufficiency, but it is not in itself enough to help many families relying on the earnings of a low-paid single mother to escape from poverty.

The life circumstances of African American fathers with children on W-2: An ethnographic inquiry

David J. Pate, Jr.

David J. Pate, Jr., is an IRP researcher and a doctoral candidate in social welfare at the University of Wisconsin–Madison.

Low-income, noncustodial fathers are often stereotyped as irresponsible absentee parents who must be legally compelled to fulfill their obligations. Some fathers do indeed fit the stereotype. Many noncustodial fathers, however, are closely connected with their children; they make informal payments in excess of their support obligations, have physical custody of children, and in many cases also take responsibility for nonbiological children living with them. Often they do so while confronting a daunting array of economic and personal disadvantages.

The ethnographic research discussed in this article forms part of the Child Support Demonstration Evaluation (CSDE), a federally mandated evaluation of Wisconsin’s innovative child support policies implemented in 1997, under the rubric of the Wisconsin Works (W-2) welfare reforms. These policies allowed all child support paid by noncustodial parents to be passed through to the child, regardless of the mother’s welfare status, and to be ignored in the calculation of the family’s benefit amounts. The purpose of this qualitative, two-year study was to provide a deeper understanding of the life experiences of noncustodial fathers in light of the changes to welfare and child support programs.

There were 36 fathers in the ethnographic study, all African American and all from the city of Milwaukee. All were fathers of children receiving public assistance. In extended interviews, I explored the nature and extent of fathers’ responsibilities, their concepts of their parental role, their experiences finding and holding work, the ways in which these experiences affected their family roles, and their understanding of the child support system and of welfare reform. Sixteen of the fathers were interviewed again a year later.

Because the CSDE project was particularly interested in learning about fathers who had participated in job search and job training programs, 11 of these fathers were specifically drawn from among participants in the Children First program administered through two W-2 agencies in Milwaukee, United Migrant Opportunity Service (UMOS) and Employment Solutions. Children First provides work experience and training to unemployed and underemployed noncustodial parents who are unable to meet child support obligations; participation is generally court-ordered.

A distinctive and challenging feature of this project was that the majority of the participants were randomly selected from an administrative dataset, Wisconsin’s automated child support data system, Kids Information Data System (KIDS). It was, as a consequence, hard to gain access to prospective informants and to persuade them that there would be no negative repercussions from participating. Many of the men had had consistently difficult interactions with police and government officials, and the ability to assure them of a high standard of confidentiality was extremely important.

Fathers’ characteristics

The men I interviewed ranged in age from 21 to 57. Ten had only one child and two had more than ten apiece; 22 of the fathers had children by more than one woman. Thirty-one fathers had lived with their biological children, and 21 had lived with children they did not father (primarily children of their partner at the time). Most fathers were currently not living alone; about half lived with a female friend or partner, and some lived with their mothers. The majority of the men were neither homeowners nor listed on the lease at their current address; some, indeed, had no stable address and were in transit among the homes of family members and friends. Eight of the 16 fathers who had ever been married were currently married, but not necessarily living with their wives.

Because these fathers were part of the larger CSDE, I was able to access the state’s administrative records of their formal earnings and child support payments. All fathers had very low formal earnings, averaging $9,600 in 1999 and $8,000 in 2000. Those in the Children First sample reported even less: $5,000 in 1999 and $7,500 in 2000. All had a child support order at the time of the interview. In 1999 they paid an average of $1,400 in child support; in 2000, they paid $1,200. Those in the Children First sample paid $800 in 1999, $1,200 in 2000. Men in both groups averaged support arrearages of $6,200 when their children entered W-2, though these amounts diminished over the two years of the interviews. Both groups owed substantial amounts to the state for hospital costs associated with the birth, interest on support arrears, and public assistance reimbursements.
In addition to the child support they did (or did not) pay, many of the fathers provided other support, not directly monetary: outings, supplies such as diapers and clothes, child care. Said Deion, 21 years old, the father of one daughter (all names are pseudonyms):

I don’t pay [child support] all the time cause I don’t have it all the time. . . . That don’t mean I ain’t doing it. . . . I watch her . . . when she [the mother] need me to watch her even—though I help pay for day care, you know what I’m saying? I buy diapers, all that. Play with her, take her out. [p. 54]

Some of these fathers have family lives of extraordinary complexity. There is, for example, the household of Joe’D and his wife Mary (see Figure 1). Joe’D is a 30-year-old father of five biological and four nonbiological children, ranging in age from 5 to 14 years. Joe’D fathered his first child at the age of 20. He has been employed as a blood bank technician for six years, making $10 an hour, and “hustles” on the side by repairing cars in his garage. He has been married to Mary, who works as a bus driver, for five years. There is one child of the marriage, and Mary has custody of four children from a previous relationship (the father of these children is uninvolved with them). In addition, there are Joe’D’s four biological children with three other women, any or all of whom might have other children with other partners. Joe’D has four child support orders and has been making formal and informal payments for a decade.

Fathers’ relationships with children and mothers

All but two fathers in the study reported telephone or physical contact with at least one of their children in the three months before the first interview. All made efforts to be involved—indeed, took it for granted that they ought to be involved—with their children. Particularly for the younger men, being a good father was equated with a quality of manhood, sometimes in emulation of their own fathers, sometimes in a conscious choice to be a different kind of father. RJ, a 32-year-old father of six children by five different women, said: “You know, I don’t even know who my dad is. And I wish that I wouldn’t be like my dad. And I wish that I am a man now and I take care of my kids.” [p. 43] This sentiment was on occasion echoed by mothers who encouraged the father to be involved with his child. One father commented that his former partner had been upset when they split, but would not let that interfere with his relationship with their daughter “because when she [the mother] was growing up, her father wasn’t around. . . .

---

Notes:

——— Indicates the nonbiological relationship of Joe’D with the children in the household.

——— Indicates the biological relationship of the parents with their children.

Figure 1. Joe’D, Mary, and their children.
She won’t take that away from me because she never had it.” [p. 47]

Fathers who have been involved with multiple women may experience particular difficulty in negotiating those relationships and keeping in touch with their children. Joe’D talked about a chance meeting with a daughter who did not live with him:

She started one day to open up, and told me you know, “momma told me that you don’t care none about me.” You know, and the way she told me that, I was like—that ain’t never true. You know, I care about all of my kids—I’m just not there to spend time, or I might not see you walk across the stage, or I may not be able to hold you when you sick—But deep down inside, daddy loves you. You know. I wish the circumstances was, where that I had [an] open relationship, with the understanding that, I could go see them. [p. 46]

It is difficult to categorize the extent of fathers’ involvement with their children, because this varies, especially for fathers with more than one child. Frequently it depends on the relationship with the mother. If we consider the child with whom the father had the most contact, I suggest that we can identify four main categories of involvement: custody, frequent visitation, regular visitation, and contact (Figure 2).

**Custody** was defined in this study as meaning that the father had one or more of his children living in his principal residence. Generally, this was the only residence for the child. Thirteen fathers had informal custody or formal custody (that is, a legal determination by the court). Five fathers had sole formal custody, four of them because the mother had been declared unfit on grounds of drug use; all of these men had fathered children in other relationships and maintained contact with them. In one case, formal custody was held by the child’s paternal grandfather. Seven fathers had informal custody. All seven had active support orders and were accruing arrears, and in a formal determination in a court of law, might well have been awarded joint or sole custody. All were cohabiting with the mother of one of their children.

**Frequent visitation** may include extended overnight visits of four or more days; it is an arrangement very similar to legally established joint custody, though it is usually informal. Only one of these fathers had guaranteed legal visitation rights. RJ, whose children spent the entire summer with him, noted: “I don’t have no papers. This is just between me and her, because I’m not going to go through the system trying to get joint custody and all this.” RJ was also raising the child of his fiancée: “Her baby’s daddy ain’t been doing nothing he’s supposed to do so I guess I’m his daddy.” [pp. 49–50]

RJ’s pattern is a common one—a way for fathers to manage their visits with their children or “legislate outside the system,” as I describe it. These families are distrustful of the legal system, and frequently do not understand the custody laws or courtroom procedures. Dante, a former police officer with three children and a participant in the Children First program, expressed these attitudes:

I always wanted to go for partial custody. . . because I love my kids—I’d do anything for my kids. To me, it’s not that hard of a deal. They [the judge or officiating person] always look at me and say, “The mom has a tough job . . .” “So why don’t you give some of the responsibility to the dad, if you are not together—Let’s see how he handles it.” And I think I am one of them that would be able to handle it. . . . But, you can’t just go in there, and say I want partial custody. “Well sir, we are not going to drag them away from their family that they know.” . . . They always try to twist, and manipulate, when they want it, you know what I mean? If it benefits them, then they will do it—. But by a guy coming in there, I just don’t know if they just don’t know how to handle it, or what. [pp. 50–51]

**Regular visitation.** Six of the fathers, all with active child support orders, visited with at least one of their children three or four times a month, mostly through informal arrangements with the mother. One man, McClaine, had kept his child, now 16, for the first seven years of her life because the mother was experiencing personal problems; during that entire time he had an active child support order. Fathers’ relations with mothers ran the familiar gamut from cordial to intermittently hostile. Some noted that even with a legal award of visitation, there was no assurance of access to children.

**Contact** basically consists of infrequent visits and telephone contact. Seven fathers were in this category; some had children over 18 who no longer lived with them, others had poor and hostile relations with the mothers of their children.
Fathers’ supports and barriers

Many of these men faced formidable barriers to involvement in their children’s lives. For some, family was often the only significant source of support. Most of these men did not have the kinds of supports necessary to manage their own lives and maintain themselves, in addition to fulfilling child support obligations. Their most serious problems revolved around employment, housing, and interactions with the criminal justice system.

Employment

Just about 70 percent of the men were employed at the first interview. The educational background of these men ranged from less than a high school education to some college. In fact, nine fathers had attended college. The average wage, among those working, was $7 an hour; full- and part-time jobs included temporary services, painters, maintenance workers, fast food workers, child care workers, and meatpackers. Of those not employed, three were recipients of Social Security Disability Income.

Many of the men discussed employment opportunities in the suburbs, as opposed to the central city. Obstacles they reported in accessing suburban jobs included lack of reliable transportation, long bus rides, unwarranted police harassment, and discomfort in communities where they did not feel welcome.

Temporary employment agency jobs paid slightly above minimum wage, but appeared to offer little stability:

They promise you that, you know, this job might be long term. After 90 days you are supposed to be hired. But then the company can work you eighty-nine days, and say we don’t need you. So then you into a job, get settled into it, think this is going to be it. Then boom. You back on the unemployment list waiting on another job. [p. 58]

A few of the men had the social networks that could provide them with access to a stable job, generally a family member or a very close friend; about 20 percent of fathers had secured work this way. But even these jobs offered limited opportunities. One man had been employed 25 years at a company where his father had worked; he was currently earning $8 an hour.

Some men “hustled” in the informal economy, doing auto repair or yard work, or trafficking in drugs. McClaine, the man who had kept his daughter for seven years, was also the main caretaker for his 80-year-old mother. As a general handyman and auto detailer, he could work around his mother’s Community Care (daycare) schedule and be available to cook the mother’s dinner and watch her at other times. He was fortunate in having the daily assistance of his partner of 15 years and her daughter.

Drug dealing, to some of these men, appeared to be the only realistic way to make enough money to support themselves and meet their other responsibilities. One trafficker, Don, the father of five children and living with one of the mothers, had no high school diploma. He had dreamed of being married and working as a truck driver, but those dreams, he said, were “destroyed” when he came to police attention as a result of an accident in which he was found to be driving with only a permit. Over the years, he was not able to attend to the traffic violation and accumulated substantial financial penalties that he could not pay. He had recently put out ten job applications, for “any kind of job,” but had received no calls. So, “Mostly, I’m selling marijuana. I ain’t never heard it killing no one at work.” [p. 62]

Housing

Many fathers did not make enough money to pay for an apartment alone. Joe’D and his wife maintained a house with the help of other family members—the house was in his wife’s name, but had been her aunt’s; they had taken over the mortgage payments from the aunt. Many fathers, both younger and older, lived with their mothers, who constituted almost their only—and sometimes reluctant—social safety net. Some of these men had lived with a female partner but, not being on the lease, had lost shelter when the relationship ran aground.

Some living circumstances were extremely complex—there is, for example, P-nut, a 23-year-old father of four biological children and one nonbiological child. P-nut was trying to gain legal custody of his four-year-old son because the mother was engaged in illegal activities. His own mother was his biological son’s legal foster parent and was also foster parent to P-nut’s nonbiological son. She had helped P-nut get his current job and was also helping with transportation to work. P-nut’s entire first check from this job was garnished to satisfy a child support order (a mistake on the employer’s part, because only a portion of each check is supposed to be garnished). So P-nut’s mother paid the rent on the apartment that P-nut was maintaining as part of his effort to gain custody of his son. But then succeeding checks were also heavily garnished, and P-nut had to let the apartment go and lost his case for custody of his child.

Interactions with the justice system

Of all the issues that confronted fathers, this seemed to be the most compelling. In the first year of this research, 24 of the 36 fathers had had a criminal charge or a civil action against them. By the end of the second year, 33 were in this position—92 percent of the sample. There were 11 felonies and 14 misdemeanors, the majority for traffic violations, but also others, including assault and battery. Eleven fathers had experienced a period of incarceration for nonpayment of child support, although only three had been charged with a felony for failing to pay. Jail stays ranged from one day to six months.
Fathers and child support policy

Many of the fathers had neither the education nor the knowledge to grasp the basics of the child support system. They did not understand that an order establishing legal fatherhood led to a child support order. They did not understand that mothers receiving welfare were required to cooperate with the child support agency in collecting support due and to assign it to the agency as partial reimbursement for the cost of the welfare. They did not understand the procedures for modifying a support order if circumstances changed, or their right to initiate legal actions. They did have a better understanding of the state’s enforcement tools—the criminal charges, the liens and credit bureau reporting, the suspension of the driver’s license for nonpayment. Partly as a consequence, the child support system itself was rather widely viewed as an intruder in people’s private affairs.

The majority of fathers had been proud to acknowledge the birth of their children and all had been present at the birth of one or more of the children. But questions of legal paternity brought to the fore a mass of misunderstandings. Many of the interviewees believed that their acceptance of the role of father was sufficient. They did not understand the rationale for legal paternity when they felt they had taken on the social, financial, and moral roles of fatherhood. One father could not understand why legal paternity did not mean that the child automatically received his last name, since he had to pay support for 18 years.

As for the support payments themselves, the views were fairly predictable. Many said that they had no problem with paying support so long as it helped their children. Others complained that the system in Milwaukee viewed them as “deadbeat dads” as a matter of course. Fathers who lived with their children but did not have court-ordered custody did not understand why they continued to owe child support. Fathers who made substantial contributions to other expenses (such as paying for child care) did not understand why no adjustment was made for these contributions. Most had not heard about the W-2 pass-through policy that was the primary subject of the CSDE research.

Some fathers owed quite enormous bills, considering their low incomes. Debts could include childbirth costs, court costs, child support interest, and partial reimbursement of past welfare costs. Understanding of the state’s monthly Child Support Receipt and Disbursement statement ranged from minimal to zero. One father owed over $57,000; this father thought the bill he received was for all fathers in Milwaukee. Many fathers felt overwhelmed by the amount of the child support order and the accumulated arrearages. “Oh yeah,” said one, “those envelopes that come monthly. I don’t open them because they make me depressed. . . . why do that when—I cannot pay them what I owe.” [p. 71]

When men with child support orders are employed, child support payments are generally made through income withholding by their employer; 90 percent of those paying child support in this sample of fathers did so through wage garnishment.9 Tax interception is another enforcement tool, and a profoundly resented one. State administrative data show 58 percent of the fathers in this study had taxes intercepted since 1997.

Children First and other supportive services for men

At the time of the study, there were multiple programs for noncustodial parents in the state of Wisconsin.10 The majority of the men were not aware of their existence, though many of them did express a need for programs to help them with their current life situations—apprenticeship programs, for example, that would provide a minimal income. Those who participated in the court-ordered Children First program reported that they found it very helpful, because of the peer-support groups, the employment contacts, and the legal services programs to help them deal with child support problems and past civil actions. The advice and incentives provided by the staff appear to have been particularly valued:

The case worker is a cool sister. . . .she ain’t never shown me no shady areas. She ain’t never lied. She ain’t never pretended to me. She ain’t never made me feel like something was going to come and it didn’t come.[p. 77]

Conclusion

In the year between the first and second wave of interviews, little changed for fathers with whom I talked. Two (both under 25 years of age) had another child. Three had acquired new jobs, which paid less money. All had made efforts to pay what they owed in child support, depending on their ability, but only one had completely paid it off. Another was current except for the $1,500 childbirth cost. Several continued to face housing insecurity. Four men had had civil actions brought against them; all were temporary restraining orders. As earlier noted, more fathers were charged with criminal offenses, mostly traffic violations, but some had arrests for drug possession or use. Two fathers had been murdered.

The picture is hardly one of economic mobility. These fathers appear to be caught in poverty traps as deeply as any single mother. Poor education, criminal records, and perceived race and class prejudice limit their employment opportunities. Yet under these difficult circumstances, over half of the fathers considered themselves emotionally and financially responsible, not only for their own biological children, but for the children they lived with. Indeed, many did not differentiate between their biological children and other children with whom they lived, only counting them separately when pressed.
In sum, this group of low-income African American fathers had high levels of involvement with at least some of their children, long-term relationships with at least one of the mothers, and sporadic to long-term employment. They would have been willing to engage in the child support system if they could have been assured that their engagement would have a direct and positive impact on their children’s lives. In the absence of such assurance, the fathers and their families tried to negotiate their lives outside the formal legal and administrative structures of government.

1For a summary of, and a response to, this perspective, see E. Johnson, A. Levine, and F. Doolittle, Fathers’ Fair Share: Helping Poor Men Manage Child Support and Fatherhood (New York: Russell Sage, 1999).


3The full report on which this article is based is D. Pate, Jr., “An Ethnographic Inquiry into the Life Experiences of African American Fathers with Children on W-2,” chapter 2 in The W-2 Child Support Demonstration Evaluation Report on Nonexperimental Analyses, Volume II, Fathers of Children in W-2 Families, ed. D. Meyer and M. Cancian, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin–Madison, April 2002. Throughout this article I use the term “noncustodial” rather than “nonresidential” because significant numbers of these fathers were living in the same household with their children, at least at the time of the interview.

4In 1998, about three-quarters of the Wisconsin welfare caseload lived in Milwaukee County. See Meyer and Cancian, CSIDE Phase I Final Report, Vol. 3, Table TR1.3.

5AFDC (and TANF) recipients must give their right to prior child support arrears and amounts due during benefit periods to the state.

6Page numbers in square brackets refer to the published report cited in note 3.

7The state of Wisconsin is ranked near the top in the overall rate of high school graduation, but has the worst graduation rate in the nation for African Americans (40 percent). See High School Graduation Rates in the United States (<www.manhattaninstitute.org/html/cr_baeo.htm>).

8In Milwaukee County from April 1999 to April 2001, over 6,200 people were booked into Milwaukee County jail with “nonpayment of child support” listed as one of their offences. These were all criminal offenses; about 75 percent were misdemeanors and the rest felonies. Child support was not the primary reason for the arrest. The overwhelming point of initial police contact was a traffic stop, the second most common reason a public peace disturbance. (These data were made available by the Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Department.)

9Wage garnishment is not a choice of the employee. By federal law (42U.S.C.A.453§ 653a), all employers are required to submit information about newly hired employees to the state Directory of New Hires. Under that law the employer must be informed about the employee’s child support obligation as soon as possible, and wage garnishment is to be instituted.

10They included, for example: The W-2 Noncustodial Parent program, the Governor’s Central City Initiative, the Team Parenting Waiver Demonstration Project, Partners for Fragile Families, Children First, Welfare to Work, and Workforce Attachment and Advancement.
Children’s living arrangements after divorce: How stable is joint physical custody?

Policymakers and researchers have for some time argued that joint physical custody, in which the courts provide for children to spend substantial time with both parents after a divorce, is potentially beneficial to the child and to the whole family. But in *Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas of Custody* (Harvard University Press, 1992), Eleanor E. Maccoby and Robert H. Mnookin raised important and troubling questions about the long-term stability of these arrangements.

Maccoby and Mnookin found that settlements involving joint physical custody—that is, in which children spent at least one-third of their time with each parent—tended to be very fluid. Three years after the divorce, just over half of families with shared physical placement still maintained that arrangement. The authors concluded that the “label of joint physical custody often does not reflect the social reality” (p. 159) and asked whether a shared placement order by the court is really in the child’s best interests over the long term. For example, the shift may leave one parent (generally the mother) with primary child-rearing responsibility but disproportionately reduced support.

Answering this question has become more important as shared parenting has become common nationwide. In Wisconsin, for example, joint legal parenting, awarding mothers and fathers equal responsibility in major decision making regarding the children, has become the norm. Shared physical custody, though much less common, rose from fewer than 5 percent of cases to about 20 percent of cases between the mid-1980s and the later 1990s.

A report by IRP researchers sheds new light on the stability of shared physical placement for children after a divorce. There are some important differences between the social and legal environment, research design, and analytic objectives of this project and *Dividing the Child*, but because the legal environment of Wisconsin in the late 1990s appears to be remarkably similar to that of California in the mid-1980s, the Wisconsin data can provide useful evidence on the issues raised by Maccoby and Mnookin.

The report examines evidence concerning shared physical custody for families who were awarded divorces in 21 of Wisconsin’s 72 counties between 1996 and 1998. It documents the frequency with which families revise physical placement decisions, whether children’s living arrangements are consistent with the legally recorded placement order, and the differences among families that may explain their custody decisions after the divorce. Data for the report consist of court orders for families that entered the court from July 1996 through June 1998, and from a telephone survey of a sample of those families. These records form part of a large archive, the Wisconsin Court Record Data (CRD), that has been collected by IRP.1

On average, about three years had elapsed between the divorce settlement and the survey. The survey was limited to divorce cases in which the judge ordered shared placement (293 cases) or sole placement with the mother (300 cases) and in which there was at least one child under 18.

Interviewers asked survey participants about the living arrangements of children and collected information on demographic characteristics and economic resources, employment, and household composition, as well as contact and conflict with the other parent.

The researchers found that if families’ practices are assessed against the standards of the legal record and the administrative code, shared placement families revise placement orders at a higher rate and return to court more often than sole-mother families. And although the proportion of shared-placement families with living arrangements consistent with the legal record is remarkably high (over 60 percent), a much larger proportion of sole-custody families adhere to the broad guidelines set by the court.

But viewed within a larger social context, the Wisconsin results suggest a paradox. The living arrangements of children in the sole physical custody of the mother are indeed more “stable” in terms of children’s formal physical placement. But children in over one-third of these families have no contact with their fathers, and those who do face significantly greater risk that this contact will diminish over time. In contrast, children in over 99 percent of shared-placement families have contact with their fathers, and 75 percent of them stay with those fathers at least 31 percent of the time. In terms of the well-being of children and families, it appears, the most legally “stable” arrangements do not necessarily make for the most enduring relationships between children and both their parents. ■

1The CRD includes divorce and paternity cases with potential for child support between 1980 and 1998. The most recent cohorts of divorce cases are being updated and cases entering the system in 2000–2001 are now being collected and archived.
Poverty, nonwhite poverty, and the Sen index
Gary Hoover

Over the past forty years, considerable resources have been devoted to investigating the link between economic growth and poverty. Over this period, poverty has fallen dramatically, while the macroeconomy has seen periods of recession and robust growth. The relationship between robust economic growth and poverty has been one of great concern to policymakers and academics alike.

Early work showed that there was an inverse relationship between poverty and growth. During the 1960s real GDP increased by nearly 46 percent, and poverty fell by one-half. In light of these advances, researchers were convinced that government policies aimed at increasing economic well-being would end poverty. However, beginning in the late 1970s, this relationship became less clear. Researchers began to reexamine the relationship between growth and poverty and questioned whether the “trickle-down” theory of antipoverty policy had run its course.

The 1980s saw a return of robust economic growth. Real per capita GDP rose by nearly 27 percent during this expansion, but it did not have the same antipoverty boost that accompanied the expansion of the 1960s. In fact, poverty fell by approximately 16 percent during this period. Economists speculated that during the 1980s expansion the real wages of those persons in the lowest quintile of the population had been stagnant, robbing economic growth of its poverty-fighting attributes and causing poverty to be more intractable.

Researchers were very interested to see how poverty would be affected by the long and sustained period of robust growth that occurred during the 1990s. Some recent work examining the relationship between macroeconomic growth and poverty finds that this relationship is tenuous at best, and that it should be bolstered by policies targeting wage and education programs. In addition, these results are very sensitive to the distributional features of those in poverty.

The research that I am conducting with colleagues examines the changes that occurred in the poverty rate using time series analysis that includes the most recent expansion of the 1990s. Our findings show that the expansion of the 1990s more closely resembles that of the 1980s than that of the 1960s, taking into account the fluctuations in real wages that occurred over the period. In addition, we show how this relationship could have been overlooked by previous researchers by using a distribution-sensitive measure of poverty, such as a Sen index. In essence we show that although overall poverty has fallen since the late 1950s, the composition of those left in poverty has changed dramatically, causing robust growth to be less effective in reducing poverty.

We also focus our attentions on a subset of the poverty population, namely nonwhites in poverty. We have two primary questions: (1) Do macroeconomic control variables affect this subset of the poverty population as they do the entire population? (2) Are these results sensitive to the distributional aspects of the subset when measured using a Sen index of poverty?

Relative to their starting point, this group has seen a tremendous fall in their poverty rate. One of the more striking differences between nonwhite poverty and aggregate poverty is the impact of the robust growth of the 1960s on the two samples. The statistically significant estimated coefficient of the 1960s expansion was much larger for overall poverty than for the nonwhite cohort. An important determinant of nonwhite poverty was the percentage of female-headed households, which increased dramatically over the sample period.

The poverty implications are clear: policies aimed at reducing poverty have to be cognizant that robust economic growth alone will not be sufficient to alleviate poverty and that some components of the poor are less able to enjoy the benefits of a robust economy. In addition, policymakers will need to be aware that not all groups that are in poverty respond in the same way, and that the nonwhite poverty population has been significantly affected by the dramatic increase in the number of households headed by females.

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The negative effects of incarceration on fathers in fragile families

Charles E. Lewis, Jr.

Studies of the effects of criminality on labor market productivity have sought to determine if sanctions caused by an individual’s involvement with the criminal justice system significantly reduce opportunities for legitimate work. If so, are postrelease earnings reduced to such a degree that a convicted felon would choose to pursue criminal activity? Findings in this area have major relevance. Because of the tremendous growth in incarceration in the United States over the past three decades—from 300,000 in 1972 to more than 2 million at midyear 2001—large segments of the population have been economically weakened by linkage to the criminal justice system.

Another reason for studies of the impact of incarceration is to examine what part of the incarceration effect may be due to unobserved characteristics or heterogeneity. There is speculation that men who go to jail have other characteristics that may result in poor labor market outcomes after release. This study uses the rich data from the Fragile Families Project, which provided controls for more individual characteristics than previous studies, which generally controlled only for age, ethnicity, marital status, and education. To those characteristics, we were able to add variables for substance abuse, mental health, and family background.

Findings on this subject have implications for policies designed to assist convicts seeking legitimate work after release. For example, if education and work history have little effect on wage and earnings, then traditional job skills programs may not be the answer to assisting these men in finding legitimate work. If lower wages and employment are due to family history and mental health, then psychological counseling may be a more effective means of addressing the deficits within this population. If incarceration has large negative effects on earnings, it may be wise to use alternative punishment for certain crimes.

Estimating a variety of logistic regression models, we found that fathers in the sample who were incarcerated at some point fared poorly on outcomes for employment and earnings. These fathers suffered substantial losses in earnings, weeks worked, and hours worked. After controlling for fathers’ characteristics, we estimated that incarcerated fathers earned 53 percent less than never-incarcerated fathers, worked four weeks less in the previous year, and averaged 3.5 less hours per week of work. The amount of time incarcerated significantly reduced the earnings of fathers in the sample; there was a 5 percent reduction in annual earnings for each month incarcerated. Regarding age of first incarceration, the data showed that incarceration between the ages of 17 years and 21 years significantly reduced earnings for incarcerated fathers.

Incarcerated fathers were 30 percent as likely to be married and 53 percent as likely to be cohabiting, after controlling for all characteristics. These findings on marriage and cohabitation support earlier research by Bruce Western and Sarah McLanahan on union formation. That is, economically challenged men are less likely to form stable or formal unions.

The study provided further documentation of the damaging effects of incarceration on the employment probabilities and earnings of imprisoned offenders. The effects varied over time, and the age of first incarceration was a significant predictor of employment and earnings losses. Further research should seek to add additional controls for unobserved heterogeneity. Policymakers should consider the consequences of incarceration’s harmful effect and explore alternative means for sanctioning nonviolent offenders. Policymakers should also reconsider rehabilitation strategies to mitigate these effects.

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Including the poor in the political community

Robert Asen

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Throughout the public policy debates of the retrenchment era of welfare, the market stood as an exemplar. President Reagan extolled the virtues of the market as he condemned the vices of government. A market orientation shaped the employment contract that functioned crucially in the mid-1980s reform consensus; and 1990s reformers trusted a market ideal as they turned over federal welfare programs to the “competitive” fifty states. But the market is a misguided metaphor for political institutions and interpersonal relations. So long as it continues to guide welfare policy, the market model complicates the process of crafting and circulating images of the poor that recognize the complexity of their lives, including the difficult choices they may confront—for example, the single mother’s “choice” not to work because, although she desires paid employment, she worries that low-wage labor cannot secure the health of her child.

Markets seek profitability, but political institutions confront problems that require a long-term perspective and commitment. Markets sustain a truncated view of human relationships. This view manifests itself in the celebration of privatization that characterizes the current political climate. Privatization entails transferring functions that have been regarded as properly the responsibility of governments to private agents and market forces. But this transference turns citizens into consumers, which threatens the prospect and potential of deliberation. Consumers need not deliberate, and do not initiate dialogue with others to consider collectively what ought to be social goods. Producers do not initiate deliberation. They may conduct market research as part of a development strategy, but producers assess the desirability and undesirability of goods through the aggregated purchasing decisions of independently acting consumers. A consumer orientation transfigures public interest into consumer desire and social goods into available products. In these ways, a market model undermines the legitimacy of public intervention into pressing social problems and reduces interpersonal relations to purchasing decisions.

Participants in the debate over welfare that is now underway might begin to displace this market model by imagining “work” anew. Throughout this book, I have not distinguished public assistance receipt from “work” but rather from “paid employment,” “paid work,” “low-wage labor,” and other such specifications. My reference to these more specific terms has been meant to indicate what reformers demanded of recipients when they insisted that recipients earn their way. Reformers demanded tacitly not that recipients work but that they work in a remunerative job. Indeed, not all work is recognized socially as “work.” “Work” is understood in our collective imagination only as those activities valued by market forces. As a consequence, we devalue many functions important to nourishing and sustaining community such as serving on citizens’ advisory boards, aiding elderly parents, participating in neighborhood watch programs, and caring for children. Moreover, this narrow vision of work produces perverse policy positions that denounce recipients when they care for their own children and yet praise these same recipients when they care for another recipient’s child as employees of a welfare-to-work day care program. I am not arguing that we resurrect a women’s sphere of domesticity. Quite the contrary, the nation as a whole is strengthened when women pursue opportunities and choices that historically have been restricted to men. Rather, my position is that we need to broaden our view of work to include activities devalued by market forces. We might imagine work as all those activities that contribute to the sustainment of a community whether or not women and men are paid for these activities. A specific policy implication of this redefinition may be that we should support present and former recipients—not penalize them by creating a category of substandard jobs—as they work in this broader sense.

Any future policy agenda that seeks to improve the lives of the poor must first come to terms with the images of poverty that shaped the debates over welfare culminating in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. In Visions of Poverty: Welfare Policy and Political Imagination, Robert Asen traces the rhetoric of the poverty debate from the War on Poverty through the 1996 reforms—the “era of retrenchment” in welfare policy, as he describes it. This essay, adapted from his concluding chapter, envisions a community in which the meaning of work is redefined, a community that includes, rather than excludes and stigmatizes, poor people.

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My proposals regarding “work” suggest that a focus on community might present an affirmative alternative to the market model that originated retrenchment-era debates. Community signifies mutual regard and concern which resist translation into calculations of profit and loss. In their individual and collective visions, a community’s members look out for one another. Especially important for welfare policy is the idea of commonalty signified by community, for debates in the retrenchment era and earlier eras often treated poor people as figures who did not share the values, beliefs, drives, and dreams of the middle and upper classes. My appeal to community is not meant to erase differences among its members—certainly, the varying opportunities sometimes available to people simply because of their race, sex, or class ought to concern participants—but to affirm membership in a larger collective. A focus on community may motivate participants in the present debate to seek out common experiences and interests among all members of the American polity. Believing that a healthy public life could develop only when people recognized a need for cooperation to attend to the consequences of human actions, John Dewey held that “democracy . . . is the idea of community life itself.”

In important respects, the 1996 repeal of AFDC signaled a retreat from community, from a national commitment to one another’s well-being. However much this commitment may have been diluted and even vitiates in practice, AFDC’s prescription of an entitlement to assistance for all who qualified inscribed in law a collective understanding of the interdependent condition of an American political community. Repeal symbolized a disavowal of interdependence. Community now must find its place in the spaces forged by relatively autonomous global market forces. This search must proceed as the increasing economic isolation of poor Americans further jeopardizes a sense of national community. When Michael Harrington, in 1962, called on his readers to rediscover the inhabitants of an “other America,” between one-fifth and one-quarter of all Americans lived in poverty. Though the poverty rate, especially among the elderly, has declined since then, income inequality has reached its highest point since 1945. Economist Richard Freeman observes, “The facts are not in dispute. . . . virtually all analysts agree that something has gone seriously wrong with our income distribution.” Increasing income inequality portends, in the view of some observers, a return to invisibility for poor Americans. The disappearance of poor people from public view is seen by James Fallows as a potential consequence of “the unusual and imaginative separation between prosperous America and those still left out.”

Adopting a community framework, debate participants might imagine welfare reform as an effort to secure the minimum conditions necessary for all members to participate in sustaining an inclusive political community. Debate could elucidate the specific contents of these minimum conditions, and participants could design and evaluate policy initiatives with regard to their success in establishing a threshold of individual and familial well-being that fosters participation in community life. One could argue, for example, that people may not be able to participate fully in community life if they are burdened by the worry that a sudden illness might precipitate financial as well as physiological traumas. One could argue that people cannot participate fully in community life if the limitations of the low-wage labor market produce adverse consequences so that people employed full time still cannot provide financial stability for themselves and their families.

Disabling images of the poor, often fueled by misunderstanding, ignorance, or prejudice, informed the retrenchment-era debates over welfare. A focus on community in the welfare debate recognizes the interconnectedness of all members of the American polity, imagining poor people not as delinquents, contract workers, or wards of the government but as fully enabled participants in an inclusive political community.

Evaluation of State TANF Programs: An IRP Conference, April 2002

TANF programs in nine states: Incentives, assistance, and obligation

Thomas Kaplan

A single, national structure of cash assistance, allowing state differences only through waivers granted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, has yielded ground, since 1996, to 51 different systems (the 50 states and the District of Columbia). The tasks confronting analysts and policymakers anxious to understand what works and what does not have grown more difficult since that time. What mix of financial incentives, work supports, and work obligations is most effective in moving recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) into employment, as the law requires? What are the barriers to reform that have been surmounted, and what barriers remain? What evaluation strategies are proving most useful in helping us understand the effects of changed policies and programs and projecting the consequences of programs still in flux? What kinds of data are being collected, and how adequate are they to answer these and related questions?

With questions like these in mind, IRP in April 2002 organized a conference focusing on evaluations of TANF programs in nine states: California, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Washington, and Wisconsin. Among them, these states encompassed about 41 percent of all TANF families in June 2000 and represented most regions of the United States. They also exhibited a wide range of populations and of welfare policies, in each case evaluated independently by university-based research teams or major evaluation firms. In hopes of promoting fruitful interchange between researchers and practitioners, conference participants were drawn both from the academic and private evaluation community and from state and federal agencies responsible for designing and managing TANF programs. The first two articles in this section of Focus review the states’ policies and the methodology of the evaluations; the third article consists of excerpts from the discussion during the conference session that asked what we still need to learn from state evaluations and considered approaches states might take and resources they might need.

In this introductory article I ask how formal program evaluation compares to other forms of inquiry useful to program managers and analysts and suggest ways to characterize the TANF programs in states selected as a conference focus.

Defining TANF program evaluations

Evaluation falls into two distinct kinds, impact and process. Impact evaluations seek to understand, for particular populations, the economic, social, and behavioral consequences of altering a policy. Such evaluations use explicit counterfactuals, so that the consequences of the policy being evaluated are described in comparison to the consequences of a different policy, frequently the status quo.

A standard and often powerful strategy for measuring these policy consequences is through classic experimental design, in which program participants are randomly assigned to “treatment” and “control” groups; the treatment group receives the new policy, and the control group receives, say, the existing policy, unchanged. But experimental evaluations have limitations, especially when new reforms have large effects on the community that are likely to influence both treatment and control groups. And random assignment to treatment and control groups is sometimes not politically feasible. Thus the best available strategy may be a nonexperimental evaluation design that uses some combination of counterfactuals—comparing policies before and after the reform, say, or different policies in different jurisdictions. With nonexperimental evaluations, however, it may be more difficult to convince observers that the evaluators’ conclusions about cause and effect are valid.

Process (sometimes called implementation) evaluations almost never utilize a separately existing formal counterfactual—indeed, an experimental counterfactual, in which the same managers implement the same policy in two different ways to assess which is most successful (by whatever standard chosen to measure success) seems unlikely ever to occur. Many process evaluations are intended to be purely descriptive, providing insight into the treatment that program participants actually received.
Other sources of information and insight

Other forms of inquiry and reporting can be quite helpful to managers and policymakers.

Monitoring

Research that records the well-being of a population over time but does not attempt to say precisely what caused that level of well-being is usually called “monitoring.” Monitoring can be expensive, as studies of welfare leavers in several states have demonstrated. But it can be very helpful to know the approximate level of well-being in a population even if one cannot know for sure how much change stems from welfare or other government policy or practice, and how much from economic conditions and other factors.

Performance measures

These measures establish particular targets that a program is supposed to meet—for example, the percentage of TANF recipients participating in work or worklike activities—and then collect data on how programs are doing relative to those targets.

TANF in the nine conference states

Many students of TANF would find their work lives to be easier if they could sort the 51 programs into, say, five or six broad types, for easier comparison. But the challenge of doing so is severe; even apparently small differences in state programs within a type could, through interaction effects, generate large differences in program effects. State child care policies provide an example of the difficulty of trying to cluster single state programs by type. After a lengthy study of child care for low-income families, Abt Associates noted that “our hope was that we could discern different patterns and configurations of states’ policy decisions and could characterize the states in the study into a few, relatively simple clusters. However, this goal proved to be impossible.”

Despite the challenge of grouping states according to TANF policy and practice, we wanted to try to create such a structure, based on observable policy attributes, for the nine conference states. As background, Table 1 characterizes the nine states by their median household income and state taxes. By these measures, the conference states are for the most part both relatively wealthy and relatively highly taxed. Seven have median incomes in the top third of the states. The other two, Florida and Kentucky, rank in the bottom quarter of states by median household income. Most have a rank in per capita state taxes that is relatively close to their rank in median household income. However, Kentucky ranks 39th in household income but 19th in per capita taxes; Illinois ranks 10th in median household income and 24th in per capita taxes. These data are only crude measures of tax capacity compared to tax effort, but it seems unlikely that Kentucky, for example, could easily find a way to support cost increases in its TANF program if the state wanted to do so.

To group the states into policy configurations, Tables 2–4 show features of the state TANF programs in three areas that I consider most helpful to understanding the programs in two dimensions: their use of state authority and their use of supports and incentives. I rank the nine states as “high,” “medium,” or “low” in these two dimensions.

- Table 2 lists the work requirement, as demonstrated by policies such as how quickly a new participant must work, who is exempt from work requirements, and the proportion participating in work or work-like activities.
- Table 3 lists the cash grant/earnings-from-work combination, as demonstrated by benefit levels, earnings disregards, and time limits.
- Table 4 lists noncash work supports, limited here to health insurance programs and child care assistance.

These data, I hope, allow the programs to be categorized according to their approach toward work promotion, the primary emphasis of all state TANF programs so far. Ideally, to see how states promote work among low-income populations, I would investigate more broadly the range of state programs likely to influence work, includ-
ing state unemployment insurance systems, tax policies, and vocational and basic educational systems. Yet even the narrower consideration of employment promotion through TANF, health insurance, and child care subsidies that I have undertaken here allows us to cluster state work promotion efforts, and I have done this in Table 5. The categorizations are solely descriptive. I do not wish to argue that one place on the summary scale is a priori better or worse than another place.

These categorizations carry some caveats. The policy characteristics that I use for my clustering are reminiscent of many of the categories by which state AFDC programs were sorted. This is in some ways unfortunate, for states and their representatives have recently (and, in my view, appropriately) emphasized that TANF is evolving toward a broad-based service program that is quite distinct from AFDC. Yet even the narrower consideration of employment promotion through TANF, health insurance, and child care subsidies that I have undertaken here allows us to cluster state work promotion efforts, and I have done this in Table 5. The categorizations are solely descriptive. I do not wish to argue that one place on the summary scale is a priori better or worse than another place.

Table 2
The Use of State Authority: TANF Work Requirements and Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Fiscal Year 1999</th>
<th>Fiscal Year 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Participants</td>
<td>Exemptions from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Must Work within</td>
<td>Work Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Job Search</td>
<td>Unsubsidized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Authority States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>Parent of child&lt;1 yr. Dom. violence victim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>Immediately</td>
<td>Parent of child&lt;1 yr. Pregnancy Dom. violence victim Disability/illness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>24 months</td>
<td>Parent of child&lt;12 wks Pregnancy Dom. violence victim Disability/illness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-Authority States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>Immediately</td>
<td>Parent of child&lt;6 mo. Pregnancy Disability/illness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>Immediately</td>
<td>Parent of child&lt;3 mo. Disability/illness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Immediately</td>
<td>Parent of child&lt;1 yr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>2 months</td>
<td>Parent of child&lt;3 mo. Disability/illness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-Authority States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>Immediately</td>
<td>Parent of child&lt;3 mo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>Immediately</td>
<td>Parent of child&lt;12 wks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

may have found a job, and then left the caseload before the end of a month.

Nonetheless, there is some justification beyond the availability of crude data for using the information in Tables 2–4 to group state TANF programs. First, the basic structure of authority and financial assistance that states set up is likely to exert important influence over individual case management relationships and the desire of new participants to stay in the program long enough to be counted in activities. Second, many states will almost certainly have to pare their TANF expenditures to match continuing federal appropriations, since they are now spending more than their annual TANF allocation now in order to catch up on underspending during the early years of the program. In making these expenditure reductions, it seems likely that states will support fewer primary prevention programs in the future than they have in the past few years. The service and case management strategies of state TANF programs may continue to evolve, but growing financial constraints seem likely to limit services and case management to program participants who have been declared eligible on the basis of criteria that can be summarized.

One purpose of the clustering of states in Table 5 is purely descriptive, creating a framework in which students of TANF can summarize policy types. The second purpose is to begin to map out a process of connecting program type to program outcome, perhaps at some point allowing researchers to estimate the effect on outcomes of particular program types.

### Table 3

**The Cash Grant/Earnings-from-Work Combination**

**FY 1999**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Benefit Level for 3-Person Family with No Income (January 2000)</th>
<th>Earnings Disregarded in Determining Cash Benefit</th>
<th>Lifetime Limits for Grant Recipiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low-Incentive/Support States</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>$303</td>
<td>$200 + 50% of remainder</td>
<td>48 months (also 2 out of 5 &amp; 3 out of 6 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>$377</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>60 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>$262</td>
<td>100% for first 2 months; $120 + 1/3 next 4 months; $120 for next 8 months; $90 for subsequent months</td>
<td>60 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium-Incentive/Support States</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>$459</td>
<td>$200 + 20% of remainder</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>$424</td>
<td>100% for first month; 50% for subsequent months</td>
<td>60 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>$628 or $673</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>60 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High-Incentive/Support States</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>$626</td>
<td>$225 + 50% of remainder</td>
<td>60 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>$536</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>60 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>$546</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>60 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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1. We excluded evaluations conducted by state TANF agencies themselves.

2. For further discussions of these, see “Evaluating Welfare Reform in an Era of Transition: A Report of the National Research Council,” *Focus* 21, no. 3 (Spring 2001): 6–11.


### Table 4
**Noncash Work Supports: Health Insurance and Child Care Benefits**

**Eligibility According to Maximum Family Income, by % of FPL, for Medicaid, SCHIP, or Similar State Program**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Child Care Assistance</th>
<th>Guarantee/Priority for Child Care Assistance for Leavers</th>
<th>Child Care Copayment for Nonemployed TANF Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pregnant Women</td>
<td>Infants(^a)</td>
<td>Other Children At Entry Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Low-Incentive/Support States**

- Florida 185 200 200 150 185 Priority for 2 yrs or to 185% FPL Sometimes>$25/month
- Kentucky 185 200 200 160 160 No wait list; eligible to 240% FPL 1 yr, then 165% None

**Medium-Incentive/Support States**

- Illinois 200 200 185 157 157 Priority for all families<157% FPL; no wait list <$10/month
- Michigan 185 200 200 188 188 No guarantees or priorities for leavers None
- New Jersey 185 350 350 200 250 Guarantee for 24 months None
- Wisconsin 185 200 200 185 200 No guarantees or priorities for leavers, but no current wait list for eligibles Sometimes>$25/month

**High-Incentive/Support States**

- California 300% 250% 250% 244% 244% Guarantee for 24 months or to 244% FPL <$10/month
- Minnesota 275 280 275 275 275 Guarantee for 12 months Sometimes>$25/month
- Washington 185 250 250 225 225 No guarantees or priorities for leavers $10-$25/month

**Note:** FPL = federal poverty line.

\(^a\)Child care eligibility is expressed as a percentage of state median income in California, Illinois, and Minnesota; here it has been converted to FPL equivalency.

\(^b\)Children below age 1 in all states except Minnesota; below age 2 in Minnesota.

\(^c\)“Guarantee” refers to an assurance in state statutes that those eligible for child care assistance have an entitlement to it.


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### Table 5
**Employment Promotion Summary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>High Incentive/Support</th>
<th>Medium Incentive/Support</th>
<th>Low Incentive/Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Authority</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Authority</td>
<td>California</td>
<td>Illinois, Michigan</td>
<td>Florida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Authority</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>Kentucky</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Author’s summary of Tables 2, 3, and 4.
Evaluation of State TANF Programs: An IRP Conference, April 2002

TANF impact evaluation strategies in nine states

James P. Ziliak

James P. Ziliak is Professor and Carol Martin Gatton Chair in Microeconomics, University of Kentucky, and an IRP affiliate.

With near unanimity, state governments, granted greater autonomy under the welfare reform legislation of 1996, have constructed their new social assistance programs on a “work first” paradigm. Their hope is that these programs can permanently shift the perceptions and behaviors of current and potential welfare recipients toward work and away from income assistance. The new rules use both stick and carrot: most states have time limits and penalties designed to make cash assistance less attractive, but many also established higher asset limits and earnings disregards that permit households to retain a higher level of earnings and hold greater asset balances without losing benefits.

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, states, and private foundations have mounted a strong effort to monitor and evaluate the effects of these changes on the well-being of welfare families and the low-income population in general. The impending reauthorization of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) makes this a critical juncture to take stock of what we have learned about the effect of welfare reform on low-income Americans, and of the methods employed to arrive at these findings.2

In this article I examine the TANF evaluation strategies adopted by researchers in nine states—California, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Washington, and Wisconsin. I concentrate on strategies used to monitor and evaluate the effect of program rules on the well-being of children and families, i.e., impact evaluation, as opposed to strategies used to monitor the implementation of new rules and administration, i.e., process evaluation.

In reviewing the state evaluations, I focus on one key report in each state (Table 1). These reports differ widely in size, from preliminary summaries of Washington’s Work First program to multiple-volume reports on Minnesota’s Family Investment Plan (MFIP) and Wisconsin’s Child Support Demonstration Evaluation (CSDE). At this writing, the impact analysis of the California evaluation is not yet publicly available, so my review is based on summaries provided on the Research Forum web site (http://www.researchforum.org/) along with the impact analysis methodology paper. In other cases (e.g., Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, New Jersey, and Washington), the evaluation is in midstream, so that my review is limited to midterm reports.

Consistent with the goals of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), the work-first emphasis of each state’s program is front and center in either the report title or the program title. The evaluations consequently paid much attention to work outcomes or at least job readiness. Table 2 summarizes key findings on employment and earnings outcomes—the average employment rates and the average annual earnings for the employed.3 There is remarkable consistency across the states in both employment levels (around 50 percent) and annual earnings (around $10,000–$12,000). Perhaps this is not surprising given the relative homogeneity of the caseload composition across states and the shared economic success in the late 1990s.4

The evaluation criteria

In evaluating the nine state studies, I devote most of my attention to four of the five evaluation criteria established by the National Research Council in their survey of national welfare reform evaluation strategies: these criteria are the populations, outcomes, data, and evaluation methods of interest.

The panel’s fifth criterion, the questions of interest, is not discussed—not because the questions are unimportant (indeed the number of relevant questions is seemingly limitless), but because all the studies share a focus on two key questions related to labor-market outcomes: What is the impact of program participation on employment and earnings, and what are postwelfare employment rates and earnings?

Populations of interest

There are three prime groups of interest: Families currently on welfare, because their well-being is potentially affected directly by the welfare policies in place, e.g., work requirements, time limits, sanctions, earnings disregards, and family caps. Welfare leavers, because their success or failure is an important guide to how current recipients are likely to fare when they in turn leave cash welfare. For example, if leavers have difficulty sustaining employment, or face the prospect of “dead-end” jobs, then policies could be redi-
rected toward building the job readiness and human capital of current recipients or toward supports and income supplements for current leavers. The rate at which families go back onto welfare is also fairly high. If it is possible to identify the sources of such recidivism, programs for current recipients can be redesigned to mitigate cycling on and off welfare.

Low-income families broadly construed include the “working poor,” both single- and two-parent families, and the so-called near poor, i.e., those families not in poverty but who are within, say, 200 percent of the threshold. The near poor face a reasonably high risk of entering welfare, possibly through a major change in family composition, a prolonged spell of joblessness, or a severe illness.

Within each of the populations are distinct subpopulations. Evaluating the well-being of children is particularly critical to any comprehensive research program on the impact of welfare reform. The market opportunities for work, child care, and health may differ by education level and by race. Gender matters: single, female-headed households constitute over 90 percent of the AFDC and now TANF caseload. That said, after passage of PRWORA, most states no longer distinguish between the single-parent and the two-parent caseload, and we might expect the long-term composition of the caseload to shift toward a higher proportion of two-parent families.

Table 3 makes readily apparent that the nine state evaluations placed primary emphasis on recipients and leavers. The MFIP, CSDE, and Work First New Jersey studies...
did, however, include new applicants in their populations of interest, permitting the evaluation to look at cohort differences.

Quite absent from the majority of studies is a research focus on low-income populations at large. We do not really know whether the new welfare policies have had a behavioral impact on this broader cross-section of families, and the nine state evaluations bring us no closer. Because certain policies, such as expanded earnings disregards and liquid-assets limits, reach deeper into the income distribution, and because other policies focus on family structure (notably by encouraging two-parent families), an understanding of how the working poor and/or the near poor are faring under the new rules is highly necessary, yet here it is largely neglected, with minor exceptions in the case of Florida and New Jersey.⁶

On a more positive note, however, most of the studies examined the comparative effects on important subpopulations: one- versus two-parent families, white versus nonwhite household heads, urban versus rural families, and household heads with higher versus lower education. These data provide added flexibility in assessing how

Table 2
Employment and Earnings Results from Nine States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Months Between Initial and Final Measurements</th>
<th>Average Employment Rates (%)</th>
<th>Average Annual Earnings for Those Employed ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Initial (Control)</td>
<td>Final (Treatment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>27 (37)⁴</td>
<td>(50)</td>
<td>(9,348)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>12 (79/79)</td>
<td>(78/79)</td>
<td>(4,272/5,885)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table shows employment rates and average earnings at the start of the period as compared to the end of the evaluation period (or, for those studies in progress, the most recent levels), when these are available. Two states use formal experimental designs (Minnesota and Wisconsin), so I record the respective levels for the control and treatment groups in bold; the difference between the two yields the “treatment effect.” Washington uses nonexperimental methods in the earnings model and these are highlighted in italics.

³Weighted average across three groups for evaluation period.
⁴Results are for single-parent families.
⁵The first number for each of the treatment and control groups in Wisconsin refers to 1998, and the second to 1999. The percentages refer to any earnings throughout the year for resident mothers.
⁶The Washington nonexperimental estimates are obtained from Figure 3 in M. Klawitter, “Effects of WorkFirst Activities on Employment and Earnings” (2001) (http://www.wa.gov/WORKFIRST/about/studyActiv.pdf). The control (treatment) group estimates refer to those who did not (did) complete pre-employment training activities.
⁷Earnings are for all resident mothers, not just those employed. For employed resident mothers, average earnings across the treatment and control groups were $5,576 in 1998 and $7,652 in 1999.

Table 3
Populations Studied in Nine State Evaluations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Leavers</th>
<th>Low-Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
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¹The sample also included new applicants to the program after initial assignment of current recipients.
⁶As part of the Community Study aspect of New Jersey’s evaluation, a separate survey was fielded that included households up to 250 percent of the poverty line.
policy effects may vary, at least within the recipient and leaver populations.

Outcomes of interest

Historically, economists have focused on family income levels as a measure of individual or collective welfare. Part of this narrow focus comes from convenience, because most national surveys of households measure income. Part emanates from the development of the National Income and Product Accounts by Nobel economist Simon Kuznets, which provided a common benchmark to compare living standards within and across countries.

Another Nobel-prize-winning economist, Amartya Sen, eschewed this focus on income as the sole barometer of well-being in favor of multiple indices which more adequately capture the “capabilities” of individuals and families to function in an economy. To be sure, income is to be maintained as a measure of welfare in Sen’s view, but so are the direct and indirect costs and benefits of obtaining the income, e.g., access to human capital, job quality, transportation mode to work, health benefits, access to child care, and the physical and mental health of children and their parents. The evaluation of welfare reform, in Sen’s view, must necessarily be broad in scope.

Critical indices of family well-being include:

Education. What types of education and training have the household head(s) and children completed and what additional types do they have access to pursue? Education is strongly positively correlated with income, and negatively correlated with crime and alcohol or drug dependence; thus avenues to independence often stem from solid human capital formation.

Employment. Is the head working, and if so, how many hours, how many jobs, what types of jobs, and at what time of day (e.g., day or night shift)? If custodial parents are working night shifts, then is adequate child care available?

Income. We would like to know the usual hourly wage, the levels and growth of earnings, the amount and types of public assistance (cash versus in-kind), the extent of interfamily transfers, and any child support received.

If possible, there should be a measure of disposable income, which is typically defined as the sum of labor and capital income, less taxes, plus transfers and credits. The last is very important, given the increased generosity of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in recent years. Ideally, researchers would also document “discretionary” income. If low-income households have money left over after the critical expenses (food, shelter, and health care needs, for example) are met, they then have opportunities for social mobility, by moving to a new neighborhood, sending children to better schools, or saving for a down payment on a home.

Health and Family Life. Education, employment, and income are clearly factors in well-being, but other aspects of human “capabilities” are usually considered also: the physical and mental health of the parents and children, the cognitive and social development of children, housing quality, and family structure and relations. For example, are welfare recipients job ready, or do they face physical and/or mental barriers to gainful employment? Does the cognitive development of children formerly on welfare thrive or deteriorate with a working parent? Are parent-parent or parent-child relations of the nurturing type, or are people more prone to destructive behaviors such as physical or mental abuse? Although identifying the causal channels is often a challenge of the first order, there is a clear need for research on these and related issues in order to more comprehensively inform policy.

The nine state evaluations have cast their nets very broadly in terms of outcomes of interest, much closer to the ideal notions of well-being set out by Amartya Sen than to the income-based metrics typically employed by economists. All these reports collected and analyzed data related to education, employment, earnings, welfare use, and the well-being of parents and children. All save Florida sought to collect information on disposable income. This ambitious evaluation focus conveys a commitment on the part of state agencies and evaluators to obtaining a comprehensive view of overall well-being. In general, though, whereas Sen would argue that good health and a stable family life are end goals, most of the nine states view good health and family stability as a means to an end, the end being employment and self-sufficiency.

Data of interest

In the context of welfare evaluations, high-quality datasets are characterized by (1) a large cross-section, so that statistical tests have reasonable power even in analyses of narrowly defined subpopulations; (2) a wide array of information to address the outcomes of interest listed above; (3) data that are well measured and not polluted by extensive biases arising from item nonresponse (i.e., missing answers to individual questions) and survey nonresponse (i.e., complete nonparticipation by a sample member); and (4) longitudinal design, so that it is possible to follow families over time.

State-level administrative data offer a fruitful source of information, particularly for welfare recipients and leavers, and tend to satisfy criteria (1), (3), and (4). These data include social benefit programs, but the information they report is often limited in scope and it may be necessary to merge several administrative data files to obtain a more complete profile of labor market and public assistance activity. Even such an enlarged dataset is likely to lack important demographic information.

Survey data, preferably those that can be linked to administrative data and that follow families over time, are the
best way to gain detailed information on the well-being of families.

All nine studies make use of administrative, survey, and longitudinal data as a key part of their analyses. Most often the administrative data are from social benefit programs—TANF, food stamp, and Medicaid caseload databases, and Unemployment Insurance records, which contain basic wage and employment history data for those in covered employment. The administrative data are then typically linked to survey data, which in all nine evaluations are longitudinal, making it possible to collect detailed information over time. This approach of combining administrative and survey data over time is likely to become a predominant technique in welfare impact evaluations.

The studies defined the samples of recipients and leavers differently. For example, a common approach to determining which recipients were eligible for sample inclusion was to select families who were TANF recipients in a given month (California, Kentucky, Michigan, New Jersey, Washington, Wisconsin) or a calendar quarter (Florida, Illinois). In the MFIP evaluation, cases were randomly assigned over a two-year period, whereas in both New Jersey and Wisconsin new applicants were added to the sample for several months after initial assignment.

Selection of study samples for welfare evaluation can present a particularly complex set of issues.

First, there are both seasonal and cyclical components to welfare utilization. All else equal, more people are on welfare in winter months than in summer months. A sample selected in a given month or quarter may be different from a sample selected over, say, six to twelve months, and a wider window for sample inclusion seems important to avoid any bias caused by seasonal variation. In these nine studies, the differential effects of economic cycles seem to be of less concern. Even though the bulk of the samples were drawn near the peak of the 1990s business cycle—by many accounts very beneficial for low-income families—there appears to be little evidence that those on the caseload in the late 1990s were very different from those on the caseload at similar points in other cycles.

Second, how did researchers compensate for nonrandom survey samples and survey nonresponse? With the exception of Washington’s Work First study, in which the entire state TANF population in March 1999 was eligible for inclusion in the sample, the studies employed some form of stratified random sampling. For example, the CSDE study in Wisconsin stratified the sample based on W-2 status (“transitioned W-2” and “new W-2”) and by W-2 tier location (“upper” and “lower”), whereas the KTAP study in Kentucky stratified the sample based on county of residence (focusing on 6 of the over 100 counties in the state). Within each stratum, however, simple random sampling was employed, though the KTAP study also employed quota sampling, whereby sampling is continued until a desired sample size is attained. Most of the time, sample weights were constructed to adjust statistically for differential assignment, though I was unable to find evidence of such weighted adjustment in the KTAP evaluation.

Overall response rates were typically 80–90 percent, though there are some notable exceptions. The Florida WAGES survey had dismal response rates on the order of 18–45 percent, Washington’s Work First Study had response rates of 55–70 percent, and the noncustodial parent survey in Wisconsin’s CSDE study had very low response rates of about 30 percent.

When response rates are better than 80 percent, it is not uncommon for researchers to ignore potential problems of nonresponse bias, though good practice dictates at least a comparison of observable characteristics if a subset of data is available for both respondents and nonrespondents. When response rates fall below 80 percent, it is possible for analyses to be compromised unless there is some adjustment for nonresponse.

I could find no evidence of such adjustment in the Washington Work First Study. Some adjustment was made in the Florida evaluation, but the method adopted, Bayesian Multiple Imputation, suffers from two significant drawbacks. First, multiple imputation is most often applied to situations of item nonresponse, not survey nonresponse as in the Florida study, especially when upwards of 80 percent of the sample needs to be imputed. Second, the method is valid only if survey participants and nonparticipants do not differ in important dimensions, such as welfare participation. In Florida, there is evidence that the two groups differed in their use of welfare and the amounts of benefits they received; these circumstances might jeopardize the nonresponse adjustment mechanism.

The noncustodial parent portion of the Wisconsin CSDE survey was plagued by the high nonresponse typical of surveys of this hard-to-reach population. As a consequence, a formal model of survey participation was estimated using administrative and survey data. Weights were constructed based on the inverse (fitted) probability of survey participation, and then adjusted for the stratified design in the main sample.

**Evaluation methods of interest**

The types of populations, outcomes, and data of interest in impact evaluation research are often directed by the intended method of evaluation. Is there to be a formal experimental design where one subset is randomly assigned to a “treatment” group, which is subject to a new policy (or policies), and another subset randomly as-
signed to a “control” group not subject to the policy? Will a nonexperimental design be employed, whereby regression-based methods are used to compare families affected by the policy to similarly situated families that are not affected by the policy and are not randomly assigned? Or will the primary focus be a descriptive monitoring of outcomes, possibly over time?14

The power of the experimental design emanates from the fact that the correct counterfactual outcome is identified by randomly assigning people to treatment and control groups, thus implicitly ruling out the possibility that participants will “self-select” into the program on the basis of characteristics observable and unobservable to the evaluators. But experiments can be compromised on many fronts. The initial assignment may not be random, there may be substitution bias (when the control group also receives some form of treatment) or general equilibrium effects (when behavior overall reacts to the policy change), and subjects may drop out of the experiment.

The nonexperimental approach generally offers the advantage of large sample sizes and detailed questions, improving the power to detect policy effects within key subgroups. The main disadvantage is that identifying the correct counterfactual is at best difficult, and at times impossible.

With respect to welfare reform, descriptive monitoring has been and will continue to be a crucial component of evaluation. Monitoring studies provide detailed information on the trends in employment, income, welfare utilization, health, and overall well-being. Although averages and variances are typical statistics reported, for many variables we want to know more about the distribution. For example, reporting the average amount of child support received does not adequately convey the fact that a large percentage of custodial parents receive no support at all from noncustodial parents.

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Table 4
Methods Utilized in Nine State Evaluations

The importance of choosing the correct evaluation method cannot be overstated. Consider two questions of primary interest to policymakers: what is the impact of TANF on employment rates, and what are the employment rates of those who have left welfare? The outcome of interest is the same for each question, but answering the former requires an impact analysis, whereas the latter simply requires monitoring and thus does not provide the counterfactual to answer the impact question.15

Formal impact analyses are relatively rare among these nine states. In general the studies utilized monitoring methods of evaluation (Table 4). In some cases information was presented for a single cross-section, but more often than not the studies presented a comparison over time, which permits the identification of simple trends in outcomes of interest such as employment, income, and health. When adjusted for nonrandom sampling and nonresponse error, these descriptive statistics provide a benchmark from which more formal analyses can be conducted.

Only the MFIP and CSDE programs conducted randomized trials, and only the Washington Work First and CalWORKS evaluators used, or plan to use, nonexperimental evaluation methods.16 Both the MFIP and CSDE studies contained thorough and detailed documentation on the implementation of the randomized trial, on the survey design and the construction of weights (especially CSDE), on the outcomes of interest, and on the evaluation methods. For outcomes, MFIP reports the simple mean difference between treatment and control groups as the average treatment effect, whereas CSDE reports regression-adjusted mean differences, the latter adjustment often improving the efficiency of the estimated mean differences.

Summary

The nine state TANF impact evaluations tell us a great deal about child and family well-being, the employment and earnings of parents, and transfer-program participation, typically following the same family for two to six years. From MFIP, for example, we learned that the program policies, at least among single parents, led to higher employment, income, and child well-being, and to lower domestic abuse. From CSDE we learned that if the state passes through to the resident parent all child support received from the nonresident parent, child support receipts among welfare mothers are higher, and a higher percentage of nonresident fathers pay child support, though there appear to be few to no benefits for child well-being. In addition, both the MFIP and CSDE studies conducted cost/benefit analyses, which revealed that there were no net costs to the government for the CSDE pass-through experiment and positive net benefits, on the order of $2,000 per family, in the MFIP experiment.
But to date, the research has unquestionably fallen short in the failure to consider possible effects on the broader low-income community and in the scarcity of formal impact analysis. New and modified program rules are on the horizon as TANF reauthorization proceeds. States should be preparing now to evaluate the effects of these changes, and as part of that effort, should consider seriously (1) expanding the populations of interest from recipients and leavers to the low-income population, to provide greater detail about the impact of welfare reform on vulnerable families; and (2) expanding those evaluations from simple monitoring studies to full-blown studies based on experimental designs, supplemented with nonexperimental evaluations to permit analyses of large subgroups. Continuing to debate and implement welfare policy without a basis of scientific knowledge could be very costly to the families affected and to local, state, and federal governments. ■

1 I wish to thank Glen Cain and Jeff Smith for comments on an earlier version of this paper presented at the IRP Conference on State Evaluations, April 4–5, 2002.

2 See the recent special issue of Focus, Vol 22, no. 1 (2002), for a broad perspective on welfare reform and TANF reauthorization.

3 With the exception of Minnesota and Wisconsin (and to a lesser extent Washington) the data presented in Table 2 are not derived from experimental or nonexperimental impact analyses; rather, they are simple summary statistics.

4 Wisconsin’s CSDE results differ from the other studies in that employment rates are for those “ever employed” rather than currently employed, and earnings averages are for all sample members, including nonworkers. The primary focus of the CSDE is on the effect of the child-support pass-through on child support receipts and payments, not necessarily on employment.


6 One of the three groups included in Florida’s evaluation consisted of Medicaid families who were income-eligible nonparticipants in cash assistance. The Florida report does not reach the near poor per se, but it touches upon an important behavior—nonparticipation by those who are in fact eligible. The New Jersey evaluation has three components, a Client Study, a Community Study, and a Program Study. Within the Community Study, which is a case study of Newark, Camden, and Cumberland County, the population of interest expands to families within 250 percent of the poverty line. But this portion of the study is still somewhat of a sideshow compared to the main focus on recipients and leavers.


8 Here defined as labor and nonlabor income, plus transfers, minus taxes, plus the EITC.


11 The Michigan study used simple random sampling, but only one county was selected as the relevant population. To the extent that this county is representative of the state TANF population, then inferences can be drawn for the state as a whole; however, this is highly unlikely, so that inferences must be restricted to that county unless some later adjustment is made to account for the relative share of TANF cases in the county.

12 See A. Deaton, Analysis of Household Surveys (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) for a recent discussion of survey sampling and the econometric issues surrounding sample weights.


15 I thank Jeff Smith for stressing this point in an earlier draft.

Perspectives of researchers and federal officials: A panel session

Panel Chair: Robert Haveman, University of Wisconsin–Madison

Participants: Jonah Gelbach, University of Maryland, Karl Koerper, Administration for Children and Families (ACF) in the Department of Health and Human Services, Bruce Meyer, Northwestern University, Don Oellerich, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) in the Department of Health and Human Services, Wendell Primus, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP), and Jeff Smith, University of Maryland.

Robert Haveman, University of Wisconsin–Madison: Obviously the purpose of evaluation studies is to give advice to policymakers. One of the important questions that has been thrown out at this conference is the following: If we in state government were to have a million extra dollars available, how do we allocate it to get the biggest impact in terms of our objectives?

It’s that sort of question that evaluation studies should be designed to answer. In the current context, if we need to encourage work participation rates, what strategies are available that would be most effective in attaining that goal? Jim Ziliak has given us, in some sense, a counsel of perfection for evaluating welfare reform and alternative welfare reform strategies—call it the Ziliak critique. Nearly everything that we would now say would have to be held up to the high standards that critique requires. Jim wants more formal evaluation, meaning random assignment, less informal assessment, less monitoring. He would like more focus on the entire low-income population, which probably means less focus on leavers and recipients.

So the question which follows directly from Jim’s paper is “How should we in the research community and at the state level proceed?” How can we improve the evaluation-type information that we are going to be providing policymakers? Do people have ideas for how the academic community and state governments can better meet the Ziliak critique? What are the constraints on states in improving the quality of research and evaluations of welfare reform? Are they financial resources? Are they staff resources? Are there too few staff interested in evaluation, or are the interests of the staff in other areas? If we can identify those constraints, are there options for relaxing them?

Bruce Meyer, Northwestern University: I would like to emphasize some of the same things that Jim Ziliak emphasized in his talk. A few of them I would like to push even farther, because I think they’re important. First of all, we were asked to answer what we need to learn; we need to learn what policies work and how well-being changes, how much policies cost. Jim emphasized that we should look at a variety of measures of well-being and I would like to add to the list or emphasize more things like child test scores, behavior at school, fertility, and marriage. Also Jim emphasized looking at disposable income; I think we should go one step further and look at measures of consumption or material hardships, like difficulty paying for rent or going to bed without having eaten enough. If one looks at the work in detailed interviews by, say, Kathryn Edin and Laura Lein and others, they’ve argued that income doesn’t do a good job of measuring the well-being of people at the bottom and I’d like to push people to look more at consumption. The reason is that there is a lot of underreporting of income, particularly at the bottom (food stamps, TANF, EITC, housing subsidies, and the like). For example, if you look at the tenth, twentieth, thirtieth percentile of consumption of low-educated single mothers, it is twice their reported income. Consumption measures, whether you are asking about food, housing, or about hardships like difficulty paying rent or having enough food, are more direct measures of well-being.

I think the National Research Council reports did an excellent job of summarizing the benefits and problems with different approaches and I would like to even push further Jim’s preference for random-assignment evaluations and to a lesser extent quasi-experimental evaluations over the monitoring approaches. The problem with monitoring is we just can’t, in general, estimate the causal effect of the policy. We can’t figure out if a different policy improves things and to what extent. There is typically no comparison group or counterfactual to know what would have happened in the absence of the policy. We generally don’t look at the full populations at risk, including people diverted or discouraged from applying; we maybe just look at people on the rolls and leavers. So we should emphasize experimental evaluations, bearing in mind the caveat in Jim Ziliak’s paper, and including a key acknowledgment that we could only look at those in the system, those who are on the rolls or who have showed up in welfare offices.
Now as for nonexperimental evaluations, quasiexperiments with difference-in-difference types of experiments, it is much harder to make general statements, because those experiments, those methodologies differ a lot depending on circumstances. But one general comment is that it’s important that you have a good comparison group. When you’re looking at outcomes for one group you need to have a group that you think is comparable in some way. There are a lot of ways to assess comparability and to see if the comparison group has responded similarly to other things going on in the state over time. So I will leave it at that: a stronger push for more experiments over just monitoring studies and a push to look at more outcomes, including consumption.

Karl Koerper, ACF: As an ACF representative, I of course have to push for experimental design studies as well, and I want to go back and look a little at some of the history of our experience with that, particularly some experience in Illinois. One of the early attempts we made when we were still in the AFDC program to look at employment retention was a project called the Post Employment Services Demonstration. It would prove quite successful because basically people who left employment, stayed employed. I think we got about 80 percent employment among both controls and experimental.

Illinois was just one of the participants in that study. Had they done the study in the fashion that they wanted, they’d have been doing monitoring studies, just to see if they were doing a good job, and they might to this day be spending the extra money that they were putting into more extensive case management to help people stay employed. But the unit back then was basically sinking good money to get no extra effect, and they abandoned that project after we found that it just didn’t give them any more for their costs. Now they’re involved in the Employment Retention and Advancement Study, in which we basically have 9 states participating in 16 different interventions to test various strategies that build upon what we’ve learned from the Post Employment Services Demonstration. We will again see that some things will work and some things won’t work, but we will know when we’re done whether putting our money toward each strategy will work and what we get for our dollar. So when states make decisions about what policies they want to pursue in shrinking budget times, they’ll know whether a particular policy works.

Shrinking budgets actually give you opportunities to use random-assignment evaluation. Illinois once again is a great example. The state was also participating in our Welfare-to-Work rural strategies evaluation. They had a project that helped people in low-income families find work in the rural areas of Illinois and that was threatened with budget cuts—actually was going to be completely eliminated—except that by having the opportunity to join our national evaluation they were able to save it. They were able to cut it back and by denying services to a control group, because they couldn’t serve everybody, were able to allow it to continue to be funded for a number of years, basically hoping that once we have the results they will be able to go back in front of the legislature and see whether they can defend the program. So if you have some projects going on out there, some interventions that face derailment because of the budget cutbacks, this may be a way to say to the legislature, “Well maybe we can test this. Right now we don’t do random-assignment experiments because taking services away from somebody brings up an ethical consideration. But if we can’t give it to everybody anyway, the situation lends itself to the environment for random-assignment experiment.”

Jonah Gelbach, University of Maryland: I like the randomized experiment as much as the next guy, and in a world of essentially infinite budgets I can see why you’d want to, in fact, I know why you would want to randomize absolutely everything about the budget set and about the time limit policy and so on, and we’d learn all sorts of wonderful things about every detail of welfare policies. But we don’t seem to have infinite budgets for these things. As a very, very casual consumer of the state evaluations—I certainly haven’t come close to the Ziliak performance of having read nine major reports—what I find interesting partly is that a lot of these evaluations look at different populations and it’s hard to compare those populations across states. The state policies which we are evaluating are frequently or almost always multidimensional in ways that make it less than obvious how to interpret the treatment effect and so I wonder if the expense is really entirely justified.

I know that I’m taking a somewhat unpopular position, but it’s one that has a relatively venerable history in this debate over experimental versus nonexperimental policy research design. I wonder whether it would be better to spend a good chunk of money on designing administrative data systems that would be up and, if not available for public use, at least relatively easy for researchers to access. In a sense, academics are a very cheap source of labor. There are a lot of dissertations that need to be written because there are students, and there are a lot of papers that need to be written because there’s tenure to be gotten. I am only slightly kidding, because making good administrative data, particularly panel data, available would provide the impetus for a lot of research to be done on the kinds of evaluations that the public or policymakers would like to see.

We teach our students how to do nonexperimental research on these sorts of policies and I know, at least with respect to the UC Data system and some of the data have been put up regarding California caseloads, that several very high quality papers have been written that have really expanded our knowledge about things like the impact of local labor market conditions on transitions into and out of welfare and those sorts of questions. Had those
data never been put up and instead that money spent on randomized designs to test the impact of one thing on another, some of those papers might never have come out.

I think there’s a trade-off between the long-run investment in these sorts of resources and very unquestionable identifications from experimental designs, in which the program evaluation has to stop at some point because the evaluators have spent all the money and now it’s time to go home. I’d like to argue for some balance in how our resources are spent. I think the last thing we need to worry about is the labor to actually implement some of these evaluations. What we do need to worry about is providing the data.

With respect to the experimental designs that are done, I think it’s important that somebody keep track of the identifying numbers, like social security numbers, because being able to look at the long-run impacts of some of these programs 5 or 10 years from now or maybe longer than that would be very valuable.

On a relatively unrelated point, I wanted to express the concern that I don’t really feel that I know much about the extent to which participants, and especially potential participants, understand the rules of the programs. I am told that in one state evaluation of the old AFDC plan versus its newer plan, apparently 70 percent of both treatment and control groups thought that they were subject to time limits. Maybe I misunderstood, but that’s a horrifying thing if you are trying to understand whether time limits have any impact on people. If people don’t know that there are time limits, then the limits probably don’t have any impact until the last minute, and then it’s maybe a little too late. I think it’s great that they ran the survey and asked people. More research on that front would be tremendously valuable for those of us who do academic research, because frequently we just have to take it at face value that people know the incentives they face.

The very last thing I’ll say is that one of the problems with randomized designs is that they tend to be either stock-sampled or flow-sampled, which is to say that they sample either people who are already on the program when the reform kicks in or people who want to enter the program after the reform has started. That’s a wonderful way to know about the people who either are on the program or want to get on it. But it’s not such a great way to know about the people who could plausibly have wound up on the program, particularly in a time when we know that the economy changed mightily. We may be missing a lot of the population in trying to evaluate what’s happening. I don’t know what the answer is, but not having any sense of potential entry effects is arguably damaging.

Haveman: I am going to exercise the prerogative of the chair and make a couple of comments now. It seems to me that Jonah put his finger on one of the critiques of Jim Ziliak’s paper and I would like to emphasize it. The paper sets a very high standard and then simply asks what we can do to move more closely toward that standard without ever mentioning the cost of doing so. At the margin, if you have another million dollars to be spent on studying the effects of welfare reform, do you learn more by, let’s say, sponsoring a randomized experiment of some limited intervention, or in fact would we all be benefitted by allocating that money to continuing and improving the monitoring, leavers-type studies? I think that’s an open question and I don’t think Jim’s paper has addressed it. Maybe one question that would focus exactly on the issue would be to ask yourselves, “Have we in fact learned more from very costly, extensive, randomized experimental designs in studies such as the one of MFIP or the CSDE study here in Wisconsin than we have from the much less costly monitoring studies of leavers that have been done in the states?”

Jeff Smith, University of Maryland: I think my remarks will be a little closer to what Jonah said. But let me first distinguish here between the questions of interest and the methods we should use, given we have decided on the questions of interest. I think those two things have gotten a little confused in the discussion about random assignment. If the question is, “What happens to people who fall off of welfare because of time limits?” we don’t need to do any experiments to answer that question; monitoring studies will do just fine. If our question is “What’s the impact of this treatment for these people versus that treatment for these people?” then we want to do an experiment if we can, because that’s going to give us the most credible answer in most circumstances.

I expected to come to this conference and learn something about welfare evaluations, and what I have learned is that we haven’t learned much about welfare evaluations yet. But I have learned a lot about what the government people think about these issues and that’s actually really interesting. One thing that I’ve heard people saying is that research is a public good (they don’t mean it, of course, but that’s what they have been saying). So if you say to the states, “do experiments, do experiments, do experiments,” what you are basically saying to them in general is “Please provide an unacknowledged good to all the other states. It will be useful to you too but it will mainly be useful to everybody else.”

That’s quite a request to the states and I can see why they are not eager to do that. They have their own questions, that to some extent can’t be answered by random assignment because they are questions that the states want answered tomorrow. Some of those questions could be answered by reading the literature, so I won’t let the state people off the hook entirely. But it seems to me that maybe there’s a division of labor here—in fact, in some ways the only economic justification for federal involvement in this area might be as a knowledge producer.
We learned a lot from the MDRC work-welfare experiments over the ’80s and during the early ’90s. We don’t need to do any more of those—that’s a great example of an experiment that now would be a waste of money because we know how well job search works for this population. But it generated a good deal of knowledge. The individual states did the experiments and then we changed some national policies for all states on the basis on the knowledge provided by a few states. That’s something the feds arguably ought to be paying for. A question that would be relevant to TANF would be, “How do recipients respond to different types of sanctions?” That’s information that would be useful to every state—almost every state that we’ve heard about here has some sort of sanction regime. My impression is that policymakers ought to know what happens if you take away 10, 15, or 20 percent? The whole point of the program is income maintenance—or at least part of it is income maintenance—and to punish by taking away income is shooting yourself in the foot. Maybe we ought to consider other sanctions: treatments like time taxes, leisure taxes, as we do to people now in some states when they have automobile tickets; we give them a choice between paying cash or wasting some of their time at court or in driving school. This sort of thing is ideal for an experiment, this is a public good that can benefit all the states. So, pitch number one is, let’s do some experiments that provide public goods in terms of useful knowledge to the states.

Point two is data. This is echoing Jonah—if you give them the data they will come. You can get a lot of free research done just by making interesting data available. I was shocked that it sounds as if some of the states don’t actually know, can’t tell you, what services are applied to whom, in the population. They can’t tell you who was sanctioned, they can’t tell you how many were sanctioned, they can’t tell you why they were sanctioned, they can’t tell you how many people got this service or that service. Everybody’s got to know that. To me that’s basic fiduciary duty to the taxpayer, although I don’t mean to sound sanctimonious here. Not only that but it’s useful to the state in figuring out what they’re doing and knowing whether they’re providing services equitably.

So better data in this case are useful to states but would also be useful to researchers, first of all because of measurement error. On the Urban Institute site you can see policy variables—this state does this, this state does that—but you don’t know what happens. That’s what they say, but one state may actually sanction 1 percent and another may sanction 10 percent. You’d like to know that, so that you can take account of that when you’re doing a study matching this information on state policies to some sort of larger national dataset.

I think it would be useful to do some general methodological research on how well we can measure participation in TANF. Do we know whether we are any better at doing it than under AFDC, where the programs were the same in every state? We know that AFDC was underestimated, maybe TANF is underestimated; maybe it varies across states. Some of our research will use these national surveys; there’s no way around it. How well do we measure services received and sanction impositions in these surveys? Do people know that they’ve been sanctioned? Do they know when they’ve gotten a service? Some work I’ve done suggests that people often don’t know.

It’s apparent that some states have developed really good models for making administrative data available to the research community and other states haven’t. A really useful activity that some institutions, maybe even IRP, could undertake would be to describe such models and then disseminate that information to the other states so that they could then try to emulate those successful models of making administrative data available to researchers.

One last point: yesterday we were discussing performance standards and we heard statements like “We don’t use the performance standards for evaluations, we just use them to manage the program.” I don’t know what that means. We can poke a little farther and you get the impression that people don’t call it evaluation but really it’s evaluation. The performance measures are actually levels, there’s no counterfactual here, but people are speaking as if they were impacts. They’re not, they’re levels. There is some literature on this; it suggests that the correlation between the outcome levels and the impact, the net gain, the actual difference the program is making, is pretty small and maybe it’s zero.

That’s a problem, and I think we need to do two things about that. First we need to keep repeating over and over again, “These are not impacts, these are levels.” It doesn’t mean you don’t want to know them, it just means you have to interpret them correctly, and maybe you don’t want to attach high-power rewards to these things until we’re a little bit more sure that they are actually related to impact. The second thing is that we want to do some research to find performance measures. We need something that can be calculated quickly and inexpensively, but maybe there is something that can be calculated quickly and inexpensively that is also correlated with impact. We don’t know that, but we do know that what we are using now doesn’t give us that.

We ought also think a little bit about alternative management tools besides outcome levels and performance standards. There is a whole literature on this in public management; there are, for example, input-based performance measures and some states already have those.

Wendell Primus, CBPP: I really want to emphasize that in my view we’ve probably done too many welfare leaver studies and now we need studies of low-income populations. TANF right now is only covering, when you look at
parents with children, probably about 1.7 million. That is a small fraction of the low-income households, no matter how you define them. We need to understand better which fraction of those low-income households find their way on to TANF and exit TANF to really understand what is going on.

The second, and the big story, in some sense, of TANF, is that we’ve reduced cash expenditures by probably on the order of 10–12 million dollars annually and we’ve increased child care expenditures also by a large amount. But I don’t think anyone can tell me if we’ve increased child care expenditures by more than the work effort of never-married mothers and if so, by how much. In other words, how much of the TANF cash savings really were moved on to the working poor? And now, in an era of budget cuts, how much are we going to reduce those child care expenditures on the working poor? I don’t think we’ve done nearly enough on that.

The third thing is that an amazing amount of research has been done on the TANF program. There are other income maintenance programs as well. We spend a lot more cash on the Unemployment Insurance Program. I’d like to see some side benefits from all this welfare research. For example, what percentage of the low-income working population is covered by UI in each state? As we have gone through this recession, the question has been: If we really believe in a work-based safety net, how many of those former welfare recipients who lost their jobs, found themselves onto the UI system? Were they eligible or weren’t they eligible, and if not, did they make it over to the welfare system? In some cases, if they were working 25–30 hours, they really should have found themselves onto both systems. Their UI check probably should have been supplemented by a TANF check as well.

The last thing is that there’s some interesting work to be done regarding the male welfare client. There’s an interesting paper by Paul Offner and Harry Holzer on the Brookings web site that points out what we’ve done about employment over the last several years for females, as opposed to males—I’m primarily talking now about black males between 16 and 24—sorting out why the performance of these two groups varies over the same period. I challenge the labor economists and others in this audience to help us understand better what is to be done if we really want to increase the employment of noncustodial parents.

Don Oellerich, ASPE: I think it’s important to make the point again that Jeff made: that it’s really the questions that the states have that drive the research, not the other way round. States need very quick answers that are really monitoring answers. They need to know something right away, not 5 years from now or 10 years from now, and the method has to be able to do that. We have to work on those methods to improve the answers because I think a quick answer is sometimes not right in the long run and people are making bad choices on the information they have in hand.

On the question of the population of interest, I have some thoughts, as one of the people who designed the leavers studies. People thought we were only interested in leavers. They asked, Why aren’t you interested in the caseload? Well, we went from the leavers to the diverters and now we’re dealing with caseload. We’re interested in people who don’t come on to programs, so we’re interested in the whole low-income population. As Wendell Primus pointed out, the cash assistance program touches very few single-parent families relative to the size of the population. Whenever we talk about doing experiments, we’re generally dealing with cash assistance, the cash assistance caseload. Yet about half of the 24 billion dollars that states are spending now is not going to cash assistance but to services. We need to know a lot more. Where is that money going? How effectively is it being used?

States and federal officials have a number of important questions that need to be looked at in the next round of research. We’re a long way from doing experiments on child-only cases, but we need to know who are the child-only cases, what are their service needs, and what are the goals for those cases. Are we interested in parents in those families, or only interested in the needs of the children? Those questions have not been addressed in any way and yet child-only cases are a growing proportion of the caseload, about 35 percent.

I think we could do some more experimentation concerning the optimal use of case management. One of the things that I am interested in—I have a background in child welfare—is the worker/client relationship and how that affects the outcome for that particular case. Not just the services provided but also the relationship that the worker and the client are able to develop over time may be the telling factor, as it is in child welfare.

We have to have a better understanding of our caseload, which is much more dynamic than it ever was before. We used to say: About half the caseload leaves every year, about half of that caseload goes to work, and 70 percent return within two years—we had this whole welfare dynamic straight. But now, states are dealing with very different caseloads. Where 4 percent of their caseload was entering every month, on average now it is 10 percent; in some states, a third of the caseload comes in every month. The caseload is a revolving door, it’s very dynamic, more like the emergency room than the hospital proper because we’re seeing the critical care group. This makes demands on workers that weren’t there before and we need to learn a lot more through observational studies, through qualitative studies, and through some experiments about how we can best be effective.
Finally, I’m a strong proponent of random assignment; I think it has its place. The Department is sponsoring earning advancement and retention random-assignment experiments on services for the hard to employ.

A selection of comments from the floor

Rachel Hickson, Evaluation Projects Manager, New Jersey Department of Human Services. New Jersey did have some bad experiences with experimental design. I think that drove the state heavily in a monitoring-type direction. Monitoring is the primary focus of our current evaluation, mainly because of the need for very rapid information, especially for public management but also for legislators and for taxpayers; at certain times of the year they get curious about what’s happening in the welfare program. In the type of study that we have, with a group of families being followed over time with a periodic survey, we’ve been able to make very rapid and frequent changes—enhancements to the program—that we were not able to do in the past, when we had an experimental design and the state was trying to leave the program undisturbed so that they could get good evaluations.

Koerper: I’m hoping that states are not hung up with past experience with random assignment. Experience with AFDC, which was not a block-granted program, was different, probably because TANF is a block grant program with greater flexibility. For one thing, I think a lot of states pursued the waivers more as an opportunity to change their policy than an opportunity for evaluation and as the provider of the waivers HHS was bound by the requirements of 1115 and also bound by the requirement that those waivers be cost neutral. So if you wanted to go statewide you had to be cost neutral and you had to have a statewide nonexperimental treatment group and all the rest.

Larry Mead, New York University: One of the attitudes one often hears from evaluators and academics is that unless we evaluate we don’t know whether it works or not. The impression that I’ve had, talking to the actual officials who are operating the welfare system or closely related agencies, is that they often do know what works and they know it without evaluation. Generally speaking, people I’ve interviewed knew what would make their programs work better, they just didn’t have the authority to do it, or they didn’t have the funds to do it. But they knew what worked.

The people who know are the operators, who are close to the program. They have a feel for what’s effective and what isn’t without evaluation. This gets to Jeff Smith’s point, that really evaluation is a public good. You generate findings for people who are further away from the firing line and who don’t have the feel for what works and who need evaluations—Washington particularly. That’s why evaluation may be most useful at that level or maybe at the state capitol. At the local level, they all have a much better sense of what’s effective. Now maybe when you get down to more fine-grained questions, let’s say the use of case managers, local people won’t have a clearcut opinion and there you do need an experiment in order to be sure. But that’s also a situation in which you probably don’t have to have an unserved control group. You can do comparative studies and different treatments and find out what’s most effective, and that’s all you need to do. So actually experimentation, it seems to me—evaluation in general—has a lesser role in improving programs that we sometimes think. It’s really a service to ourselves, people who don’t have this hands-on contact.

Meyer: Let me say a couple of words on Larry’s point. I think the problem with just relying on administrators to use their best guess about what works is that administrators think all their programs work. When you look at many of the successful programs that have been carefully evaluated using random assignment they often have a 3 percent increase in employment, or a 5 percent increase in employment. It’s hard to see that that an administrator’s going pick that out without a very careful evaluation.

Mike Wiseman, George Washington University: One problem with Jim Ziliak’s paper—in general it was very informative—was the specific assertion that to inform policy we needed random assignment. This is problematic. All the techniques that we’ve found can inform policy. The notion was—and Bruce picked up the notion—that what monitoring lacked was a counterfactual. In the many good monitoring studies I’ve looked at, the counterfactuals, it’s very clear, are not counterfactuals, they are sort of a point of reference. You have a notion that something is going on and the monitoring study attempts to establish whether or not it is. If there’s a difference between what is going on and what we nominally believe is going on then that is a useful bit of information.

The study Jonah Gelbach mentioned was a monitoring study; the fact that 70 percent of the people didn’t know about the time limit—that’s a monitoring outcome. That tells us something. We can’t deny that that’s informative, so we have to ask what it is that makes monitoring studies pertinent to inform policies.

I want to follow up on something Jeff Smith said, that we know how to do monitoring just fine. We don’t know how to do monitoring just fine, I’d say, and so there really seems to be a need—just as we do conferences on improving random assignment—for conferences on improving our procedures for nonexperimental evaluation. At some point it would be very good to have some conferences on the way in which we improve the utility of monitoring for feeding into the deliberations over TANF.
**Joe Hotz, UCLA:** In these efforts to get data, one of the key problems is that the kind of information you need for different groups in the low-income population, especially when you start thinking about states, is really difficult to come by. It’s easy to pull out administrative data on participants that we have in the system. I think we could spend a lot more attention on creative ways to get information on the low-income population. One, which isn’t going to work for everybody, is to start linking together data—survey data, administrative data. There are efforts in California and other states to do that. But also it’s important to support data efforts like the American Community Survey, in which the sample size is large enough to be able to do the analysis within states. If you start working on these methods and strategies for dealing with administrative data and these surveys we’ll start to put ourselves in a better position to monitor this low-income population.

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3From the early 1960s, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services and its predecessors had the authority to waive portions of the Social Security Act to permit states to innovate within the AFDC program. These were known as Section 1115 waivers and were not much used until the late 1980s. On waivers, see E. Boehnen and T. Corbett, “Welfare Waivers: Some Salient Trends,” *Focus* 18, no. 1 (special issue 1996): 5–8.

4The American Community Survey is a mail survey that the Census Bureau plans will replace the long form in the 2010 Census. It will provide estimates of demographic, housing, social, and economic characteristics every year for all states, as well as for all cities, counties, metropolitan areas, and population groups of 65,000 people or more. The ACS is already implemented in selected communities, and it is proposed to begin full implementation in 2003 in every county of the United States. See <http://www.census.gov/acs/www/About/index.htm>.
New IRP Special Report

Patterns of Long-Term Utilization of Medicaid and Food Stamps by Wisconsin Welfare Leavers

Robert Haveman, Thomas Kaplan, and Barbara Wolfe, with Sandra Barone

Subsidized medical insurance and food purchases through the Medicaid and Food Stamp programs potentially improve the health and economic well-being of low-income people, but only if eligible participants receive program benefits. Reports of low rates of take-up and declines in Food Stamp and Medicaid participation following passage of welfare reform legislation in 1996 raise concern about the health care and nutritional status of low-income families, particularly those formerly receiving cash welfare. This new IRP report (Special Report 82, published July 2002) describes the long-term utilization of food stamps and Medicaid by welfare recipients who left the cash benefit rolls in Wisconsin in 1995 (under an early welfare reform regime) and in 1997, after the institution of the Wisconsin Works (W-2) reforms.

Some key findings of this new IRP report are:

1. Those who left the Wisconsin cash assistance rolls in 1997 were much more likely to take up food stamps and Medicaid than were those who left in 1995.

2. Rates of program take-up reported for Wisconsin are higher than rates reported in most studies of other jurisdictions, even among those who left in 1995.
   - One year after exit, mean food stamp take-up rates were 38 percent for the 1995 leavers and 59 percent for the 1997 leavers, compared to rates of 35 percent in most other studies summarized in the report.
   - Estimated Medicaid coverage rates in the fourth quarter after leaving were 48 percent for the 1995 leavers and 63 percent for the 1997 leavers, compared to a rate of about 40 percent in other summarized studies.
   - For children, Medicaid coverage rates in the fourth quarter after leaving are 62 percent for the 1995 leavers and 82 percent for the 1997 leavers, compared to rates in the 50–60 percent range in other summarized studies.

3. Eligibility for food stamps declined with the passage of time after leaving cash welfare, presumably reflecting increased earnings and other income over time, but participation rates among those who were eligible declined much more quickly. Food stamp eligibility levels among those who left in 1995 declined from 96 percent in the first year after leaving to 82 percent in the fourth year. Participation rates among those who were eligible declined from 60 percent at some time in the first year after leaving to 37 percent at some time in the fourth year.

4. Participation rates also dropped among those eligible for Medicaid. Among eligible 1995 leavers, participation rates for mothers dropped from 73 percent at some time in the first year after leaving to 37 percent in the fourth year, and rates for children dropped from 81 percent at some time in the first year to 55 percent in the fourth year.

5. In a sample of children whose mothers had at some time participated in Wisconsin’s W-2 program, those most likely to be uninsured (without either Medicaid or private health insurance) were (a) children who moved at some point during the year and (b) children whose mothers worked for firms that offered health insurance (an unexpected result).

6. The introduction of Wisconsin’s BadgerCare program in July 1999 increased eligibility for public health insurance coverage (more so among mothers than among children), but take-up rates among eligible leavers remained approximately constant after the start of BadgerCare.

On the IRP World Wide Web site:
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/irp/sr/sr82.pdf
Income volatility and the implications for food assistance programs

David M. Smallwood, Mark A. Prell, and Margaret S. Andrews

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Through the Food Assistance and Nutrition Research Program (FANRP), the Economic Research Service has responsibility for conducting studies and evaluations of food assistance and nutrition programs within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). In 2002, FANRP and the Institute for Research on Poverty (IRP) sponsored a conference in Washington, DC, on “Income Volatility and Implications for Food Assistance Programs.” The conference sought to stimulate new research on income volatility and the movement of households in and out of program eligibility, the household’s decision to participate, compliance over time, and the costs of the programs. The effects of income volatility on these outcomes are likely to be specific to particular programs because each has different target populations, benefit levels, and administrative procedures. The papers summarized here were presented at the conference.

Food assistance programs and the safety net

Three food and nutrition assistance programs are among the ten largest federal means-tested programs: the Food Stamp Program, school meals (the National School Lunch Program, and the School Breakfast Program) and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); see Figure 1 and Table 1. The food assistance programs, administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), seek to provide access to food and to improve the nutrition of low-income families and children. These programs serve about one in every six Americans over the course of a year and account for over half of USDA’s budget outlays.

Figure 1. The largest federal means-tested programs, 1998.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Program Description</th>
<th>Basic Eligibility Requirements</th>
<th>Reporting &amp; Recertification Requirements</th>
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| **Food Stamp Program (FSP)** | • Target group: low-income households  
• Federal cost: $17.7 billion  
• Participants: 17.2 million in average month  
• Average monthly benefit: $74.77/person | • Includes:  
✓ Income: 130% of poverty line  
✓ Net (of certain deductions) income: 100% of poverty line  
✓ Assets: $2,000 ($3,000 if elderly or disabled)  
✓ Vehicular Value: $4,650  
OR  
• Household participates in TANF or SSI | • Certification periods:  
1–24 months; varies by state and type of household  
Average certification period: almost 10 months (FY 00)  
Amount of change in monthly income to be reported varies by state and type of household |
| **National School Lunch Program (NSLP)** | • Target group: children attending a participating school  
• Federal cost: $6.5 billion  
• Lunches served (average) 25.4 million daily  
• USDA basic cash subsidies (until 6/30/02):  
✓ Free lunches: $2.09  
✓ Reduced-price lunches: $1.69  
✓ Paid lunches: $0.20  
(amounts differ for AK, HI, and some schools)  
• Donated commodities are an NSLP component | • Any child attending a participating school  
• Free lunch:  
Income at or below 130% of poverty level  
OR  
Household participates in FSP, Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations (FDPIR), or TANF  
• Reduced-price lunch: income 130%–185% of poverty level  
• Children who purchase “full-price” lunches receive some USDA subsidy and are considered NSLP participants. | • Most applications completed at start of school year  
• Certification is for duration of school year  
• Report changes in monthly income of more than $50 per month (or a lower amount set locally); or changes in certification for FSP, FDPIR, or TANF. |
| **Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC)** | • Target groups: pregnant women, postpartum nonbreastfeeding and breastfeeding women, infants, and children up to fifth birthday.  
• Federal cost: $4.1 billion  
• Participants: 7.3 million per month (1.78 million women, 1.92 million infants, 3.6 million children)  
• Average monthly benefit: supplemental food packages vary by category of participant | • Income:  
185% of poverty level  
OR  
Certain family members in FSP, TANF, or Medicaid  
• Applicant is at nutritional risk | Certification periods:  
Pregnant women: up to 6 weeks postpartum  
Postpartum nonbreastfeeding and breastfeeding women: 6 months  
Infants: most up to first birthday  
Children: 6 months |

**Note:** For more detailed information, see the publications of the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) or visit the FNS website at http://www.fns.usda.gov.
Ensuring access to food is a fundamental aspect of safety-net policies for poor Americans. Wealthy households have financial resources (wealth or credit) with which to smooth consumption, but a low-wealth, low-income household may have few resources to draw upon in a downturn, and may even consume hand-to-mouth, buffeted by day-to-day variation in income. Households with little or no financial assets or property find it difficult to obtain credit. Income dips can thus have dire consequences for the poor, especially for their consumption of items such as food (as opposed to durable goods such as appliances), which are purchased on a short-term basis and are likely to be an “adjustment variable” subject to reduction when the income constraint suddenly worsens. Thus, food assistance programs are an important component of the safety net for low-income people, and particularly for those with volatile incomes.

Although each of USDA’s food assistance programs contributes to providing a safety net for the poor, they differ in their target populations, types and amounts of benefits, and the complexity, targeting precision, and burden of their administrative procedures. For example, the Food Stamp Program entitles households meeting income and resource requirements to a monthly benefit averaging $158. Eligibility and benefit determination rules are highly specific so that benefits may be precisely targeted. The Food Stamp Program application can be 30 pages long, requiring detailed financial data on expenses and on several sources of income and public assistance. Applicants must provide documentary evidence of many reported figures and recipients must frequently report changes in circumstances. In contrast, a School Lunch Program application does not require documentation and, covering just basic income sources, it can fit on a single page. Typically, households with children who receive a free or reduced-price school lunch are not required en masse to resubmit current information more often than once a year, at the start of the school year. There is, as one might expect, a School Lunch Program guideline stating that a participating child’s household should report changes to household monthly income (of $50 or more), and a small sample of between 1 and 2 percent of households submitting School Lunch Program applications must provide follow-up documentation. Meanwhile, some Food Stamp Program households are recertified monthly. Table 1 summarizes basic eligibility requirements and certification procedures for three major programs. The food assistance programs developed with such diversity because of the difficulties inherent in serving multiple populations through a single program.

Policy trade-offs and program design

If we increase emphasis upon one program goal, we may be obliged to place less emphasis on other goals—that is the essence of a policy trade-off. Three fundamental goals of social assistance programs that may impinge upon one another are: support for households with little or no income, which suggests a high benefit level for such households; preservation of work incentives, which suggests a low benefit reduction rate as household income increases; and low program expenditures, given that we live in a world of scarce resources. Normative disagreements over public policy arise, in part, because the first two goals together conflict with the third and, for any fixed amount of program expenditures, the first two goals conflict with one another.

Program administration presents yet another set of trade-offs, between three other goals: convenient access for clients, targeting precision for benefits, and administrative accuracy at reasonable cost (Figure 2).

Easy, convenient access to programs not only reduces the burdens upon participating households—an outcome that could be considered an end in itself—but this reduced burden may in turn increase the number of (eligible) households that choose to participate in the program, an increase that is widely viewed as desirable. Access may be promoted by designing short, simple application forms and imposing few documentation requirements. In contrast, precise targeting—channeling benefits to the population segments that are intended to be benefit recipients—may be promoted by a lengthy (and therefore burdensome) application process that asks for detailed information and thorough documentation. Because an application can not be both short and long, there are policy trade-offs between access and targeting precision.

Reducing the administrative burden for the program agency saves administrative resources but may cost more in program benefits. Because detailed applications and thorough documentation place burdens not only on clients but also on the agency that processes the paperwork, more precise targeting of benefits may add to the administrative burden. The verification of documents is another issue that emerges in benefit targeting. Perhaps the burden of compliance with a program can be shifted between client and agency, creating a policy trade-off by requiring different forms of documentation; for example, an offi-
cial pay stub may reduce the need to contact employers directly.

**Policy trade-offs and income volatility**

Because food assistance programs have income criteria to establish whether a household (or a household member) is eligible to participate, the volatility exhibited by a household’s sequence of monthly income has important implications for the agency and for clients. It affects both the program’s administrative burden and its eligibility requirements, certification periods, and error rates, and clients’ ability to access a program, their reporting burden, and, more broadly, their well-being.

The economic opportunities facing a low-income household contain important random elements. Low-income workers do not always work regular hours and tend to change jobs frequently. The consequence is incomes that can fluctuate not just annually but monthly or even daily. Milton Friedman pioneered economic analysis that examined how households make consumption decisions based on their estimates of permanent and transitory income. In this dynamic context of income uncertainty, there emerge additional targeting issues that are on the frontier of today’s policy research.

The critical point here is the same as Friedman’s: today’s actual income may be a poor estimate of a household’s future income stream. A household that is certified as eligible today and starts to receive program benefits may have an increase in income that causes the household to fall out of eligibility tomorrow, or perhaps after 57 tomorrows. Nobody, including the household, knows for sure. The program agency’s recertification process detects whether or not a participating household continues to remain eligible at the time it is recertified. A central administrative issue is how often the program agency should require a participating household to be recertified: each year? each month?

A household’s program benefits may be said to be **unwar-ranted** if a household receives benefits at a time when it is in fact ineligible. That is, according to the program agency’s **most recent** information the household is eligible but, because of its volatile income, the household’s current income no longer matches the information on file. Household size matters too—income criteria in program eligibility guidelines depend on household composition. If the program agency’s recertification detects that the household is ineligible, the household’s benefits are terminated. When a household’s stream of unwarranted benefits is stopped sooner rather than later, targeting precision is increased. However, frequent recertification has effects that conflict with other program goals. Frequent recertification adds to the administrative cost of the program; administrative accuracy is not a free lunch. Furthermore, frequent recertification adds to the client’s bur-

An “appropriate” certification period somehow balances the trade-offs between unwarranted benefits, unclaimed benefits, the burden on the client, and administrative costs. Such a period might be called “cost-effective” or, better, “optimal” (to use an economic term that incorporates the concept of trade-offs between benefits and costs). Whether an optimal certification period is long or short, a week or two years, depends on several underlying factors, which can include:

- The exit rate from eligibility: The greater the household’s exit rate from eligibility (per unit time), the more frequently the program agency should recertify in order to reduce unwarranted benefits;
- The agency’s recertification cost: The greater the program agency’s staff and resource costs (per recertification), the less frequently it pays to recertify;
- The household’s recertification cost: The greater the costs of transportation, forgone earnings, or implicit cost of leisure to the client (per recertification), the longer the optimal certification period; such costs would be considered relevant in a framework that takes account of all costs and not just program agency costs.
- The sensitivity (or elasticity) of household participation in light of the burden that recertification imposes: If many eligible households chose not to participate because recertifications were highly frequent, the optimal recertification period would be infrequent. The importance of this factor increases to the extent that unclaimed benefits are a social cost.
- The size of benefits: The greater the amount of program benefits (per unit time), the greater is the (total) amount of unwarranted benefits if the ineligibility spell remains undetected, and the shorter the optimal certification period. From a benefit-cost-analysis perspective, program benefits are simply a transfer from taxpayers to program recipients so that there is no net loss for the economy as a whole. From the perspective of the program agency that is charged by Congress (and ultimately by the citizenry) with providing benefits only to eligible households, unwarranted benefits are interpreted as a cost. In either case, any deadweight loss associated with financing program benefits by taxes that are not lump-sum payments would add further to cost and shorten the optimal certification period.

This reasoning suggests two conclusions. First, in general different programs will have different optimal certifica-
tion periods; cross-program “consistency” in certification periods is unlikely to be optimal. A free school lunch costs USDA about $48 per month (the product of a basic reimbursement rate of $2.09 per meal for roughly 23 meals) whereas a typical Food Stamp Program household receives $158 of food stamps per month. Setting aside other factors that influence certification periods, the Food Stamp Program should be recertifying households more frequently than the School Lunch Program (which it typically does) because of the different benefit levels.

The second conclusion is that different groups participating in a given program will in general have different optimal certification periods. For example, the elderly may well have optimal certification periods in the Food Stamp Program that exceed the periods of the nonelderly. The elderly probably have low exit rates from eligibility because the incomes of participating elderly people may not be particularly volatile. They probably also receive small amounts of benefits relative to the nonelderly, because food stamp benefits are income-dependent, and the elderly have lower rates of poverty than the nonelderly. In practice, some Food Stamp Program offices have extended the actual certification period for some elderly households to be as long as 24 months.

The optimal certification period for a working-poor household may, in contrast, be much shorter. A working-poor household is likely to change either the amount of food stamp benefits for which it is eligible or, perhaps, its eligibility status altogether, becoming ineligible for any food stamp benefits at all. But there are countervailing factors. The benefit levels of working-poor households are small relative to households with zero income, which receive the maximum food stamp benefits. Furthermore, the working poor may be especially sensitive to frequent recertification because they must make work arrangements to take time for visiting the Food Stamp Program office (unemployed households do not face a comparable barrier). In practice, the actual certification period for some households with earnings is as short as a month. A short certification period is consistent with the view that income volatility is the strongest consideration.

Another consideration is whether the period(s) for which benefits are certified (or, alternatively, paid) should coincide or be in alignment with the period(s) over which income is measured. For example, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) addresses “long-term” or “annual” poverty, as opposed to “short-term” or “monthly” poverty (the time horizon of the Food Stamp Program). The EITC pays benefits (in the form of tax credits) based on annual income (on the household’s federal income tax form), making the EITC benefit period of a year coincide with the EITC income period of a year (though EITC benefits are paid the year after income is measured). The School Lunch Program is in practice another “long-term” program, certifying children for free or reduced-price lunches for the academic year, but typically its benefits are based on monthly income rather than annual income. Thus the School Lunch Program benefit and income periods do not coincide. There is, however, an important School Lunch Program guideline that achieves alignment in egregious cases. For households in which monthly income “does not fairly or accurately represent the household’s actual circumstances,” School Lunch Program benefits are based on a projection of annual income. Thus, children in a household that has low annual income but temporarily high monthly income can still be eligible for free or reduced-price lunches for the school year. This guideline reflects one pragmatic approach to a complex challenge posed by income volatility.

FANRP research on income volatility

FANRP’s portfolio of research has several projects that pertain to the volatility and timing of income. Topics have included the dynamic pattern of expenditures on food over the month exhibited by Food Stamp Program households, the dynamic determinants of food insufficiency, and statistical issues in the measurement of the number of people eligible for WIC and of error rates in the School Lunch Program. The statistical issues arise, in part, from the use of annual income figures from national surveys to estimate the number of people eligible for a program such as WIC or the School Lunch Program, whereas program offices use monthly income to determine actual eligibility. Because of ordinary month-to-month variation in income, a household could have “low” income for a month or more—and thus be a valid participant at time of enrollment—and yet have a “high” above-eligible income for the year as a whole. In annual data, such a family may resemble an ineligible household.

FANRP welcomed IRP as a cosponsor for our conference on “Income Volatility and Implications for Food Assistance Programs.” The papers presented at the conference expand our understanding of how household income volatility and the policies of the food assistance programs interact and influence the participation and experiences of the country’s low-income households and children. Brief summaries of these papers follow.

FANRP research on income volatility

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Income Volatility and the Implications for Food Assistance Programs
An IRP/ERS Conference, May 2002: Contributors

The role of food stamps in stabilizing income and consumption
Craig Gundersen, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and James P. Ziliak, University of Kentucky

Income volatility and household consumption: The impact of food assistance programs
Richard Blundell, University College London, and Luigi Pistaferri, Stanford University

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The role of food stamps in stabilizing income and consumption

Craig Gundersen and James P. Ziliak

The Food Stamp Program is part of an extensive system of government programs in the United States that provide income insurance when incomes are low. These “automatic stabilizers” are designed to smooth consumption in the face of both aggregate business-cycle shocks and idiosyncratic shocks to individuals, such as a health crisis or significant change in family composition. Needy families meeting the Food Stamp Program’s income and asset limits are entitled to benefits that vary in size according to their income, assets, and household composition. These benefits are considered to be “near-cash” and are increasingly given in the form of an electronic transfer. Eligibility must be recertified, through sometimes complex procedures, at intervals ranging from a month to a year.

At the program’s peak in 1994, over 27 million people received food stamp benefits, at an expense of $25 billion to the federal government. Despite the program’s importance, however, there has been little research on its effects in stabilizing income and consumption. Such research has become especially important in light of the 1996 welfare reforms that eliminated the federal entitlement to cash assistance and therefore gave the Food Stamp Program a greater role as a potential consumption stabilizer for vulnerable low-income households. In the research reported here we use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1980 to 1999 to examine the effect of food stamps on income and consumption volatility.

Participation in the Food Stamp Program moves, as one would expect, countercyclically with the state of the macroeconomy. In the 1980s and 1990s, eligibility rates fell by about 15 percent near the peaks of economic expansion (1988 and 1998), and rose by about the same amount near the troughs of economic contractions (1983 and 1993). But from one expansion to the next and from one contraction to the next, the number of eligible households declined, in large part because fewer families could meet very low liquid-asset tests for eligibility (around $2,000 for people under age 60). From 1983 to 1998 there was also a decline in the participation rate among eligible households. In 1983, almost 50 percent of those eligible received food stamps, but by 1998 this had declined to 33 percent. Over the same period, food stamp benefits lost relative value: the ratio of benefits to income for all eligible households dropped from 8 percent to 5 percent. Food stamp benefit levels and participation were both quite volatile over this period.

In our research we examined, in addition to all PSID households, three subsamples: households whose current incomes were below 130 percent of poverty (i.e., the currently poor, those who were gross-income-eligible for food stamps), households whose liquid assets fell below the eligibility limit, and households whose average family income placed them within the lowest quartile of the average income in the sample. We considered two measures of consumption, expenditures on food and expenditures on nondurable goods, because food stamps may allow money formerly spent on food to be used for other
programs. We included a wide selection of demographic and income data in our models. We also controlled for state-specific economic, political, and welfare variables.

**Income volatility.** We found that beginning in the early to mid-1980s and lasting until that decade’s end, there was a marked increase in the level of income volatility for all the groups we considered. Levels of volatility were highest for the currently poor families. The early 1990s saw another surge in income volatility that is particularly notable because, by most measures, the recession of 1991–92 was relatively mild, especially compared to that of the early 1980s. This increased volatility was found across all the samples considered. During these same years both food stamp and welfare caseloads rose over 30 percent.

Considering all families in the sample, we found that food stamps lowered income volatility by about 3 percent between 1980 and 1998. Among those currently poor, however, the reduction in volatility was greater, around 12 percent in the model with individual fixed effects. But there have been substantial changes over time in the effects of the program. For example, among currently poor families, the Food Stamp Program reduced income volatility in the early 1980s by upwards of 16 percent, but in the early 1990s, when income volatility and program participation surged again, food stamps became less effective in smoothing income, reducing transitory variance by only 5–10 percent (and by as little as 2.5 percent in 1994, in the model with fixed effects).

**Consumption volatility.** Volatility in food consumption increased somewhat beginning in 1990, but when we add food stamps to our estimates, we find substantial effects. As one would expect from the targeting mechanisms built into the Food Stamp Program, the reductions between 1980 and 1998 were greatest for currently poor households and for households with low average incomes, averaging 13.8 and 9.0 percent in the models with fixed effects. The average reduction of volatility in food consumption exceeds that of income.

Again, however, the effectiveness of the program declined over time. During and immediately following the recession of the early 1980s, the level of volatility in spending on food consumption among currently poor families diminished by about 20 percent when food stamps were included; for those in the lowest income quartile, the variance in spending on food consumption diminished by upwards of 15 percent. But by 1993 and during the peak of consumption volatility, the reduction in variance from food stamps plummeted to 5 percent and 3 percent, respectively, for each group.

In response to an income shock, nondurable consumption will be more volatile than food consumption as households withhold or reduce expenditures in ways that they cannot do for food. But our findings show that in the 1980s, the Food Stamp Program had some smoothing effect on nondurable consumption, akin to its effect on income. This mitigating effect was substantially diminished by the 1990s.

Overall, beginning in 1990, the effectiveness of food stamps as a stabilizer of income and consumption changes shrank by nearly two-thirds while income and consumption volatility and program participation both increased. The underlying reasons require further research, but the higher variance likely stems from labor market instability, given that the reduction in effectiveness is found among those currently poor (incomes less than 130 percent of poverty) and lifetime low-income families (those in the lowest income quartile) who typically have no capital income. By the mid-1990s, some of the effectiveness of food stamps in smoothing income and consumption among vulnerable low-income families had been restored, but at levels significantly lower than in the early 1980s.

**Income volatility and household consumption: The impact of food assistance programs**

Richard Blundell and Luigi Pistaferri

How effective is the Food Stamp Program, the largest food assistance program in the United States, as an insurance measure against income shocks to low-income households? The research reported here offers an approach to understanding the role of this insurance program in the United States over the past three decades—a period characterized by rising income inequality and increased income volatility.

The link between income inequality and food stamp use is almost mechanically set by the program’s features. A greater dispersion in the income distribution (greater inequality) implies that it is more likely for a household to receive income shocks that push them below the eligibility threshold and trigger food assistance. But different types of shocks may generate different probabilities of food stamp use. For people to participate in the Food Stamp Program, income shocks must be fairly persistent, because the program includes eligibility criteria for both income and assets. Transitory shocks that push people temporarily below the poverty line may not make them eligible for food assistance if their assets are high enough and can be used to buffer the family against the shock. But permanent shocks may exhaust assets very rapidly, so that the family becomes eligible on both counts. Thus we asked if the Food Stamp Program helps to smooth house-
hold food consumption and if such smoothing (or insurance) depends on whether the income shock is permanent or transitory.

We began by documenting changes in income volatility in the United States over the 1980s and 1990s, using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We constructed two samples, a representative sample of the whole population, in which food assistance should have little impact, and a low-income sample to which the food assistance program is directed. We were able to do this because the PSID contains two groups of households: the first is representative of the general U.S. population; the second is a supplementary low-income subsample (also known as Survey of Economic Opportunity, SEO, households). In constructing these samples we chose households that were demographically stable and unlikely to suffer severe income setbacks. Thus we focused on continuously married couples headed by a man, eliminating households that experienced some dramatic family composition change, households headed by a female, and households younger than 30 or over 65 (to avoid problems related to changes in family composition or education, in the first instance, and retirement, in the second). We also excluded households for which data were missing or anomalous. When we include the SEO families we use the same selection criteria applied to the representative sample (so, stable families, etc.) Our final sample consisted of just over 34,000 families in the general population and about 17,700 families in the SEO subsample.

The two samples differ in their ethnicity (there are more blacks among SEO households), geographic location (there are more SEO households in the South), and income, but are rather alike in their labor market attachment. Food expenditures in both samples are similar. In 1992, the monetary value of food stamps in the sample that includes SEO households averaged about $70 per capita overall, and $1,700 per capita for those families receiving food stamps.

We next examined the consumption patterns of the households in the sample over the years 1979 to 1984 and 1985 to 1992, to determine the extent to which the pattern of changes in the dispersion of consumption mirrors changes in the income shocks. We used two food consumption measures, one in which we included food assistance (i.e., total out-of-pocket expenditures plus food stamps) and a second measure in which we considered only out-of-pocket expenditures. These contrasts between the two samples and the two measures were sufficient to identify the “insurance” impact of food assistance for low-income households. In this analysis we assume that households make their savings choices so as to smooth consumption. The theory of intertemporal consumption behavior is used to derive a relationship linking changes in household consumption to demographics and unexpected income changes. The effect of the latter on consumption growth depends on the extent of smoothing or insurance that households have available. It is precisely the extent of insurance against temporary and permanent income changes that we focus on.

We first compared the two samples considering only out-of-pocket expenditures on food. For the general population of households in the PSID, our empirical results suggest, the food assistance program has little effect. As one might expect for the population at large, the food assistance does not appear to provide any additional insurance, over and above personal savings. However, for the group that includes poorer households the results are strikingly different. We find a strong sensitivity of food consumption expenditures to both permanent and transitory income shocks. This sensitivity is higher when we examine out-of-pocket expenditures only. But when we consider the effects of the more comprehensive measure of total food consumption, the sensitivity of consumption to permanent income shocks declines by one-third. There is much less effect on the sensitivity of consumption to transitory income shocks, consistent with the notion that food stamp use is more likely to be triggered by long-run rather than short-run income change. Even though the poorer households are less able to smooth out transitory income shocks, the most damaging effects on their long-run income position occur through permanent shocks. It is encouraging, therefore, to see that food stamps reduce, though they do not completely eliminate, the effect of permanent income shocks upon low-income families.

Short recertification periods in the U.S. Food Stamp Program: Causes and consequences

Nader S. Kabbani and Parke E. Wilde

The U.S. Food Stamp Program is the cornerstone of the federal government’s efforts to alleviate hunger and food insecurity among low-income households. Steep declines in program participation rates, which dropped by over 35 percent between 1994 and 2000, have, therefore, evoked concern and considerable attention among analysts and policymakers. Good economic conditions appear to have played a role in the decline; so too have changes in benefits and eligibility requirements (for example, the 1996 welfare reforms restricted eligibility for some groups, such as legal immigrants). But so far, around 50-65 percent of the decline remains unexplained.

Part of the explanation may lie in various policy and program administration changes that have not so far been adequately taken into account. In the research summarized here, we seek to quantify the effects of one particular change: the trend among states to shorten recertifica-
tion periods for those households that wish to continue to participate in the program. The federal government requires states to recertify households with working-age members participating in the Food Stamp Program at least once every 12 months. Many states have required an increasing proportion of participating households to recertify more frequently, in an effort to lower the state’s program error rates in federally mandated quality control reviews of the Food Stamp Program.

The federal government pays for Food Stamp Program benefits and shares administrative costs with the states. The most important program design issues are decided at the federal level, so state-level Food Stamp Program policy decisions have not been the subject of much research. Attention has only recently focused on one program feature that states do control: the frequency with which food stamp households must be recertified. State Food Stamp Program administrators face a difficult trade-off as they choose policies and practices guiding how often participants must be recertified. Under federal Food Stamp Program regulations, each state is rewarded for having a low rate of errors in administering Food Stamp benefits and confronts hefty financial penalties if its error rates are high. The emphasis on error rates is a result of the federal government’s strong interest in maintaining the financial integrity of the Food Stamp Program and ensuring that households obtain only the amount of food stamps to which they are entitled.¹

In responding to federal quality controls, state Food Stamp Program administrators must confront the reality that, increasingly, the Food Stamp Program has become a program for working households. In fiscal year 2000, 38 percent of those enrolled had earnings, compared with only 25 percent 10 years earlier. Working households have more volatile incomes than households whose incomes come predominantly from cash welfare or retirement programs, because their wages and work schedules often fluctuate widely from month to month. As a result, food stamp households with working members have, for many years, registered higher error rates than households with no working members. State program administrators must balance the goal of maintaining program access for working households against their strong financial interest in keeping errors to a minimum.

States have adopted a number of administrative and managerial strategies to help reduce their error rates, including supervisory review, greater training, and use of other federal and state administrative data to verify applicants’ income and assets. One common administrative solution has been a marked trend toward shortening the recertification periods of program participants. In fiscal year 1992, only 4 percent of participants in working households (and 3 percent of all participants) were obliged to undergo recertification at intervals of 3 months or less. By FY 2000, 38 percent of participants in working households (and over 23 percent of all participants) faced the burden of frequent recertification. And that burden is substantial for low-income working families. A study sponsored by the Food and Nutrition Service in the U.S. Department of Agriculture estimated that the average initial application required nearly five hours, including at least two trips to the Food Stamp Program office, and cost the applicant about $10. Recertification involved about 2.5 hours and at least one trip, and cost nearly $6.

One consequence of the move to shorter recertification periods has been greater variability in state policies, affording us an opportunity to explore the consequences of the policy shift. In doing so, we use Food Stamp Program Quality Control (QC) data to provide estimates of recertification periods, error rates, and program participation in all 50 states and the District of Columbia for fiscal year 1999-2000. The QC data contain a wide range of information about the characteristics, benefits, employment status, and earnings of food stamp participants. Our econometric analysis controls for variables that affect both participation and error rates. It does not, however, address other administrative factors, such as interruptions to food stamp recipiency occasioned by failure to meet program requirements. Nor can it take into account the fact that states facing high error rates may implement several concurrent policies: shorter recertification, greater staff training, more specialized software.

It will prove no surprise that states whose error rates in one year were higher than other states were more likely to adopt shorter recertification periods in later years. The policy change was not immediate, but came some 2-5 years later. Furthermore, increasing the use of shorter recertification periods in one year had the anticipated affect of lower error rates that year. For each 10-percentage-point increase in the number of households subject to short recertification periods, error rates were reduced by 9 percent for working households and 6.6 percent for nonworking households. This slight decline in error rates occurred during a period when many more food stamp recipients were working, so that we might, instead, have expected to see an increase in error rates.

At the same time, however, we estimate that the increase in state use of short recertification periods also reduced participation rates by between 16 and 20 percent overall. A 1-percentage-point reduction in the error rate is associated with a 0.5 percentage-point reduction in the share of the population that participates in the program. Thus it seems clear that short recertification periods succeeded in their intended goal of reducing error rates. But the reduction comes at a “cost” of lower program participation.

¹Error rates are determined through an annual review of about 50,000 food stamp cases under the Food Stamp Program’s quality control system. In fiscal year 2000, 18 states were liable for penalties because their error rates were above the national average of about 10 percent, and 11 states received bonuses for having error rates of less than 6 percent. Over the last few years, and especially in the 2002 Farm Bill, the federal government has sought to improve access to and simplify procedures for receiving food stamps.
Food Stamps and the elderly: Why is participation so low?

Steven J. Haider, Robert F. Schoeni, and Alison Jacknowitz

People aged 60 and over (whom the Food Stamp Program defines as “elderly”) account for almost 20 percent of the U.S. population, but for just 10 percent of all food stamp recipients. The elderly are just as likely as those under 60 to be eligible for food assistance; they are simply much less likely to participate. Only about one-third of the elderly who are eligible are actually receiving food stamps. In contrast, about two-thirds of those under 60 who are eligible are participating in the program.

This disparity has not received much attention, but it is too important to ignore for reasons of equity and of public policy. First, if large numbers of those over 60 are not receiving benefits they need and are entitled to, the program may not be effectively fulfilling its goal of target efficiency and it is necessary to determine why. Second, the Food Stamp Program is one of the largest means-tested programs in the United States (see Figure 1 on p. 56, in the article by Smallwood). Food Stamp Program participation among the elderly, at present rates, is predicted to double over the next 30 years as the population ages, rising from 1.72 million to 3.36 million by 2030. But if those over 60 began to participate at the same rate as those under 60, the number of elderly enrolled by 2030 would be 6 million, 25 percent of the caseload.

In the research summarized here, we explicitly examine why there are such large age differences in Food Stamp Program participation rates, focusing on two possible explanations—measurement factors and behavioral factors. We find that neither offers a satisfactory explanation for the disparities in participation.

A wide array of financial and demographic information is necessary to determine accurately whether an individual is eligible for food stamps, including labor market earnings, pension income, assets, number of people in the household, out-of-pocket medical expenditures, housing costs, and age. For our analysis, we use the Health and Retirement Study, HRS (1998 and 2000 waves). The HRS is a large, nationally representative survey of individuals over the age of 50 in the 48 contiguous states, providing high-quality information on many factors important to assessing eligibility, including multiple sources of income, assets, and medical expenses.

Measurement factors

One explanation for low take-up rates among various food stamp populations is that they are, in effect, an artifact of measurement error. Measurement error might arise for two reasons: existing surveys have insufficient information to correctly determine eligibility or survey participants provide incorrect responses to various questions that are asked.

Incorrect responses. Even if all necessary eligibility information were asked of survey participants, researchers may still incorrectly assess eligibility if the survey participants respond to questions incorrectly. The likelihood of such error might systematically be related to age, but we find little evidence that such issues are important. We considered the possibility that the elderly respond with unsystematic error and with systematic underreporting of income and wealth.

Behavioral explanations for low take-up

Two common explanations for low take-up of food stamps among the elderly are low expected benefits and high participation costs. Calculated benefits are indeed much lower for the elderly, roughly half the size for those over 80 when compared to those in their 50s, but this is largely because their households are smaller, and benefits are related to household size.

Costs are somewhat harder to measure. The opportunity cost of time is likely to be higher for younger, working people. Health status and physical functioning may be worse among the elderly, making it harder for them to negotiate a complex system and continuously reapply for benefits.

Among other hard-to-measure factors are lack of information, demographic or cultural circumstances, and stigma. Education may be a reasonable proxy for lack of information, on the assumption that better educated people are likely to be better informed and more able to work through the enrollment system (but they are also likely to have higher permanent income). Gender and racial differences in participation could reflect cultural or other unobserved disparities. Moreover, gender and racial composition differ by age.
Even after adjusting for all these factors, it may be that the elderly are simply different in fundamental ways. Their nutritional and other needs, or perceptions of needs, may be lower, for example. Or stigma may be important; older generations that grew up before the major government transfer programs were initiated may have greater distaste for government assistance programs.

Applying regression methods to examine various behavioral explanations, we found support for many of the proposed explanations but the large differences by age remained. Demographic factors among the older population have some direct effects. Most notably, blacks are much more likely to take up food stamps. But the difference between non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics is substantially reduced once financial factors are taken into account. Nor does the age gradient disappear when we take into account participation in other programs such as Supplemental Security Income or cash welfare, on the assumption that people enrolled in these other programs may know more about the Food Stamp Program or be less deterred from applying by issues of stigma. In all, only a modest amount of the age gradient is explained by observed behavioral factors. After these factors are taken into account, a difference in age of 20 years still translates into a difference in food stamp take-up of 12 to 16 percentage points.

The explanation that is perhaps most consistent with our data is that the elderly simply need less food, and thus do not participate in the program. This explanation is consistent with nutritional research that suggests caloric need decreases with age because of metabolic changes. This pattern is consistent with age differences in food expenditures by age in the HRS, which drop from an average of $62 a week among food stamp recipients aged 50–59 to an average of $37 a week among recipients aged 80 and over. Despite their relatively low take-up rate for food stamps, the elderly are far less likely to skip meals, more likely to be food sufficient, and generally have fewer unmet needs than those in their 50s. Among those eligible for, but not receiving food stamps, for example, some 20 percent of people in their 50s report skipping meals and the same proportion has skipped medications. Among those 80 and over, however, only 3 percent report skipping meals and 9 percent have skipped medications.

**Gateways into the Food Stamp Program**

Aaron Yelowitz

After hovering around 19–20 million participants a year for most of the 1980s, the Food Stamp Program began to grow dramatically. Between 1987 and 1993, the number of participants shot up 41 percent, to about 27 million. Equally rapidly, it declined again, down to 18.2 million by 1999. A host of reasons for these changes have been explored in the literature; the research reported in this summary focuses attention on some relatively underappreciated factors—expansions in Medicaid eligibility, the outreach associated with them, and income volatility.

**Medicaid eligibility.** Medicaid, the most expensive means-tested program, also grew rapidly between 1987 and 1993, but unlike Food Stamps it continued to increase throughout the boom years of the 1990s, reaching 39.9 million participants by 1999. The federal government has taken an extremely active role in Medicaid policy. In particular, it greatly expanded eligibility for pregnant women, infants, and children, beginning in 1987 and culminating in the creation of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. Before the expansions, the main way for a poor family with children to qualify was by participating in the welfare program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children. By 1998, approximately 20 percent of U.S. children were eligible for health insurance coverage under Medicaid, regardless of their welfare status, and the eligibility expansions had translated into greater Medicaid coverage. It seems reasonable that households newly eligible for Medicaid may not previously have had much contact with other parts of the welfare system. Thus there exists the possibility of spillovers to the Food Stamp Program.

**Medicaid outreach.** As eligibility expanded, states implemented other changes to streamline Medicaid applications and better inform families about their eligibility. Asset tests were dropped, application forms shortened; applications could be submitted by mail and at multiple sites. Caseworkers were stationed in hospitals to reach parents of newborns, schools and employers were involved in outreach initiatives, and Medicaid was more actively publicized in the media. The various Medicaid outreach initiatives are not well documented, and in this study I simply classify states as “aggressive” and “nonaggressive” in outreach, depending on whether they offered more services than the median state (as reported by the National Governors Association) at any particular time.

**Features of the Food Stamp Program.** Four features of the Food Stamp Program have bearing upon this research. First, benefits are available to nearly all low-income households meeting national eligibility limits for income and assets. Income eligibility is 130 percent of the federal poverty line nationwide, and is indexed to the Consumer Price Index and updated every October. Second, no explicit family structure requirements exist, though benefits and eligibility are linked to family size. Third, there is no direct link to Medicaid. Before 1996, an indirect link existed through AFDC; under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), food stamp eligibility is automatic, but Medicaid eligibility is not. Fourth, income net of deductions is “taxed” at 30 percent under the Food

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Medicaid participation among SIPP households with children hovered around 8.0–8.7 percent. Between 1988 and 1996, it rose dramatically, to 18.5 percent. By 2000, it had fallen to 15 percent. From 1985 to 1993, food stamp participation gradually increased from 8.2 to 11.9 percent. Between 1993 and 1996 it hovered around 11–12 percent. Thereafter it plummeted to 7.1 percent in 2000.

Measuring the effect of Medicaid policy changes is challenging, because the expansions were phased in over time and to different income limits for children of different ages. From family characteristics and standard estimates of medical costs, I construct a “Medicaid replacement rate” that represents the fraction of expected health care expenses for the family that will be covered by Medicaid. The Medicaid replacement rate rose steadily after 1987 and increased predictably as SCHIP was implemented. In 1987, less than 1 percent of household expenses were covered. The fraction of spending covered by Medicaid rose to 8.1 percent in 1996 and to more than 11.7 percent by 2000.

This research points to several robust findings. Medicaid eligibility had strong effects on Medicaid participation, and part of this “spilled over” into Food Stamp Program participation. My estimates suggest that for every 100 families that participated in Medicaid as a result of the expansions, about 27 to 31 families also participated in the Food Stamp Program. State outreach efforts raised overall food stamp participation, but were poorly targeted: participation by those who were eligible for Medicaid was less than was participation by those who were ineligible. Finally, income volatility had a significant negative effect on Food Stamp Program participation. If a household moves from the 25th to the 75th percentile in income variability—that is, the range of possible variation in its annual income rises from $418 to $1,282—participation is reduced by 1.3–2.0 percentage points. This very large effect suggests that high transaction costs may have outweighed the low benefits when the period of food stamp receipt was expected to be short.

WIC eligibility and participation

Marianne Bitler, Janet Currie, and John Karl Scholz

The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) provides nutrition education and food supplements to pregnant and lactating women, infants, and children under age 5 who are considered to be at nutritional risk. To qualify for WIC, families must have incomes below 185 percent of poverty. If they are receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, food stamps, or Medicaid, they are eligible for WIC regardless of income. In the 25 years since it was authorized as a permanent program, WIC has grown steadily. In 1999 the program served over 7 million women and children a month, at an annual cost of $3.9 billion.

There is no single, representative national data set with comprehensive information about WIC eligibility, the factors that might determine participation, and health outcomes for WIC participants and nonparticipants. Because we lack information about which families are eligible for WIC, and which eligible families choose to participate, it is difficult to budget for it accurately or to evaluate the effects of the program on health. Less is known about the determinants of eligibility and participation in WIC than in other social assistance programs such as Medicaid or Food Stamps. In recent years, for example, the number participating in WIC has exceeded the estimates of those eligible to participate that are produced annually by the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. And although evaluations suggest that pregnant women who participate in WIC have healthier children than those who do not, we do not know whether this is because of WIC itself or because of the characteristics of the women who choose to participate in WIC. Nor do we know much about the effects of the program on children aged 1–4, even though children constitute the largest and most rapidly growing segment of the WIC caseload.

The research reported in this article asks whether two national panel data sets, the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), can provide some of the missing information about WIC eligibility and participation. Questions regarding WIC participation were added to the CPS in the 1995 Food Security Supplements and again in 1998 in the main Annual Demographic File, but because the CPS asks only about annual income, it is impossible to determine
monthly income with any accuracy and thus difficult to
tell if people are actually eligible for WIC at any particu-
lar point. The SIPP, though based on a smaller sample of
households, does collect monthly data on income, pro-
gram participation, and household characteristics.

We begin by examining the extent to which the CPS and
SIPP reports of participation are consistent with WIC ad-
ministrative totals. We find that both panel data sets signifi-
cantly undercount participants. The Food Security Supple-
timents to the CPS capture only about 70 percent of the total
number reported in the WIC administrative data, and only
about 60 percent of infants. The Annual Demographic File
of the CPS and the SIPP do rather better, but still only about
three-quarters of infant recipients appear in the SIPP. Par-
ticipants in other transfer programs are much more accu-
rately reported: the CPS, for example, reports around 85
percent of food stamp recipients, and the SIPP around 90
percent. The missing WIC recipients are not concentrated in
any one group; they are randomly distributed across the
various categories of eligibility. Moreover, the characte-
ristics of families receiving WIC in the CPS and the SIPP
match the characteristics reported in the administrative data,
with one major exception: family incomes are higher in both
the CPS and the SIPP (either because incomes are
underreported to WIC administrators or because WIC par-
ticipants gain eligibility at times when their incomes are at a
temporarily low ebb).

What do these data tell us about actual participation rates
in WIC among eligibles? We use the SIPP to examine this
question. We calculate that there are 44–51 percent more
households eligible for WIC than is implied in the FNS
budget estimates, which use the CPS. In contrast to FNS
estimates, we base eligibility on monthly rather than an-
nual income, account for eligibility arising from partici-
pation in other transfer programs, and model the fact that
once infants are deemed eligible they are eligible until
their first birthday (and we similarly model certification
periods for pregnant women under children aged 1–4).
We estimate that 58 percent of all infants, 57 percent of
all U.S. children aged 1–4, and 54 percent of pregnant
and postpartum women are eligible for WIC, either be-
cause of income or because they are participating in an-
other program. But actual participation rates for eligible
individuals are 73 percent among infants, only about 38
percent among children, and 67 percent among pregnant
and postpartum women. Clearly, a program that served all
eligible families would be very much larger than the
current program, but because WIC is not an entitlement,
greater take-up among eligible families could create se-
vere fiscal stress.

Using both CPS and SIPP data, we examine factors corre-
lated with participation in WIC. A better grasp of these
factors may make it possible to (1) examine how state
policy choices in administering the WIC program may
affect participation; (2) enhance outreach and targeting
efforts by better identifying the economic and demo-
graphic characteristics of families that choose to partici-
pate; and (3) explore the extent to which outcomes for
children participating in WIC are a result of the program
itself or reflect the greater capabilities of parents who
choose to participate in the program.

In characterizing state policy variations, we examine the
value of the WIC package provided to women, whether
benefits are distributed monthly or at longer intervals,
whether and to what extent women are required to docu-
ment their income (federal law made verification manda-
tory in January 2000), and when a state determines that a
pregnant woman is at nutritional risk (states are required
to determine hemoglobin and hematocrit levels of preg-
nant women, but may set their own nutritional-risk cutoff
point). These criteria measure both the costs to families
of participating in the program and the strictness of state
requirements.

Demographic and economic data are collected in both the
SIPP and the CPS. From SIPP, we have indicators of the
educational achievement of the mother, of family income,
of race and ethnicity, and of participation in other social
assistance programs. The CPS, which has a greater
sample size and longer time series, allows us also to
consider state characteristics such as the unemployment
rate, the share of the population that is poor, and the share
living in metropolitan areas. Thus we can examine such
issues as the extent to which variations in WIC participa-
tion within a state are driven by economic need, differ-
ences in participation among ethnic groups, and links
between participation in other programs, the generosity
of their benefits, and WIC participation.

Our various analyses lead to some intriguing findings.
Here, very briefly, we give a few examples. We find that
variations in WIC participation are not strongly related to
state levels of need, at least as measured by the unem-
ployment or poverty rates. But participation is correlated
with the features of WIC programs in different states.
People are, not surprisingly, more likely to participate
when the value of the food package is higher, and less
likely to participate when stricter proof of income is
required and the nutritional risk cutoff is higher. But,
unexpectedly, participation is higher if WIC benefits are
disbursed monthly, requiring more trips to the office,
rather than at two- or three-month intervals. Participation
is significantly higher among families that are eligible
because they are receiving food stamps and, especially,
Medicaid. Medicaid recipients, for instance, are over 50
percent more likely to be receiving WIC than are eligible
families not participating in Medicaid.

At the individual level, participation is strongly associ-
ated with demographic characteristics such as education,
race, and marital status. WIC participation falls as educa-
tional attainment increases, even though the SIPP-based
analysis includes only those low-income families eligible
for WIC. African American or Hispanic households are
more likely to participate than non-Hispanic white households, but Asian households are less likely. Households with married respondents are more likely to participate than single-parent households, perhaps because single parents are less able to negotiate the transactions costs involved in applying. Households in metropolitan areas are less likely to participate than those in less urban areas.

Knowing who receives (and does not receive) WIC is only the first step in a complete policy analysis of WIC benefits. In particular, the analysis does not provide information on whether WIC is beneficial to families, and, if it is, whether the benefits exceed the cost of providing them. But the SIPP does provide some data relevant to these questions. For example, it includes parents’ reports on their children’s well-being that ascertain widely used indicators such as children’s height and weight. Children at either extreme of weight and height are of concern—improper nutrition may result in stunted growth or obesity, which are linked to many health and developmental difficulties. In a preliminary analysis, we find that WIC participation is associated with a higher probability of healthy weight-for-age and length-for-age ratios among children younger than 2. Given that the more poorly educated mothers are more likely to participate than the better-educated mothers, we conjecture that the effect of WIC on children’s well-being may, if anything, have been underestimated.

The correlates and consequences of welfare exit and entry: Evidence from the Three-City Study

Robert Moffitt and Katie Winder

For program analysts working with targeted social assistance programs, a good understanding of the extent of volatility in the caseload is important to budgetary decisions and proper evaluation of the effects of the program. The state and federal welfare reforms of the mid-1990s were associated with declines in participation that were precipitous in the case of cash welfare, but also significant for programs such as Medicaid and Food Stamps. Most research investigating the employment and income consequences of these reforms has focused on those who have left welfare. It is, however, equally important to understand the consequences for those who entered Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) after the reforms and for potentially eligible families who did not enter welfare. The research reported in this article explores postreform patterns of welfare program use, income, and employment among poor families, using data from the Three-City Study, a longitudinal survey of about 2,400 families with children living in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods in Boston, Chicago, and San Antonio.

The Three-City Study is collecting data on employment, income, family structure, and characteristics of the caregiver (usually the mother) as well as data on children, although this report will focus only on the former. The first two waves of interviews took place from March to December 1999 and from September 2000 to May 2001, and a third wave is in the planning stages. An ethnographic study collected information on a monthly basis from an additional 242 families living in the same neighborhoods. All families had incomes below 200 percent of the federal poverty line. About one-third of all caregivers in the sample did not have a high school diploma or General Equivalency Degree (GED). Most mothers were between 25 and 35 years old, and one-third were married. About a quarter reported poor or fair health. All city samples included non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and Hispanic families, though in somewhat different proportions. Mothers in Chicago had the lowest education and the worst health among the samples in the three cities. Hispanic mothers had the lowest education levels and the highest marriage rates among the three main ethnic groups.

The three cities can be considered broadly representative in their rates of employment growth and decline (which postdates the data analyzed here), but state TANF policies are rather different. Massachusetts is a high-benefit state with a very short time limit (two years out of every five) and a fairly strict sanctions policy, but it exempts many families from the two-year limit and has no lifetime limit on welfare receipt. Texas is a low-benefit state with a complicated set of time limits and the lowest earnings disregards among the three states; it is a Work First state with an official diversion policy. Illinois, a medium-benefit state, maintains the five-year federal limit on benefits but “stops the clock” on the five-year limit for families working 30 or more hours a week. Work requirements are not imposed so quickly as in Massachusetts or Texas, and the state has no official diversion policy.

Welfare turnover rates among these families were very high. Between Waves 1 and 2, the proportion of the sample that was on TANF declined from 32 to 25 percent. Almost half of those receiving TANF at the Wave 1 interviews were off welfare by Wave 2, 18 months later. The numbers of new entrants were also relatively small: 71 percent of those still on TANF at Wave 2 had been on TANF at Wave 1. Yet the average level of educational disadvantage in the sample remained about the same—almost half of the caseload at each point had no high school diploma. This stability is at first sight puzzling, since research on welfare turnover shows that the most disadvantaged women stay on welfare the longest and that those who move on and off are less disadvantaged. We found, however, that new entrants onto TANF were more
likely to have a high school diploma or GED than either those who stayed or those who left, and thus the average rate of educational disadvantage changed little. New entrants had better physical health than those who stayed on welfare—stayers reported by far the worst health and highest rate of depression in the sample—but were much more likely to report “fair or poor health” at Wave 2 than they had at Wave 1, and this may have contributed to their entry into TANF.

The patterns of employment transitions that accompany movement on and off welfare by mothers in the sample are complex (Figure 1). Overall, the mean employment rate of women in the sample increased from 47 percent in Wave 1 to 56 percent in Wave 2. But when we examine the different welfare transition groups separately, we find that increases in employment came equally among women not on welfare at either time and women who left welfare. This is of some significance, because higher employment rates among low-income women in the later 1990s have frequently been attributed primarily to increased employment among former or current welfare recipients. As the Three-City Study shows, this may not be the case.

What patterns of income change does the survey reveal? Again, the answer is complex:

- *Families who were on TANF at both times* saw an increase of about $135 a month, a 11 percent rise that almost entirely resulted from increases in their own earnings and earnings of other household members. Despite the increased income, TANF benefits among this group fell only slightly.

- *Families who left TANF* saw an increase of $166; although they had large increases in earnings, they also experienced significant declines in TANF, Food Stamp, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and Social Security benefits that left them with income gains of around 13 percent.

![Figure 1. Employment transitions of mothers.](image-url)
- Families that entered TANF saw income declines. Earnings fell for all family members. So did income from SSI, suggesting that loss of other benefits might be one of the events that precipitate TANF entry. The increases in TANF and food stamp benefits that accompanied entry did not offset other income losses.

- Families that were off welfare at both times experienced large income gains, almost $700 a month, and poverty in this group declined from 51 to 33 percent. These families, therefore, are responsible for the lion’s share—around 83 percent—of the increase in mean income among all families.

One of the most important conclusions from these data is that the income gains from combining earnings with TANF, food stamps, and other public assistance benefits are about the same as the income gains from moving off welfare altogether. Thus the incremental income advantage of moving off welfare is approximately zero. Especially for women who are uncertain about their prospects of regular employment, moving off welfare carries serious risks. Among women in this sample who left welfare and continued to be unemployed, income fell significantly and deep poverty rose—at Wave 2, over 50 percent had incomes of less than $1,000 a month.

Participation in TANF programs affects participation in other social assistance programs also. Those who left experienced declines in Food Stamp and Medicaid assistance, as other research has also shown. Among families that were on TANF in Wave 1, but had left by Wave 2, Food Stamp participation dropped from 84 to 56 percent. Participation rates and benefits increased for those entering TANF, suggesting that it is easier to obtain these benefits if one is also receiving TANF.

Why did the welfare rolls fall if the income gains from work alone were as small as they appear to be, relative to the gains from combining welfare and working? There are many possible explanations, three of which we can explore with the Three-City Study data.

1. Some significant fraction of exits was involuntary and the result of sanctions. Across the entire sample, about 18 percent gave sanctions as a reason for leaving, and another 8 percent said they had hit a time limit. Time limits were most often cited in Boston, with its short two-year limit on receipt, and sanctions were imposed most heavily in Chicago, where over a third of leavers gave that as the reason.

2. Some significant fraction of the work of welfare stayers was involuntary and the result of work requirements. Over half of respondents who were on TANF were told they had to comply with some kind of work requirement.

3. Entry onto TANF was discouraged by involuntary diversion and other front-door barriers. Of those who applied for TANF, 38 percent were asked by a caseworker to discuss a plan for getting by without welfare, 24 percent were diverted to a different program, and 29 percent were given temporary cash assistance in lieu of welfare; about 66 percent of those who applied eventually received benefits. The high levels of diversion appear to have affected the decisions of many who thought about applying or visited the welfare office—almost a third of these two groups cited “too much hassle” as the reason they did not apply. Among those who visited the office, about another third stated that the caseworker “discouraged” them from applying or that the welfare office had treated them “badly.”

From this evidence alone, it seems clear that nonfinancial barriers played a strong role in people’s decisions about welfare over the time of the study. But despite the presence of sanctions, work requirements, and diversion, the history of welfare policy suggests that in the long run, financial incentives play a strong role in determining work and welfare decisions. In designing welfare programs, then, policymakers must decide whether to give a higher priority to moving women off welfare or inducing them to work; contrary to conventional wisdom, these goals may often be at odds.

### Measuring the well-being of the poor using income and consumption

Bruce D. Meyer and James X. Sullivan

The research reported in this article examines the quality of income and consumption measures of material well-being for households with limited resources, exploring both conceptual and measurement issues. The research presents empirical analyses that directly examine the relative quality of measures of income and consumption, and examines whether income or consumption is more closely related to other measures of well-being for the poor.

Previous work on well-being has relied almost exclusively on income to measure economic deprivation in the United States. But for families with few resources, where the extent of material deprivation is most important, there is significant evidence suggesting that income is mis-measured. Also, for a number of reasons, current income may not be a good measure of well-being for poor families. For example, large temporary fluctuations in current income that arise from a job loss or changes in family status may overstate actual changes in well-being. Survey data on income also fail to capture important components of the total resources available to poor families. For example, income does not capture certain in-kind transfers such as Medicaid or the “insurance” value of means-tested transfers. Thus, recent changes in Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, for example, are likely to affect family well-being, but this effect will
not be reflected in survey income. Income measures also fail to capture off-the-books earnings that are an important source of income for families with limited resources.

There are several reasons that consumption may be a better measure of the material well-being of the poor. Consumption is a more direct measure of material well-being, and it is more likely to capture the value of certain in-kind transfers and the insurance value of transfers. Ethnographic research on poor households in the United States suggests that consumption is better reported than income for households with few resources. Off-the-books work or illegal activities that are not captured in reports of income will be reflected in consumption behavior. With consumption data one can take into account relative price changes in different categories of expenditures, which may be particularly important if the “market basket” of goods consumed by those with few resources differs from that of the average household.

One reason that income is commonly used to measure material well-being is that income is easy to report because it often comes from a small number of sources and is reported on government tax forms. Consumption, on the other hand, is based on spending on a wide variety of goods and services, making it more difficult to report accurately. The ease of reporting income relative to consumption, however, is less evident for poor households. These households often have income from a number of different sources, including earnings, transfer income, and off-the-books income. Much of the consumption for these disadvantaged families, on the other hand, can be accounted for with expenditures on food and housing.

Analyses of survey data on income show that these data are underreported for families with few resources. Moreover, the extent of underreporting has changed over time. Under Aid to Families with Dependent Children there were strong incentives for potential recipients of welfare to conceal or reduce the value of income from other sources; after passage of welfare reform and other program changes in the 1990s, these incentives were greatly reduced. Thus, reported income for these families might rise even if the true amount of income did not. Transfer income, an important component of income for poor households, is also significantly underreported, and the rate at which these transfers are underreported has increased noticeably over time. Between 1993 and 1997 underreported cash transfers grew by 68 percent for those near the bottom of the income distribution.

Income data tend to be available for larger samples than consumption data, allowing patterns to be determined with greater precision and hypotheses to be tested with greater power. Furthermore, income measures are available in many datasets that include a rich set of demographic variables and other variables of interest. Surveys that include total household consumption are limited by the high costs associated with collecting these data.

This study examines measures of material well-being from several sources, including the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and the March Current Population Survey (CPS). The CE and the PSID provide both income and expenditure data for the same families; the March CPS provides only income data. Income data are better in the PSID than in the CE, but the CE provides far more comprehensive measures of expenditures.

We focus on disadvantaged families as defined by demographic characteristics—those headed by low-educated single mothers aged 18–54. To reflect the resources available to these families we use an after-tax measure of income which includes earnings, public transfers, the cash value of food stamps, and asset income. To construct a measure of consumption we use data on total household expenditures, converting expenditures on durable goods to a service flow in order to smooth over the lumpy nature of these purchases. Also, we exclude from expenditures investment spending such as education, retirement contributions, and health care. In the PSID, we predict total consumption using data on spending for food and housing.

Our comparisons of consumption and income provide strong evidence that income is underreported and measured with substantial error, especially for those with few resources such as low-educated single mothers. Consumption for those near the bottom greatly exceeds reported income. For example, a household at the 10th percentile of reported income brings in $4,551 of income, whereas a household at the 10th percentile of reported consumption consumes $6,748, suggesting that the most disadvantaged households outspend their incomes by nearly 50 percent. These differences between expenditures and income cannot be explained with evidence of borrowing or drawing down wealth, as these families rarely have substantial assets or debts. This difference between income and consumption could also arise if consumption is overreported, but comparisons of microlevel consumption data to national aggregates provide no evidence of overreporting of consumption in these surveys. Other evidence in survey income data suggests that earnings reports are understated. For example, the implied hourly wage rate for these disadvantaged families is often implausibly low. More than 25 percent of all low-educated single mothers report earnings in the CPS that imply a wage below the federal minimum.

We also examine whether low consumption or low income is more closely associated with independent measures of material hardship or well-being such as health outcomes, the size of the residence, or ownership of durable goods such as cars or major appliances. For single mothers, the analysis suggests that material hardship and other adverse outcomes are more evident for households with low consumption than for those with low income, indicating that consumption does a better job of capturing well-being for disadvantaged families.
We conclude that the case for using consumption as a measure of well-being of the poor is fairly strong. Conceptually, consumption is a better measure of material well-being. There is persuasive evidence that income is underreported among the poor and that this underreporting has changed over time. Moreover, low levels of consumption appear to be more strongly related to other measures of hardship. This evidence suggests that consumption should be used more often in studies examining the well-being of poor households.

There is solid evidence from small, in-depth surveys that much better data about well-being can be obtained by asking detailed questions about income and consumption in the same survey and reconciling the two information sources. The evidence we present here suggests that we should use consumption to supplement income in analyses of poverty wherever possible. It is worth investigating whether these ideas are feasible in a nationally representative survey of a large number of families.
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