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CONTROL-SHARING OF ADMINISTRATIVE
FUNCTIONS IN THE CITY

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ABSTRACT

This paper is an examination of the current movement in cities to share administration and policy-making functions in public service bureaucracies with lay clientele or neighborhood residents. The paper first makes a distinction between two forms of control-sharing--decentralization and client representation--and explores the differences between them in regard to organization, the criteria by which administrative standards may be established, the availability of the bureaucracy, and the sources of lay influence or control in the policy-making process.

A second purpose is to trace the origins of control-sharing ideas to their roots in American federalism and developing notions of participatory democracy.

Finally, the paper closes with an argument that improvement of service delivery offers only one (and perhaps not the most important) justification for control-sharing experiments. Another justification is that such institutional arrangements promise to provide the psychological resources necessary for the development by politically deprived or inexperienced groups of integral political communities. These resources include recognition, community, individual psychic resources such as a sense of efficacy, and the commitment of the larger society to goals defined and sought by the poor.

Of the many striking political developments of the past ten years in American cities, two stand out in sharp relief. One is the beginning rise of potentially powerful black constituencies, uncertain of their strength, expectant, and occasionally violent. The other is a generalized sense of crisis, characterized, depending upon one's perspective, either by the conviction that we have lost control over the urban environment or by the realization of the magnitude of the difficulties we face in gaining control in the first place. The two phenomena are not unrelated. They are indeed linked by the fact that the political movements these developments have given rise to share a common antipathy toward big and centralized city government.

Blacks have always suffered a dilution of their power in centralized urban political systems. There is, for example, much evidence to indicate that cities with at-large councilmanic elections are less responsive to minority group demands than are cities with ward-based elections.¹ And blacks have traditionally opposed metropolitan consolidation reform efforts on similar grounds.² In addition the achievement by blacks of the first rudimentary organizational resources necessary to enter the urban political process has often brought disappointing results. As Herbert Kaufman has pointed out, not only have they discovered that the process of building access to political structures is a long and slow one, but they also encounter well-organized, entrenched interests (the city public employees unions are examples), schooled in the art of getting what they want from big city government, which block their aspirations.³ In the big arena of the city, the experience and resources blacks can bring to bear to back their demands place them at a disadvantage in contests with established groups. For these reasons, then, black antipathy toward big and centralized city government is not difficult to understand.

For somewhat different reasons the sense of crisis (what James Wilson has called the "urban unease") is also marked by a revulsion toward urban political institutions in their current dimensions. Big city government has not, perhaps, neglected the interests of most city dwellers in the same way that it has often neglected those of the Negro. But living with

big government has apparently robbed many of them of the feeling that they can control their immediate, that is, their neighborhood, environment.⁴ People seem to feel that things have gotten out of hand: those with the means flee the cities, and a substantial majority of Americans express a preference for life in small towns or suburbs.⁵

One apparent reaction to the confrontation of the urban citizenry and its big governments has been the call to reduce the latter to manageable proportions either by breaking it up in some way or by seeking devices to mitigate its size and concentration. This call has taken a variety of forms over the past decade, and it has emanated from a diversity of sources. To some extent the history of the reaction can be traced through its catch-phrases and battle cries. The earliest and a still persistent strain has been the call for participatory democracy or, as it is more likely to be put today, "citizen participation." Private foundations (Ford), the federal government, liberal wings of professional associations (planners), and community voluntary and political associations of various hues have all at different times advocated mechanisms for involving citizens on a formal basis in the affairs of big government. More recently many of these same groups, dissatisfied with the limitations of mere participation, have begun to demand "local control" or "community control."

Today there are few American cities without some evidence of the attraction of these ideas. The federal government provided incentive and a model when it institutionalized citizen participation ("maximum feasible participation") on a wide scale through the community action program. Over 1000 communities currently have anti-poverty boards with citizen representatives of the poor. Many cities are beginning to experiment without the stimulus of the federal government. For example, a report on the status of school decentralization in all of its possible forms indicates that by the end of 1969 at least 31 cities and metropolitan governments were considering the decentralization of their educational systems or have actually begun such experiments.⁶ One city, Washington, D.C., is considering a serious proposal for subjecting the police to some degree of direct popular control,⁷ and at least three others have established

officially sanctioned citizen auxiliary peace-keeping patrols. Several additional cities have such patrols which are not sanctioned by the police.⁸

Pressure for similar experiments has spread to other municipal service agencies. The Department of Housing and Urban Development reports that tenant representatives now sit on the public housing authorities in a dozen cities, and tenant control has become a major demand.⁹ Social workers and community organizers have also advocated representative roles for welfare recipients on public welfare boards. Conceivably, the same principle of client representation could be applied to many other urban service agencies. In short the movement to counter big, centralized city government is variegated and to all appearances, growing in momentum.

As is perhaps customary in response to reform proposals which capture the activist imagination, policy planners and practitioners have tended to plunge into these experiments with little sense of what they signify.¹⁰ This paper represents an attempt to examine this complex reaction to big urban government with the intentions in mind of making clear what these reforms entail, establishing the intellectual and political contexts within which they are taking place, and attempting to understand the meaning of the demand for such reforms.¹¹

It is essential at the outset to lay out some definitions. I propose to examine not only the form of what I shall call control-sharing arrangements but also the demand for them. A control-sharing arrangement is, for the purposes of this paper, a form of administrative and political organization of municipal service agencies in which the authority to make policy decisions about service levels and general administrative standards is shared among professional bureaucrats, elected officials, and citizen representatives of geographical neighborhoods or particular client groups. I shall not deal with various federally backed programs such as Model Cities or community action, except insofar as they provide models, nor shall I be concerned with proposals which involve private funding or sponsorship such as community economic development corporations. Furthermore, control-sharing does not refer to the hiring by the service bureaucracy in question

of minority group members or service clients as regular employees. My concern is exclusively with the sharing of policy-making authority in urban service bureaucracies.

The analysis is based on the abstraction of elements from both current experiments in existence and from proposals or demands for such schemes. No effort is made to examine how such arrangements will probably work: my interest here is how they would ideally work.

There are two principal forms of control-sharing. One may be called decentralization, a form of organization designed to share control through the transfer of some policy-making authority to residents of particular neighborhood territories. The second may be called client representation, a scheme for sharing control by institutionalizing representation of client groups on bodies vested with policy-making powers over bureaucratic agencies.

Two ideal-type models will serve to provide reference points. In a decentralized system both administration and policy-making occur at two levels in the city: at a central or city-wide level and at the local or neighborhood level. Citizen representatives are selected by neighborhood residents to make local policy subject to certain general guidelines and budgetary constraints determined at the central level (or sometimes, as in the case of education, by the state as well). Members of the body vested with policy-making power at the central level include representatives from the neighborhood policy boards. Administrators, that is, bureaucrats, tend to be professionals at both levels.

In a client representation system there is only a central bureaucracy in the city. However, a policy-making board for that bureaucracy includes representatives of the particular clientele the agency serves. The two types of control-sharing might, of course, overlap. For example, decentralized policy boards might include only representatives of local (neighborhood) clients rather than representatives of all local residents. For our purposes, however, it is best to keep the two forms analytically distinct, for they are different in important ways. Yet both are similar in that they confer authority on people whose legitimacy as policy-makers in bureaucratic organizations was hitherto unrecognized.¹²

The initial task of this analysis is to examine the basic elements and their implications of these two types of control-sharing arrangements. These elements are: the basis upon which the policy-making and administration of the bureaucracy is organized; the criteria by which administrative standards are established; the extent to which the bureaucracy is available to those who wish to influence it; and the nature of the source of control over bureaucratic policy-making.

Decentralization

1. Organization. The decentralization of any municipal service bureaucracy is based on the creation of a federal scheme of organization. To speak of federalism implies two important points. One is that the first principle of organization of a federal system is territorial subdivision. The second is that the notion of federalism implies a division of authority between the central and constituent levels.

What is important about the idea of territory as the basis of decentralized organization is that those who advocate such reform need not assume the prior existence of integral, self-conscious "communities" based on common demographic characteristics. Territorial subdivision may and usually does reflect ethnically or racially segregated residential patterns, but the organization of the system does not assume that these population groupings comprise communities with a sense of their own cohesiveness and capabilities. By the very act of defining the geographical boundaries of a subdivision, a decentralized system actually serves to form a political community. Each subdivision becomes the locus of an integral political life, which revolves initially around the administration and control of the service in question. (The political habits acquired in managing the public service may carry over later into other areas of political concern.) The creation of territorial subdivisions with formal boundaries establishes a legal and psychological basis for defining localized political interests. Thus in the case of decentralization it is formal territorial definition and not the demographic homogeneity of a residential neighborhood that establishes the integrity of the political community. By acknowledging the territorial basis of decentralization we come to understand that the formation of cohesive political communities is as likely to be a consequence as a cause of such organization.

Federalism also implies a division of authority between the territorial subunits and the central governing apparatus. Hence in a decentralized system the former jurisdictions are never constituted as wholly autonomous units, free to follow the dictates of their own localized political ambitions in all matters of service administration. The central apparatus retains various powers such as the establishment of certain basic standards and the allocation of funds to the various subunits.

The very fact that authority is shared poses a problem fundamental to any federal system: namely, what are the appropriate concerns of the subunit policy-makers and what are those of the central apparatus? One purpose in creating decentralized subunits in the cities is to protect citizens from the insensitivities or possibly discriminatory practices of the central bureaucracy. This would suggest that there are at least two areas over which the subunits should always exercise ultimate authority.

One area concerns the selection, control, and evaluation of what Lipsky has called "street-level bureaucrats,"¹³ those implementors of public policies, such as teachers, policemen, welfare case workers, and lower court judges, whose behavior most directly affects the experiences people have with public services. All of these personnel functions may be performed within the framework of a civil service system, the standards of which guarantee a certain minimum degree of qualification and basic protection for the street-level bureaucrats.

A second area is the determination of appropriate service priorities and standards of administration. Which laws will be strictly enforced and which ones leniently?¹⁴ How will truancy be treated? What kinds of educational experimentation should be funded?

In both areas local preferences and standards can be brought to bear at the point of contact between citizen and public servant, making less likely the perpetration by the central bureaucracy of practices repugnant to certain local areas or the assignment or retention of personnel insensitive to local needs.

2. Standards and the scope of administration. A second element of a decentralized urban system derives directly from its federal nature. In any such form of organization the territorial scope of administration is reduced, thereby permitting policy-makers and administrators to devise

standards peculiarly suited to their particular subdivision. Centralized administrative systems are designed, of course, to formulate and impose a uniform set of standards for an entire territorial jurisdiction. These standards must be geared either to meet some notion of the mean demand or they are devised in response to the needs of the politically dominant group in the jurisdiction.

Where the needs of a particular group fall far from the mean or where that group has little political power, it may be expected that the standards by which the members of the group are served will not meet their particular requirements. In a decentralized system however, policy-makers and administrators may devise special standards to meet localized demands and needs. Within their territorial subdivisions, groups with minority status in relation to the urban population taken as a whole may exercise dominant political power, and it is in response to this power that standards will be set.

The logic of locally specialized standards would seem most persuasive for cities in which the population is heterogeneous and at the same time residentially segregated. In every city distinct residential territories do exist, their lines drawn not only most apparently along racial lines but also along ethnic and class lines. Special standards for black ghettos seem especially appropriate in light of the evidence of the failure of many urban services, notably school systems and police forces, to meet black demands and needs.

The patchwork quilt model of urban residential patterns, however, does not constitute the only condition under which the logic of territorially specialized standards of administration might hold. Many urban subdivisions will be socially heterogeneous. But heterogeneity does not rule out the possibility that demands and needs might be quite distinctive from those of neighboring subdivisions. Needs in fact might be distinctive because the population is heterogeneous. Special needs may also be a function of a subdivision's location in the city rather than its population composition (it may border a high crime area, for example).

In short, any urban subdivision, whether its population shares social characteristics or not, may have both objective and subjective needs distinct from those of other territories in the city. Decentralization not only crystallizes the awareness of those needs by helping to form a political

community but also enables administrators to meet them without having to take into account the widely divergent demands expressed in a centralized system.

The student of urban politics might justly raise the point here that public services are presently--even in their largely centralized state--administered differently in different parts of the city. We know, for example, that the police respond to blacks in a manner different from the way they respond to middle class whites. Yet there is a crucial distinction to make between the present system and decentralization. In the former system varying standards and practices are determined within the bureaucratic hierarchy or by street-level bureaucrats without required reference to the expression of citizen sentiment on an institutionalized basis. In a decentralized system citizen control over the administration of the service in question is formally guaranteed. Hence, pressures for different standards in different subdivisions of the city originate from those who receive the service rather than those who offer it.

3. The availability of the bureaucracy. A third element of a decentralized system of administration is the relative intimacy with which interaction takes place between policy-makers and administrators on the one hand and clients on the other. Essentially, the bureaucracy is more available to its clientele than in a centralized system of organization.

Availability may be understood in at least three different ways. In the first place the physical routes of access are literally closer to the people served. Administrators and policy-makers make important decisions about a small territory, and that is where their offices are located. Citizens who wish to influence decisions or who wish to lodge a complaint about certain practices need not make the long trip downtown. Both the legal authority and the physical seat of power in a decentralized system are located in the neighborhoods of the territorial subdivision.

The implications of this physical availability are perhaps especially important for poor people. Caplovitz has pointed out, for example, that in regard to their shopping patterns, poor people are inclined to stay within the physical confines of their neighborhoods.¹⁵ It is reasonable to speculate that the same complex of factors that lead to parochial shopping habits (Caplovitz cites the "degree of sophistication in the ways of urban

society," a function of education, length of residence, and proficiency in English) might be operative in determining the likelihood that a citizen would venture from his immediate residential environment to make a demand on government. If poor people are indeed more oriented toward institutions, commercial and otherwise, which are located in their neighborhoods rather than downtown, then one might assume that placing government bureaucracies close to them would make those agencies more available.

In a second sense availability might also be understood as a function of the social context of the political relationships in the subunit. Elected policy-makers will presumably share similar life experiences and perspectives with the clients of the agency they govern. Being "of the people" they are likely to be perceived as potentially more responsive and more understanding than professional bureaucrats. Hence clients are likely to have greater confidence that they will be heard if they attempt influence or voice a complaint. In this sense the policy-makers make the bureaucracy more available to its clients.

Finally, the availability of the bureaucrat may be understood as a function of the extent to which any given type of demand directed at the bureaucracy must compete with other types of demands. In a centralized system bureaucracies must handle, if not respond to, a wide range of types of demands. This range encompasses widely divergent and competing types. However, unless the territorial subdivision in a decentralized system is a true microcosm of the system as a whole (an unlikely event), the range of types of demands made on the subdivision bureaucracy is likely to be much smaller. This situation makes for concentration and focus. The competition of the larger polity is attenuated in the subdivision. Bureaucrats may concentrate on a relatively circumscribed range of demands. Each type of demand in the narrower range of types may receive proportionally greater attention. In a system of limited competition, then, the bureaucrat is more available to each demand maker.

4. The source of control. Finally, urban decentralization involves a substantial reformulation of the means by which public bureaucracies are controlled in the American democratic system. In the established framework of American government citizens pay no direct, formal role in the

governance of bureaucratic agencies that serve them. Instead they influence (but do not control) bureaucracies indirectly through their elected executives and legislative bodies or directly through interest group activity.

A decentralized system, however, vests controlling authority for certain critical operations of the bureaucracy in question in the hand of the residents of the subdivision the agency serves. Invariably, this arrangement takes the form of democratically elected citizen policy-making boards, whose task it is to oversee the local administrators and to set basic policy. The establishment of an elected board to make policy for the operations in a given territory contrasts with more common modes of bureaucratic policy-making, namely, those which occur through executive-appointed agency heads, bureaucratic staff groups, or high level civil servants. These latter modes continue, of course, to operate but in conjunction with the lay boards. Hence the term "control-sharing."

The powers lodged in such citizen boards are not inconsequential. In the newly decentralized school system in New York City, for example, the community school boards are authorized to employ a district superintendent and establish his duties, to appoint, promote and discharge teachers, and to determine and select all instructional materials, among other powers.¹⁶

In summary, a decentralized control-sharing form of administrative organization implies federal territorial subdivision; reduction of the territorial scope of administrative concern, which enables policy-makers to set special standards applicable to the distinctive needs of the subdivision population; relatively intimate interaction between clients and policy-makers and bureaucrats, such that the latter two groups are easily available to the former; and finally the direct sharing by the subdivision citizenry of the burden of control over the decentralized bureaucratic agency.

Client Representation

Clients in the sense that I shall use the term are users or consumers of government services.¹⁷ Client representation is a form of organization whereby the producers of a particular public service (the bureaucrats) must

share control over what is to be produced with the consumers of that service. The mechanism for such control-sharing is the formally guaranteed presence of democratically selected client representatives on bureaucratic policy-making boards.

The representation of interest groups affected by a given bureaucracy's behavior on administrative policy-making boards is not an unfamiliar phenomenon. Several European countries practice this form of organization,¹⁸ and this country relied heavily upon the principle of interest group representation during the Depression and World War II.¹⁹ Even today American regulatory agencies are often manned by representatives of the industries they are empowered to regulate. But client representation in the cities constitutes a departure from these more traditional modes of organization in at least two ways.

One is that interest group representation has normally been found on the boards on regulatory agencies, whereas client representation is geared to bureaucratic agencies concerned with the implementation of distributive or redistributive policies, to use Lowi's terms.²⁰ Two examples of the new types are the inclusion of public housing tenants on municipal housing authority boards and the proposals for sharing control of the welfare bureaucracy with welfare recipients. A second difference is the departure from the traditional arrangement which enabled representatives of private producers to control their own production under the aegis of governmental authority. This is exemplified by the elected county-level farm production boards of the Depression years.²¹ The new urban client representation is designed, however, to allow consumers to share in the control of the producers. The client representatives then, are not primarily concerned with the regulation of client behavior, but rather with controlling the behavior of those that serve the clients.

Let us turn now to an examination of the implications of client representation and its relationship to decentralized forms of control sharing.

1. Organization. In contrast to decentralization, client representation is dependent upon a functional basis of organization rather than a territorial basis. The bureaucracy in question is conceived not as one which serves an area but one which serves a particular group in the urban population. The members of that group are those who are dependent in some way on the functions performed by the bureaucratic agency. The basis of the involvement of the clientele

in sharing control over the bureaucracy is the fact of their dependence on the service offered. Involvement is not a function of residency in a particular neighborhood.

There are several implications of this functional basis of organization. One is that although the client population may be geographically dispersed throughout the city and its size may fluctuate, its power over the operations of the agency that serves it remains relatively unaffected by changes in these factors. Client representation control-sharing mechanisms usually simply call for a certain percentage of client delegates on policy-making boards after the manner of the federal community action program.

In contrast fluctuations in the size and residential concentration of a particular client group in a decentralized system (e.g., a change in the number of parents of school-aged children in a decentralized school system) may radically affect the control exercised by the client group within any given territorial subdivision. Under a decentralized arrangement all the residents of a subdivision share in the control of the bureaucracy in question. Conceivably, one potential line of cleavage would pit clients against nonclients. Hence a change in the size of the client group within a subdivision might seriously affect its power. In a client representation form of organization, however, clients are protected from challenges to their power by nonclients and they are protected against fluctuations in the size and dispersion of their own group. Thus, a client representation scheme affords a firmer guarantee than decentralization that client interests in particular will always be represented on policy boards and that this representation will be stable in the sense that it is unrelated to size and residential concentration.

A second implication is that reorganization of the bureaucracy is less drastic than in a decentralization reform. Instead of subdividing the city and establishing separate bureaucracies for each territory, client representation simply calls at most for the formation of a policy-making body to control a particular agency. If such an organ already exists, then the inclusion of client representatives represents the sole extent of change.

Client representation, then, is probably a less visible modification insofar as the perceptions of the general population are concerned. This is true not only because the magnitude of the reform is smaller than that which decentralization entails, but also because the population at large is not included. For these reasons one might expect that the establishment of a client representation scheme will be politically more viable than decentralization.

2. Standards and the scope of administration. Because client representation forms of control-sharing are designed to serve a specific population whose members share the characteristics of consumption of a given public service rather than a population whose members share a geographical subdivision in the city, policy-making for the bureaucracy is centralized. Under such a system there is no fractionation of the city. Client delegates converge on the policy board of the central agency. They assume a formal role in the operation of the agency at the central locus of authority.

The consequence of this central control is that administrative standards are promulgated for the entire clientele. The members of any given clientele--say, public housing tenants--are likely to possess more similar characteristics than are the residents of a geographical subdivision in a decentralized system.²² Hence, the establishment of uniform standards to serve that clientele may be geared to the shared needs and characteristics of its members.

The logic of a decentralized system, on the other hand, requires that each subdivision establish a unique set of standards by which to serve its residents. The population of a subdivision is likely to be characterized by a particular mix of diverse and competing groups, different from the mix in other subdivisions or by a set of population characteristics distinct from other subdivisions in the city by virtue of residential segregation.

Thus, while decentralization is designed to allow for the establishment of diverse sets of standards for the administration of a service within the boundaries of a single city, client representation maintains the traditional pattern of uniform standards, centrally determined. The difference between client representation schemes and current methods of

determining administrative standards is that while that determination is accomplished centrally in both cases, authority to do so is shared by client delegates only in the former type of bureaucratic organization.

3. The availability of the bureaucracy. Whereas in a decentralized system citizens may gain access to bureaucrats and policy makers within their own local territorial subdivision, a client representation form of organization guarantees clients access to the bureaucracy at the central level. Yet despite this difference in the physical and organizational locus of authority between the two forms of control-sharing, the level of interaction between clients and those who serve them is still qualitatively different from that which occurs in a traditional centralized service agency. Like a decentralized system a client representation scheme is characterized by the greater availability of the bureaucratic machinery to clients wishing to influence the agency or to lodge complaints.

Elected client delegates to policy-making boards will share characteristics and perspectives with those the agency serves. Not only is it probable to expect that clients will find these representatives easier to approach than regular high level officials in the bureaucracy, but they will also have the power to hold the representatives to account through elections.

In the client representation form only clients comprise the electorate responsible for the selection of delegates to the policy-making board. In other words clients in particular are accorded a formal role in the policy process. This role guarantees not only that their views will be heard, but that they will be taken into account in any decision.

Under current forms of centralized service administration clients may attempt to influence decisions that affect them through interest group activity. They may, indeed, be only one of many different interest groups concerned with the behavior of the agency that serves them, but they possess no special advantage over other groups in pressing their claims. In a client representation scheme, however, clients occupy a privileged status: they share formal authority over policy-making, while other private interest groups wishing to affect that particular agency must still operate through the uncertain process of competitive interest group politics. In the sense

that client representation affords clients a guaranteed and privileged place in making their desires felt, the bureaucracy is more available to them than it was before, and it is more available to them than it is to nonclient interests.

It should be noted that in a decentralized system both clients and nonclients comprise the population of a territorial subdivision, and everyone may participate in electing members of the policy-making board. Hence, both client and nonclient interests may gain positions of guaranteed access and authority in the bureaucracy, and this fact distinguished decentralization and client representation.

4. The source of control. Finally, client representation, like decentralization, involves placing at least some policy-making authority in the hands of lay citizens. The difference between the two forms of control-sharing, as we have already had occasion to note, is that decentralized agencies share control with the residents of the area they serve, while agencies which institutionalize client representation share control only with clients.

Whether the more diverse boards of decentralized agencies would tend to bring a broader variety of considerations to bear in policy-making than the more narrowly constituted client boards is difficult to tell at this point. Certainly nonclient interests are likely to be represented in decentralized institutions (e.g., people who have no children in local schools), while client interests will certainly predominate in the other form of control-sharing. What actual difference this would make in the formulation of policies is uncertain. In any event the perspectives of those who are served or who might be served become in large measure the operative criteria in setting certain aspects of policy, and this is not the case under current forms of bureaucratic organization.

The foregoing discussion of the two major forms of control-sharing suggests two dimensions from which we might fashion a typology of administrative arrangements in the city. The typology is useful primarily as an organizing device as well as a means by which to summarize control-sharing arrangements and to place them in a broader perspective. We have examined four elements of control-sharing: the basis of organization, standards and the scope of administration, the availability of the bureaucracy to those wishing to influence its behavior, and the sources of policy-making control.

The first two elements--the basis of organization and the scope of administration--relate to the following question: For whom and how is a given service administered? We may group these two elements along the organizational dimension. The latter two elements--the availability of access and the sources of control--relate to a different question: Who has institutionalized access and control to the bureaucracy? These elements comprise the control dimension. The two dimensions serve well to place the various forms of administrative organization in the city in relation to one another.

A TYPOLOGY OF URBAN ADMISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

		Control Dimension	
		Control by Executive and Legislative Body	Control Shared by Citizen Boards
Organizational Dimension	Centralized Jurisdiction	I. CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL	II. CLIENT REPRESENTATION
	Decentralized Jurisdiction	IV. FRAGMENTED ADMINISTRATION	III. DECENTRALIZATION

Quadrant I contains those agencies organized to serve the entire area of the municipality, such as public health, park and welfare departments. The source of policy-making authority for these bureaucracies lies largely with the duly elected and appointed officers of the city government. The mayor

and his welfare commissioner, in consultation with staff civil servants in the welfare department, formulate policies for the administration of the service.

Quadrant IV is populated by those services which are organized for administrative efficiency on the basis of territorial subunits, such as police precincts, school districts, and firehouse districts, but in which authority over the subunits is centralized. Unlike a decentralized control-sharing arrangement this form of service organization does not entail federation of the subunits, and it does not invest elected local citizen boards with policy-making authority. The administration of Quadrant IV services is decentralized in the sense that administrative work is performed in local jurisdictions, but authority to determine the standards, the style, and the strategies of administration remains centralized. Hence subunits are not independent of one another to the extent that the local administration cannot make policy decisions on its own authority.

It ought to be noted, of course, that administrative standards may differ from subunit to subunit. Police departments concentrate their manpower in high crime areas and school systems maintain special programs in ghetto districts. But the decision to employ varying standards (which is made possible by the geographical subdivision into administrative jurisdictions) is made at the central level.

The two cells on the right side of the typology contain services administered on a control-sharing basis. Quadrant II contains the client representation form and Quadrant III the decentralization form. Services in Quadrant II might include tenant-controlled public housing authorities, police civilian review boards with authority to make their findings binding, and welfare boards composed at least in part of welfare client representatives. Such agencies are organized to serve the entire city, as are the agencies in Quadrant I. Standards are uniform and the policy-making apparatus is centralized. The sources of policy-making control differ, however. Service agencies in Quadrant III are decentralized, serving territorial subunits, each with its own policy-making apparatus controlled directly by the local electorate.

From the typology we can see that the critical dimension in control-sharing arrangements is, of course, the nature of the sources of policy-making control. It must be emphasized again that control-sharing implies

that the citizen or client representatives must share policy-making authority with members of the government. One of the first of the modern models of client representation, the municipal anti-poverty policy board, is composed of mayorally appointed government officials as well as representatives from poverty areas.

Thus, in client representation schemes control is likely to be shared among clients and government on the board itself. In decentralization arrangements control is shared between locally elected subdivision policy-making boards and central government organs. In New York City locally elected school boards share control with a central school bureaucracy (although their respective functions and powers are clearly differentiated). In all cases service agencies which institutionalize control-sharing are dependent upon public funding. Hence control must also be shared to some extent with boards of estimate, budget bureaus, and appropriations committees, and frequently the state.

II.


If we have succeeded in placing control-sharing arrangements in the limited context of urban administration, it is appropriate now to broaden our perspectives by attempting to understand the place of these organizational forms and the demand for them in American politics in general. It is the purpose of this section to argue that control-sharing in the cities is not a radical solution to problems of the distribution of power in the cities in the sense that it does not represent a major break with established political traditions. Rather it appears to be a logical response, given developments in contemporary American politics, to growing black political strength and to those who yearn for the creation of political communities on a smaller, and therefore presumably more manageable, scale.

To make such an argument one must locate the primary forces which have given rise to control-sharing institutions and the demands for them and make explicit the linkages among them. It is useful to sketch this pattern of development first in its most skeletal form. We begin with a search for the models upon which control-sharing arrangements are based. For this we turn to American federal theory. A contemporary application of federal theory is the notion of "creative federalism," from which derive several pieces of national legislation crucial to the control-sharing idea.

Besides locating models for control-sharing in American politics we must also seek the sources of the contemporary demand itself. The fountainhead of the demand, I would contend, is what has been variously called alienation, the loss of community, or the advent of the mass society. This generalized sense of malaise, or better, sense of powerlessness, has given rise to more specific intellectual and political currents such as the call for black "self-determination," "consumerism," a sense of the necessity for institutionalized citizen participation in government affairs, and an awareness of the possibility of neighborhood-sized governments. Around such current groups and movements have formed, some prior and some subsequent to the passage of legislation like the Economic Opportunity Act, and they have expressed specific demands for control-sharing in the city.

In response to these forces some state and local legislation has been passed establishing control-sharing institutions, and many proposals have been developed by private groups as well as by government. The following diagram attempts to place these various forces in relation to one another.

CONTROL-SHARING AND ITS MAJOR SOURCES



(The direction of the arrows represents the direction of influence.)

Let us examine these forces and the lines of influence in some greater detail. It may certainly be argued first that the urban decentralization form of control-sharing that I have described traces its roots to the model provided by the theory of American federalism. The essential feature of modern federalism, as Martin Diamond points out, is the constitutional guarantee of the division of governing authority between a central government and its constituent subunits.²³ The object of federalism is to transfer policy-making authority on certain matters to subnational constituencies. But besides providing a model upon which to organize authority spatially, federalism also makes explicit the necessity and virtues of sharing authority. The territorial subunits share authority in the sense that they gain access to national governmental resources and some control over them that they would not have if the form of political organization were unitary or if it were a confederation of autonomous units. By the same token urban decentralization is a form of control-sharing whereby the territorial subunits of the city establish policy-making bodies with some authority to control the uses to which municipal resources will be put. The central municipal government--in the usual case we would speak of a specific central service agency--retains some element of control, such as the disbursement of common tax revenues to the subunits and the establishment of certain general standards of administration.

During the Depression years notions of federal control-sharing gave rise to developments in regulatory administration which provide a qualified model for current client representation schemes.²⁴ Leiserson wrote in the early 1940's:

In the United States, particularly since 1933, there has been a tendency in regulatory legislation and administrative practice to recognize expressly a role which private group organizations may fill within the scope of the plan of regulation. In such cases certain fairly well-defined functions may be delegated to representatives of these groups, usually under the supervision of a public agency.²⁵

The group organizations concerned here were producer groups such as farmers and bituminous coal interests. These were not client groups, of course, but what is important is the fact that participation in administrative policy-making was based on function. Control-sharing in both the Depression organizations and the current forms occurs among government officials and private groups defined exclusively by function.

While both control-sharing forms draw on federal theory for the idea of sharing authority, the contribution of federalism does not end here. At least two important themes or values characterize both urban control-sharing and federalism, and they serve to offer a similar rationale for the establishment of these two forms of organization. One of these values is the attempt to minimize arbitrariness and the other is the attempt to maximize democratic control.²⁶

Federalism, according to Diamond, is a species of decentralization.²⁷ As such it serves to minimize arbitrariness by maintaining the possibility of adapting government to local or special conditions. Federalism, as Lockard puts it, is a means of "softening the rigidity of the law."²⁸ This recalls, of course, a similar element of urban decentralization: the same value underlies the establishment across the city of diverse sets of administrative standards based on localized needs and demands. And in a client representation scheme the views of clients are taken into account as a shield against the potential insensitivities (or arbitrariness) of the bureaucracy.

Both types of control-sharing as well as federalism are also designed to maximize democratic control. Lockard understands this to be a question of access (or as I have called it, availability) when he writes, "...an official who lives across town is accessible in a way that an official in the state capital or Washington often is not."²⁹ But urban control-sharing carries the attempt to realize this value farther than federalism: the establishment of some degree of direct citizen control over bureaucratic policy-making is an innovation in the cities. In short, control-sharing proposals are consistent with values that run through the national federal system and therefore to that extent represent a continuity rather than a break in American politics.

The attempt to make explicit this whole congeries of ideas inherent in American federalism found its expression during the height of the period of rapid expansion of national governmental concerns in the notion of "creative federalism." When Lyndon Johnson first used the phrase in 1964, he was simply lending a name to a trend already in motion. Yet Johnson was to give this trend new impetus. As Max Ways has written, creative federalism begins with the belief that total power is expanding rapidly. "Creative federalism as it is now developing emphasizes relationships between Washington and many other independent centers of decision in state and local government [and] in new public bodies."³⁰

The major strategy policy-makers have pursued since the Johnson years in the development of creative federalism has been to decentralize the administration of federal programs. For our purposes the most important pieces of legislation were the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and the Demonstration and Model Cities Act of 1966.³¹

The role of these two acts in our developmental scheme cannot be understated. They were, in the first place, a direct embodiment of the principles of creative federalism, for they lodged the administration of these programs squarely in the hands of the cities or private non-profit agencies in the cities. In doing so, the federal government largely bypassed the states.³² In the second place the legislation served to legitimize control-sharing as a way of making policies in the city for public bureaucracies. The now famous Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act calls for "programs developed, conducted, and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served," and an amendment to the act in 1966 requires that at least one-third of the city-wide policy-making boards for the community action program have incomes below the poverty level. The Model Cities Act also provides for "widespread citizen participation in the program," and the implementation of this clause requires "the development of means of introducing the views of area residents in policy-making and the provision of opportunities to area residents to participate actively in planning and carrying out the program."³³ Finally, the programs which have actually resulted from these acts have provided models of and experience with control-sharing mechanisms, opening up possibilities for

extending the scope of this mode of organization within the confines of the city and without the necessity of the federal impetus or support.

If control-sharing arrangements can be seen on the one hand as an outcome of developments in the federal system, they may also be viewed as a product of a pervasive sense of alienation, or more specifically, of powerlessness. To some extent, of course, creative federalism and the resulting urban-oriented legislation are responses to these widespread feelings, as the arrows in the schema indicate.³⁴ But we can trace a more direct pattern of development from the feeling of powerlessness to control-sharing institutions.

Lane speaks of alienation as the sense that one is the object, not the subject, of government and that government is not run in one's interests or with one's approval.³⁵ To feel this way is to feel powerless. This sense of powerlessness may be understood in part as a crisis representation. Henry Hart, for example, in an article in which he argues for the creation of viable metropolitan political entities, contends that a prerequisite for such organization is the formation of local community-based schemes of political representation as a weapon against alienation in the cities. "(C)ommunity," he writes, "must be found through representation."³⁶

Herbert Kaufman dwells on the same theme:

(R)epresentativeness is still a powerful force in American government. But in that century of building professional bureaucracies and executive capacities for leadership, the need for new modes of representation designed to keep pace with new economic, social, and political developments did not arouse equal concern. Partly for this reason, and partly because the burgeoning of large-scale organizations in every area of life contributes to the sensation of individual helplessness, recent years have witnessed an upsurge of a sense of alienation on the part of many people, to a feeling that they as individuals cannot effectively register their own preferences on the decisions emanating from the organs of government.³⁷

If this sense of powerlessness may, then, be traced to a failure of representative institutions, it follows that reform must offer new ways to include the powerless. Thought and action on this problem have followed a variety of currents in the last ten years, all of which converge, ultimately, on the kind of control-sharing arrangements we have discussed. It is my intention to do little more than identify these currents rather than dwell on them at length.

In the last decade, for example, Americans have acquired a heightened awareness of the need for and the possibilities of "participatory democracy" as a means of combatting the powerlessness of ordinary citizens.³⁸ Participatory democracy is, of course, a term descriptive of both decentralization and client representation. In the early 1960's the Ford Foundation was as responsible as any institution in American life for translating ideas about participatory democracy into social action. The Ford "Grey Areas" projects, forerunners of the federal community action agencies, were designed "to plan with people, not for people."³⁹ Later Ford was involved in supporting both the development of Mobilization For Youth on New York's Lower East Side, a social action agency run client participation, and the decentralization of New York City's public schools, for which the Foundation drew up the first major proposal.⁴⁰

These various projects fed and were fed by growing demands for black power or black self-determination. Certainly today the major impetus behind control-sharing are the demands of impatient black constituencies in the cities, and much current analysis of control-sharing explicitly associates such reforms with blacks in particular.⁴¹

Other currents of thought and action which seem to spring either from the sense of one's powerlessness or the perception of that condition in others might include Ralph Nader's "consumerism," or the quest for consumer power; various explorations of the possibility of neighborhood-based government,⁴² and the proposal of Mayor John Lindsay for creating 62 local boards in New York City to evaluate municipal services, make recommendations, and provide channels of access between city service agencies and citizens.⁴³

Such are the diverse sources of control-sharing arrangements. As a means of organizing the administration of urban services, control-sharing follows logically not only from the whole tradition of federal government and its modern development, but also from a variety of contemporary movements in the political arena. It would not be foolhardy to predict that cities will experiment with such forms of organization more and more frequently during the current decade.

III.

Much of the rationale behind the arguments for control-sharing is that it offers a step in the direction of solving various problems connected with the delivery of municipal services by introducing the viewpoints of consumers of those services as institutionalized factors in the policy-making process of the agencies in question. Services wholly controlled by the conventional bureaucracy are not only potentially open to an indictment of irrelevancy but also to one of insensitivity, for administration and policy-making take place according to a set of professional codes and class cultural perspectives foreign to the experience of a substantial number of consumers. Thus, the proponents of control-sharing claim that if public education has failed lower class blacks, it is because the schools are controlled by middle class whites, who set unrealistic and insensitive standards. If the police are brutal or discriminatory, it is because they are not accountable to those whom they police. If public housing regulations are set which fail to speak to the experience of those who live in such places, it is because they are devised by people who have never lived there.

In this view control-sharing is perceived largely as an administrative reform in the sense that people are searching for a mode of reorganizing public agencies as a means of improving the quality of the services they offer. The harder the problem lies in the mechanisms by which service levels and priorities and standards are established. Control-sharing is seen as an antidote.

Critics of control-sharing schemes find few grounds to accept these assumptions. They contend that merely introducing the viewpoints of consumers as factors in bureaucratic policy-making offers no guarantee that the quality of services will improve, however one might measure quality.⁴⁴

There is a vast difference between the power to make policy and the power to improve the quality of services. There is no basis, they argue, for supposing that the educational achievement of poor children will improve if their parents control the hiring of teachers and the establishment of school curriculum. Public housing authorities are probably no less likely to go bankrupt if tenants sit on the housing board, nor is the quality of life in such projects likely to improve markedly.

It is not the purpose of this paper to decide the relative merits of these two opposing arguments, for the problem of the nature of the impact of agencies which administer their services through control-sharing arrangements is an empirical one. Instead my intention in this final section is to argue that observers ought not focus solely on the question of the improvement of services when they examine the meaning of control-sharing demands. The point I wish to make is that control-sharing, as a reaction to big centralized government, is not simply an instrumental demand for the means to improve the quality of services. Not that improved services are an unimportant aim of proponents of control-sharing: they certainly are. But the desire for better public services is only part of the rationale that lies behind the demand for control-sharing. Indeed, even if such reforms do not produce services of higher quality, they may still provide benefits that make the reform worthy of serious consideration.

The additional benefits sought through control-sharing largely have to do with the acquisition by politically deprived or inexperienced groups of the means to fashion a collective political life. Thus, groups seek control-sharing arrangements not simply to improve the services they consume but also to acquire resources to use in the larger political arena and to control the quality of the political life within their own communities. Hence control-sharing must be understood in this sense as a means to an end which is greater than the improvement of services.

These benefits may be understood primarily as psychological resources, without which people in groups cannot hope to control the nature of their collective political life. There are at least four particular resources which proponents hope will accompany the establishment of control-sharing arrangements. I shall call them: recognition, community, psychic resources, and commitment.

1. Recognition. The demand for the establishment of a control-sharing institution is a demand made by or on behalf of a particular collectivity, either a neighborhood in the case of decentralization or a distinctive group of consumers of government services in the case of client representation. To make such a demand is to require an acknowledgment by other actors in the urban political arena of the integral identity of the collectivity making the demand. The neighborhood or the client group is in essence claiming recognition as a distinctive participant in the political process.

By establishing a control-sharing institution the larger society acknowledges the claim to identity, and thus accepts implicitly the legitimacy of that collectivity as a group in the bargaining arena, a competitor for resources in the city. Recognition works two ways in such a situation. The collectivity demands recognition by other political actors; if it is granted through the transfer of authority to the collectivity, then the recognition made by the larger society may reinforce or even stimulate identity formation, or self-recognition, on the part of members of the collectivity. Thus, recognition is a psychological resource both in the sense that to be recognized is to be granted a legitimate role in the bargaining process and that to be recognized also strengthens the internal coherence (self-recognition) of the group and hence the capacity to act together.

2. Community. The search for community constitutes part of the reason for seeking control-sharing institutions. Control-sharing offers the prospect of reducing the scale of government. The assumption is that government on a smaller scale is more personalized, more democratic. Control-sharing is perceived as the creation of political relationships where individuals count and where the complexities and insensitivities of modern bureaucratic government are absent. "Community" is that ideal state in which those who wield the power of government are conscious of particularistic needs and desires and take these into account. The achievement of community represents the triumph of particularistic values over professional and bureaucratic impartiality.⁴⁵ To gain control-sharing institutions, then, is seen as a way to achieve community. Control-sharing in this sense offers a resource by which to fashion and maintain a distinctive quality of political life within the collectivity.

3. Psychic resources. Advocates contend that by sharing in the control of institutions which affect their lives, people will develop personal psychic resources that will enable them to become confident and knowledgeable political participants. Those who feel helpless will gain a sense of efficacy, because the bureaucracy is open to their influence. Those who are alienated will gain a sense of stake in the political process, for their participation will help to determine directly the benefits they receive. The responsibility of wielding authority will make people interested in political decisions and vigilant in the defense of their interests.

The newly acquired sense of efficacy and involvement, it is argued, may be expected to carry over from the limited arena in which the control-sharing institution operates to the larger political order. To achieve the establishment of control-sharing institutions, then, is to gain the resources to make citizens.

On a more limited scale control-sharing offers a context in which those with leadership and managerial propensities may gain experience and training, the underpinnings of confidence. Furthermore, such arrangements offer a forum from which to develop a public reputation and perhaps a political following. Hence control-sharing provides an opportunity for the interplay of experience and responsibility on the one hand and a sense of confidence and efficacy on the other.

4. Commitment. Finally the demand represents a test of the commitment of the larger society to goals defined and sought by historically deprived groups. The argument is that if Americans are pledged to eradicate poverty and racism and their attendant evils, and if the groups which suffer most from those evils propose one way to arrive at a solution (i.e., control-sharing) while other solutions have been of dubious value, then to make the demand for control-sharing is to test the commitment of the society to the goals it has enunciated.

What is important here is not perhaps so much the substance of the demand but rather the fact that it is being made. Control-sharing in this case is simply the occasion for the test. Other solutions have yielded meager results, hopeful sometimes but certainly insufficient in their impact.

The question which the demand for control-sharing poses is whether the commitment of the society is still good in the face of the frustrations engendered by no or little progress. If cities grant the legitimacy of control-sharing demands and establish such arrangements, then groups making these demands, advocates contend, will see this as a sign of the renewal of the commitment. To gain such a commitment is to gain the resources of both license and encouragement to continue seeking change in the cities through the established political process.

In summary one may argue that those who demand control-sharing are seeking a great deal more than the authority to determine service levels. Whether these various psychological resources actually will accompany the establishment of control-sharing institutions we do not yet know, just as it is too early to make conclusive statements about the impact of control-sharing on service levels. But what is important for scholars, activists, and city politicians to understand at this juncture is the breadth of the dimension of the demand. By understanding this we come to see that the idea of control-sharing is far more important to the political life of cities than the mere reorganization of service bureaucracies might suggest. Those who pose the demand are seeking to define their role in urban society as well as to fashion a collective identity within their own groups.

The demand for control-sharing is probably not extremely widespread at this moment. The scanty evidence we have on the reaction of ordinary citizens to various forms of control-sharing reveals that the willingness actually to participate in such schemes is not pervasive. Only 14 percent turned out to vote for local school board candidates in four boroughs of New York City (the Manhattan election was held two months later and only 9 percent voted), despite the fact that the issue of school decentralization was emotionally and violently contested over a two-year period.⁴⁶ Even smaller percentages of people turn out to vote in anti-poverty board elections.

Yet scattered survey data indicate that attitudes toward control-sharing appear to be relatively favorable,⁴⁷ a finding which leads one to suspect that it is too early to draw firm conclusions based on the results of this early school decentralization experiment. Certainly there is a small active stratum in the mass population whose concern cannot be dismissed.

Whether or not there is widespread active or attitudinal support for control-sharing at this moment in time may in fact be beside the point. Demands seldom generate at the mass level but rather reflect an interplay between the demands of opinion leaders and spokesmen and the support which develops for those demands among the masses. What is important for American cities now is that the demand is being made, and it is being made by spokesmen for people who have never had a significant voice. Because the demand has been articulated, because it can be construed as a test of the society's commitment to certain social goals, and because other solutions have brought little progress in eradicating the problems faced by the cities, it will be necessary in the next few years for cities to consider control-sharing arrangements in the most serious way.

FOOTNOTES

¹Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, LXI (September, 1967), pp. 701-16.

²Speaking of metropolitan reform, John Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt write, "For the most part, Negro political leaders look with disfavor on efforts to reorder the system. Their base of operation and strength lies in the central city. An area-wide government poses a threat to their hard-won and long-incoming major political influence by joining the predominantly white electorate of suburbia to that of the core municipality." The Metropolis: Its People, Politics, and Economic Life (New York: Harper and Row, 1970, Second edition), p. 382.

³Herbert Kaufman, "Administrative Decentralization and Political Power," Public Administration Review, XXIX (January/February, 1969), p. 5.

⁴James Q. Wilson, "The Urban Unease: Community Vs. the City," The Public Interest, (Summer, 1968), pp. 25-39.

⁵Robert A. Dahl, "The City in the Future of Democracy," American Political Science Review, LXI (December, 1967), p. 965.

⁶Educational Research Service, Circular No. 7, Decentralization and Community Involvement: A Status Report, (Washington, D.C.: American Association of School Administrators, 1969).

⁷Arthur I. Waskow, "Community Control of the Police," Institute for Policy Studies, a mimeographed proposal distributed by the Center for Emergency Support, Washington, D.C., no date. See also Jeffrey R. Freund, "Neighborhood Police Districts: A Constitutional Analysis," California Law Review, 57 (Oct. 1969), pp. 907-47, for a discussion of how such arrangements might work.

⁸Cities with officially sanctioned patrols include New York, Hartford, and St. Louis, while those with unofficial patrols are Dayton, Detroit, Seattle, and Tallahassee. The New York Times, March 3, 1970.

⁹Thea K. Flaum and Elizabeth C. Salzman, The Tenants' Rights Movement (Chicago: Urban Research Corporation, 1969), p. 33.

¹⁰This is essentially Irving Kristol's complaint in "Decentralization For What?" The Public Interest (Spring, 1968), pp. 18-19.

¹¹It is not my intention to assess the pros and cons or the costs and benefits of these various schemes and experiments. This task has been ably done by Alan Altshuler in his Community Control: The Black Demand for Participation in Large American Cities, (New York: Pegasus, 1970), Chapter One.

¹²Michael Lipsky sees the effort to gain this legitimacy as one of the central sources of conflict in the debate over what I have called control-sharing. "Radical Decentralization: A Response to American Planning Dilemmas," The 2nd International Symposium on Regional Development, Tokyo, Japan, September 17-19, 1968, p. 103.

¹³Michael Lipsky, "Toward a Theory of Street-Level Bureaucracy," a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1969.

¹⁴Waskow has written, for example, "Neighborhoods where back yards and recreation cellars were scarce might decide that enforcement of laws against playing ball in an alley or loitering to talk on the street would not be high priority matters and that enforcement of decent housing laws would." "Community Control of the Police," op. cit., p. 3.

¹⁵David Caplovitz, The Poor Pay More (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 49.

¹⁶The New York Times, March 18, 1970.

¹⁷The definition is similar to that of Herbert Jacob's in his Debtors in Court: The Consumption of Government Services (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), p. 3.

¹⁸Samuel H. Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist Age (New York: Knopf, 1965), pp. 78-9.

¹⁹See Avery Leiserson, Administrative Regulation: A Study in Representation of Interests (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).

²⁰Theodore Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Science," World Politics (July, 1964), pp. 677-715.

²¹Reed L. Frischknecht, "The Democratization of Administration: The Farmer Committee System," American Political Science Review, XLVII (Sept. 1953), pp. 704-27.

²²In the first place they are all dependent on a given service (a statement which cannot always be made about the residents of a subdivision). In the case of welfare or public housing this service substantially determines their life style. They are also likely to share certain social characteristics. In the case of public housing, for example, tenants are likely to be black and poor. See Leonard Freedman, Public Housing: The Politics of Poverty (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969), pp. 107, 140.

²³Martin Diamond, "On the Relationship of Federalism and Decentralization," in Cooperation and Conflict: Readings in American Federalism, Daniel J. Elazar, et. al., eds. (Itasca, Illinois: F. E. Peacock, 1969), p. 70.

²⁴There is no evidence to suggest that activists and policy planners have looked to the Depression experiments for models, but the point to make here is that these attempts to include private groups in policy-making serve at least as precedents.

²⁵Leiserson, Administrative Regulation, op. cit., p. 11.

²⁶Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 45.

²⁷Diamond, "On the Relationship of Federalism and Decentralization," loc. cit., p. 80.

²⁸Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government, op. cit., p. 46.

²⁹Ibid., p. 48.

³⁰Max Ways, "'Creative Federalism' and the Great Society," in Cooperation and Conflict, op. cit., p. 620.

³¹An important forerunner of these pieces of legislation was the Housing Act of 1949, which required citizen participation in the formulation of urban renewal plans. Participation was construed to refer to blue ribbon citizen committees, open hearings, and city council approval. What is important is that administration was vested in the cities and opinions of lay citizens were to be solicited by law in the planning process.

³²See, for example, Roger Davidson, "The War on Poverty: Experiment in Federalism," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 385 (September, 1969), pp. 2-13.

³³United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, Improving the Quality of Urban Life: A Program Guide to Model Neighborhoods in Demonstration Cities (December, 1967), p. 20.

³⁴Moynihan, for example, sets his analysis of the community action program in the context of Robert Nisbet's The Quest for Community. Nisbet's is a mass society argument. He contends that the erosion of primary groups and traditional sources of authority have exposed the individual to the power of the state. Life in the mass society is marked by the themes of personal alienation and cultural disintegration. The sense of community has vanished, and the quest to regain it has become the "dominant social tendency of the twentieth century." Quoted in Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 11. For a view, however, that the notion of community-as-it-once-was is highly romanticized, see James Fesler, "Approaches to the Understanding of Decentralization," Journal of Politics, 27 (1965), pp. 539-45.

³⁵Robert Lane, Political Ideology (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 162.

³⁶Henry Hart, "The Dawn of a Community-Defining Federalism," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 359 (May, 1965), p. 154.

³⁷H. Kaufman, "Administrative Decentralization and Political Power," op. cit., p. 4.

³⁸See Arnold Kaufman, "Human Nature and Participatory Democracy" and "Participatory Democracy: Ten Years Later," in the Bias of Pluralism, William E. Connolly, ed. (New York: Atherton, 1969), pp. 178-200 and 201-212.

³⁹Peter Marris and Martin Rein, Dilemmas of Social Reform (New York: Atherton, 1967), p. 164.

⁴⁰See the Ford Foundation or Bundy report: Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New York City Schools, Reconnection for Learning: A Community School System for New York City (New York, 1967).

⁴¹Altshuler's work is a prime example of this tendency, as one might observe from the subtitle of his book Community Control: The Black Demand for Participation in Large American Cities, op. cit.

⁴²See, for example, Milton Kotler, Neighborhood Government (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969); and Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Relations, Ninth Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: the Commission, 1968). The latter urges cities to consider establishing neighborhood sub-units with limited governmental powers. P. 21.

⁴³The New York Times, June 5, 1970. Lindsay's plan is an attempt to resurrect his idea of placing "little city halls" in the city's neighborhoods which was defeated by the City Council soon after his first inauguration.

⁴⁴Altshuler summarizes this argument. Community Control, op. cit., pp. 53-4.

⁴⁵A similar point is made by Marilyn Gittell and Alan G. Nevesi in their introduction to The Politics of Urban Education, Gittell and Nevesi, eds. (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 8-9.

⁴⁶The New York Times, March 23 and June 3, 1970. It should be noted that leaders in the pilot experimental school district of Ocean Hill-Brownsville asked local residents to boycott the elections because the new school district boundaries threatened the integrity of the original jurisdiction.

⁴⁷Altshuler, Community Control, op. cit., pp. 58-9.