PROTEST BEHAVIOR AND THE INTEGRATION OF URBAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS*

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ABSTRACT

    This paper explores the hypothesis that participation in what is

defined as "instrumental" protest activity is likely to be associated

with a commitment to the peaceful maintenance of the political order,

to foster a sense of a stake in the society, and to engender a real-

ization that compromise is often necessary in politics for the preser-

vation of social peace. White and black instrumental protestors were

compared separately with white and black non-instrumental protestors,

using survey data gathered in the city of Milwaukee. The data reveals

that white instrumental protestors demonstrate the hypothesized com-

mitments, while the black protestors do not. We conclude that the

protest act, undertaken for instrumental purposes, has no didactic

effect insofar as the learning of fundamental integrative norms is

concerned. Black-white differences in commitment to such norms must

probably be explained by reference to the respective socialization

experiences of the two races.

This is a paper whose purpose is to explore in a preliminary way the relationship of participation in political protest activities and adherence to certain attitudes by the individual participants which seem crucial for the integration of political systems. Various scholars and political philosophers have long suggested that the very act of participation in the political affairs of a society is likely to foster concern for collective interests and to engender some degree of commitment to the peaceful maintenance of the polity.

John Stuart Mill, for example, wrote of the "moral part of the instruction afforded by the participation of the private citizen...in public functions."

> He /the citizen/ is called upon, while so engaged, to weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the general good...

Lane argues that "participation in national or community processes tends to enhance the loyalty and sense of identification of participants with nation and community."[2] And in his classic study of the TVA Selznick shows how participation in the organization of potentially dissident elements had the effect of diminishing the threat to its stability or existence which those elements initially posed.[3]

While these writers have based their propositions largely on the effects of participation in decision-making processes (e.g., voting), one can make, I believe, an essentially analogous argument in theory about the impact on attitudes of participation in certain types of political protest. In particular I have sought to explore the hypothesis that frequent participation in protest activities for instrumental purposes is likely to be associated with a commitment to the peaceful maintenance of the political order, to foster a sense of stake in the society and hence to create bonds of identification, and to engender a realization that "private partialities" must often be compromised in the interests of social peace. The commitment to peaceful resolution of conflicts, the absence of feelings of alienation, and a willingness to compromise are all critical indicators of a politically integrated society.

In the following pages I wish to point out first of all that not all protestors are concerned with achieving instrumental goals. Indeed, we may distinguish protestors according to their degree of commitment to protest as an instrumental tactic. Then I shall make explicit the argument that committed instrumental protest participation is likely to be associated with or to foster attitudes supportive of system integration. Finally, I shall proceed to examine some data which bear on the argument.

II.

Observers of contemporary politics in America have been quick to designate a host of disparate public manifestations as "protest," a form of political conduct which relies for its effect primarily on its disruptive quality. Scholarly attention has generally focussed on protest as an instrumental tactic: people use protest to bring pressure to bear on actors in the political system for the purpose of achieving collective goals.

The characterization of protest as an instrumental activity predominates in the relevant literature. Wilson, for example, in his pioneering work on the subject, sees protest as a mass action utilizing negative inducements in the bargaining process.[4] Ralph Turner conceptualizes protest as an action which, among other things, is designed to provoke ameliorative steps by some target group.[5] And Nieburg writes:

> Demonstrations on the street, evocation of the risk of violence or counterviolence, disruptive direct action—all aim at creating maximum inconvenience for the social order. This is a way of influence for those who are weak in other more positive assets of social bargaining.[6]

If we begin to examine those specific incidents which we tend to group under the rubric of protest, however, we find that there is substantial variability in the extent to which such actions are used for instrumental purposes. There are, then, many different types of protest. When welfare mothers in Brooklyn sit-in at the municipal welfare office demanding allowances for winter clothing, they are

using what may legitimately be called protest differently from the way in which

students used mass marches on their college campuses in the spring of 1970 to

protest the Cambodian troop commitment. Similarly, when Father Groppi led hundreds

of Negro youths on marches in quest of fair housing legislation in Milwaukee, he

was using these collective manifestations differently from the uses intended by

urban blacks who marched in the streets in silent protest to express their grief

at the assassination of Martin Luther King.

These different protest incidents vary in the extent to which the protestors

confront the targets of their actions in a face-to-face situation. The welfare

mothers sit at the very door of the welfare commissioner and may in fact expect

to speak to him personally. The students on college campuses relied for the most

part on the news media to communicate their grievances to the president. Most

of the demonstrators neither sought nor expected a face-to-face confrontation

with the chief executive and hence they aimed their immediate actions at surrogate

targets: the police and college administrations.

These various actions are also marked by differences in the specificity and

nature of the demands they pose. Whereas the fair housing marchers wanted legis-

lation to guarantee their freedom to live where they wished, the marchers mourning

King wanted primarily to express their own outrage and grief and to have the rest

of society acknowledge their loss.

Another difference involves the persistence of the protestors themselves and

degree of organization of the protest group. While Groppi marched for one hundred

days, the Cambodian protests and the marches for King were short-lived and unor-

ganized in comparison.

Finally, it seems apparent that these protests are characterized by differences

in their violence potential. If we assume that protest is frequently effective

because it relies on the implicit threat of violence or counter-violence (and

thus threatens to impose costs on society which the society may not be willing

to bear), then we may argue that some protest acts contain that threat more

successfully than others. The welfare mothers want their allowance: resort to violence in this instance is likely to alienate the welfare bureaucracy and make their behavior counterproductive. On the other hand the students did not expect a favorable response from President Nixon and the demands of the King mourners lacked the kind of specificity to which a society might respond. These protestors, then, had little to lose by failing to contain the threat of violence.

What these examples suggest is that people use protest for different purposes. More specifically, we might argue that to view protest exclusively as an instrumental tactic fails to cover the spectrum of motivations which propel people to to protest. Himmelstrand supplies us with the polar force at the other end of the motivational spectrum: behavior may be understood as prompted by motives which range from the instrumental to the expressive.[7] Milbrath distinguishes the two motivations succinctly:

> Expressive political action focuses on symbol manipulation; mere engagement in the behavior is satisfying or drive-reducing. Instrumental action, in contrast, is oriented primarily toward manipulating and changing things.[8]

The distinction is appropriate for understanding our examples of protest. To be sure, both instrumental and expressive motivations underlie the behavior of most protestors, yet in any given type of protest action the particular mix of motivations for any given individual is likely to be located closer to one pole than to the other.

The welfare mothers and the Groppi marchers are actively seeking specific responses from the political system. For them protest is employed as a tactic to enhance their chances of gaining such responses. For the students and the mourners the collective action provides a setting for catharsis, an opportunity to demonstrate in public one's own outrage, or a chance to assuage one's own sense of political impotence. Indeed, it may be as important for the individual protestor in such cases to be seen by his fellow protestors as it is to be seen

by their targets, if not more so. Expressive protest more than instrumental protest offers a means by which the individual participant may stake out a role for himself--that is, identify himself--in the political arena.

The expressive protestor is less likely than the instrumental protestor to require a face-to-face confrontation with his target. He is protesting as much to fulfill his own needs as he is to show his feelings to his target. The instrumental protestor, however, expects to elicit a response to his behavior from his target. The expressive protestor need not expend the effort (and may not even be able to do so) of sharpening and specifying his demands, for his protest is not so much to pose a demand for action by a target as to assure himself and his fellow protestors that he is angry. Expressive protestors are also likely to engage in protest sporadically, while the instrumental protestor, having made a conscious choice of tactics to win his goal, is likely to be much more persistent.[9] Finally, the expressive protestor, who does not enter the protest arena with high expectations of a response from a target, has little to lose if he resorts to violence. Violence in fact is a more dramatic form of catharsis and a surer way of expressing anger.

In short these differences illustrate the point that the motivating forces which cause individuals to protest may vary and that the characteristic mix of motivations which underlies any given protest incident may also vary. For any given protest incident the motivations upon which that action is based probably have, as we have seen, different implications for the course of that particular action. But more than that I shall argue here that the different motivations underlying protest are associated with different attitudes relevant for system integration. Thus, one purpose of this paper is to explore how actors who engage in protest for differing motivations pose very different problems for elites in the political system to handle.

III.

The findings reported here are based on interviews taken during the summer of 1970 of a sample of Milwaukee residents aged 18 and over selected by block cluster techniques. The sample was stratified by race such that black respondents constitute a much larger proportion of the total than they do in the population. In all 313 white interviews and 241 black interviews were completed, comprising two separate probability samples of each racial group. In each case the race of the interviewer and the respondent was matched.

Of the 554 respondents 85 had engaged at some point in one or more protest actions, a finding ascertained by responses to separate questions inquiring whether the interviewee had ever taken part in "a mass march or demonstration," "a sit-in," "a civil rights rally or meeting," or "any other type of protest or direct action." The distinctions among these types of protest are unimportant for our present purposes. To some extent such distinctions exist largely in the perceptions of the participants or as a consequence of the labels by which protest leaders characterize their actions. The variety of terms reflects conventional notions of protest and was employed simply to cover all possibilities.

Over one-fifth of the black sample had engaged in protest action (N=50; 20.7%) and over one-tenth of the white sample had done so (N=35; 11.1%).[10] In the analysis which follows, which focuses solely on the 85 protestors, I have controlled for race in all cases in order to generalize to the entire populations of the two racially defined groups of protestors.

The initial argument suggested that the different motivations which propel people into protest are likely to signal important differences in the way different types of protestors relate to the political system. In particular I have hypothesized broadly that the protestors committed to protest as an instrumental tactic are likely to make a series of pragmatic calculations to enhance their chances of success in the political process. These calculations will be reflected in

attitudes which indicate a basic commitment to a politically integrated society. Those less committed to instrumental protest may or may not exhibit integrative attitudes, depending upon the alternative courses of political action toward which they incline. I shall discuss these alternatives momentarily.

To determine the existence of instrumental motivations I have employed two operational measures: the frequency of actual engagement in protest actions and the protestor's assessment of the efficacy of protest as a way to get the city government to listen to grievances.[11] The justification for these measures is simply that those who use protest again and again and at the same time believe that it is effective for voicing grievances, thereby demonstrate a commitment to a relatively unconventional, indeed often socially unpopular,[12] tactic because it succeeds for them, that is, because it has instrumental value. Success in this instance is defined by one's ability to "get the city government to listen to you" by the use of demonstrations and mass marches. Success is not defined in terms of personal expressive needs but rather as the ability to gain access to government to make a case for one's demands. Assessment of protest as effective is measured by "strongly agree" and "agree" answers. "Agree and disagree" answers were deemed ambivalent about the effectiveness of protest as an instrument for gaining the ear of the city government, while disagreement, of course, indicated a negative assessment.

If respondents answered in the affirmative when they were asked if they had ever engaged in any of the various protest activities, they were then asked how many actions they had participated in. The distribution of frequencies is presented in Table I.

Table I
Frequency of Protest Participation

Number of Protests	Number of participants
1	31
2	10
3	8
4	12
5	4
6	6
7	2
8	-
9	2
10 or more	10
Total	85

The dividing line on the frequency distribution was drawn between the one-time protestors (N=31) and those who had participated two or more times (N=54). This decision was made in order to isolate those who demonstrated no propensity whatsoever to repeat their protest participation, by which we might infer that their commitment to protest as a form of political activity was in general a tenuous one. Those who protested more than once showed sufficient motivation to repeat their behavior at least once and in a majority of cases more than once.

Of the frequent protestors, 36 (66.6%) also believed that protest was an effective means of getting the city government to listen to grievances. These 36 represent the instrumental protestors, those committed to the repeated use of proven tactic for making claims in the political arena. The remainder reflect a mixed set of motivations. Some are surely expressive protestors (frequent participants/low or doubtful effectiveness).[13] This group (N=18) demonstrates a willingness to repeat participation in an activity which they believe gains them little from government. One eminently reasonable explanation for why they continue to protest is that through such activity they fulfill expressive needs (e.g., catharsis, social adjustment, self-identification).

Others are potential recruits for future protest actions (infrequent participants/high effectiveness). There are 17 who fall into this category. Many of the members of this group undoubtedly experienced success in their single venture into protest, but they apparently do not consider it a tactic necessary to repeat on a regular basis to gain the attention of government. Thus their commitment and their reliance on protest as an instrumental tactic is not as strong as those whom we have classified as instrumental protestors.

Finally, there is a fourth group (infrequent participation/low or doubtful effectiveness). The motivations of the 14 protestors who fall into this category have apparently not been reinforced by material success or by psychological fulfillment. Their single experience with protest was probably discouraging and unsuccessful. Such people are unlikely to repeat their actions: protest is not an instrument in which they have confidence.

The typology presented below provides a summary of the preceding discussion.

<div align="center">ACTIVITY</div>

	Frequent	Infrequent
	I	II
High	Committed instrumental protestors N=36	Potential recruits: sporadic instrumental commitment N=17
	IV	III
Low	Expressive protestors N=18	Discouraged protestors: neither instrumental nor expressive reinforcement N=14

EFFICACY

The motivations which prompt each type to engage in protest are surely mixed. Yet for the Type I protestors—committed instrumental protestors—the motivations appear relatively unambiguous and strong. For all three other types the mix of motivations and the commitment to instrumental protest is less strong in varying degrees. While it would be desirable to analyze each type alone, the size of the

cells does not permit this when we control for race. Thus, the strategy I have followed in the subsequent analysis has been to compare the Type I committed instrumental protestors to a category composed of Types II, III, and IV which I shall call the "less committed."

In order to justify collapsing Types II, III, and IV into a single category, it is necessary to demonstrate that each type differs individually from Type I. That is, we must be certain that all the types in the "less committed" group are indeed less committed and that no single type accounts for all the differentiation between Type I protestors and the other category as a whole. If it is plausible that those most committed to instrumental protest are those who wish most to see more protests, then the following table indicates the justice of the research strategy by showing that each individual type differs from Type I and differs in the predicted direction.

Table II. Would you like to see more demonstrations or fewer demonstrations or do you think it doesn't matter one way or the other?

Blacks

Types	I	II	III	IV
More	84.6% (22)	50% (5)	40% (2)	77.7% (7)
Other responses	15.4% (4)	50% (5)	60% (3)	22.2% (2)
Totals	100% (26)	100% (10)	100% (5)	100% (9)

Whites

Types	I	II	III	IV
More	50% (5)	28.5% (2)	0	22.2% (2)
Other responses	50% (5)	71.5% (7)	100% (9)	77.7% (7)
Totals	100% (10)	100% (9)	100% (9)	100% (9)

Both black and white instrumental protestors are more inclined than each of the other types taken individually to favor more demonstrations. Thus, this table provides evidence that no single type is likely to account for all of the variation if we group Types II, III, and IV and compare that group to Type I protestors, a comparison between the committed and the less committed in terms of their use of protest as an instrumental tactic.

IV.

To this point we have argued that individuals who engage in protest do so for different reasons. We have hypothesized that as these reasons or motivations vary, so will attitudes important for the integration of the political system. Let us examine the proposition that committed instrumental protest participation is likely to be associated with or to foster attitudes important for integration.

Instrumental protestors have hit upon a political tactic short of violence, yet outside the conventional framework of interest group bargaining and electoral activity, which makes repeated participation in the political process possible. Furthermore, this tactic regularly gains them access to government. Hence we may characterize their behavior as considered action in which means are geared to ends. We may hypothesize that these protestors make the following calculations: If peaceful protest works, then why use the more costly and more volatile tactic of violence? Protest is a tactic that has been profitably used again and again; thus violence, the threat of which often lends protest its impact, is unnecessary in such circumstances.

Not only is violence costly to those who perpetrate it, but it is a bargaining tactic of doubtful utility in American politics. Those who use violence alienate their targets and provoke counter-violence by both targets and third party observers. Hence we would expect instrumental protestors to eschew violence and to view its potential with some disfavor.

Having found an effective bargaining tactic, instrumental protestors are likely
to seek to enhance their bargaining position to ensure success in achieving their
demands. One way is to demonstrate a willingness to negotiate. Another way to do
this is to form coalitions with sympathetic groups or to activate what Lipsky has
called "third parties," reference groups of the protest target, to enter the conflict
in ways favorable to the protestors.[14] Whether formal or implicit coalitions are
formed, gaining support from other groups is likely to require compromises. The
same holds true when the protestors engage in negotiations. If the instrumental
protestor is the pragmatist we might suppose him to be, then he will display under-
standing attitudes toward the necessity for compromise. Lipsky, writing of protest
groups, notes that, "Groups whose members derive tangible satisfactions from polit-
ical participation will not condone leaders who are stubborn in compromise or appear
to question the foundations of the system."[15]

By his evaluation of protest as an effective tactic, the instrumental protestor
indicates that he expects public officials at least to listen to his demands when
he resorts to such behavior. In a sense we might argue that the protestor believes
that he can count on a response, and the public official knows that the protestor
is both willing to compromise (bargaining assumes that one does not necessarily
expect to win his initial demands, and protest is explicitly a bargaining tactic)
and unlikely to resort to violence.

To summarize, we may suppose that the committed instrumental protestor is
sufficiently pragmatic not to abuse the tactic that wins him what he wants. That
he believes the tactic wins him what he wants also indicates that he perceives pub-
lic officials to have been responsive and willing to listen to protestors and even
to grant their demands on occasion. To this extent we can say that the protestor
feels that he is visible in the political system and that he can sometimes make
that system work for him. If the instrumental protestor gets what he wants from
elites through his protest tactics and if he makes the calculation to avoid violence

and to seek and accept compromise, then we may conclude that participation in instrumental protest fosters attitudes important for system integration.

If it is reasonable to suspect that we might characterize the instrumental protestors as pragmatists, the less committed group, because of its mix of motivations, presents more difficulty. There are several couses of action we might expect them to take. One is to exhibit signs of withdrawal from politics. Here we assume that such people have found both conventional politics and protest (perhaps in this order but not necessarily so) unrewarding and frustrating. They will be unwilling to participate further in protest and will show low conventional activity rates. Such people would also not consider violence a viable tactic. They would tend to score high on a measure of political alienation (unlike the instrumental protestors who have achieved some degree of mastery over their political world) and they will exhibit high levels of cynicism.

A second possible course of action for the less committed is to show a marked tendency toward violent political activity. Lipsky senses this possibility when he writes:

> Groups which seek psychological gratification from politics, but which cannot or do not anticipate material political rewards, may be attracted to militant protest leaders. To these groups, angry rhetoric may prove a desirable quality in the short run.[16]

These people feel they have gained nothing through protest in the way of influence in the system, and conventional politics is less appealing and may even represent for them a regression. Although they may have satisfied expressive needs through protest, it is unlikely that such gratifications offer an enduring reason for stable protest participation in the long run. Catharsis, for example, can only take place so many times before the individual is exhausted.

A third possible course of action for the less committed is to remain with or return to conventional politics. For many, the excursion into protest was uncharacteristic. Others have found it unsatisfying but still wish to participate in politics. If violence is an unacceptable course of action, then conventional

electoral and party activity is the only option which remains. Let us turn to the
data to see how these speculations are borne out.

V

To what extent are the different groups of protestors committed to protest as
a form of political participation? In the two tables below both white and black
committed instrumental protestors reveal a substantially stronger commitment to
the desirability of protest and to the necessity of taking part in such actions
than do the less committed groups. That is to say, those who do not engage fre----
quently in protest for instrumental reasons, but who participate in protest less
frequently or for other reasons, show a lesser commitment to the protest tactic
as a general form of political behavior.

Table III. Would you like to see more demonstrations or fewer
demonstrations or do you think it doesn't matter
one way or the other?[17]

	Blacks		Whites	
	Committed	Less committed	Committed	Less committed
More	84.6% (22)	58.8% (14)	50% (5)	16% (4)
Fewer	3.8% (1)	25.2% (6)	20% (2)	44% (11)
Doesn't matter	7.6% (2)	12.6% (3)	10% (1)	12% (3)
None, DK	3.8% (1)	4.2% (1)	20% (2)	28% (7)
Totals	100% (26)	100% (24)	100% (10)	100% (25)

Gamma coefficient: .58   Gamma coefficient: .54

Table IV. It's sometimes important to take part in demonstrations
because that's one way to make your voice heard.

	Blacks		Whites	
	Committed	Less committed	Committed	Less committed
Agree	96.1% (25)	83% (20)	90% (9)	72% (18)
Agree and disagree	-	4.2% (1)	10% (1)	16% (4)
Disagree	3.8% (1)	12.6% (3)	-	12% (3)
Totals	100% (26)	100% (24)	100% (10)	100% (25)

Gamma coefficient: .65   Gamma coefficient: .57

Not only are the instrumental protestors more committed to protest as a tactic,
but the black committed group shows a slight tendency to believe that demonstrations
are better than voting as a way of getting one's point across in the city (Table V.).

Table V. Demonstrations are better than voting in this city
because demonstrations are about the only way to
get your point across.

	Blacks		Whites	
	Committed	Less committed	Committed	Less committed
Agree	42.3% (11)	21% (5)	30% (3)	8% (2)
Agree and disagree	23% (6)	29% (7)	30% (3)	20% (5)
Disagree	34.6% (9)	50% (12)	40% (4)	72% (18)
Totals	100% (26)	100% (24)	100% (10)	100% (25)

Gamma coefficient: .34   Gamma coefficient: .56

When we examine the data on attitudes gauging the impact of the black ghetto
riots of the 1960's (Table VI), we find that all of the black protestors but only
the white committed protestors tend to assess the effects of these violent incidents
in favorable terms. The committed protestors of both races are more favorable than
the less committed. This greater inclination to assess violence favorably belies
our hypothesis that the pragmatic success of protest for these committed groups
makes any attraction to violence unlikely.

We find reinforcement to reject this hypothesis, especially for the black committed protestors, when we look at the answers to a question on whether respondents had ever felt that violence was the only way to get government to act (Table VII). Black committed protestors are the most likely to answer in the affirmative. White committed protestors, however, largely conform to original expectations here by demonstrating an unwillingness to consider the personal resort to violence.

With the data in this table one speculation about the course of action the less committed may follow can be laid to rest: The less committed are not violence-prone--compared to the instrumental protestors. If they are frustrated by their experiences in protest, they do not consider violence a satisfactory alternative.

Table VI. Some people say that no good can ever come from riots like those that happened in Detroit and Newark a few years ago. Other people say that such riots do some good. Which comes closest to the way you feel?

| | Blacks | | Whites | |
	Committed	Less committed	Committed	Less committed
Some good	88.4% (23)	79.8% (19)	80% (8)	56% (14)
No good	11.5% (3)	16.8% (4)	20% (2)	28% (7)
DK	-	4.2% (1)	-	16% (4)
Totals	100% (26)	100% (24)	100% (10)	100% (25)

Gamma coefficient: .23   Gamma coefficient: .55

Table VII. A lot of people get so angry about certain things that they think that violence is the only way to get the government to do something. Have you ever felt this way?

| | Blacks | | Whites | |
	Committed	Less committed	Committed	Less committed
Yes	80.7% (21)	63% (15)	30% (3)	24% (6)
No	19.2% (5)	33.6% (8)	70% (7)	72% (18)
NA	-	4.2% (1)	-	4% (1)
Totals	100% (26)	100% (24)	100% (10)	100% (25)

Gamma coefficient: .38   Gamma coefficient: .12

If black committed instrumental protestors show some inclination to view violence as a potentially useful political tactic, it is not surprising that we should find that they are the group most impatient with the idea of compromise in politics. Violence is the ultimate expression of impatience and renunciation of methods of peaceful, bargained conflict resolution. Such a finding, however, provides additional evidence that the black committed protestors are not the pragmatists that the initial hypothesis predicted. The impatience reflected in their attitudes toward compromise would seem to indicate a tendency to adopt rigid postures in the bargaining arena (hence alienating targets whose efforts to find a mutually acceptable position are likely to be rebuffed). The black committed protestors also see blacks as a special group which should be free of the normal constraints of compromise. Inflexibility, it should be noted, is a critical barrier to the formation of coalitions.

The black less committed, while impatient with compromise, are less so than the black committed. Both types of white protestors show patterns similar to one another: Some express agreement that a group has to compromise too much to get what it wants, but a majority either disagree or are ambivalent. The white protestors are also reluctant to accord blacks special status when it comes to compromise, although the white committed protestors are ambivalent.

Table VIII. A group has to compromise too often to get what it wants from government.

| | Blacks | | Whites | |
	Committed	Less committed	Committed	Less committed
Agree	76.9% (20)	54.2% (13)	40% (4)	48% (12)
Agree and disagree	19.2% (5)	29.4% (7)	40% (4)	28% (7)
Disagree	3.8% (1)	16.6% (4)	20% (2)	24% (6)
Totals	100% (26)	100% (24)	100% (10)	100% (25)

Gamma coefficient: .47   Gamma coefficient: .06

Table IX. Black people shouldn't have to make compromises when they make demands because they've waited so long to be treated fairly.

	Blacks		Whites	
	Committed	Less committed	Committed	Less committed
Agree	76.9% (20)	63% (15)	–	8% (2)
Agree and disagree	23% (6)	21% (5)	70% (7)	20% (5)
Disagree	–	16.6% (4)	30% (3)	72% (18)
Totals	100% (26)	100% (24)	100% (10)	100% (25)

Gamma coefficient: .38   Gamma coefficient: .56

The implications of the original argument about the committed protestors dictate that the members of this group score low on conventional tests of alienation and low on cynicism toward government. If these people feel that protest works, it must in part be because government has been responsive to them. Yet the data do not support this reasoning for the black protestors.

All black protestors--and especially the black committed protestors--tend to believe that "people in the government in this city don't care much what the average person thinks."[18] White committed protestors, however, score relatively low on this indicator of alienation, lower in fact than the white less committed. This finding would fit the initial hypothesis.

Table X. People in the government in this city don't care much what the average person thinks.

	Blacks		Whites	
	Committed	Less committed	Committed	Less committed
Agree	76.9% (20)	63% (15)	10% (1)	24% (6)
Agree and disagree	19.2% (5)	33.6% (8)	40% (4)	36% (9)
Disagree	3.8% (1)	4.2% (1)	50% (5)	40% (10)
Totals	100% (26)	100% (24)	100% (10)	100% (25)

Gamma coefficient: .30   Gamma coefficient: -.25

The most significant differences which emerge when we compare the protestors on their assessment of the honesty of local public officials are racial ones, not differences in the degree to which respondents are committed to protest as an instrumental tactic. We find that blacks almost universally doubt the honesty of people running the government. If the original hypothesis had held, then we should have found that committed protestors showed low cynicism, reflecting their success in establishing working relationships with public officials through their considered protest behavior.

In contrast both types of white protestors express the opinion that most officials are honest. No significant differences appear between the committed and the less committed. These findings suggest that cynicism--insofar as it is reflected in the responses to this question--is a function more of race than of experiences in the political arena.

Table XI. Most of the people running the government in Milwaukee are honest.

| | Blacks | | Whites | |
	Committed	Less committed	Committed	Less committed
Agree	3.8% (1)	8.4% (2)	50% (5)	56% (14)
Agree and disagree	26.9% (7)	29.4% (7)	30% (3)	32% (8)
Disagree	69.2% (18)	63% (15)	20% (2)	12% (3)
Totals	100% (26)	100% (24)	100% (10)	100% (25)

Gamma coefficient: -.16   Gamma coefficient: -.14

To this point we have discovered that black instrumental protestors do not conform to the integrative, pragmatic norms that we hypothesized they would. White committed protestors, however, do tend to exhibit pragmatic tendencies associated with their instrumental use of protest. In general we have found that the less committed groups of both races show patterns slightly less threatening to the norms which help to integrate political systems.

Earlier we speculated that the less committed, who, we found, are not violence-prone, might either withdraw altogether from political participation or would remain with or return to conventional forms. The data indicate that the less committed do not for the most part withdraw from politics but rather exhibit a moderate commitment to conventional electoral activity (Tables XII and XIII).

Other patterns of some interest are also apparent. The white committed protestors show the highest commitment to voting as a form of political participation, but black committed protestors show the lowest electoral participation rates of any of the groups. (In Table XIII, those who were too young to vote in the last mayoral election in Milwaukee have been eliminated.)

Table XII. A good many local elections aren't important enough to bother with.

| | Blacks | | Whites | |
	Committed	Less committed	Committed	Less committed
Agree	42.3% (11)	8.4% (2)	-	20% (5)
Agree and disagree	26.9% (7)	8.4% (2)	10% (1)	4% (1)
Disagree	30.7% (8)	83% (20)	90% (9)	76% (19)
Totals	100% (26	100% (24)	100% (10)	100% (25)

Gamma coefficient: .78   Gamma coefficient: -.51

Table XIII. Percentage Voting for Mayor, 1968.

| | Blacks | | Whites | |
	Committed	Less committed	Committed	Less committed
Voted	44.4% (8)	58% (11)	78% (7)	65% (15)
Did not vote	55.5% (10)	42% (8)	22% (2)	35% (8)
Totals	100% (18)	100% (19)	100% (9)	100% (23)

Gamma coefficient: -.26   Gamma coefficient: .30

VI.

The data presented here indicate that the black committed protestors adhere least to those norms which are significant for the integration of political systems and most to those which have potentially disintegrative effects. As a means of summarizing the data the four groups of protestors are ranked in Table XIV according to the percentage of each group which demonstrated a commitment to each norm of political belief or conduct tapped by the various questions asked on the survey. A "1" represents the highest percentage committed to the norm and a "4" the lowest percentage committed. I assume that commitments to the norms of peaceful political conduct, compromise, trust, and belief and participation in elections is integrative in the sense that these norms are widely shared as some of the underlying rules and conventions of politics in America. In the Table I have distinguished among "protest norms," "evaluations of violence," "generalized conventional norms," and "alienation."

To adhere to protest norms in contemporary urban America is to represent only a mildly disintegrative force in the political system. That is, protest may generate heated disagreement and disapproval, but it seldom results in violence or counter-violence, and public officials are usually willing to respond in some way to peaceful protest. Hence the high commitment of both black and white instrumental protestors to protest norms cannot be viewed as significantly disintegrative.

The favorable evaluations of violence and the low commitment to the conventional norms of compromise, trust and electoral participation by the black committed protestors however, do represent disintegrative forces. To admit to having felt that violence was sometimes the only way to get the government to do something is a response we would not have expected from people who had discovered a less costly and more manageable way of making their voices heard in politics. They are also the most impatient with the idea of compromise, upon which coalition formation and peaceful bargaining are generally predicated, and they are prone to feel that blacks deserve exemption from the necessity to compromise their demands. These protestors

are the most cynical, the most alienated, and the least likely to believe in the
importance of voting. In short, their evaluation of protest as a successful
instrument for gaining a voice in politics and the frequent resort to such tactics
are not accompanied by nor have they generated any sense of commitment to a peaceful
bargaining system or any feeling of belonging to that system. To the extent that
their instrumental behavior is not congruent with the conventional or instrumental
norms, we may say that the black committed protestors represent a volatile and
unpredictable force in the political system.

Table XIV. A Summary of Relative Norm Commitments of Protest Groups*

Norm	Black Committed	Black Less committed	White Committed	White Less committed
Protest Norms				
More protest	1	2	3	4
Important to take part in protest	1	3	2	4
Demonstrations better than voting	1	3	2	4
Subtotal	3	8	7	12
Evaluations of Violence				
Ghetto violence has done some good	1	3	2	4
Thought violence might get government to act	1	2	3	4
Subtotal	2	5	5	8
Generalized Conventional Norms				
Compromise is necessary	4	3	1	2
Blacks should compromise like others	4	3	1	2
Government officials are honest	4	3	2	1
Local elections are important	4	2	1	3
Local voting participation rate	4	3	1	2
Subtotal	20	14	6	10
Alienation				
Government cares about average people	4	3	1	2

*Ranks for each group within the norm categories have been added to provide a
simple means of comparison by reference to the subtotals, although these
figures have only a crude capacity to discriminate among the groups.

The white committed protestors present a different picture. While their commitment to protest norms is high and their evaluations of violence intermediate, they are the most committed to the conventional norms. In addition they are the least alienated.

The less committed blacks and whites occupy inter mediate positions. The blacks lean toward the protest norms and away from the conventional norms. The whites show the least commitment to the protest norms and lean toward the conventional ones.

Superficially, we might draw the conclusion that a demonstrated commitment to instrumental protest has different effects on blacks and whites. For the former if fosters disintegrative attitudes; for the latter it generates commitment to the political order as a consequence of the pragmatic calculations we hypothesized the instrumental participant would make.

Such a conclusion, I believe, would hold only if we found that protest generally failed for committed black protestors and was successful for committed white protestors. But when the respondents were asked if they thought that each of the individual protest acts they were asked to discuss had helped them get what they wanted, the black committed group answered in the affirmative 46 percent of the time while the white oommitted group answered similarly 47 percent of the time. Thus, both the black and white committed protestors assessed the effectiveness of their protest acts identically. Perceived success or failure fails to explain the difference between the two groups in their respective commitment to integrative norms, unless--and this is simply speculation--blacks and whites have very different expectations as to what constitutes success and failure.

In attempting to explain why the two groups of committed instrumental protestors both of whom feel that their protest is effective in getting them what they want about half the time, differ in regard to the basic attitudes we have examined, I suspect that we must look at the development of such attitudes prior to the experienc of protest.

While we have no data on the socialization experiences of the Milwaukee sample, findings in the literature indicate that black-white differences on political efficacy and cynicism scores are well-established in childhood.[19] And Greenberg writes that, "The 'normal' pattern of patriotic learning is not found in black children....Nor, finally, do we see a growth in the absorption of ideological consensus and an appreciation for the needs of the community."[20]

Students of political socialization generally claim that participation in politics is an important agent in the development and alteration of adult political attitudes.[21] Yet we find little evidence that participation in political protest for instrumental reasons has much impact on attitudes important for political integration. We can only conclude that the protest act has no striking effects as a didactic experience insofar as the learning of fundamental integrative norms is concerned. Despite the considerable personal commitment required of the protest participant, the experience of protest, even when it is perceived as relatively successful, is not strong enough to overcome the deep-rooted feelings established in childhood.

To lend credence to this conclusion it is instructive to look at the respective educational achievements of the protestors.

Table XV. Mean Education of Protest Group Members

	Black Commited	Black Less committed	White Committed	White Less committed
Mean no. of years	11.8	12.8	15.7	13.9

We know that education is positively related to social trust and a sense of mastery over the political environment.[22] If low education is taken to be an accurate indicator of deprivation, then we may say that the high sense of disaffection of the black committed protestors, who score lowest among the four groups in education, is fully understandable. The data on the Milwaukee protestors suggest, then, that adherence to the conventional norms of political belief and conduct may largely

be a function of the socialization and formal education experiences rather than of
distinctive patterns of political behavior. Hence, white instrumental protestors
enter the protest situation with a prior sense of commitment to bargaining and to
the peaceful conventions of flexibility which make for integration. Black
instrumental protestors, however, may have found protest a successful tactic, but
these successes have not been sufficient to eradicate the impatience and distrust
they bring with them into the political arena.

The persistence of the black protestors' disaffection is probably a function
in part of their relation with local government. For many urban blacks the heavy
dependence on municipal services means that the quality of their daily lives is
substantially determined by the level of public commitment to those services. Unlike
the members of the white middle class, the black poor cannot rely on private or
personal resources to supply them with good housing, extra police protection, and
conscientious sanitation services. Thus, blacks are more dependent on the city
government for the amenities of life than better-off segments of the population.

This dependence, and hence concern, is reflected in the fact that black protest
is overwhelmingly directed at city agencies and officials: 83 percent of the
incidents mentioned by the protestors fell in this category. Only 24 percent of
the protest incidents in which whites took part were directed at the city government,
as whites divided their attentions more or less evenly among the city, the national
government (Vietnam protests, for example), universities, and private institutions
and business.

The point is that blacks probably feel they cannot afford a success rate
identical to that of whites: slightly less than half the time they protest do they
believe it was successful. For white students protesting university administration
policy or for white housewives taking part in an antiwar demonstration, success
or failure in achieving one's aims probably has only tangential immediate impact
on their daily lives. But for blacks who need welfare money for winter clothing,
the success or failure of a protest for that goal means the difference between
being warm and being cold.

While adherence to the generalized norms of political belief and conduct seem more related to the socialization and formal education experiences, commitment to the norms of protest and the relatively favorable evaluations of violence seem instead to be functions of involvement in protest. Participation in what is perceived as successful protest generates the desire to protest more. Or to put it another way, successful experiences in politics breed favorable expectations of further similar participation. This is not a startling conclusion, but it is significant nevertheless because it indicates the probable durability of protest tendencies in the city among a substantial portion of both the black and white populations. No less than 13% of the total black sample and 3% of the total white sample exhibit this enduring commitment to instrumental protest. For these people, protest is not a tactic of the last resort, to be used reluctantly and sparingly. Some among them prefer it even to voting as a way of influencing government. This committed protest bloc, whose members have made a considerable investment of political resources in protest, represents a force that city government must reckon with on a regular basis. In no way does it appear to be a passing phenomenon but rather a fixture in city politics.

Instrumental protest also seems to incline people toward the favorable perception of violence rather than away from it as we had expected it might. But we might explain this finding in the following way: instrumentalists have hit upon protest because it works. Protest often depends for its impact on the implicit threat of violence, the ultimate sanction which protestors can use for leverage in the political system. As long as protest works, then the threat need not be carried out. But instrumental protestors must consider the possibility that protest may not work some day in some critical situation in which they have a passionate interest. In this case, then, the threat may have to be carried out to maintain the credibility of protest as a tactic. Hence, to use protest instrumentally is to consider implicitly the possibility of violence if the tactic upon which one has placed his reliance fails.

To conclude, we may say that we have discovered that different types of protestors relate to the political system differently and thus pose different problems for elites in that system to handle. The white protestors--especially those committed to instrumental protest--bring to the system a host of beliefs concerning the honesty of public officials, the desirability of compromise, and so on. They can afford to adhere to these norms: their status in the society is comparatively secure, for in a broad sense the system works for them. They will be amenable to negotiation and more ready to search for common ground with the targets of their protest. Those black protestors not committed to integrative norms are unpredictable, relatively intransigent, and less trusting and hence more difficult to deal with. Those of both races less committed to instrumental protest enter the protest arena sporadically, bringing with them moderate commitments to integrative norms. They do not pose a difficult problem for the system to handle; most appear to be more committed to conventional political participation than to protest. The problem that will continue to plague public officials is that they must deal with a segment of the urban black population that is deeply dissatisfied, intensely committed to protest methods, and the most difficult to satisfy. To deal with this group city officials must come to understand not only the crucial importance of city government to the lives of poor blacks, but also that more than a moderate rate of responsiveness is order. What measures will conquer the disaffection of these urban black activists and generate a commitment among them to the society? The answers, of course, are hardly clear, but present levels of response are clearly inadequate.

Footnotes

1. John Stuart Mill, _Considerations on Representative Government_ (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), p. 72.

2. Robert Lane, _Political Life_ (New York: The Free Press, 1959), p. 344.

3. Philip Selznic, _TVA and the Grass Roots_ (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 13.

4. James Q. Wilson, "The Strategy of Protest: Problems of Negro Civic Action," _Journal of Conflict Resolution_, 3 (September, 1961), p. 291.

5. Ralph H. Turner, "The Public Perception of Protest," _American Sociological Review_, 34 (December 1969), p. 816.

6. H.L. Nieburg, _Political Violence_ (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), p. 129.

7. Ulf Himmelstrand, "Verbal Attitudes and Behavior: A Paradigm for the Study of Message Transmission and Transformation," _Public Opinion Quarterly_, XXIV (Summer, 1960), pp. 224-250.

8. Lester Milbrath, _Political Participation_ (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 12.

9. Himmelstrand writes: "Expressive goal attainment is a static or repetitive process, the goals of expressive action being proximal goals of symbolic gratification which do not give rise to new drives and new goals as they are attained....Instrumental goal attainment is a dynamic process, new distal goals being extablished over and over gain on the basis of previous attachments..." "Verbal Attitudes and Behavior..." _loc. cit._, p. 235.

10. Comparable data is hard to find in the literature, but these figures seem surprisingly high. Cataldo and Kellstedt write simply that participation in protests and demonstrations by either race in Buffalo is "rare." Everett Cataldo and Lyman Kellstedt, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Political Involvement over Time: A Study of Buffalo's Urban Poor," _Proceedings of the American Statistical Association_, Social Statistics Section, 1968, p. 83. Don Bowen, et al., found in Cleveland that only 5% of their poverty area sample had actually participated in protests, and most of this had involved picketing on strike lines, and item not included in our measure of protest. Don R. Bowen, Elinor Bowen, Sheldon Gawiser, and Louis Masotti, "Deprivation, Mobility, and Orientation Toward Protest of the Urban Poor," _American Behavioral Scientist_, II (March-April, 1968), p. 21.

11. The question read as follows: "Demonstrations and mass marches are one good way to get the city government to listen to you." Agreement or disagreement was sought. The purpose in using a question about gaining access to city government is that the agencies of city governments are not only more amenable to influence by protest (they are physically closer to the people than other levels; the stakes they allocate are not as high as those at other levels; they provide direct services; and so on), but a majority of the protest incidents which protestors cited concerned demands made on city officials and agencies (N=123; 53%). Other levels of government and private institutions were targets 38.6% (N=90) of the time, while 20 people mentioned having protested King's death (8.5%).

12. Data collected by Marvin Olsen indicates that public disapproval is high for mass protest demonstrations and sit-ins. Close to 60% of his Ann Arbor sample expressed strong disapproval of such tactics. Marvin E. Olsen, "Perceived Legitimacy of Social Protest Actions," Social Problems, 15 (Winter, 1968), p. 299. Similar findings are reported in Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Demonstrations and Race Riots," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXXI (Winter, 1967-68), pp. 655-677, a review of Gallup and Harris poll data between 1961 and 1967.

13. Compare this operational measure of expressive behavior with Alford and Scoble's "ritualist" voter, who exhibits high voting turnout but low interest. Robert R. Alford and Harry Scoble, "Sources of Local Political Involvement," American Political Science Review, LXII (December, 1968), p. 1192.

14. Michael Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource," American Political Science Review, LXII (December, 1968), pp. 1144-1158.

15. Ibid., p. 1149.

16. Ibid.

17. Although the responses by non-protestors to the questions dealt with in the following tables are not important for the purposes of this present paper, it is interesting, nevertheless, to note that they differ uniformly from the responses of the protestors. In every case the non-protestors show less enthusiasm for the idea of protest, show a higher commitment to non-violent modes of political behavior, are more trusting, less alienated, and more willing to compromise. Despite these consistent differences, the responses' of the non-protestors need not be construed here as a standard of support for political integration, since the argument I make concerns the effect on such support of different types of protest. Nevertheless, we would in fact expect that to engage in protest in the first instance requires a slightly lesser prior commitment to political integration, since protest is by its very nature disruptive and controversial.

18. Among the syndrome of attitudes which make for alienation, Lane includes the following: "The government is not run in my interest; they do not care about me; in this sense it is not my government." Robert Lane, Political Ideology (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 162.

19. Schley R. Lyons, "The Political Socialization of Ghetto Children: Efficacy and Cynicism," Journal of Politics, 32 (May, 1960), pp. 288-304.

20. Edward S. Greenberg, "The Political Scoialization of Black Children," in Political Socialization, Edward S. Greenberg, ed. (New York: Atherton, 1970), pp. 181-2.

21. Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little Brown, and Co., 1969), p. 59.

22. Ibid., pp. 176-7.