


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The American Class Structure

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ABSTRACT

This paper presents the first systematic investigation of the American class structure based on data gathered from an explicitly Marxian, relational perspective. Classes in this research are not defined in terms of categories of occupations, but in terms of social relations of control over investments, decisionmaking, other people's work, and one's own work. Data on these dimensions of social relations of production were gathered in a national survey of the U.S. working population. Five general results from the study are particularly important: (1) the working class is by far the largest class in the American class structure; (2) close to half of all locations within the class structure have a "contradictory character," that is, their class content is determined by more than one basic class. The American class structure cannot therefore be represented by any simple scheme of class polarization. (3) Lower status white collar occupations are virtually as proletarianized as manual occupations. It therefore makes little sense to consider such occupations as part of the "middle class." (4) Women and blacks are considerably more proletarianized than white males. The result is that a sizable majority of the U.S. working class is composed of women and minorities. (5) Large "monopoly" corporations in the United States have a higher proportion of managerial-supervisory positions than either the state or smaller competitive firms. The working class is concentrated in the competitive sector, and "semi-autonomous employee" positions (positions which control their own work but not the work of others) are concentrated within the state.

The American Class Structure

Since sociology began as a discipline the concept of class has been at the very heart of sociological theory and debate. It is one of the few concepts which bridges virtually all subfields of sociology: one speaks of class in political sociology, stratification, the sociology of education, social psychology, urban sociology, and so on. And it plays a pivotal role in both the macro-theories of entire social structures and the micro-theories of individual social behavior. While sociologists of different theoretical persuasions may define the meaning of the concept in different ways and accord it different explanatory importance within their theory and research, very few sociologists would argue that the concept of class is peripheral to sociological concerns.

Given this centrality, it is surprising that there has been so little systematic research on the concept of class as such. Research on class tends to take one of two forms: either it is essentially subjectivist in character, being preoccupied with people's subjective images of the class structure or their self-identification with specific classes, or, if class is recognized as an objective feature of social structures, it is primarily treated as a variable attached to the biographies of individuals which influences individual outcomes of various sorts. Rarely does empirical research go beyond such subjectivist and individualist uses of the concept of class, and attempt to study class structures as such in their own right.

The central objective of this paper, and of the larger research project of which this is a part, is to rigorously investigate the objective

contours of the class structures of advanced capitalist societies. The larger project will eventually involve systematic comparative analysis of several different countries using data gathered from identical question-naires administered in each country.³ That data will be used to explore a variety of specific problems: the differences in class distributions in the various countries; the relationship between the state and private employment within the class structure; the patterns of class and occupational mobility; class structure and the sexual division of labor in work and in the home; class structure and income inequality; the interrelationship between class structure, class location, and class consciousness. This paper will not broach most of these topics. Its focus is much more limited: to develop a satisfactory strategy for operationalizing a particular variant of the Marxian concept of class structure, and to use that operationalization to generate a series of descriptive analyses of salient features of the American class structure.

Part I will present a brief, general discussion of the concept of class. The purpose of this section will be less to develop a full-fledged theoretical defense of the Marxist concept than to clarify the central lines of demarcation between Marxist and non-Marxist approaches to class. Part II will then examine a range of problems encountered in operationalizing the Marxist concept of class. This will be followed in Part III with an empirical exploration of the American class structure.

I. LINES OF DEMARCATION IN CONCEPTS OF CLASS

Marxist versus Non-Marxist Definitions

There are nearly as many different ways of generating typologies of concepts of class as there are different ways of defining the concept itself. Various theorists have emphasized the distinction between gradational and relational conceptualizations (e.g., Ossowski, 1963), between undimensional and multidimensional perspectives on class and stratification (e.g., Lipset, 1968: 310), between realist and nominalist conceptions (e.g., Lenski, 1966: 23), between continuous and discontinuous gradations (e.g., Landecker, 1960), and so on. In earlier work, Wright (1979: 4-17) utilized a set of three nested distinctions to differentiate among concepts of class: gradational vs. relational concepts; and among relational definitions, concepts based on market relations vs. production relations; and among production relations definitions, concepts based on technical vs. authority vs. exploitation relations. Each of these strategies of analysis reveals different salient features of class concepts, and for different specific purposes, different typologies may be more or less useful.

In order to understand the specificity of the family of Marxian definitions of class, two dimensions on which class concepts vary are particularly important: (1) whether or not the concept of class involves

appropriation relations, and (2) whether or not the concept involves

domination relations. Appropriation relations are social relations between people within which economic resources (products and income) are

transferred and distributed. In capitalist societies the central form of appropriation relations is markets of various sorts, although nonmarket forms of appropriation relations also exist (e.g., taxation). Domination relations are social relations within which the activities of one group of people are controlled by another. Taking these two dimensions together gives us the four different ways of conceptualizing class represented in Table 1.

Let us look briefly at each of the cells of this table. Weberian definitions of class revolve around market relations (Weber, 1922 [1968]). In the simpler forms of Weberian class analysis only labor markets are considered. The working class is defined as sellers of raw labor power, the middle class as sellers of skilled labor power and the capitalist class as purchasers of labor power. In more complex accounts, credit markets and commodity markets are also considered (see, for example, the discussion by Wiley, 1967). In either case the important point is that classes are defined by the exchange relations within which economic resources are distributed.⁴

The definitions of class elaborated in the work of Ralf Dahrendorf (1959) explicitly reject appropriation relations as central to the concept of class. In its place domination relations—or as Dahrendorf specifies it, authority relations—become the central basis for defining class structures. The class structure is characterized by "command" classes—those who give orders—and "obey" classes—those who follow orders. It was only under the peculiar conditions of mid—19th century capitalism that such domination relations happened to coincide with property relations, thus giving the appearance that property (appropriation relations) was at the heart of the class structures of such societies.

Table 1

Domination and Appropriation in the Conceptualizations of Class Structure

	Domination Relations				
Appropriation Relations	Central to Concept of Class	Marginal or Absent in the Concept of Class			
Central to the concept of class	Marxist definitions	Weberian definitions			
Marginal or absent in the concept of class	Dahrendorf's definition	status-gradational definitions			

In contrast to both Weber's and Dahrendorf's concepts of class, much empirical sociological analysis implicitly rejects both appropriation and domination relations as central to class. Classes are defined as divisions within status rankings rather than as locations within structured social relations of any kind. The names of classes within such approaches thus have purely quantitative identifications: upper, upper middle, middle, lower middle, lower, etc., in contrast to the qualitative designations in Marxian and Weberian theories (capitalist and worker, lord and serf, etc.).

In terms of the categories presented here, the distinctiveness of the Marxist approach to class structure is that it sees class relations as simultaneously defined by domination and appropriation relations. 6 When Marxists argue that classes must be defined in terms of the "social relations of production" and "exploitation" they are in effect stating that class relations involve both domination and appropriation. As in the Weberian analysis of classes in capitalist society, this means that market relations play an important part in specifying class structures. Marx, like Weber, stresses that workers are dispossessed of the means of production and must sell their labor power to employers on the market in order to obtain their means of subsistence (in the form of wages). But unlike Weber, the Marxist concept of the working class also specifies that workers are subordinated to capital within the production process itself. They are systematically related to the capitalist class not only via the exchange relation in the market, but via the domination relation within production.7

Classes are thus neither simply categories defined by the social relations which distribute economic resources nor by the relations through which one group dominates another; they are defined by those appropriation relations which are simultaneously relations of domination. In cases where a domination relation is not linked to an appropriation relation, it does not constitute, in the Marxist sense, a class relation. This would be the case, for example, in a prison where prison guards dominate prisoners but do not necessarily appropriate any resources from those prisoners. Similarly, where an appropriative relationship exists in the absence of domination, the relation is not a class relation. Children typically appropriate considerable resources from their parents (i.e., there are regular transfers from parents to children), yet do not dominate them, and thus the parent-child relation is not a class relation. 8 Domination without appropriation or appropriation without domination is not a class relation.

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a proper defense of this concept, it is worth pointing out the basic reasons why Marxists see this concept as powerful. Three arguments underlie the basic defense of a concept of class as the unity of domination and appropriation. First, it can be argued that the conjunction of domination relations and appropriation relations provides the basis for understanding the stable reproduction of each. Stable power requires resources, and thus for a domination relation to be reproduced over time it must be linked to an appropriation relation. Similarly stable appropriation (at least if it is exploitive) requires power, and thus for an appropriation relation to be reproduced over time it must be linked to

domination. The Marxist concept of class thus captures these reciprocal conditions of reproduction. 9 Second, a concept of class which links domination and appropriation provides the most powerful basis for a theory of class conflict. When conflicts over appropriation are simultaneously conflicts over power they are most likely to become crystallized as struggles between organized collectivities. The analysis of the transformation of classes understood as a structure of positions within relations (a "class-in-itself") into collectivities organized in struggles (a "class-for-itself") is facilitated when the positions themselves are understood in terms of both domination and appropriation. Finally, Marxists argue that this conceptualization of class provides the basis for linking the problem of social reproduction (the first point above), the problem of social conflict (the second point) to the problem of epochal social change. A theory of history built around this concept of class, it is argued, is more capable of revealing the social contradictions and dynamics which systematically generate trajectories of historical development than is a theory of class which revolves exclusively around appropriation or domination.

Specifying the Marxist Concept of Class Structure

Defining the class structure in terms of domination and appropriation relations may constitute the essential difference between Marxist and non-Marxist concepts of class, but it does not yet provide a sufficiently precise specification to enable an empirical operationalization of the Marxist concept. Within the broad family of Marxist definitions which conform to this general concept there are widely different strategies for specifying the concrete criteria for capitalist class relations. It is

essential, therefore, to make quite explicit the criteria by which one moves from this very abstract understanding of class structure to a more concrete map of class relations.

Since the strategy which we will propose has been elaborated in considerable detail elsewhere (Wright, 1976; 1978a: Chapter 2; 1979, Chapters 1 and 2; 1980a, b; Wright and Singelmann, 1982), only the essential points will be sketched out here. This strategy is based on a distinction between three kinds of locations within a class structure: basic class locations, contradictory locations within a mode of production, and contradictory locations between modes of production. The second and third of these can be grouped under a more general rubric, contradictory locations within class relations. Let us examine each of these.

Within a given mode of production, basic class locations are defined by a complete polarization on both the domination and appropriation dimensions of class relations. Within the capitalist mode of production, for example, the bourgeoisie is defined as that class which within appropriation relations owns the means of production and exploits workers and which, within domination relations controls the activities of workers within the process of production; whereas workers are defined as that class which is exploited within appropriation relations and subordinated within the domination relations of production.

Contradictory locations within a mode of production, on the other hand, specify situations in which such complete polarization is absent.

Managers, for example, dominate workers and are dominated by the bourgeoisie, thus occupying a contradictory location within domination

relations. They may also exercise certain ownership rights and exploit workers, while at the same time being exploited by capital. They are thus in a sense <u>simultaneously in two classes</u>: they are workers in that they are exploited and dominated by capital; they are capitalists in that they dominate and exploit workers.

Contradictory locations between modes of production constitute the most complex situation. Concrete capitalist societies always contain at least some noncapitalist forms of production relations. What is often termed "simple commodity production" in which the direct producers own and control their own means of production and hire no wage labor is the most obvious example. In some societies there may also be remnants of feudal production relations which continue to have some importance. And it is possible that the growth of forms of state-organized production should be seen as an emergent form of post-capitalist production. Concrete class structures are thus complicated by the fact that certain positions may be determined within these forms of noncapitalist class relations. This is the case, for example, of the "petty bourgeoisie" in simple commodity production. Class structures may also be complicated by the fact that even within capitalist firms and organizations, certain aspects of these noncapitalist relations may continue to have a structural presence. Wright (1982b) has termed such situations examples of the "interpenetration of modes of production." The class locations defined within such interpenetrated relations constitute contradictory locations between modes of production. Two important examples are (1) small employers, who should be understood as simultaneously petty bourgeois in that they own and use their own means of production (i.e.,

they are self-employed direct producers) and capitalist in that they employ workers and thus both exploit and dominate the labor of others; and (2) semi-autonomous employees such as professionals, who, like the petty bourgeoisie have substantial control over the direction of their own activity within production, and yet are dispossessed of the means of production (nonowners within appropriation relations) and partially dominated.

Taking these different kinds of class locations together, we have the general class map of capitalist society presented in Figure 1. Several comments on this picture need to be made. First, the spatial metaphor is somewhat misleading. The "contradictory locations" are not literally "between" classes, but rather represent locations which are simultaneously within more than one class.

Second, the picture in Figure 1 must itself be seen as a simplification in that only capitalist relations of production and simple commodity production are included. Locations within the state have thus been merged with capitalist production proper. While it is possible to defend such a procedure (Wright, 1978: 94-96), in many ways it may be more fruitful eventually to separate state production as a distinct form of production relations.

Third, the typology presented here only decodes the class locations for the economically active population. A variety of locations in the social structure are thus ignored: housewives, students, retirees, etc. This is not to say that such locations have no class content, but simply that they are not directly organized within the structure of class relations. Such locations, as Wright (1978:91ff.), argues elsewhere, should be treated as having a mediated class content (i.e., their class character —




Figure 1. The basic class structure of capitalist society.

is determined by the various ways in which they are linked to the class structure through nonclass relations—familial relations, for example). For purposes of the empirical analysis of this paper we will simply exclude such locations.

Finally, the typology is strictly a typology of class structure ("class-in-itself") not of classes organized as collective actors in class struggle ("class-for-itself"). This is not to suggest that the Marxist conception of class is reducible to the problem of class structure. As Wright (1978: 97-108) has argued, the concept of class within Marxist theory involves a complex of interconnections between class structure, class struggle, and class formation. Our focus in this paper, however, will be limited to the first of these essential elements.

II. OPERATIONALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT OF THE MARXIST CONCEPT OF CLASS STRUCTURE

The typology presented in Figure 1 constitutes the conceptual framework for this research on the American class structure. It is not, however, an easy task to obtain data which adequately map the categories in this typology. As we shall see in the empirical analysis later in this paper, there is at best only a loose correspondence between census occupational categories and these class locations, and thus it is not possible to translate occupational data into class data. And while some social surveys exist which contain data relevant to this typology, no existing data set contains a full inventory of appropriate indicators. In order to properly measure this structure, therefore, it was necessary to generate new data. This was done in a national survey conducted by the

Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan in the summer of 1980.

In this section we will first discuss the general problems in developing a satisfactory set of survey questions needed to measure the class structure. This will be followed by a fairly detailed discussion of the concrete measures developed for each class location in the typology.

General Problems in Operationalizing Class Relations

Two problems have pervaded the task of operationalizing class relations: first, the problem of measuring objective relational properties via a questionnaire instrument which unavoidably relies on subjective judgments of respondents, and second, problems rooted in the relative conceptual underdevelopment of some of the criteria used in the typology itself.

The problem of subjective responses in the measurement of objective properties is, of course, a general one in survey research. The distance between the categories people use in describing their jobs and the objective properties sociologists require for defining occupations, for example, causes considerable difficulty in conventional sociological research on social mobility and occupational structures. This difficulty is considerably compounded when the objective properties of interest are relational in character. The concept of class being measured in this research centers on aspects of one's own job that specify the location of that job within a complex system of social relations. We need to know, for example, the ways one is dominated and controlled within the production process as well as the ways one dominates and controls others.

The basic strategy adopted to deal with these measurement problems was to attempt to specify a series of concrete activities which could be considered plausible indicators of the relational properties in question. These activities revolved around forms of participation in decision—making of various sorts, forms of involvement in the supervision and sanctioning of other employees, and types of initiatives one could exercise on one's own. While these questions are not perfect, they should provide a reasonably satisfactory basis for measuring the relations which constitute the class structure.

The second problem in the present research lies in the conceptual criteria themselves. In these terms the most problematic case is the category "semi-autonomous employee," class locations which involve genuine control or self-direction over one's own labor process without controlling the labor process of anyone else. It is not at all clear from this very abstract formulation which of the multitude of aspects of jobs are the pivotal ones for defining this "petty bourgeois" form of autonomy within capitalist production. And even if we decide on a particular dimension, it is not obvious how to avoid arbitrariness in specifying the class location, since self-direction is clearly a continuous variable rather than a naturally dichotomous one. 11

The general strategy adopted to deal with these kinds of problems has been first, to include a variety of alternative indicators of the same theoretical dimension, so that different formal criteria can be compared in various ways; and second, to construct a series of class typologies employing criteria of different levels of restrictiveness in order to establish ranges for the distribution of the population into different locations.

Operationalizing Specific Classes

Table 2 presents the general logic of overall construction of the class typology. The specific questions used to measure these criteria are given in Appendix A to the paper. We will examine the logic for each of the class locations in the typology below. The distributions of respondents for the various concrete criteria used to operationalize this typology are given in Table 3.

1. The Bourgeoisie and Small Employers. Because of the nature of social surveys, by necessity very few proper members of the bourgeoisie are ever actually included in samples. Because of this, relatively few questions were included in the survey to capture variations within this category. The bourgeois class is operationalized in this survey by two principal criteria: (1) self-employment (Q.A7) and (2) number of employees (Q.A9 and A10).12 The problem, of course, is to specify the appropriate number of employees to distinguish between small employers-the contradictory location between the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie--and actual capitalists. Because of the relative arbitrariness in establishing such a criterion, we have adopted several alternative cutoff points for uses in different analyses. In practical terms this is not such a serious issue, since there are so few respondents with more than two or three employees. As a result, for many of 'the statistical analyses it became necessary to merge small employers with large employers into a more diffuse "employer" class category.

It should be noted in the distributions given for the various categories of self-employed in Table 3 that the overall proportion of the

Table 2. Overall Logic of the Class Structure Typology

•			Capitalist	Mode of Production		Simple Commod	lity Production
				tions of Appropriation			
Type of Class Location	Class Location	Ownership Relation	Exchange Relation	Real Exercise of Effective Property	Authority Relations	Ownership Relations	Domination Relations
Basic class location	Bourgeoisie	Owns means of produc- tion	Buys labor power	Directly makes core decisions over allocation of resources and use of means of production	Directly controls the authority hierarchy		
Contradictory location within the capitalist mode of pro- duction	Managers	Does not own means of pro- duction	Sells labor power	Directly involved in at least some core decisions	Dominant and subordinate		Ę
duccion	Supervisors	**	**	Excluded from all decisions over the workplace	Dominant and subordinate		
Basic class location	Workers	88	u .	11	Subordinate		
Contradictory location between cap- italist pro- duction and simple com- modity pro- duction	Semi-autonomous employees	•		•	***************************************	Nonowner of means of pro- duction	Substantial direction within the labor process (unity of conception and execution)

(table continued)

Table 2 (continued)

			Capitalist Mode of Production			Simple Commodity Production		
Type of Class Location	Class Location	Relation	ations of Ap Exchange Relation	propriation Real Exercise of Effective Property	Domination Authority Relations	Ownership Relations	Domination Relations	
Basic class location	Petty Bourgeoisie					Owns means of production and directly uses them without employing labor power	Complete self-direc- tion within the labor process	
Contradictory location between cap- italist and simple com- modity pro- duction	Small employers	Owns means production	Buys limited amounts of labor power	Makes core decisions	Controls authority structure	Owns means of production and directly uses them within the labor process and employs some wage labor	8	

Α.	Self-employment		
***	odii employment		
	Self-employed	14.6%	
	Employees	85.4	
В.	Number of employees		
	(For self-employed respondents only)		Cumulative
	(For seri emproyed respondence only)		%
	0-1 employee	47.6%	
	2-5 employees	34.0	81.6%
	6-10 employees	5.7	87.3
	11-15 employees	6.4	93.7
	16-30 employees	2.2	95.9
	31-50 employees	2.0	97.9
	51-100 employees	1.2	99.1
	over 100	0.9	100.0
С.	Decisionmaking		
	ŭ		•
	(For employee respondents only)		
	Participates directly in making		
	at least one policy decision	17.8%	
	The result one person, several		
	Provides advice but does not		
	directly participate in making		
	policy decisions	9.2	
	Nondecisionmaker	73.1	
D.	Authority		
	(For employee respondents only)		
	Sanctioning supervisor	28.0%	
	Task supervisor	8.8	
	Nominal supervisor	2.8	
	Nonsupervisor	60.4	

(table continued)

Table 3 (continued)

E.	Formal hierarchy		
	(For employees only)		
	Top managerial position Upper managerial Middle managerial Lower managerial Supervisory Nonmanagerial-supervisory	3.2% 2.9 5.0 2.8 17.4 68.6	
F.	Managerial location		
	(For employees only)		
	Manager Advisor-manager Nonmanagerial decisionmaker Supervisor Nonmanager/supervisor	14.4% 5.3 3.3 15.0 62.1	
G.	Autonomy		
	(For employees only)		
	High autonomy Probably high Moderate autonomy Probably moderate Low nominal autonomy No autonomy	12.8% 6.9 12.3 5.2 8.3 54.5	

respondents who are self-employed is considerably higher than is reported in Census statistics. This is largely because the Census has a completely nonsociological way of defining "self-employment." To be self-employed in the Census one has to be <u>unincorporated</u> and not work for a wage or salary as well as being self-employed. Thus, if you are self-employed but sell a service and are paid by the hour (e.g., as a consultant), you are likely to be classified as a wage and salary worker. Similarly, if for tax purposes you were to incorporate your business and thus be "employed by your own corporation," you would not be considered self-employed any longer. This makes the Census criterion for self-employment virtually useless in a class analysis.

- 2. Managers and supervisors. The most complex part of the typology centers on the contradictory locations between the bourgeoisie and the working class. Three criteria were used to define these locations: decisionmaking, authority, and formal hierarchical position.
- a. Decisionmaking participation. Respondents were asked whether or not they participated in policymaking decisions in their work place (Q.Dl), and if they responded affirmatively, they were then asked specific questions about forms of participation in eight different types of decisions dealing with budgets and investment, products, and various aspects of operation (Q.D2 and D3). On each of these decisions, respondents could get one of three codes:
 - 1 = directly participates in making the policy decision (i.e., they
 make the decision on their own authority, or they make it subject
 to approval from above, or they are a voting member of a group
 which makes the decision)
 - 2 = provides advice to the decisionmakers, but does not directly
 participate in making the decision
 - 3 = neither provides advice nor participates.

The responses to the initial general question on decisionmaking and these specific questions were then aggregated into a simple three-value variable:

- Decisionmaking: l = participates directly in making at least one decision
 - 2 = does not participate in any decisions, but provides advice on at least one
 - 3 = nondecisionmaker.

For certain analyses we also make use of the specific kinds of decisions in which the respondent participates, but for the general class typology these distinctions are not included.

b. Authority. It turns out to be not so simple to ask a proper authority question. The typical question used on surveys is something like, "Do you supervise anyone on your job?" or "Do you have any subordinates on your job?" The problem with these types of questions is that they do not distinguish between someone who performs purely nominal supervisory functions, acting more as a transmitter of communications from above than as a wielder of even limited power, and positions which involve real authority. The head of a work team might answer "yes" to these questions without really having any power over his or her subordinates. To avoid these problems we ask a number of detailed questions about authority relations to construct an authority variable. The result is a variable with four values with the following interpretations:

- Authority: 1 = sanctioning supervisor: a supervisor who is able to impose positive and/or negative sanctions on subordinates (Q C4-6)
 - 2 = task supervisor: a supervisor who cannot impose sanctions, but does give orders of various kinds (C3)

- 3 = nominal supervisor: a supervisor who neither gives orders nor imposes sanctions
- 4 = nonsupervisor: no subordinates of any sort, or supervises a single clerical subordinate (who in turn has no subordinates).

In the constructions of class typologies, level 3 was generally combined with level 4 into a broader nonsupervisor category.

c. Position within the formal hierarchy. In addition to the questions about decisionmaking and authority, respondents were asked whether the position they held was classified as a managerial position, a supervisory position or a nonmanagement position (Q.D4). Initially this question was included in the survey as a kind of validation check on the supervisory questions, and indeed as expected there is a relatively close fit between positions which are called managerial or supervisory and actually being able to exercise supervisory powers, as is seen in Table 4. But the fit is not perfect, and thus we decided it was appropriate to include the formal hierarchy variable in the operational criteria for these class locations.

Once these different variables had been constructed, the problem was then to combine them into a general managerial-supervisory location variable. Here a number of critical theoretical choices had to be made. If we wanted to be highly restrictive in our definition of managers, we could restrict the managerial category to those positions which were unambiguously managerial on all three of these variables (i.e. positions which made decisions, which had real supervisory capacities, and which were in the formal hierarchy). Similarly, the most restrictive definition of supervisors would be nondecisionmakers with real authority in the formal hierarchy. On the other hand, if we wanted to be unrestrictive, a

Table 4

Authority by Formal Hierarchical Position (employees only)

Position within the				Total		
Formal Managerial Hierarchy	Sanctioning Authority	Task Authority	No Authority	Total	•	(column percentages)
Top or upper manager	79.7%	2.1%	18.1%	100.0%	77	6.1%
Middle manager	70.0	12.0	18.0	100.0	64	5.1
Lower manager	55.6	15.3	29.1	100.0	35	2.8
Supervisor	65.1	13.2	21.7	100.0	220	17.4
Nonmanagement positions	9.7	8.0	82.3	100.0	867	68.6
N	353	113	798		1264	
Total %	28.0	8.9	63.1	100.0		100.0

Note: Percentages sum horizontally.

manager would be anyone who made decisions regardless of how they scored on the other two variables, and a supervisor would be any nondecision—maker with subordinates, regardless of how much real power was involved in the supervisory activity or whether the position was formally in the hierarchy or not.

In order to leave maximum flexibility, the strategy we adopted was to construct a general managerial location variable which contained all of these possibilities, and then to collapse this variable in different ways in order to examine various problems using broad and narrow definitions of these class locations. The full managerial location variable is given in Appendix B. The version of that variable which we will use in most of this paper involves the following definitions:

- Managerial location: $1 = \frac{\text{managers}}{\text{or supervisors in the formal hierarchy}}$
 - or supervisors in the formal hierarchy and/or have real authority (values of 1 or 2 on the authority variable)
 - 2 = advisor-managers: advisors to decisionmakers who are in the hierarchy and/or
 have real authority
 - 3 = nonmanagerial decisionmakers: decisionmakers who are neither in the hierarchy nor have any authority
 - 4 = supervisors: nondecisionmakers with sanctioning authority or with both task authority and a supervisor/manager location in the formal hierarchy
 - 5 = nonmanagers, nonsupervisors.
- <u>3. Semi-autonomous employees.</u> While the actual construction of the variables to operationalize this class location is fairly simple, there are probably more problems with the validity of the measures employed

than in any of the other aspects of the typology. Of the various possible aspects of "self-direction" within the labor process, the one that seemed most salient for defining the petty bourgeois character of certain employee positions was the capacity of individuals to plan and design significant aspects of their work and put their own ideas into practice on the job. The rationale behind this was derived in part from the work of Harry Braverman (1974), who, building on themes present in various works of Marx, argues that the essential logic of proletarianization is one of an increasing separation of conception and execution within the labor process. In the classical independent artisan, conception and execution are united; in the radically proletarianized operative on an assembly line, they are almost entirely separated. We therefore sought a measure of autonomy rooted in the extent to which conception was a self-directed activity within work.

Our final approach was to first pose the following very general question:

"Now we have some questions about various aspects of your present job. First, is yours a job in which you are required to design important aspects of your own work and to put your ideas into practice? Or, is yours a job in which you are not required to design important aspects of your own work or put your ideas into practice, except perhaps in minor details?" (Q.B1).

Those respondents who claimed that they were required to design their own work were then asked to give a typical concrete example of this. The interviewer had instructions to probe for specific details. We then developed a fairly elaborate coding system to code the examples. The essential logic of the coding was to give people a score based on how much self-direction we felt the example indicated and how confident we were in our judgment. The scale thus had the following values:

- Autonomy: l = high autonomy: the example indicates an ability to design broad aspects of the job, engage in nonroutine problem-solving on a regular basis, and to put one's ideas into practice in a regular and pervasive way.
 - 2 = probably high autonomy
 - 3 = moderate autonomy: ability to design limited aspects of the job, engage in relatively routine forms of problem-solving and, within fairly well defined limits, put one's ideas into practice.
 - 4 = probably moderate autonomy
 - 5 = <u>low autonomy</u>: virtually no significant ability to plan aspects of the job, problem-solving a marginal part of the job, and only in unusual circumstances can one put one's ideas into practice.
 - 6 = no autonomy: the individual responds negatively to the initial filter question.

Our overall strategy for operationalizing the semi-autonomous employee class location was thus to use these examples as a way of correcting for subjective distortions by respondents who overestimate their capacity for self-direction within work. The assumption was that people who really could plan and design their work and put their ideas into practice would overwhelmingly say "yes" to the filter, but that some people without such autonomy would also claim to be self-directed. The examples were designed to correct for this. Approximately 18% of respondents who claimed to have planning autonomy in the filter question were judged, on the basis of the example they provided, to have no real autonomy in work. My feeling is that we were fairly successful in that enterprise. We are not able, however, to correct for the other subjective distortion, people who understate their autonomy in the initial filter question.

Again, as in the managerial location variable, this autonomy scale enables us to adopt alternative operationalizations by collapsing the scale in different ways. For most of the present analysis we will consider semi-autonomous employees to be people outside of the managerial structure who have levels 1-3 on the scale.

4. Petty bourgeoisie. The pure petty bourgeoisie is defined as positions which own their own means of production (self-employed) and employ no one. As soon as a single person is employed in a regular way, the social relations of production are transformed, for now a relation of domination is introduced into the production system.

Unfortunately in the questionnaire we developed for this study we made a slight wording error in the question about number of employees. The question was worded in the passive voice in the following manner: "How many people are employed in this business?" From the responses, it is fairly clear that at least some of the respondents with no employees responded "one," meaning themselves. Since it is not possible to unambiguously identify these people, we will define the petty bourgeoisie as self-employed individuals with one or no employees. In practical terms it is improbable that this will make any important substantive difference in our analysis.

5. The working class. In terms of the formal construction of the typology, the working class is a "residual" category. That is, all wage laborers are in a sense initially defined as workers, and then the various criteria discussed above are applied to take respondents out of the working class and place them in various kinds of contradictory locations. After that procedure is completed, the remaining respondents are

identified as workers. Since all of these criteria are interlocking, the size of the working class depends upon how restrictive or expansive a set of criteria are used to define the various nonworking class locations. When we discuss the results later in this paper we will present ranges for the size of the working class and other locations depending upon the kinds of criteria used.

Taking all of these various operationalizations together, we get the operational typology for class relations presented in Table 5. The categories in this table provide the basis for the empirical analyses which follow.

The Survey

The data which we will discuss in Part III was gathered in a national telephone survey conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan in the summer of 1980. The final sample consisted of 1499 adults in the labor force, 92 unemployed adults, and 170 house-wives not currently in the labor force. This represented a response rate of about 78%. All of the present analyses will be on the active labor force sample.

A Note on Weights

For reasons which are not entirely clear, the marginal distributions in the sample for occupation and education deviate from the comparable distributions in the U.S. Census to a greater extent than is usual in telephone surveys. Our sample is overrepresented both in higher-status occupations and in higher levels of education. This overrepresentation

Table 5
Operational Typology for Class Structure

Class	Self- Employment	Number of Employees	Managerial Location ^a	Autonomyb
Bourgeoisie	self-employed	<u>></u> 10	Хс	x
Small employer	self-employed	2-9	X	X
Petty bourgeoisie	self-employed	0-1	X	X
Managers and supervisors	employee	X	x	x
Managers	31	11	1	X
Advisory managers	, 	и	2	X
Supervisors	II	н .	4	X
Semi-autonomous employees	11	11	3, 5d	1-3
Workers	11	11		4-6

 a The definition of the values in the managerial location variable is given on p. 25.

bThe definition of the autonomy variable is given on p. 27.

cx = criterion not applicable.

d"Nonmanagerial decisionmakers"—people who make decisions but have <u>no</u> subordinates and are classified as "nonmanagement" in the formal hierarchy are merged with semi-autonomous employees (if they are autonomous) or workers (if they are nonautonomous) throughout this paper. The number of cases involved is very small, less than 2% of the sample.

will probably have relatively little effect in the various multivariate analyses of individual outcomes which we will pursue, but it almost certainly will affect the more descriptive macro-structural investigations of overall class structures. We have therefore constructed a post-hoc system of weights based on the Census occupation-by-education table for the employed population which, when applied to our sample, reproduces the Census distributions. Unless otherwise noted, throughout this paper we will use the weighted sample.

III. DATA ANALYSIS

This examination of the U.S. class structure will proceed in the following steps. Section 1 will present estimates of the overall distribution of the economically active population into the class structure. This will be followed in Section 2 by a discussion of the relationship between this distribution into classes and conventional occupational distributions. Sections 3 and 4 will then look at variations in class distribution by sex and by race respectively. Finally, in Section 5, we will examine the variations in class structure in the state, monopoly, and competitive sectors of the economy.

1. Overall Class Distributions

Figure 2 presents the distribution of the economically active population (excluding unemployed) in the United States into classes according to the criteria defined in Table 5. Table 6 presents the range of estimates for this distribution using the most restrictive and least restrictive criteria for each class.

Capitalist Mode of Production

Simple Commodity Production




Figure 2. Class distribution of the economically active population.

Table 6

Ranges for the Estimates of the Class Distribution of the United States Labor Force, 1980

Class Location	Best Estimate	Minimum	Maximum
Petty bourgeoisie	6.8%		
Small employers	6.0		
Employers/bourgeoisie	1.8		
All managers/supervisors	29.3	21.1%	43.0%
Managers Advisor-managers Supervisors	12.3 4.5 12.8	9.5 2.6 9.0	15.1 7.8 20.2
Semi-autonomous employees	9.5	2.3	16.6
Working class	46.3	35.2	56.7

Note: Ranges were based on following criteria:

Managers: Minimum = decisionmaker + sanctioning authority +
in formal hierarchy
Maximum = decisionmaker

Advisor-manager: Minimum = advisor on decisions + sanctioning + in formal hierarchy

Maximum = advisor on decisions

Supervisor: Minimum = nondecisionmaker + sanctioning +
informal hierarchy
Maximum = nondecisionmaker + sanctioning or task
authority or in hierarchy

Semi-autonomous employees:

Minimum = nonmanager/supervisor with minimum criteria for each category of managers + levels 1-2 on autonomy Maximum = nonmanager/supervisor with minimum criteria for each category of managers + levels 1-4 on autonomy

Workers: Minimum = maximum criteria for managers and semiautonomous employees Maximum = minimum criteria for managers and semiautonomous employees

Several things are worth noting in this overall distribution. First, the working class is the largest single class location within this structure, approaching half of all positions, and 54% of employee positions. This means that nearly half of all people who work lack significant control over their own work, are excluded from all planning and decision-making activities within their place of work, and do not control the work of anyone else.

Second, there are nearly as many positions defined as contradictory locations within class relations—positions which are simultaneously located in more than one class—as there are basic class locations.

Of these contradictory locations, approximately half—or about 20% of all positions—can be considered locations within which the working class aspects are probably dominant (i.e., supervisors and semi-autonomous employees). 13 This means that approximately 65-70% of the people in the sample are either working class or in positions with a significant working class aspect. The United States may be becoming a "middle class society" in certain cultural or ideological ways, but it remains structurally a class society within which the working class continues to have the greatest social weight.

Third, it is important to recognize that the estimates presented in Figure 2 are fairly sensitive to theoretical decisions about precisely how to combine the various criteria in the typology. If, for example, we exclude from the working class those who indicate in their questionnaires that they in any way supervise other people or that they have even very modest levels of autonomy, the size of the working class is reduced to 35%. If, on the other hand, we insist that to be a manager one must

be unambiguously a manager on all of the criteria, that to be a supervisor one must both be in the formal hierarchy and have sanctioning authority, and to be semi-autonomous one must have high levels of autonomy, then the size of the working class increases to 57%. What these figures suggest is that 35% of all positions are unambiguously working class, an additional 11% of positions are almost certainly working class and a further 10% are possibly working class. 14 The operational choices are thus not innocuous. While throughout this analysis we will adopt the criteria which we feel to be the most sound theoretically (those used in Table 5 and Figure 2), it is important to understand the nature of the assumptions underlying these measures.

How does the shape of the overall class distribution defined in Marxist terms differ from mainstream sociological conceptions of the class structure? Table 7 presents the cross-tabulation of our concept of class by the conventional manual/nonmanual occupational classification of the class structure. For purposes of comparison, our class typology has been collapsed into a worker/nonworker dichotonomy.

Perhaps the most striking feature of Table 7 is that the marginals of the table are virtually identical for the two definitions of class: 45.5% of positions are classified as working class on a simple manual/nonmanual criterion and 46.2% on the relational criterion. The composition of these categories, however, is quite different. Nearly 40% of the people classified as working class on the manual/nonmanual criterion would be considered nonworkers (generally in contradictory class locations) by our relational criteria, and over a third of the people classified as middle class would be considered workers. The result of this difference

Table 7

Comparison of Marxist and Conventional Sociological Definitions of Class

Conventional	Marxist Definition ^a								
Sociological Definition ^b	NonWorking Class		Workin	g Class	Total				
Middle class	67.0%	(66.1%)	39.9%	(33.9%)	54.5%	(100%)			
Working class	33.0	(39.0)	60.1	(61.0) ^c	45.5	(100)			
Total	100.0	(53.8)	100.0	(46.2)	100.0				
N = 1,469									

^aDefined according to the relatinal criteria in Table 5.

 $^{^{\}mathrm{b}}\mathrm{Working}$ class defined as manual occupations; nonworking class as nonmanual occupations.

^cPercentages in parentheses sum horizontally; percentages not in parentheses sum vertically.

in composition is that the demographic structure of the class distribution is dramatically different under the two definitions. Using the manual/nonmanual definition of class, 67% of all workers are men. Using the relational definition, this drops to only 46%.

It is, of course, a problematic and arduous task to adjudicate between contending specifications of a concept. Ultimately such adjudication involves the general explanatory purposes of the broader theoretical structures within which the concepts play a role. Nevertheless a rough kind of comparison is possible by examining the cells in Table 7 over which there is a dispute in classification and seeing if according to some criterion such cells more closely resemble one or the other of the undisputed cases.

One obvious criterion for this task is average income. Both Marxist and non-Marxist concepts of class play a role in explaining income distributions in their respective theories, and it is thus a relevant criterion for examining the relative merits of the two systems of class classification. The issue, then, is first, whether those nonmanual positions which are classified as working class by relational criteria have average incomes which are closer to the cell which is defined as working class by both definitions of class or classified nonworking class by both definitions; and second, whether those manual positions which are classified as nonworking class by relational criteria have an average income closer to one or the other of the nondisputed cells.

Table 8 presents the mean annual income for each of the cells in

Table 7.15 Let us look at the disputed cells in the table (the upper-right- and lower-left-hand cells). The upper-right-hand cell consists of

Table 8

Mean Incomes for Cross-Classification of Marxist and Non-Marxist Definitions of the Working Class

	Marxist Def		
Non-Marxist Definitionsb	Nonworking Class	Working Class	Difference
	A. All Responden	ts	
Middle class	\$20,790	\$11,504	\$9,224
Working class	15,478	12,164	3,314
Difference	5,312	-660	
	B. Employees Only	<u>9</u>	
Middle class	\$18,992	\$11,504	\$7,488
Working class	15,914	12,164	3,750
Difference	3,078	-660	

^aDefined according to criteria in Table 5.

 $^{^{\}mathrm{b}}\mathrm{Middle}$ class = nonmanual occupations; workers = manual occupations.

people who, by the non-Marxist definition are defined as middle class (nonmanual occupations), but by the Marxist definition are defined as workers. Is their income closer to those who are considered workers by both definitions or nonworkers by both definitions? Clearly from these data this category is much more like the worker category: it has an average income which is actually slightly less than that of the agreedupon workers, and about half that of the agreed-upon nonworkers. results for the lower-left-hand cell are less clear-cut: people classified as nonworkers by the Marxist definition but workers by conventional sociological definitions have incomes which fall in between the two agreed-upon categories, but closer to the agreed-upon workers. This result, at face value, supports the non-Marxist definition of workers as manual occupations. The mean incomes in the table, however, are in this case somewhat misleading, since the nonworker category in the Marxist definition consists of all class locations outside the working class, including capitalists, top managers, small employers, etc. Since manual occupations outside of the working class (by the Marxist definitions) are very unlikely to be proper capitalists, this has the effect of biasing the comparisons-of these cells in favor of the non-Marxist definition. In fact, if we calculate the mean incomes in Table 8 only for employees (Table 8B) we see that mean for the agreed-upon nonworker category drops considerably. The result is that in this table, the disputed cell-people in manual occupations who are outside the working class in Marxist terms -- has a mean income slightly closer to the agreed-upon nonworkers.

Overall, then, these data are more supportive of the Marxist criteria for defining class categories than the conventional sociological

approach. The disputed categories in the cross-classification of definitions are either much more similar to the Marxist than conventional definitions (upper-right-hand cell), or are ambiguous with respect to the two definitions (lower-left-hand cell). In either case there is little support for the conventional manual/nonmanual criteria for defining the working class.

2. Class and Occupation

We have already briefly looked at the relationship between class and occupation in Table 7. Here we will look in more detail at this interrelationship. In particular, we want to examine two complimentary issues:

(a) To what extent can classes defined in relational terms be viewed as aggregations of occupational categories? (b) Which occupational categories are most closely associated with the working class? The first of these questions concerns the status of the conceptual distinction between class and occupation as aspects of social relations, the second concerns the long-standing sociological debate over the class character of lower-level white collar jobs.

a. The status of the conceptual distinction between class and occupation. Most sociological discussions of class either explicitly or implicitly view classes as essentially aggregations of occupational categories. Even where they disagree on the conceptual content of the concept of class, they agree that operationally classes can be identified as groups of occupations.

Marxists generally reject this conceptual conflation of class and occupation and insist that these two concepts designate qualitatively

distinct dimensions of the social organization of work. Occupation broadly designates the technical content of jobs; class designates the social relations of domination and appropriation within which those technical activities are performed. To be sure, there are some specific jobs within which this distinction collapses, since the actual activities of the job are defined by these relational properties. This is the case, for example, with the occupation "foreman," which explicitly designates job activities of supervision. But, Marxists argue, this is not the case for most occupations. A carpenter, for example, could easily be a worker, a semi-autonomous employee, a manager, or a petty bourgeois artisan. In each of these cases the technical content of the job remains largely the same (transforming lumber into buildings or whatever), but the social relational content changes.

If the claim that class and occupation are different dimensions of social structure is correct, then we would expect many occupations to be relatively heterogeneous in terms of their internal class distributions. While a systematic association between class and occupation would still be predicted, it would be expected that a substantial part of the population would fall outside of the primary (model) class within given occupations. As we see in Table 9, this is indeed the case. If we attempted to define an individual's class by the most frequent class within that individual's occupational category, we would misclassify nearly 45% of the people in the sample. The Even if we radically simplified the class model into a simple worker vs. nonworker structure, and classified people into one or the other of these "classes" on the basis of their being in an occupational category with a majority of workers or nonworkers, we

Table 9. Class Distributions within Occupations

	(1) Managers	(2) Advisor Managers	(3) Supervisors	(4) Total Managerial (1 + 2 + 3)	(5) Semi- Autonomous	(6) Workers	(7) Petty Bourg.	(8) Employers	(9) Total	(10) _N a
Professionals	21.1%	12.3%	18.3%	51.7%	20.1%	12.8%	9.3%	5.9%	100	143
Technicians	20.6	13.3	16.2	50.1	18.5	24.2	1.8	5.4	100	44
Teachers ^b	18.3	3.7	5.1	27.1	64.3	7.2	1.4	0	100	51
Managers & officials	39.0	5.8	9.8	54.6	3.3	4.8	9.5	27.7	100	174
Clerks	4.9	2.5	17.0	24.4	3.8	66.6	2.0	3.2	100	279
Sales	5.3	8.0	0.8	14.1	20.5	43.8	15.6	6.1	100	88
Skilled services ^c	15.6	.6	24.0	40.2	8.2	36.8	4.0	10.8	100	79
Crafts	8.3	4.1	15.3	27.7	12.5	47.2	6.9	5.7	100	163
Foreman	30.4	11.9	51.2	93.5	4.7	1.7	0	0	100	29
Operatives & transport	1.8	1.1	9.1	12	1.1	82.5	3.3	1.1	100	225
Laborersd	3.4	2.1	4.8	10.3	3.4	70.6	5.7	10.1	100	71
Unskilled services	6.4	1.7	6.2	14.3	3.3	65.7	14.4	2.2	100	125
Farmers	0	6.8	0	6.8	0	0	33.5	59.7	100	22

The Ns are the weighted Ns used in calculating the distributions.

bPrimary and secondary teachers. University teachers are included in professionals.

CIncludes occupations like barbers, airline cabin attendants, chefs, etc.

dIncludes farm laborers.

would still misclassify 29% of the sample. Class, therefore, cannot be viewed simply as clusters of occupations.

There are two likely objections to these interpretations of the results in Table 9. First, it could be argued that the deviations from a perfect class-occupation association are the result of the crudeness of the occupational classification scheme in the table. If a fine enough set of distinctions were introduced, class could be empirically treated as an aggregation of occupations. It is undoubtedly true that the association of class and occupation would be improved using more refined occupational categories. If we increase the number of occupational categories in the present data from 13 to 27, the proportion of the sample falling outside of the primary class for a given occupation does drop from 45% to 37%, and with finer distinctions this would probably be improved upon still more. Yet, even with a very refined set of occupational categories, the fit between class and occupation would still be far from perfect. The occupational group (aside from foremen to farmers) which is most homogeneous in class terms--operatives--still has 17.5% of its members outside of the working class, and it seems unlikely that finer divisions among operatives would eliminate these discrepancies.

A second objection could be that the class-occupation association in Table 9 ignores the career structure of certain occupations. It could be, for example, that all of the professionals who are workers are young professionals in the early stages of their careers who have not yet been promoted into positions of authority. As Stewart et al. (1980) argue, occupations should not be viewed as static "slots" filled by encumbents, but as trajectories with a systematic temporal dimension. Viewed as

trajectories, occupations would be much more homogeneous in class terms than it appears in Table 8.

Eventually, we will directly explore the relationship between class and occupation in the actual career trajectories of the respondents in the sample using work history data. For the moment we will rely on simpler data to see if the objection is plausible. Table 10 indicates the proportion of respondents in each of the major occupational categories who are workers and managers-supervisors in different age groups. If the deviations from a pure class-occupation association are the result of the career structures of occupations, then within those occupations which have career structures we would expect to find a higher proportion of workers in younger age groups than in older age groups.

The results in Table 10 indicate that there are some age differences in the distributions of classes within occupations, but that they are not consistent or strong enough to account for the class heterogeneity of occupations. Among professional occupations, except for the very youngest and oldest categories, between 9% and 13% of each age group is in the working class, with no discernible trend. Among technicians the proportion in managerial positions does rise with age, but the proportion who are workers does not systematically decline (the main shift coming out of semi-autonomous locations). Among craft occupations, the proportion who are workers is lowest in middle-age categories and the proportion who are managers/supervisors rises with age, probably reflecting a combination of career effects and cohort effects. And among less-skilled manual occupations there is no systematic pattern of class distributions by age at all.

Table 10

Class Distributions within Occupational Categories by Age Groups

			Age	Group		
Occupational Category	Under 25	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 & Over
Professionals						
% who are workers % who are managers/supervisors	23.5 45.5	11.4 52.1	9.4 61.6	11.9 52.7	12.5 56.2	(19.8) (0.0)
Technicians				·		
<pre>% who are workers % who are managers/supervisors</pre>	33.1 20.2	20.4 49.9	29.8 65.8	(9.9) (81.2)	(27.8) (44.5)	
Teachers						
% who are workers % who are managers/supervisors	(0.0) (25.6)	2.7 27.4	(10.3) (38.4)	(19.1) (16.6)	(21.3) (28.9)	
Managers & officials						
% who are workers % who are managers/supervisors	0.0 75.7	4.9 53.6	1.6 66.9	12.4 41.3	0.0 58.2	12.3 7.3
Clerks						
% who are workers % who are managers/supervisors	68.6 23.5	72.3 23.1	57 . 9 27 . 4	66.9 22.9	63.6 30.0	63.3 16.9
Sales						
% who are workers % who are managers/supervisors	38.1 23.8	27.9 0.0	54.4 3.4	31.5 36.7	67.4 0.0	(75.6) (24.4)
Crafts						
% who are workers % who are managers/supervisors	39.9 29.8	56.4 27.8			57.9 (16.6)	(100.0) (0)
Foreman						
<pre>% who are workers % who are managers/supervisors</pre>	(14.4) (85.6)	(0) (72.3)	(0) (100.0)	(0) 100.0	(0) (100.0)	- -

(table continued)

Table 10 (continued)

Occupational Category	Under 25	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 & Over
Crafts & foremen combined						
<pre>% who are workers % who are managers/supervisors</pre>	37.7 34.6	51.6 31.5	(19.3) 47.7	35.4 46.6	(47.6) (31.5)	(100.0) (0)
Operatives & transportation						
<pre>% who are workers % who are managers/supervisors</pre>	82.9 13.9	74.2 17.8	86.9 9.8	85.8 6.0	82.5 12.9	100.0
Laborers			•			
<pre>% who are workers % who are managers/supervisors</pre>	68.1 25.8	79.4 4.4	(40.6) (0.0)	93.2 0.0	(47.0) (14.8)	
Skilled services						
% who are workers % who are managers/supervisors	42.0 48.5	19.8 67.3	34.8 19.2	(49.9) (35.2)	(53.6) (28.0)	(62.3) (37.7)
Unskilled services						
% who are workers % who are managers/supervisors	68.5 15.3	73.8 11.1	67.6 22.1	72.3 9.2	73.0 5.5	28.6 28.8
Farmers						
% who are managers/supervisors	(33.3)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	0.0	(0.0)

Note: Percentages in parentheses are for age groups with a sample size of less than 10.

Overall, then, the data in this study support the conceptual claim that class and occupation are distinct dimensions of social relations. While there is an important association between the two, the former cannot be considered simply an aggregation of the latter.

b. The class content of occupations. Let us now shift our attention from the deviations in the class-occupation relationship to the pattern of associations. There is a long tradition in sociology of arguing over whether or not lower white collar jobs should be considered in the working class or the "middle class." Usually it is assumed in such debates that occupations as such can appropriately be grouped into classes, the issue being where a specific occupation ought to be located. As we have argued above, if classes are conceptualized in relational terms, this is not the correct way to even pose the problem. Instead, the empirical question is the extent of proletarianization within different occupational categories.

Table 11 reorganizes the data in Table 9 in terms of the disproportion of incumbents in given occupations who fall into the working class and the managerial-supervisory location. Table 12 represents the same data in a more technically sophisticated way as "standardized residuals" in the occupation-class relationship. The entries in this table are calculated as follows: for each cell in the table the expected number of people is calculated on the assumption that there is no relationship at all between class and occupation (i.e., that they are completely independent). This number is then subtracted from the actual number of observations in the cell. This difference would be zero if in fact there was no association. The difference between observed and expected

Table 11

Disproportionate Presence of Workers and ManagerSupervisors in Different Occupational Categories

Rank Order for Disproportions in Occupational Categories	Disproportion
Workers	
1. Operatives	1.79
2. Laborers	1.53
3. Clerks	1.44
4. Unskilled services	1.43
5. Craftsmen	1.02
6. Salespeople	•95
7. Skilled services	.80
8. Technicians	•52
9. Professionals	.28
10. Teachers	.16
11. Managers and officials	.10
12. Foremen	.04
13. Farmers	.0
Managers and supervisors	
1. Foremen	3.15
Managers and officials	1.84
Professionals	1.75
4. Technicians	1.69
Skilled services	1.35
6. Crafts	.93
7. Teachers	.92
8. Clerks	.82
9. Unskilled services	.48
10. Salespeople	•47
ll. Operatives	.40
12. Laborers	•34
13. Farmers	.23

Note: The disproportion is calculated as

% workers (or managers) in occupation
% workers (or managers) in sample.

Table 12
Standardized Residuals for Occupation-Class Association

	-	Class Categories						
Occupational Categories	Managers	Advisors Managers	Supervisors	Semi- Autonomous	Workers	Self-Employed		
Professionals	2.447*	5.073*	1.541	4.155*	-6.434*	.1339		
Technicians	.9269	1.315	.9858	2.402*	-2.173*	-1.122		
Teachers	.1797	5038	-1.634	11.98*	-3.709*	-2.546*		
Managers & officials	10.02*	.1924	-1.417	-3.151*	-8.445*	7.744*		
Clerks	-4.164*	-1.991*	1.576	-3.324*	6.579*	-4.104*		
Sales	-1.589	1.117	-2.845*	2.331*	2436	2.031*		
Crafts	-1.987*	.1698	.7370	1.148	•6624	8733		
Foremen	2.553*	1.457	4.585*	-1.105	-2.935*	-1.971*		
Operatives & transport	-4.397*	-2.447*	-1.410	-4.119*	8.593*	-3.412*		
Laborers	-1.844	8528	-1.224	-1.333	2.764*	•1075		
Skilled services	.7822	-1.538	2.497*	3181	8331	6033		
Unskilled services	-2.500*	-1.306	-1.900	-1.722	4.038*	0895		
Farmers	-1.604	.1446	-1.505	-1.371	-2.623*	8.447*		

Note: Entries are the standardized residuals in the loglinear model of independence for the class by occupation association. A positive entry indicates that there are more than the expected number of people in the cell under the assumption that there is no association between class and occupation; a negative entry indicates that there are fewer than the expected number of people.

^{*}Significant at the .05 level. Given the assumptions of loglinear models, the residuals (0-E) have an asymptotic normal distribution with standard errors equal to the square root of E. Thus the standardized residuals $[(0-E)/\sqrt{E}]$ are significant at the .05 level if their absolute value is greater than or equal to 1.96.

 $G^2 = 895 \text{ w. } 60 \text{ D.F.}$

frequencies—the "residuals"—are then divided by the square root of the expected frequency in order to standardize the deviations. This makes possible both comparisons across cells of the table and formal tests of statistical significance (on the assumption that such standardized residuals are normally distributed).

The data in Table 12 indicate that there are four occupational categories which have a significantly disproportionate representation of workers within them: operatives, unskilled services, laborers, and clerical workers. With the exception of laborers, these occupational groups are significantly underrepresented among managers (the test statistic falls just below the .05 level of significance for laborers). Six other occupational groups have significant underrepresentations of workers: managers, technicians, teachers, professionals, farmers, and foreman. The remaining occupations—salespersons, crafts, and skilled services—have proportions of working class positions within them that do not differ significantly from the sample as a whole.

These data, therefore, add considerable support to the claim that lower level white collar jobs have a working class character. Clerical occupations have class profiles that are much closer to those of manual operatives and laborers than to higher status white collar positions. Indeed, in terms of the proportion of working class positions within the occupational category, clerical occupations are clearly more working class than are skilled manual occupations (crafts). This, it must be emphasized, is not a question of the incomes of incumbents of these positions, but of the social relations which characterize the actual jobs. On the basis of these data, then, we can characterize the class character of major occupational groups in the manner summarized in Table 13.

Table 13

Summary of Class Character of Major Occupational Groups

Class Designation	Occupational Groups
Working class occupations	operatives, laborers, clerical, and unskilled services
Semi-autonomous occupations	teachers, technicians, and sales
Managerial occupations & semi-autonomous & petty bourgeois/employer	professionals, managers, foreman professionals managers
Supervisor occupations	skilled services, foremen
Largely indeterminate class character	crafts
Petty bourgeois/self- employed occupations	farmers

3. Class and Sex

In recent years considerable research has been devoted to understanding various aspects of the relationship between gender divisions and the labor market. Most of this work, however, has focused primarily on the problems of occupational segregation, status attainment, and income inequality by sex. Relatively little directly or indirectly deals with the problems of class differences by sex.²⁰ Our data enables us to address this aspect of sexual stratification systematically.

Table 14 presents the distribution of class positions for men and women taken separately. These data clearly indicate that women are more proletarianized than men: 54% of all women in the labor force occupy working class locations compared to only 40% for men. If women were a small part of the labor force this would not be such an important figure, but given that women's labor force participation rates are well over 40%, this higher level of female proletarianization in fact means that the majority of the working class in the United States consists of women (53.6%). It is worth noting in this context that if the manual/nonmanual distinction is used as the basis for defining the working class, this picture is radically different: only 32.7% of workers are women in conventional sociological definitions, compared to 54% for the Marxist definition adopted in this research.

Whereas women are overrepresented within the working class, they are underrepresented in all categories of managers and supervisors. Among men 35% are some kind of manager or supervisor compared to only 23% of women. Furthermore, this underrepresentation is greatest among full-fledged managers. If we calculate the ratio of the percentage of men who

Table 14
Class Distributions by Sex

Class Categories	Men	Women	
Managers-supervisors	35.0%	23.4%	
Managers	15.5	8.6	
Advisor-managers	5.3	3.6	
Supervisors	14.2	11.2	
Semi-autonomous employees	9.1	9.9	
Workers	39.6	54.0	
Self-Employed	16.4	12.5	
Petty bourgeoisie	6.3	7.4	
Small Employers	7.4	4.3	
Capitalists	2.7	0.8	
Total	100.0	100.0	
n	809	685	

are in a given category to the percentage of women we find that supervisors are overrepresented among men relative to women by a ratio of 1.26, advisor-managers by 1.47, and proper managers by 1.80. If we further divide the managerial category into subcategories based on the kinds of decisions made by managers, we find that the overrepresentation of men increases to 2.25 for core managers, (i.e., managers involved in investment and budgetary decisions).

The most striking underrepresentation of women is in the capitalist class. While women and men are almost equally represented among petty bourgeois producers, among employers of over 10 employees, men are nearly 3.4 times overrepresented relative to women.

It might be thought that this higher level of proletarianization of women relative to men and the consistent underrepresentation within managerial locations is the result of occupational choices by women (or occupational segregation): women end up in occupations with more workers and fewer managers, and this explains their class composition. Table 15 indicates that this is not a plausible explanation. In virtually every occupational category, women are considerably more proletarianized than men: 22% of women professionals are workers compared to only 7% of men; 35% of women technicians are workers compared to only 16% of men; 53% of women salespeople are workers compared to 35% of men. Even in blue collar occupations within which men are also highly proletarianized, the level of proletarianization is generally higher for women: over 90% of women operatives are workers compared to just over 77% of men operatives. The only significant deviation from this pattern is for laborers, but the number of women in this category is so small that the

Table 15
Occupational Proletarianization by Sex

Occupational	% Who Are Workers					
Categories	Men	(N)	Women	(N)		
Professionals	7.1	(88)	22.0	(55)		
Technicians	16.3	(25)	35.4	(18)		
Teachers	4.8	(14)	8.1	(37)		
Managers	4.3	(121)	6.0	(53)		
Clerks	64.0	(38)	67.0	(241)		
Salespeople	34.8	(46)	53.4	(42)		
Foremen	1.9	(26)	0.0	(3)		
Crafts	47.2	(159)	44.4	(4)		
Operatives & transport	77.1	(140)	91.3	(84)		
Laborers	74.0	(54)	59.9	(17)		
Skilled services	36.1	(44)	37.7	(35)		
Unskilled services	69.9	(33)	63.7	(90)		
Farmers	0	(19)	0	(3)		
Total	39.5	(807)	53.9	(683)		

Note: Weighted N for the sex-occupation category.

results could be due simply to chance. Women are thus not more concentrated in the working class than men primarily because of their occupational distributions, but because within given occupational settings they are differentially allocated to and kept in the working class.

Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze in any depth the actual process by which men and women are sorted into classes, we can get a first glimpse at the process by looking at the class distributions for men and women within age groups. As Table 16 indicates, the proportion of women who are working class varies relatively little across age groups. Excluding the oldest age group, the range is from 51% for women 25-34 to 59% for women 55-64. Among men, on the other hand, the proportion who are in the working class initially drops sharply, from 48% in the youngest age group to 25% in the 35-44 year old category, and then rises again to around 40% in the 45-54 and 55-64 age groups, and 63% for men over 65. What this suggests is that there are much higher rates of promotional mobility for men than for women out of working class positions into managerial-supervisory positions during the first parts of careers. Of course, the patterns observed in Table 15 are a complex result of career patterns and structural changes in the class structure over time, and eventually we will try to disaggregate these two processes through an analysis of occupation and class work history data. But at least provisionally it seems that a substantial element in the differences between the class distributions of men and women centers on the processes of promotional mobility out of the working class.21

4. Class and Race

Because of limitations in the sample size in this project it is not possible to explore questions of the relationship between class and race

Table 16

Distribution of Workers and Managers within Age-Sex Categories

		f Men and N rkers		agers	N		
Age Groups	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	
Under 25 years	48.1	56.3	12.5	9.3	152	122	
25-34	38.3	51.2	16.6	11.1	237	173	
35-44	24.5	54.3	19.6	7.2	151	135	
45-54	43.5	55.0	15.6	5.8	142	109	
55-64	41.8	58.8	13.2	7.7	83	91	
65 and over	62.5	44.1	2.1	15.8	31	36	

in great detail. Nevertheless, we can learn something on examination of the class by race cross-classification in Table 17.

While the overall pattern of class-race distributions is similar to the class-sex patterns, the degree of racial differences in proletarianization is even greater than sex differences: 64% of all blacks are in the working class compared to only 44% of whites (the sex differences were 54% vs. 40%), only 7% of blacks are proper managers compared to 14% of whites, and perhaps most striking of all, only 2.4% of blacks are petty bourgeois or employers compared to 16% of whites.

If we examine the combined race-sex-class distributions, we see that black women and black men have essentially equal levels of proletarianization, 65% and 64% respectively, compared to only 52% for white women and only 38% for white men. On the other hand, black men and white women have essentially the same proportions of managers (8.0% and 9.4%), considerably higher than black women (6.1%) and lower than white men (17.0%).

Taking all of these data together we can make two strong conclusions. First of all, white males are, in class terms, a highly privileged category. Over 20% of all white men are either full-fledged managers or capitalists (employers of ten or more workers), that is, in class locations which are either firmly part of the dominant class or within which the dominant class represents the principal element. This compares to 10% of white women, 8% of black men, and only 6% of black women. If we include all positions within which the bourgeois element is present (i.e., all managers-supervisors, small employers, and capitalists), we see that nearly half (46.5%) of white males are in class locations either fully or

Table 17
Class Distributions with Race-Sex Categories

Class Categories	Whites	Blacks	White Males	Black Males	White Females	Black Females
Managers and supervisors	30.4%	20.0%	35.3%	23.3%	24.4%	17.2%
Managers	13.6	7.0	17.0	8.0	9.4	6.1
Advisor-managers	4.8	1.3	5.4	1.8	4.1	0.8
Supervisors	12.0	11.7	12.9	13.5	10.9	10.3
Semi-autonomous employees	9.5	13.6	9.7	9.4	9.3	16.4
Workers.	43.9	64.0	37.5	63.6	51.9	65.0
Self-employed	16.1	2.4	17.6	3.6	14.4	1.3
Petty bourgeoisie	7.4	1.7	6.4	3.6	8.8	0.0
Employers & capitalists	8.7	0.7	11.2	0.0	5.6	1.3

Note: Other minorities have been excluded from this table (23 women and 36 men).

partially in the bourgeoisie, compared to only 30% of white women, 23.3% of black men, and 18.5% of black women.

Second, the American working class is predominently composed of women and minorities. Over 60% of all working class positions are filled by women and nonwhites. If we add young white males—men under 25 years of age—we find that about 70% of the U.S. working class is composed of women, minorities, and youth. The traditional image of the American worker as a white, male industrial worker is thus far from representative of the working class in the United States today.

5. The State, Monopoly, and Competitive Sectors

In recent Marxist discussions of the American economy, as well as many non-Marxist analyses a great deal of attention has been devoted to the distinction between the competitive, monopoly, and state sectors of the economy (see, among others, O'Connor, 1973; Edwards, Reich and Gordon 1975; Averitt, 1968; Hodson, 1978). There has been much debate over the theoretical basis and implications of this trichotomy, but the critical distinction centers on the way the market impinges on the strategic alternatives faced by actors within different-kinds of organizations. Without elaborating the issues at any length, the salient features of each sector are as follows:

State sector. While the resource base of the state is affected by the level of profits in the economy as a whole, the acquisition and distribution of resources within the state are not directly based on profit criteria (or as Marxists like to say, "exchange value" criteria).

Rather, the process of resource allocation and distribution is primarily

a political one, and this shapes the strategic possibilities and constraints for both workers and state managers.

Monopoly sector. The firms in the monopoly sector produce for the market (and the state), and profit criteria constitute the central basis for the acquisition and use of resources. But unlike in the competitive sector, monopoly firms strategically dominate the market, either individually, in the extreme case, or in coalitions of various sorts. This strategic position is a result both of the absolute size of such corporations, which gives them the possibility of moving capital globally and of diversifying lines of production in order to insulate themselves from market shocks, and of their relative size within given product markets (the conventional notion of "oligopoly").

Competitive sector. The firms in this sector take markets largely as givens and operate strategically within them. They are too small to operate in a wide variety of markets and they are thus subjected to the rhythms of supply and demand within specific market settings; and their relative size within those specific markets is too small to shape the conditions of the markets themselves.

We have not yet developed a nuanced operational typology of organizational relations to the market. Eventually we will combine information based on macro-characteristics of industrial sector with data coded from the names of the respondents' place of work and respondents' estimates of the number of employees at the place of work, to construct a refined typology. For present purposes, however, we will rely on two simple variables: (1) state vs. private employment; (2) among private firms, the number of employees in the firm as reported by the respondent.²² These variables are combined in the following way to construct a sector variable:

		State vs.	Private Employment	Size
1.	State sector		State	х
2.	Petty bourgeois firms		Private	0-1 employee
3.	Competitive sector			
	small		Private	2-50 employees
	moderate		Private	51-1,000 employees
4.	Ambiguous		Private	1,000-10,000 employees
5.	Monopoly sector		Private	over 10,000 employees

Table 18 presents the class distributions by sector. We will first focus on the results for the managerial-supervisory class locations, and then turn briefly to the semi-autonomous employee positions and the working class.

The data in Table 18 strongly indicate that the proportion of positions which fall within managerial-supervisory locations increases steadily with size of the firm: 27% of the positions in small competitive firms (less than 50 employees), 32% of the positions in medium size competitive firms, 36% of the positions in ambiguous firms, and 41% of the positions in monopoly firms can be classified managerial-supervisory. In the state the figure is just over 32%. Contrary to common belief, this suggests that the weight of the bureaucratic-administrative structure is greater in large corporations than within the state.

Table 18

Distribution of Classes within Monopoly Firms, Competitive Firms, and State

	Petty Commodity	Competitive Firms 2-50 51-1,000		Ambiguous 1,000-	Monopoly Firm	
	Firma	Employees	Employees	10,000	Over 10,000	State
Managers and						
supervisors	0	26.5%	31.9%	36.1%	40.5%	32.3%
Managers	0	12.8	14.2	13.1	13.0	14.6
Advisor-managers	0	5.2	3.4	5.6	8.6	3.7
Supervisors	0	8.5	14.3	17.4	18.9	14.0
Semi-autonomous			•			
employees	0	5.5	8.2	12.0	8.0	19.8
Workers	0	37.8	58.5	51.8	51.5	47.8
Petty bourgeoisie	100%	0	0	0	0	0
Employers	0	30.2	1.5	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N .	102	358	301	203	205	266
% of sample	7.1	24.9	21.0	14.1	14.3	18.5

^aThis expression is being used to designate firms owned by the pure petty bourgeoisie (i.e., no employees).

The texture of this administrative concentration in monopoly sector corporations is more clearly indicated when we examine subcategories within the broad managerial-supervisory class location. As we argued in the initial discussion of the class typology, the contradictory location within class relations between the bourgeoisie and the working class can be divided into at least three subcategories: supervisors, who have authority over subordinates but are excluded from all planning and policymaking; advisor-managers, who have authority over subordinates and provide advice to decisionmakers, and proper managers, who actually make central policy decision within the organization. In terms of these categories, what is striking in Table 18 is that there is practically the same proportion of decisionmaking managers in all of these organizations: range is from 12.8% of positions in small competitive firms to 14.2% in medium size competitive firms to 14.6% in the state. The proportion of supervisors, on the other hand, varies considerably: from 8.5% of positions in small competitive firms to nearly 19% of monopoly firms and 14% of the state. In the large corporations, in other words, nearly one-fifth of all positions involve the directing and sanctioning of the activities of people without any involvement in organizatinal planning or decisionmaking.

While the data at hand do not enable us to determine the extent to which this higher density of controllers in monopoly corporations is due to the technical requirements of coordination in large units of production or of the social requirements of domination, the net result is that more positions have to be devoted exclusively to social control

activities within such corporations than in smaller, competitive businesses or in the state.

As explained earlier, the managerial-supervisory category is defined in terms of three interrelated critiera: decisionmaking participation, authority over other employees, and position within the formal hierarchy of the organization. The data in Table 18 can be further disaggregated by examining the concrete interconnections among these dimensions. Table 19 presents some of the more salient of these relations.

In particular, let's examine the relationship between the formal hierarchy variable and the decisionmaking and authority variables. In all sectors, if you are outside of the formal hierarchy you are very unlikely to participate in decisions or to have authority, particularly sanctioning authority. The range for these figures is remarkably small: for decisionmaking, between 83.4% and 86.5% of the positions outside of the formal hierarchy (i.e., positions classified as nonmanagement) neither directly participate in decisionmaking nor provide advice to decisionmakers; for sanctioning authority, between 88% and 93% of positions outside the formal managerial hierarchy have no sanctioning capacity. For all firms and state organizations, therefore, exclusion from the formal hierarchy is tantamount to exclusion from any role in decisions or authority.

There is considerably more variation across sectors when we examine distributions among levels within the formal hierarchy. Most striking in these terms is the extent to which decisionmaking activity penetrates the lower levels of the hierarchy. Among supervisors—the bottom level

Table 19

Interrelations among Selected Class Criteria for Competitive Firms, Monopoly Firms, and the State

		ive Firms	Monopoly Firms	
	2-50 Employees	51-1,000 Employees	1,000+ Employees	State
A . T 1 . II.'				
A. Formal Hier	archical Posit	lon and Decis	10nmaking	
of people in given positions in the formal hierarchy who also make decisions directly				
Top managers only	75.4% (13)	71.7% (10)	83.8% (9)	50.0% (8)
Top and upper managers				
combined	70 . 9 (22)	70.4 (24)	74.4 (20)	64.4 (11)
Supervisors	39 . 1 (38)	28.3 (51)	17.3 (69)	26.0 (55)
Nonmanagement	6.5 (168)	8.4 (199)	4.5 (270)	12.0 (183)
of people who neither provide advice nor partici- pate directly in decisions				
Top and upper managers	6.2	29.6	12.9	24.1
Nonmanagement	83.6	86.5	83.4	83.9
B. Formal H	ierarchy and S	anctioning Au	thority	
of people in given positions who also have sanctioning authority	-			
Top and upper managers	73.4	72.6	89.8	89.2
Supervisors	61.6	70.3	70.2	61.7
Nonmanagement positions	12.1	9.1	11.0	6.9

-(table continued)

Table 19 (continued)

	Competitive Firms		Monopoly Firms	
	2-50	51-1,000	1,000+	a. .
	Employees	Employees	Employees	State
C. D	ecisionmaking	and Authority		
% of people who make policy decisions who also have				
sanctioning authority	63 . 4 (50)	68.6 (56)	75.5 (62)	48.6 (53)
% of people who do not make policy decisions who do have				
sanctioning authority	13.3 (171)	16.4 (217)	21.0 (290)	17.3 (195)
% of people with sanctioning authority who also make policy decisions	45.2	47.7	35.5	39.3
	(70)	(81)	(131)	(66)
% of people without any authority who make decisions	7.9 (151)	9.1 (186)	4.7 (236)	11.3 (180)
<u>D</u>	• Autonomy and	Authority		
% of positions with high autonomy which have no				
authority	27.3 (32)	23.9 (51)	18.7 (74)	54.8 (91)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are the N upon which the percentage is based.

of the formal hierarchy—only 17.3% in large corporations (1000 or more employees) participate directly in policy decisions, compared to 28.3% in medium—sized corporations, 39.1% in small firms, and 26% in the state.²³ Decisionmaking is clearly more concentrated at upper levels of the organization within large corporations than in either the state or smaller firms.

If we turn our attention to the top levels of the formal hierarchy, a different pattern emerges. In all private firms, over 70% of people who consider themselves top managers are directly involved in decisionmaking compared to only 50% of top managers in the state. The numbers are very small for these cases, but even when we combine upper managers with top managers the same pattern is observed, although in somewhat attenuated form.

One final interrelationship needs mentioning: Among respondents who are directly involved in decisionmaking, the proportion with sanctioning authority is lowest for the state (49%) and increases from 63% to 76% as we move from small firms to large ones in the private sector. On the other hand, if we examine respondents who have sanctioning authority, we find that the proportion who have decisionmaking power is lowest in the large corporations (36%), highest in the small and medium competitive firms (45-48%) and at an intermediate level in the state (39%).

We thus have a rather diverse array of descriptive differences between competitive firms, monopoly firms, and the state in terms of their managerial-supervisory structures. How can we synthesize these results into some sort of synthetic picture of these three sectors? The results discussed above can be grouped under four more general headings, and from

these a more composite picture of the differences in these organizations can be constructed: (1) Concentration of decisionmaking within the organizational hierarchy; (2) degree of association of decisionmaking power and authority; (3) degree of differentiation of specialized positions of authority; and (4) overall weight of the managerial apparatus within the organization.

Table 20 summarizes the statistical results in terms of these headings. The large monopoly firms are high on each of these headings: decisionmaking is the most concentrated at the higher levels of the organization; the possession of power is the most associated with the possession of authority (but not the reverse); there is the most differentiation of a specialized set of purely supervisory positions; and the managerial apparatus has the greatest overall weight within the class structure of the organization. The state, in these terms, is generally at intermediate levels, and the competitive sector at low levels on these variables. All of this taken together suggests that the monopoly corporation is the most thoroughly hierarchical in its internal structure, both in terms of the relationship between the managerial structure as a whole and the working class and in terms of the internal organization and differentiation within managerial locations.

Let us now turn briefly to the semi-autonomous class locations and the working class. The state is clearly the abode of semi-autonomous employees. Nearly 20% of all positions in the state are semi-autonomous, compared to only 8% in monopoly corporations, 12% in ambiguous firms, 8.2% in medium competitive firms and 5.5% in small competitive firms.

Table 20
Summary of Features of Managerial-Supervisory Class Locations in Competitive Firms, Monopoly Firms, and the State

	Competitive Firms	Monopoly Firms	State
Degree of concentration of decisionmaking within the organizational hierarchy	low	high	intermediate
Degree of association of decisionmaking power and authority	intermediate	high	low
Degree of differentiation of specialized positions of authority	low	high	intermediate
Overall weight of the managerial apparatus within the organization	low	high	intermediate

Furthermore, if we look at the interrelationship between the autonomy variable itself and the authority variable—that is, between control over one's own work and control over the work of others—we see a dramatic difference between these types of organizations: in the state 55% of positions with high autonomy have no authority, compared to only 19% in large corporations, 24% in medium—sized corporations, and 27% in small firms (see Table 19). These results are further indications that the state has a relatively weaker or less tightly organized internal hierarchy than does large private corporations: in the state having control over one's immediate work does not imply controlling the work of others, whereas in the private sector in general, and large corporations in particular, it does.

The relationship of the semi-autonomous class locations to the state can be further clarified if we examine not only direct employment in the state, but employment in firms which do considerable business with the state. Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not their firms "regularly did business with the federal, state, or local government," and if they said yes, they were asked to give a rough estimate of the percentage of the total business done with the state. As in the size estimates, these figures are undoubtedly crude, but they should give an indication of the order of magnitude of linkages to the state. Table 21 presents the results.

These data indicate that the semi-autonomous employee class location is by far the most linked to the state. In this class location, 42% are either directly employed by the state or in firms that do more than half of their business with the state. If the firms with ambiguous links to the state are also included, the figure begins to approach 50%. This

Table 21
Distribution of Links to the State within Class Categories

8.1% 6.2 3.8	State Employee 22.4% 15.7 21.0	Na 174 63 178	2.6 7.1 6.7
6.2	22.4%	174 63	2.6 7.1
6.2	15.7	63	7.1
–			
3.8	21.0	178	6.7
3.8	38.1	138	1.6
6.1	21.6	589	13.1
•6	0.0	98	3.3
			0.0
		.6 0.0	.6 0.0 98

aWeighted N, exclusive of "don't knows."

 $[^]b\mbox{\ensuremath{^{"}}}\m$

compares with only 30% of managers being in the state or firms with over half their business with the state, 25% of supervisors, and 28% of workers. The petty bourgeoisie and small employers are by far the least linked to the state: over 90% in each category have no or insignificant financial ties to the state.

Finally, let's look directly at the working class itself. Contrary to much "common wisdom" among Marxists, the American working class is not concentrated within large, monopoly corporations. Only about one in six workers is employed by unambiguously monopoly corporations, and not quite a third in the ambiguous and monopoly firms combined. Nearly half of the American working class is in what must be considered the competitive sector of the economy by any definition. While this may be the era of "monopoly capitalism" in terms of the dynamics and contradictions of the system as a whole, it is not the case that the American working class is itself directly employed primarily by monopoly corporations.

IV CONCLUSION

This report has largely focused on elaborating the basic descriptive map of the American class structure viewed from a particular Marxist perspective. Several general features of this structure stand out:

1. The working class is the largest class within this structure of class relations, both in terms of proportion of workers as such in the labor force and in terms of the weight of the working class within various contradictory class locations.

- 2. Close to half of the locations within the class structure have a "contradictory character," that is, their class content is determined simultaneously by more than one basic class. The American class structure cannot plausibly be represented by a simple scheme of polarized class relations.
- 3. While the working class is above all composed of relatively unskilled manual occupations, lower status white collar occupations are also heavily proletarianized. Indeed, if one chooses to use occupations as the basis for assigning classes to individuals, fewer classification errors will be made by placing skilled manual occupations outside of the working class and lower status nonmanual jobs in the working class than vice versa.
- 4. The degree of proletarianization varies significantly across racesex categories. In particular, the level of proletarianization is dramatically lower for white males than for women and blacks. As a result, women and minorities compose the majority of the working class.
- 5. The class structure also varies in the monopoly, competitive, and state sectors of the economy. The monopoly sector appears to be the most hierarchical of the three, with the highest concentrations of managers and supervisors. The state sector has the highest concentrations of semi-autonomous employees, while the competitive sector has the highest concentrations of the working class (and of course petty bourgeois and small employers). The long-term fate of the class structure thus depends upon the complex ways in which the development of monopoly capitalism both destroys and reproduces competitive capital and engenders transformations of the state.

These descriptions are important, but they are obviously only the first step in more comprehensive analysis. Future work will extend the analysis in two principal directions: First, the research will compare the results discussed here with parallel data from several other countries. This will enable us to see the extent to which these patterns are general to advanced capitalism or specific to the historical forms of development of American capitalism. Second, the research will link these macro-analyses to investigations of individual level outcomes of various sorts (attitudes, political behavior, income, etc.). Ultimately we are not so much interested in studying class structures simply for their own sake, but because we feel class is a systematic determinant of macro- and micro-social outcomes.

APPENDIX A

Survey Questions Used to Construct Class Typologies


SECTION A: CURRENT OCCUPATION AND EMPLOYMENT DESCRIPTION

Al.	EXACT TIME NOW:
A2.	DOES NOT APPEAR IN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.
A3.	First, we'd like to know about your general views toward work. Please tell me which one of the following jobs you would rather have: (READ BOTH OPTIONS.) 1. Job #1: a moderately interesting and enjoyable job with very high pay, or an extremely interesting and enjoyable job with only average pay?
A4.	Now we would like to ask you some questions about your main job. What kind of work do you do? (What do you do for a living?)
A5.	What are some of your main duties or activities?
16.	What kind of business or organization is that in? That is, what do they make or do?


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A7. Are you employed by someone else, are you self-employed or do you work without pay in a family business or farm?



A8. Are you an owner or part owner of this firm?



A9.	About how many people are employed in this business on a permanent basis?
	NUMBER NONE
uo.	About how many people are employed on a casual or seasonal basis?
	NUMBER NONE → GO TO All
	AlOa. On the average, how many weeks a year do you employ such people?
	WEEKS PER YEAR
u1.	For how long have you been an owner of this business?
	YEARS OR MONTHS
112.	Is this business a franchise operation?
	1. YES 5. NO → GO TO A13
	Alla. Can you run this franchise business more or less as you want to, or doe the franchise-granting corporation tell you how to run your business?
	1. RUN AS R WANTS 2. RUN AS CORPORATION WANTS 3. BOTH
113.	Does your business regularly receive funds from or do any business with the federal, state or local government?
	1. YES 3. BOTH, RECEIVES FUNDS AND DOES BUSINESS WITH GO TO Al4
	Al3a. About what percent of your total business is with the government? (IF BOTH: RECORD TOTAL OR HIGHER PERCENTAGE)
	PERCENT

Al4. If you were to sell your business, about what would you expect to get for it?

TURN TO P. 12, A43

Al5. Is your business incorporated?

R OWN	S FARM
A16.	What kind of farm is this?
A 17.	About how many people are employed on your farm on a permanent basis?
	NUMBER NONE
A18.	About how many people are employed on a casual or seasonal basis?
	NUMBER NONE GO TO A19
	Al8a. On the average, how many weeks a year do you employ such people?
	WEEKS PER YEAR
A19.	For how long have you run this farm?
	YEARS OR MONTHS
A20.	Do you or your family actually own this farm or are you a tenant?
	1. OWN 2. TENANT 7. OTHER (SPECIFY):
A21.	Do you receive any direct subsidies from the federal, state or local government?
	1. YES 5. NO > CO TO A22
	A2la. About what percent of your gross revenues do these subsidies represent?
	PERCENT
A22.	If you were to sell your farm, about what would you expect to get for it?
	A22a. Is this farm incorporated?

TURN TO P. 12, A43

R IS SELF-EMPLOYED PROFESSIONAL

A23. Are you the sole owner of this practice or are there other owners?

1. SOLE OWNER
GO TO A24

A23a. About what percent do you own?

PERCENT

A24. How many other people, (not counting partners in your practice) are employed in your professional practice?

NUMBER

A25. How long have you had this practice?

YEARS OR MONTHS

A26. Does any part of the income from your professional practice come directly from the federal, state, or local government?

1. YES 5. NO TURN TO P. 12, A43

A26a. About what percent of this income comes from the government?

PERCENT

TURN TO P. 12, A43

80

)		_								
	F		WORKS	WITHOUT	PAY	ON	FAMILY	BUSINESS	OR	FARM

A27. Is this a family business or is it a farm?

1. FAMILY BUSINESS

2. FARM

A28. Are there any paid employees on this (business/farm)? That is, nonfamily members who work for wages?

1. YES 5. NO → GO TO A29

A28a. How many people are employed on a permanent basis?

NUMBER

NONE

A29. What family members besides you work in this (business/farm)?


A30. For how long has your family owned this (business/farm)?

YEARS OR MONTH


A31. If your family were to sell this (business/farm), about what do you think it would be worth?

\$ _____

A32. INTERVIEWER CHECKPOINT



A33. Is this business a franchise operation?



A33a. Can you run this franchise business more or less as you want to, or does the franchise-granting corporation tell you how to run your business?

1. RUN AS R WANTS 2. RUN AS CORPORATION WANTS 3. BOTH


A34. Does your family business regularly receive funds from or do any business with the federal, state or local government?



A34a. About what percent of your family's total business is with the government? (IF BOTH, RECORD TOTAL OR HIGHER PERCENTAGE)

PERCENT

A35. Is your business incorporated?



A36. Is this the federal, state or local government?

1. FEDERAL

2. STATE

3. LOCAL

A37. At your place of work, do more than half the people in positions like yours eventually get significant promotions; that is a change in job title that brings a significant increase in pay and responsibilities?

1. YES TURN TO P. 12, A43

5. NO

A37a. Would it be some, a few, or none at all who get such promotions?

1. SOME

3. A FEW

5. NONE AT ALL

TURN TO P. 12, A43

R WORKS FOR PROFIT OR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION

A38. At your place of work, do more than half the people in positions like yours eventually get significant promotions; that is a change in job title that brings a significant increase in pay or responsibilities?

1. YES

5. NO

TURN TO P. 10, A39

A38a. Would it be some, a few, or none at all who get such promotions?

1. SOME

3. A FEW

5. NONE AT ALL

A41. Is this part of some larger corporation or organization with a different name?

1. YES 5. NO GO TO A42

A41a. What is the name of the larger corporation or organization? (PRINT NAME IN RIGHT-HAND MARGIN.)

A42. Does the company or organization for which you work, regularly receive any funding from or do any business with the federal, state or local government?



A42a. About what percent of the total business or funding would that be? (IF BOTH, RECORD TOTAL OR HIGHER PERCENTAGE.)



1. YES 5. NO

subsidiaries?) 1. YES 5. NO A39a. Is the company or organization for which you work part of some larger corporation or organization? 1. YES 5. NO A39b. About how many people are A39d. About how many people are employed employed in the entire business, in the entire business, corporacorporation or organization for tion or organization for which you which you work? We do not want work? the number just in your immedi-DON'T ate work place, but in the NUMBER KNOW TURN TO entire corporation or organization? P. 11, A42 DON'T NUMBER Would it be fewer than 10: 10-50; KNOW TURN TO 50-100; 100-500; 500-1000; 1000-P. 11, A40 10,000; or more than 10,000? A39c. Would it be fewer than 10; 1. FEWER THAN 10 10-50; 50-100; 100-500; 500-1000; 1000-10,000; or more 2. 10-50 than 10,000? 1. FEWER THAN 10 3. 51-100 2 10-50 4. 101-500 3. 51-100 5. 501-1000 4. 101-500 6. 1001-10,000 5. 501-1000 7. MORE THAN 10,000 6. 1001-10,000 8. DON'T KNOW TURN TO P. 11, A42 7. MORE THAN 10,000

8. DON'T KNOW

A39. Does the company or organization for which you work have more than one

location (that is, other divisions, branches, plants, offices, stores or

 α

NAME OF CO.

NAME OF ORG.

4	4
	•

ASK EVERYONE

A43. Do you have a second job?

1. YES		5.	NO		GO	то	A44
	ľ			•			

A43a.	What kind of work do you do on this job? What are some of your main duties or activities?
А43ъ.	What kind of business or industry is that in? That is, what do they make or do?
A43c.	On your second job are you employed by someone else, are you self-employed or do you work without pay in a family business or farm?
	1. SOMEONE 2. SELF- 3. WORK WITHOUT PAY
A43d.	About how many hours a week do you work on this second job?
	HOURS PER WEEK
A43e.	About how many hours do you usually work a week on your main job, including paid and unpaid overtime?

GO TO A45

A44. About how many hours do you usually work a week, including paid and unpaid overtime?

HOURS DER UFF

A45. INTERVIEWER CHECKPOINT

- 1. R IS SELF-EMPLOYED ON MAIN JOB OR AN OWNER-EMPLOYEE OR WORKING WITHOUT PAY IN FAMILY BUSINESS OR FARM TURN TO P. 20, SECTION E
- 2. ALL OTHERS TURN TO P. 14, SECTION B

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a:

1.

Г	1 REQUIRED TO REAL NO.	- mo r			7
L	1. REQUIRED TO DESIGN WORK 5. NOT REQUIRE	O TO B		WORK	J
	•	0 10 B.			
Could pract	you give me an example of how you design your work a cice? (IF EXAMPLE IS NOT SPECIFIC, PROBE.)	and put	your	ideas	in.
					-
	,		·		
Here	are a number of different work activities. For each	one. 1	ol ease	tell	me
Here Vou c	are a number of different work activities. For each	one, p	lease The	tell first	me act
you c	an do this on your job, either officially or unoffici	ially.	The i	first	act
you c vity	are a number of different work activities. For each an do this on your job, either officially or unofficist deciding when to come to work and when to leave wour job, either officially or unofficially?	ially.	The i	first	act
you c vity	an do this on your job, either officially or unofficial is deciding when to come to work and when to leave wo	ially.	The i	first	act
you c vity	an do this on your job, either officially or unofficial is deciding when to come to work and when to leave wo	ially. ork. (The i	first a do t	act his
you c vity	an do this on your job, either officially or unofficial is deciding when to come to work and when to leave wo	ially. ork. (The i	first a do t	act his
you c vity on yo	an do this on your job, either officially or unofficial is deciding when to come to work and when to leave wo	ially. ork. (The i	first a do t	act
you c vity on yo B3a.	an do this on your job, either officially or unofficials deciding when to come to work and when to leave we can job, either officially or unofficially? DECIDE WHEN TO COME TO WORK AND WHEN TO LEAVE WORK.	ially. ork. (The i	first a do t	act his
you c vity on yo B3a.	an do this on your job, either officially or unofficials deciding when to come to work and when to leave we sur job, either officially or unofficially? DECIDE WHEN TO COME TO WORK AND WHEN TO LEAVE WORK. The next one istake a day off from work without	ially. ork. (The i	first a do t	act his
you c vity on yo B3a.	an do this on your job, either officially or unofficial is deciding when to come to work and when to leave we sur job, either officially or unofficially? DECIDE WHEN TO COME TO WORK AND WHEN TO LEAVE WORK. The next one istake a day off from work without losing pay or having to claim vacation time, sick	ially. ork. (The i	first a do t	act his
you c vity on yo B3a.	an do this on your job, either officially or unofficials deciding when to come to work and when to leave we sur job, either officially or unofficially? DECIDE WHEN TO COME TO WORK AND WHEN TO LEAVE WORK. The next one istake a day off from work without losing pay or having to claim vacation time, sick leave or put in compensatory time. (Can you do	ially. ork. (The i	first a do t	act his
you c vity on yo B3a.	an do this on your job, either officially or unofficial is deciding when to come to work and when to leave we sur job, either officially or unofficially? DECIDE WHEN TO COME TO WORK AND WHEN TO LEAVE WORK. The next one istake a day off from work without losing pay or having to claim vacation time, sick	ially. ork. (The i	first a do t	act his
you c vity on yo B3a. B3b.	an do this on your job, either officially or unofficial is deciding when to come to work and when to leave we sur job, either officially or unofficially? DECIDE WHEN TO COME TO WORK AND WHEN TO LEAVE WORK. The next one istake a day off from work without losing pay or having to claim vacation time, sick leave or put in compensatory time. (Can you do this on your job, either officially or unofficially?)	ially. ork. (The i	first a do t	act his
you c vity on yo B3a. B3b.	an do this on your job, either officially or unofficial deciding when to come to work and when to leave we sur job, either officially or unofficially? DECIDE WHEN TO COME TO WORK AND WHEN TO LEAVE WORK. The next one istake a day off from work without losing pay or having to claim vacation time, sick leave or put in compensatory time. (Can you do this on your job, either officially or unofficially?) Considerably slow down your pace of work for a day	ially. ork. (The i	first a do t	act his
you c vity on yo B3a. B3b.	an do this on your job, either officially or unofficial is deciding when to come to work and when to leave we sur job, either officially or unofficially? DECIDE WHEN TO COME TO WORK AND WHEN TO LEAVE WORK. The next one istake a day off from work without losing pay or having to claim vacation time, sick leave or put in compensatory time. (Can you do this on your job, either officially or unofficially?)	ially. ork. (The i	first a do t	act his
you c vity	an do this on your job, either officially or unofficial deciding when to come to work and when to leave we sur job, either officially or unofficially? DECIDE WHEN TO COME TO WORK AND WHEN TO LEAVE WORK. The next one istake a day off from work without losing pay or having to claim vacation time, sick leave or put in compensatory time. (Can you do this on your job, either officially or unofficially?) Considerably slow down your pace of work for a day	ially. ork. (The i	first a do t	act his

SECTION	c.	SUPERVISION

C1.	As an official	part of your	main job, de	o you	supervise	the	work	of other	emplovee
	or tell other	employees what	t work to do	?	-			_	

		-		
1. YES	•		5.	NO
GO TO C2		_		

Cla. Have you ever had a job in which you supervised the work of other employees or told other employees what work to do?

1. YES		5.	NO
TURN	TO P. 17	SECTION D	,

C2. How many people do you directly supervise?

	ONE	GO TO C2b NUMBER, MORE THAN ONE
С2а.	What are this person's main	activities?
С2ъ.	(Does/Do any of) your subord	inate(s) have subordinates under (him/them)?
	1. YES	5. NO

C3. As a part of your job are you directly responsible for any of the following: the first thing is deciding the specific tasks or work assignments performed by your subordinates. Is this one of your responsibilities?

C3a.	ARE YOU RESPONSIBLE FOR DECIDING THE SPECIFIC
	TASKS OR WORK ASSIGNMENTS PERFORMED BY SUBOR-
	DINATES?

С3Ъ.	The next issue is deciding what procedures,
	tools or materials your subordinates use in
	doing their work? (Are you responsible for
	this?)

C3c.	What about deciding how fast they work, how	
	long they work or how much work they have to	
	get done? (Are you responsible for this?)	

	1,	YES	5.	NO
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
We would like to know if,

C4. As part of your job, you can influence the pay, promotion or discipline of the people you supervise. As I read each of the following items, please tell me if you have any influence in this area. The first item is granting a pay raise or promotion to a subordinate. Do you have any influence on this?

		C5 Who has the greatest influence you or someone higher up in the organization?			(IF "EQUAL" IN C5, ASK:) Overall, if you had to make a choice, who would you say had the most influence on this?		
		RESPONDENT (1)	HIGHER-UP (2)	EQUAL (3)	RESPONDENT (1)	HIGHER-UP (2)	
٠.	GRANTING A PAY RAISE OR A PROMOTION TO A SUBOR- DINATE?						
	5. NO 1. YES						
ь.	How about preventing a subordinate from getting a pay raise or promotion because of poor work or misbehavior? (Do you have any influence on this?)						
	5. NO 1. YES	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	}				
c.	Firing or temporarily sus- pending a subordinate? (Do you have any influence?)		:				
	5. NO 1. YES ->						
đ.	Issuing a formal warning to a subordinate? (Do you have any influence?)						
	5. NO 1. YES						

C6

Dl. The next question concerns policy-making at your workplace; that is, making decisions about such things as the products or services delivered, the total number of people employed, budgets, and so forth. Do you participate in making these kinds of decisions, or even provide advice about them?



D2. Think of your specific place of work. If the organization for which you work has more than one branch, plant or store, think of the specific location where you work. I will ask you about decisions which might affect your workplace. For each, tell me if you are personally involved in this decision, including providing advice on it.

First, are you personally involved in decisions to increase or decrease the total number of people employed in the place where you work?

D3. How do you usually participate in this decision? Do you make the decision on your own authority; do you participate as a voting member of a group which makes the decision; do you make the decision, subject to approval; or do you provide advice to the person who actually makes the decision?

,	MAKE DECISION YOURSELF (1)	 MAKE DECISION SUBJECT TO APPROVAL (3)	PROVIDE ADVICE (4)
D2a. FIRST, ARE YOU PERSONALLY INVOLVED			
IN DECISIONS TO INCREASE OR	1		i
DECREASE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE	1	'	
EMPLOYED IN THE PLACE WHERE YOU	1		
WORK?			
5. NO 6. NOT AN ISSUE 1. YES			
D2b. How about policy decisions to sig-			1
nificantly change the products,	Ì		[
programs, or services delivered by].
the organizations for which you work?			
5. NO 6. NOT AN ISSUE 1. YES			
TURN TO P. 18, D2c			


D3. How do you usually participate in this decision? Do you make the decision on your own authority; do you participate as a voting member of a group which makes the decision; do you make the decision, subject to approval; or do you provide advice to the person who actually makes the decision?

MAKE DECI-SION AS A MAKE MAKE VOTING DECISION DECISION MEMBER OF SUBJECT TO PROVIDE ADVICE YOURSELF GROUP APPROVAL (1) (2) (3) (4) D2c. (How about) decisions to change the policy concerning the routine pace of work or the amount of work performed in your workplace as a whole or some major part of it? NOT AN 5. NO 1. YES ISSUE D2d. (How about) policy decisions to significantly change the basic methods or procedures of work used in a major part of your workplace? NOT AN 1. YES ISSUE D2e. (How about) decisions concerning the budget at the place where you work? NOT AN 1. YES 5. NO ISSUE TURN TO P. 19, D2h D2f. Do you participate in deciding the overall size of the budget? NOT AN 1. YES ISSUE D2g. Do you participate in general policy decisions about the distribution of funds within the overall budget of the place where you work? NOT AN 5. NO 1. YES ISSUE TURN TO P. 19, D2h

D3. How do you usually participate in this decision? Do you make the decision on your own authority; do you participate as a voting member of a group which makes the decision; do you make the decision, subject to approval; or do you provide advice to the person who actually makes the decision?

		MAKE DECISION YOURSELF (1)	MAKE DECISION SUBJECT TO APPROVAL (3)	PROVIDE ADVICE (4)
sion which y	other kind of deci- ou feel is important place as a whole in rticipate?			
5. NO 6.	NOT AN ISSUE 1. YES			
D2j. (What kind	of decision is that?)			
		-		

D4. Which of the following best describes the position which you hold within your business or organization? Would it be a managerial position, a supervisory position, or a nonmanagement position?



D4a. Would that be a top, upper, middle, or lower managerial position?

1. TOP
2. UPPER MANAGER
3. MIDDLE 4. LOWER MANAGER

APPENDIX B The Full Managerial Location Variable

The full managerial location variable which was then collapsed in various ways for different versions of the class typology was constructed as follows:

Managerial Location	Decision- making Participation	Authority	Formal Hierarchy	Interpretation of the Category
1	Direct	Sanction or task	In hierarchy	Manager on all criteria
2	**	н	Nonmanagement	Manager not in hierarchy
3	"	None	In hierarchy	Manager without authority
4 .	n	**	Nonmanagement	Decisionmaker without authority and outside of hierarchy
5	Advice only	Sanction or task	In hierarchy	Advisor-manager on all criteria
6	n	11	Nonmanagement	Adv-mgr not in hierarchy
7		None	In hierarchy	Adv-mgr without authority
8	u	TT	Nonmanagement	Advisor without authority and outside of hierarchy
9	None	Sanction	In hierarchy	Supervisor: sanctions
10	n	Task only	In hierarchy	Supervisor: - tasks
11	10	Nominal	In hierarchy	Nominally in hierarchy
12	n	Sanctions	Nonmanagement	Supervisor: sanctions but oūtside hierarchy
13	"	Tasks only	Nonmanagement	Task supervision outside of hierarchy
14	" -	None	In hierarchy	No subordinates at all but in hierarchy
15	**	**	Nonmanagement	Nonmanager/supervisor on all criteria

NOTES

¹The classic American research on subjective images of the class structure was done by Warner (1949). For an interesting recent study which explores in a sophisticated way the multidimensionality of people's images of the class structure, see Coleman and Rainwater (1978), and for an important discussion of the British debate on working class images of society, see Bulmer (1975). The most important American work on subjective class identification is that of Centers (1949). The literature which reduces class to an "independent variable" in the biographies of individuals is voluminous, and includes a great deal of political sociology research on voting behavior and stratification research on income.

²There have been a few studies which do attempt to study the class structure as a whole, although generally with quite inadequate data. See in particular, Therborn (1972, 1981), Przeworski et al. (1980), Szymanski (1972), Loren (1977), Westergaard and Resler (1975), and for work outside of a Marxist framework, Hunter (1979), Vanneman (1977), Kahl (1957), Gagliani (1981), and Breiger (1981).

The survey used in this project was initially developed in a pilot project conducted at the University of Wisconsin in 1978. During the period 1978-1980 proposals based on this initial project were submitted by researchers in several European countries. As of early 1982 surveys have been completed in the United States, Finalud, Sweden, and Australia, and grants have been approved in Canada, Britain, Norway, and Italy. Eventually, therefore, the analysis will involve systematic comparisons among at least eight countries.

⁴This identification of the concept of class with appropriation relations in Weber is quite explicit in his restriction of the concept to market societies. In nonmarket societies appropriation relations are simultaneously domination relations (e.g., in feudalism), and thus social categories definable strictly by appropriation relations alone do not exist. It is only in capitalism that appropriation relations appear to be distinct from domination relations (that is, appropriation appears to take the form of free exchanges on markets), and thus it is only in capitalism that appropriation-classes (market classes) can be properly defined.

⁵Dahrendorf (1959) argues that authority and authority alone constitutes the basis for class division. The linkage to property relations is treated simply as a peculiar feature of the early stages of industrialization in Western Europe, a characteristic which has anyway been superseded with the institutional separation of "ownership" and "control."

⁶Some Marxists have attempted to argue that domination relations are of strictly secondary importance in the definition of classes. Classes, it is argued, are determined by property relations alone, and property relations do not necessarily entail any immediate relations of domination. For an extremely important statement of this position see Roemer (1982), and for a critique see Wright (1982a).

⁷Within such a conception of class structure, different systems of class relations are defined by different kinds of appropriation and domination relations. Feudalism, for example, is defined as an appropriative system in which peasants produce their own subsistence on land to which they have traditional use-right, and produce surplus products for the feudal lord on land which he controls. The domination relations within

these class relations consists of the coercive relations by which the lord forces the peasants to perform that surplus labor. Domination in feudalism is thus generally characterized as "extra-economic," i.e., as requiring the use of direct force in order to get the peasants to produce a surplus which the lord appropriates. In capitalism, on the other hand, appropriation relations take the form of markets within which commodities of various sorts are exchanged. Workers sell their labor power to capitalists, capitalists sell the commodities produced by workers on the market. The salient domination relation within this class system is no longer extra-economic, but rather is located directly within the production process itself, namely in the capacity of capitalists (or their delegates) to control the activities of workers within the production process. The Marxist concept of "mode of production" is the way in which such qualitatively different forms of appropriation and domination are specified.

⁸If, however, fathers were to dominate and exploit their children, as could be the case in precapitalist "patriarchical modes of production," then this would constitute at least a proto-class relation.

⁹For a more extended development of this point, see Wright (1982a).

10For a general discussion of the conceptual and empirical relationship between the concept of class and occupation, see Wright (1980b).

11To say that autonomy is a continuous variable does not imply that the concept of autonomy is gradational. Autonomy in the present context designates a social relationship between supervisors and subordinates which structures the range of activities over which the subordinate has discretion. It is possible to measure this range as a continuous

variable, while still regarding it as an indicator of the underlying social relation.

 12 The letters and numbers in parentheses refer to questions on the survey reproduced in Appendix A.

13Because "contradictory locations" are class locations which have a dual class content, the relative weight of specific class determinations varies across such contradictory locations. Most semi-autonomous employees and supervisors are probably in locations within which the working class aspects are the predominant ones.

14It is unclear at this point if these ranges reflect what are essentially measurement problems, or if the ambiguities in the application of the criteria have a deeper structural meaning. At a minimum they may suggest that in addition to contradictory locations within class relations, we need a concept of "ambiguous" locations.

15Respondents were asked a series of income questions, about the income from their own job, their family income, and the proportion of their family income from various nonwage sources (state transfers, investments, etc.). The data in Table 8 are based on the annual personal income question.

¹⁶Systems of occupational classification are rarely constructed with any coherent theoretical purposes in mind, and as a result there is often a great deal of sloppiness in what kinds of concrete jobs are lumped together under a common occupational rubric. The claim that occupational titles designate the location of a job within a technical division of labor, therefore, is somewhat of an idealization.

¹⁷This figure is based on a collapsed version of Table 9 in which all managers and supervisors are combined into a single managerial—supervisory category, and petty bourgeois, small employers, and capita—lists are combined into a single self-employed category. The amount of misclassification will obviously increase if we insist on more refined distinctions within these broad class locations.

18A similar argument for classes is made by Berteaux (1977).

¹⁹Recent examples of this debate are Vanneman (1977), who argues on the basis of life style and associational data that lower white collar occupations are typically working class, and Gagliani (1981), who insists that because of more pleasant working conditions and general status such position should be considered outside of the working class.

20 Some of the relevant recent work on sex and occupational status include Sewell, Hauser, and Wolf (1980), Featherman and Hauser (1976), Treiman and Terrell (1975). One of the few studies which deals empirically with the problem of sex and authority (or power), and thus touches on questions of class, is Wolf and Fligstein (1979a, 1979b). The Marxist and Marxist-feminist literature on these issues has tended to be more preoccupied with theoretical issues than with systematic empirical investigation, although some empirical research is now being done. Some Marxist-feminist discussions of sex and work include Beechey (1978), Barron and Norris (1976), West (1978), and Hartman (1979).

21Throughout this-analysis we have treated individuals as the incumbents of class positions. For certain purposes it may also make sense to treat families as such as the basic units of class. This would lead us to investigate the ways in which families are inserted into the system of production relations, thus opening up the possibilities of families as such being inserted in contradictory ways (when spouses participate in capitalist production in different class positions). This has important implications for analyzing the class structure for women. Since we do have data on the class of both spouses in families, we will eventually be able to analyze the problem of the location of families within the class structure.

22Respondents were asked to estimate the number of people employed in the entire organization for which they worked (unless they were employed by the state). The question was structured in such a way that respondents were directed towards the entire organization and not just the branch or office in which they worked. Of course these estimates are likely to contain a great deal of error. It is for this reason that we have created an "ambiguous" category as a kind of conceptual buffer between firms which are almost certainly in the monopoly sector and firms almost certainly in the competitive sector. It is very unlikely, on the face of it, that a respondent would say that over 10,000 people were employed in his firm when the true number was less than 1000, or that he would give a figure less than 1000 when the true number was ten times that.

 23 Because of the limited number of cases, we have combined the "ambiguous" size firms (1000-10,000) with the unambiguous monopoly sector firms in this part of the analysis.

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