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THE SMALL TRADE CENTER: PROCESSES AND PERCEPTIONS OF GROWTH OR DECLINE

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The decline of the small town is one aspect of the process of urbanization in modern society. Factors which seem to be necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for avoidance of decline on the part of the small trade center include centralization, the presence of specialized functions, extra-local orientation, and risk-taking. Extra-local orientation involves both awareness of conditions in the larger society and entrance into the regional competition for patronage. Risk-taking means reinvesting profits, extending credit, and carrying our campaigns to improve business and lure industry.

In addition to illustrating extra-locality and risk-taking, this paper looks at two aspects of the small town. First, the stages through which a declining community passes in the course of losing businesses and professionals and described Second, people's perceptions of theirs and heir economic conditions are examined.
The fate of the small town in modern industrial society has for several decades been a subject of nostalgia, of pictorial representation, of literature, and of scattered research efforts. Most observers admit that the small town is in trouble, and the smaller and more isolated the town the greater are its difficulties. Causes of difficulty are correctly perceived to be to a great extent external to the small town, with much having been written about urban appeal to young people and the influence of economic-technological changes in the larger society upon the hinterlands. Considerably less attention has been paid to the internal conditions contributing to individual or community stability, to the stages in the loss of services in the declining village, or to people's perceptions of small town economic conditions. These are the issues with which this paper seeks to deal.

Many studies of towns, even those noting the problems of population loss and economic problems, have focussed upon such large communities that decline is in fact atypical. The towns in the greatest difficulty are those of 2500 persons or less and which are far from any urban center to be incorporated into its commuter zone; these are our concern. The six villages selected for intensive investigation — two in Missouri and four in Wisconsin — are all farm trade centers. The four Wisconsin communities were chosen because of their wide range with respect to population gain or loss, and the two Missouri communities because of the author's familiarity with their region. The six ranged in population, according to the 1950 census, from just over 500 to about 950, and in distance from the nearest SMSA from 45 to 90 highway miles. Between 1950 and 1960 one of these towns lost over fifteen percent of its population, two
others lost between five and ten per cent, one remained virtually stable, another gained between five and ten per cent, and the last increased by more than 25 per cent. The population of the state of Missouri grew by 9.2 per cent during this period, and Wisconsin increased in population as fast or faster than its state as a whole.

Within these communities positional leaders and businessmen, a few housewives and retired persons, were interviewed first, usually numbering about a dozen individuals. Subsequently, the "snowballing" technique was used to incorporate those persons whom the earlier respondents indicated we "should definitely talk to." The common method was to allow up on a comment such as: "Well, if you really want to find out about the Headstart Program here, talk to Mrs. Findlay," or "I can't say for sure why we never really tried to get a new industry to come here, but Mr. Zachus, our retired bank president, should certainly know." In all, interviews were held with 108 persons ranging from 14 in one community to 25 in another. In addition, census records, business records, and personal recall by the respondents were used to piece together the picture of economic and other changes over the past three decades. The composite picture emerging from the interviews and records forms the substance of our discussion. 3

Factors in Trade Center Avoidance or Decline

It is easy to combine the findings on urban migration of young people, the greater distances which people will travel for goods and services, and difficulties confronted by the mining or railroad town when the economy or technology changes, 4 and conclude that decline and eventual death are the inevitable lot of the small town in modern society. Such has not yet, however, become the case with the small trade centers of the United States since mid-twentieth century. Rather, a
good number have declined, another substantial portion have been relatively stable in population, and a few have grown. The situation, in other words, is not yet such that "nothing can be done" in the face of competition and urban appeal.

Some of the factors studied in their effect upon small town growth or decline include size, centralization of services, and the presence of specialized institutions, such as county government. The position association between such factors and population change has been weak enough to lead the authors to state that other variables are needed to explain small town growth or decline. Therefore, besides minimizing the likelihood of large numbers of urban commuters, we have omitted county seats, college communities, and have kept the size range fairly narrow. This has made possible the isolation of certain variables which appear to be necessary conditions for population and economic stability in the small trade center.

The two factors which were isolated early in the study and reinforced as we entered each of the six communities might be called extra-local orientation and risk-taking willingness. The former is very simple, a direct confrontation of the issue of increased consumer travel distance in search of goods and services. The latter indicates whether or not key community personnel are willing to take economic chances in order to lure new industry or to develop natural resources. Industry is thus not considered to be an independent variable in its own right, but is dependent upon risk-taking for its importance. The status of the six communities on extra-locality, risk-taking, and industry may be seen in Table I.
Table I. Extra-Locality, Risk-Taking, and Industry in Six Villages, According to Population and Distance from SMSA

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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>700+</td>
<td>25+</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Lake</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Dairy</td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>5-10</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Railroad</td>
<td>Dairy</td>
<td>Paper Mill</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Furniture Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Fairly High</td>
<td>Railroad</td>
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<td>Flour Mill</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>600+</td>
<td>-5-10</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Canning Plant</td>
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<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>-5-10</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Fairly Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Feed Mill, Garment Fac.</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>500+</td>
<td>-15-20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>State Park</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Lumber Mill</td>
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Neither the presence of a natural resource or industry, the loss of an industry, nor the number of current industries bears much relationship to population change between 1950 and 1960. Furthermore, the development of a natural industry and the luring of new industry are both predicted more than anything else upon the willingness of economic influentials to invest money and "take a chance." Thus, the several dimensions of extra-locality and risk-taking should be delineated before their importance can be illustrated.

Extra-Locali and Risk-Taking Described. The distinction between local and cosmopolitan orientations to life has been drawn in such social settings as suburbia and complex organizations, among such persons as professional scientists and modernizing farmers. Lerner, for example, states that "local" farmers "show no interest in affairs outside their immediate community." However, more than "showing interest" is signified by our term "extra-local." Extra-local outlook and appeal are based on the admission that the small community (or the individual businessman or professional) is unlikely to prosper strictly on locally-determined standards or on the patronage of local residents or those from the immediate hinterland. The businessman manifests an extra-local outlook by keeping apprised of the current prices for his goods elsewhere, by being alert to new products as they appear, by comparing wholesalers, and by watching a large area for bargains in order to minimize his own overhead. The locally-oriented businessman may overprice his merchandise or have an inadequate or outdated inventory. For a small town professional to manifest an extra-local outlook means primarily that he keeps informed of the latest developments in his profession. The dentist without a high-speed drill, or the doctor or lawyer not aware of the latest research or cases,
respectively, is in a poor bargaining position for the patronage of a modern clientele.

Outlook, however, is but one portion of extra-local orientation. Virtually all of the successful businessmen, professionals, and industrialists -- and stable or growing communities corporately -- enter openly the regional competition for patronage. A key to extra-local appeal is advertising not just in the local paper but in those of surrounding communities as well.

The risk factor appears in the form of willingness to reinvest profits, to take out loans, to extend credit, and to finance building and/or advertising campaigns. Without corporate risk-taking, it is virtually impossible to gain new industry or to develop such resources as may be at hand. The importance of extra-local orientation and risk-taking in stabilizing the population and/or economy of all the small town can best be illustrated by a detailed reference to several of the sample communities.

Extra-Locality and Risk-Taking Illustrated. A most instructive extra-local vs. local comparison can be drawn between villages I and VI. Each has a natural resource or industry at its disposal, the former being located on a large and beautiful lake and the latter less than three miles from a state park. Village I leaders, in the early 1950's, became aware both of their increasing plight in the regional competition for consumers and of their advantageous recreational location. The campaign which they hammered out had three parts: (1) they advertised in the urban newspapers of the region "choice lakeshore sites" for retirement or summer homes; (2) four venturesome businessmen sold their businesses and built boat rental agencies and docks -- one of the men on his own and the other three as partners; and (3) they pooled a moderate amount of money to build a city park and the first units of an assembly
where groups could come for conferences, retreats, and recreation. The key element in their success was an extra-local orientation based upon the realization that without drawing residents and patronage from a wide area they were in trouble. The risk factor was secondary, involving only the initial cost of developing the assembly ground, the continuing expense of advertising, and the conviction of the part of a few men that an investment in boating would pay off. The success of this extra-local venture came rapidly and has not abated.

The contrast in village VI is striking if not poignant. The establishment of a state park nearby was treated locally with neither interest nor enthusiasm. Locals like their privacy and conceived of themselves as related almost exclusively to the surrounding farms as a trading center. The marginal nature of many of these dairy farms meant inevitable consolidation and loss of consumers from the hinterland. Reaction on the part of community leaders to incipient decline was almost uniformly localistic and fatalistic. "We can't compete with the city." "All our young people are leaving, but what can you do?" These comments, made to the interviewer, were not a recent but a long-term characteristic of residents. The lack of both extra-local orientation and of risk-willingness resulted in a continuing loss of young people and in the town being unable to realize the possible advantages of the state park. One of the remaining businessmen discussed the park thus: "Well, the state officials were around five years ago talking about building a dam in the park and developing a lake. I think this might help our town but we're not counting on it being built." A probing attempt to find out if he or any businessman had tried to exert pressure or to raise matching funds in order to get the dam built came up with a consistently negative result. No one, it appears, had even thought of
it. "They'll do what they want," was the general consensus regarding the state. Several businessmen and women indicated that the demise of their business was only a matter of time; two had set their date of closing. The three most successful I pointed out the inability of the community to effect a corporate economic risk for the sake of a new industry or business. One put it this way: "A few years ago we had a development corporation, but only five of us joined, and we didn't do anything. We didn't really want new businesses because they would just take away consumers from us. We couldn't seem to get any money together to interest new industries. One problem is that the banker and the retired folk control most of the money. Mr. Clayton (the banker) won't invest because he's not convinced this town can ever recuperate, and the retired folk won't invest in this town 'cause their children have all left. They would rather sit on their money 'til they die so their kids - wherever they are - can inherit it." Here, then, is a community which missed any earlier opportunity it might have had for rejuvenation and currently is characterized by businessmen who don't want more businesses, by a banker who won't take risks, by some retired persons who are 'sitting on' their profits, and by a corporate leadership which can see little opportunity in a nearby state park. This community is now in the latter stages of decline, as evidenced by the fact that in 1965 persons 65 years of age and older accounted for 64 per cent of its population.

Why, in the early stages of decline, did the influential in village I see the future in lakeside front homes, boating, and assemblies, while those in village VI could not envision an equal potential in the state park? The respondents were simply unable, in retrospect, to explain why, except that, to them, this was the normal way to react. Perhaps a
part of the explanation lies in the marginal nature of the farm land surrounding village VI and the good dairy land surrounding village I. It seems possible that the subsistence problem may have resulted in a generally more pessimistic or defeatist approach to life among the residents of the region around village VI. Another possible explanation may lie in the different power or leadership structure of the two communities, but this is the subject of another paper. Regardless of how the difference is explained, it was most apparent in the course of the interviews that the major influence upon both the economy and the population of villages I and VI had been the extra-local or local orientation of the residents.

Illustrations of the importance of extra-locality can also be found in other villages, and the necessity of risk-taking becomes even more apparent. Village II was one of two villages affected by the change of diesel railroad service and a lessening of passenger service on the railroads. Formerly a service point and junction, this town was in danger of rapid decline when no longer valuable to the railroads. However, soon after the rail yards closed down a lawyer, grocer, furniture store owner, the local banker, a hardware store owner, and four other businessmen organized under the title "Community Redevelopment Committee." They each contributed several thousand dollars of their profits and purchased a large, empty building from the railroads. The most immediate result was the luring of a furniture company from a larger town by providing a building and a small amount of new cash for equipment. Several of the "Committee" members are convinced that they have already made back in business what their original risk cost them. Others are satisfied that the individual "pay off" is only a matter of time. All are optimistic about the future of their community and about their ability to bring
other industries to town. Interestingly enough, the success of the first venture has persuaded others to join the Committee, thus lessening the individual risk and increasing the resource pool. An important point is that for village II to stabilize its economy and population it was not necessary for all the community members with money to join the Committee; it was only necessary that several key leaders be willing to risk their profits -- to do more than talk -- in order to revitalize the community.

Villages IV and V look quite similar according to the 1950-1960 population change figures. However, by 1965 village IV had begun to show signs of stabilization, while V was continuing to lose inhabitants at a slow but constant rate. The major influence upon IV's restabilization has been one man from Minnesota. This man bought the bank in 1958 when its resources amounted to $2,000,000 and has since quadrupled them. His expansion campaign involved several steps, all of which involved either individual risk-taking or extra-local orientation, or both. First, he determined to loosen (rather than tighten as his predecessor had) credit terms, and to give more loans for new housing. Second, he publicised a dinner and evening of square dancing and entertainment at the bank's expense, actually taking over the center of town for the event. This gave him an opportunity to inform those attending of his new policies. Third, he not only advertised these policies in the newspapers of surrounding communities, but kept his eye on the want ads of city newspapers for the equipment he needed to modernize the bank. A vault, draperies, a counter to refinish, large supplies of ball point pens, plate glass -- these and other supplies he found at bargain prices and brought them to his bank. The first two years of his ownership saw a sharp decline in cash reserves. This dip was a result of his investment in equipment, his new credit terms, and the fact that certain residents did not yet accept him into
the town -- he was not yet "one of them." However, the effect of his policies and campaign soon became apparent to other businessmen in town. New houses were going up. People from surrounding communities came to village IV to do their banking, and stayed to shop. The outflow of business to other communities changed to a more balanced in-out pattern. Not yet has this village solved the problem of young people leaving, for this is based on industrial or other opportunity and not just business flow; and factionalism has prevented the establishment of a viable re-development organization. However, involvement in the regional competition for consumers has been substantially changed for the better by the extra-local orientation of one influential man.

Much less effective in altering the course of either economic or population decline has been the extra-local campaign of a 5-and-10¢ store owner in village V. Having grown up in this community, he had worked for several years as a sales manager for Sears in a nearby metropolis. Some five years before the interview he bought the store and returned to his hometown to enjoy the advantages of small town and rural life. He immediately noticed the weekend exodus of shoppers particularly to a town of 1700 people located 18 miles away and one with 2000 inhabitants 25 miles away. He went through the basic extra-local process of comparing prices, increasing and diversifying inventory, placing advertisements, and using gimmicks such as prize raffles in order to bring patrons from other communities to his store on Friday nights. The result has been individual financial success, but this has not "rubbed off" on the community in general, and he readily admits the need for recreational facilities and other services to increase his Friday night appeal. Few businessmen in village V have joined in the regional competition, and the corporate trend in the community is still economic and population
Acquaintance with these villages leads to several conclusions regarding individual success and population or economic stability in the community. First, extra-local orientation is a necessary condition for individual success. The businessman or professional whose interest stops with local news and whose appeal is to "the old bunch" of patrons faces long-term difficulties. Second, the extra-local orientation of one or more businessmen may be sufficient to stabilize the economy, but may or may not greatly affect the decline in population. Third, key leaders must band together in corporate risk-taking as well as extra-locality in order to meet the necessary conditions for population stability or growth. Extra-locality and effective corporate risk-taking appear to account for much of the stability and growth of small towns not accounted for by the presence of specialized institutions or by external forces. Put antithetically, lack of extra-locality, or risk-taking, of specialized institutions, of size, and of commuter incorporation appears to be virtually a sufficient condition for economic and population decline.

The Effect of Decline on Services Offered

There is, we have argued, a method by which the small trade center may better its chances for survival. This includes broadening its consumer base beyond its immediate hinterland and luring or developing industry which will hold or bring new population. Yet the fact is most small communities are unable or unwilling to effect these conditions or to avoid the general trend toward decline.

Why cannot most small trade centers avoid decline? The external factors such as urban opportunity and competition are, of course, a part of the reason. Internally, it is related to the positions and outlooks of small town professionals, businessmen, and industrialists.
Professionals, who according to Vidich and Bensman generally have the ability to mediate between the small town and the larger society, may be in a poor position to effect extra-locality as the dominant character of communities the size of ours. Either they are absent from the village or else, as in the case of many lawyers and school officials, if they try to bring an extra-local orientation into the community they may be treated as outsiders. Industrialists, even when the company is locally owned, are geared to a wide marketing area and are neither active in community politics nor interested in luring other industries. Of the eight industries in our six villages, only the owner of the dairy in village II is a contributing member of a redevelopment group. This man is a long-term resident of the community and his involvement is predicated upon other considerations than personal economic motives. Businessmen, who comprise the financial 'backbone of community redevelopment attempts, are simply less and less willing to take risks. They save rather than invest. Most are locally oriented, seeking to develop a clientele whose loyalty is personal rather than being based upon economic advantage to the consumer. Small-trade centers such as I and II are exceptional in their growth.

The rule or trend is decline, and it is possible to piece together the steps by which services are lost to the declining community. Assuming that a community is large enough to provide specialized professional services, large dry goods such as appliances and automobiles, and the day-to-day necessities for people in their hinterlands, such as groceries, drugs, feed, and gasoline, the process of departure is generally as follows. First to leave are the specialized professionals, especially dentists, then doctors and lawyers. They move to larger places or centralized clinics on the correct assumption that a regional clientele will seek
them out. Second, large dry goods establishments close down, leaving
the sale of new cars to garages, with the cars on order rather than in
stock, and the sale of appliances to the general dry goods or hardware
store. People will travel several miles to buy items such as cars,
refrigerators, and couches, and the regional competition drives out the
small town outlet early. Simultaneously, specialized services such as
beauty parlors, laundries, paint stores, and TV repair shops fold. Third,
duplicate businesses are driven out by competition for a contracting
clientele. If there are two hardware stores one may co under; if there
are three groceries one or two may close. The same is true for filling
stations, feed stores, and other retail establishments.

Village IV, at the time of writing, is in the second phase, village
V in phase three, and village VI in the phase of losing duplicates. In
1965, for example, village VI had the following services to offer: a post
office, a bank, two taverns, a barber shop, three filling stations, two
restaurants, three grocery stores, a recreation (pool) hall, a hardware
store, a fire station, and four churches. One restaurant and one gro-
cery had already set the date for closing, and one filling station was
strictly marginal. The only businesses doing well economically are the
hardware store, the recreation hall, and a restaurant — all of which
are owned by "localities" and hold a virtual monopoly on business from
the village and hinterland. The penultimate phase of decline leaves a
trade center offering primarily those day-to-day services needed by the
immediate hinterland: groceries, filling stations, feed stores, and
general dry goods, and usually but one establishment of each type.

Three exceptions to this phase should be noted. If a community is
located at an important highway junction more than one filling station
may survive. This, however, defines the community as more than a farm
trade center. Also, a specialized service, such as the barber shop in village VI, may survive if the owner does not have to make his whole living that way. The owner keeps his barber shop open but a few hours a week and the remainder of the time he is town constable or sheriff; he simply does not have to live on what he makes barbering. The third exception is that taverns and churches appear to be the last to lose their duplicates. (Perhaps this is because at the tavern the resident of a dying community can drown his troubles and at the church he can forget them.) Not entirely facetiously: however, these are two institutions which aid the individual in coping with his and his community's plight. Another way in which he copes is by the process of projection, but that is the subject of our next section.

Projection of Personal Success or Failure

Within the six communities visited there are individual successes and failures, some whose economic position is improving and others who are marginal or going under economically. By and large, these persons are able to realistically perceive their own condition and to admit it. The exceptions are a few successes who talk like failures and a few failures who talk like successes. In one instance of the former exception the reason for the image of poverty is that the aging couple, who own a hardware store, want to keep their profits. They neither want to reinvest in business overhead or inventory, nor do they want to be asked to support local causes or campaigns. However, several informants individually and confidentially let the interviewer know that Mr. and Mrs. Cameron are "loaded;" that they also own a filling station out on the highway. The other exception is illustrated by a small number of businessmen in financial difficulty, particularly some in village V, who claim that both they and the community are doing just fine and that a
brighter day is just around the corner. The Chamber of Commerce line was not always convincing to the interviewer, nor did it agree with other informants' conceptions of who is doing well in the community.

By and large, however, people evaluate themselves realistically or in keeping with the facts. The successes are only too willing to admit to and explain their success, while the failures and marginals are sometimes embittered but most often resigned to or fatalistic about their plight. How does one's personal situation affect his perception to how the community is doing? In one of the most interesting sections of Small Town in Mass Society, Vidich and Jensman indicate the modes of psychological adjustment which residents of Springfield use in the face of their community's vulnerability and lack of autonomy. A key mode is particularization, or recognizing specific situations of community dependence but not viewing the community as a whole. Springfielders simply do not generalize the specific, and are thus "not explicitly aware of the total amount of the dependence." In our communities, however, the tendency appeared to be just the opposite: the individual tended to project or generalize his own experience -- whether success or failure -- rather than particularizing it. For example, in village V, "Mrs. Dunbar, owner of a dry goods store who is planning to sell and return to the farm, admitted that the town was in trouble. "Yes, we're losing people around here all the time. Just look up and down the street and you'll find plenty of vacant buildings. We just can't compete." When asked about the success of the feed mill and of Mr. Taylor's 5-and-10c store, she explained that the mill serves a wide area and Mr. Taylor "worked at Sears in the city where he learned a lot more than most of us know about how to run a business." Well, you might say, this isn't projection, it is realism. However, interviews with Mr. Taylor and other scattered successes in village V produce precisely the opposite result. That is,
they project or generalize their success to the community and particularize the persons who have failed. According to Mr. Taylor: "Our town is doing OK. We've had a little bad luck lately. Mr. Charles, who with his wife ran the laundromat, was an alcoholic and when he and his wife broke up they sold the business. Mrs. Dunbar just doesn't try; her heart isn't in the business and she'll be better off on the farm." One by one he explains away the business failures. "But what," the interviewer asks, "about the empty buildings in town?" "If you had come two years ago you would have seen all the buildings in use, and if you come back next year they'll probably be full again."

Thus, the majority of business and professional persons in these six villages have worked out a most ingenious method of making sense of their worlds. Whether you call it projection or the reduction of cognitive dissonance, the dominant practice is to generalize one's own condition to the community and to particularize the situations of those who diverge. This holds as true for the successful members of village V, who are optimistic about their town, and for the unsuccessful members of village II, who are pessimistic despite obvious signs of vigor, as it does for those who correctly perceive their community's growth or decline.

Summary and Conclusions

The obverse side of the coin of urbanization in modern industrial society is the trend toward small town decline. This decline is not at present, however, a uniform occurrence in all small towns. Rather, they may be stabilized by centralization or the presence of specialized functions and, according to the present study, by extra-local orientation and risk-taking on the part of key leaders. Many of the instances of small trade center stability or growth can be accounted for by these factors.
Yet the major trend is still one of decline. Internally, the loss of services ordinarily follows this pattern: first professionals, then large dry goods specialized retail services, then duplicate businesses, and finally the most frequent day-to-day services demanded by the community and hinterland. The farther a community goes along the path toward death, the more difficult it appears to be to reverse the progress without outside intervention.

People's perceptions of their own economic condition are usually quite accurate. But if this differs from the community's general condition, the tendency is to project one's own situation upon the community. This, of course, aids the individual in coping, since failure is not taken personally and success, while viewed as an individual achievement, is perceived as reflected in the community as a whole, for the successful can cannot seem to face the reality of being part of an unsuccessful town.

Are extra-locality and willingness to take risks sufficient conditions for community stability? No, they are not. If all small towns suddenly became extra-locally oriented and willing to invest in new industry, only some would be successful. It is, thus, because only a minority of trade centers have this corporate orientation that it is effective. Are extra-locality and risk-taking merely stop-gap measures on the road to eventual decline? Is small town decline a universal process of the small getting smaller and the large getting larger, which we happen to have caught in mid-stream? It is frankly too early to answer this unequivocally. Nevertheless, evidence appears to point to the great majority of U.S. towns the size of ours going the way of village VI by the year 2000. The 1960's and 1970's are, in fact, very likely the crucial period during which the successes are becoming more
clearly distinguished from the declining communities. Involved in this distinguishing process are extra-local orientation and willingness to take economic risks; most small trade centers will effect either.
Footnotes

1. William Simon and John H. Gagon, "Decline and Fall of the Small Town," Transaction, Volume 4, no. 5 (April, 1967), 42-51. This article, reprinted in this volume, discusses towns of 3,000, 7,000 and 9,000 inhabitants. A recent study by Lois Dean includes towns ranging from 9,000 to 30,000 in population; Lois R. Dean, Five Towns. (New York: Random House, Inc., 1967).


3. It should be kept in mind throughout that while the findings correctly represent the six villages, the small sample size means that the processes and perceptions reported are of course in need of verification in other communities.


6. Fuguitt and Beeley, op. cit., 53.


8. Lerner, op. cit., 331


10. The issue of community leadership patterns or power structures is being considered more fully in a separate paper.


13. Vidich and Bensman, op. cit., 89

14. Ibid., 53

15. Ibid., 299ff.