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RACE AND THE METROPOLIS: A DEMOGRAPHIC  
PERSPECTIVE ON THE 1970's

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by

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## RACE AND THE METROPOLIS: A DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE 1970's

Karl E. Taeuber

The concentration of black people in central cities and white people in suburbs is a component of the manpower and other social problems of the U. S. metropolis. A retrospective review of demographic aspects of race and the metropolis is presented as a basis from which to speculate about the 1970's.

The period of mass migration of blacks out of the rural South is drawing to a close. The U. S. black population is more urban and more metropolitan than the white population.

The development of black majorities in a few large cities is the harbinger of the same occurrence in perhaps another 8 cities in the 1970's. A population group that is a small minority in the nation is not in process of becoming a majority in large numbers of cities. During the 1960's the nation's 243 metropolitan areas displayed an enormous diversity of patterns and rates of white and black in- and out-migration to and from central cities and suburbs.

In the 1970's the essential similarities between blacks and whites in housing demands and residential location preferences may become more evident. Whether or not there is significant diminution of racial residential segregation, black suburbanization is likely to become a dominant migration stream. Too narrow a focus on racial aspects of the metropolitan scene may obscure broad social, economic, and demographic dynamics. Population redistribution of the 1970's and 1980's seem likely to develop in new ways that are inadequately captured by our traditional terminology of rural, urban, central city, suburb, and metropolis.

RACE AND THE METROPOLIS:  
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The changing demographic, social, and economic contours of the American metropolis in the 1950's and 1960's are a matter of common information. Recent public debate has focused on the plight of the central cities versus the suburbs. In exaggerated but sharp focus central cities have been seen as losing all manner of good things to the suburbs and keeping or attracting all manner of bad things. Among the "good" things increasingly being found in the suburbs are jobs, especially in newer industries; property with a high value for taxation purposes, middle and high income consumers; and young white families. Among the "bad" things perceived as concentrating in the central cities are old, deteriorating housing, an outmoded physical plant, black people of all ages, the welfare population, inadequate and corrupt municipal services, pollution, congestion, crime, and most other social problems. This widely shared perspective, albeit in more sophisticated language, underlies many current discussions of the changing metropolis.

At the beginning of the 1960's a discussion of the urban crisis would likely have focused on the metropolis as an entity-- on its expansion into an all consuming megalopolitan system that seemed to spell the ruination of our rural and agricultural territory. National and scholarly attention was also focused on the severe

plight of the occasional metropolis left behind by the forces of industrial expansion and economic growth. Fortunately or unfortunately, there is no rule against academicians drifting with the tides of public debate.

Demographers have a penchant for mining the data of the last Census and hence for insistently being out of date. To managers and politicians, lack of timeliness tends to characterize even those of us who pore over the latest sample survey results pertaining to dates only one to two years ago. Demographers have many techniques for looking into the future, and some are willing to use these tools in public; others of us are more sensitive to repeated bitter experiences with precise prognostication. I belong to the second group and claim no special powers of prevision. Indeed I feel lucky to recognize fundamental social change even after it is far advanced. The new dynamics of the changing metropolis of the 1970's will only become obvious a few years from now, when we can look back. Hence, my futurist assessment of the 1970's will draw very heavily on a summary and interpretation of the 1960's.

The general volume of the 1960 Census Monograph series includes a 41-page chapter on urbanization, a 67-page chapter on metropolitan dynamics, three separate chapters on population redistribution and migration, and still more chapters on major social and economic characteristics and trends in fertility and mortality. There would be little point in trying in the short space available to update such a mass of information or to review all other relevant data documenting and challenging the general proposition that central

cities have been on the short end of the stick. My special interest is demographic aspects of race relations in the contemporary United States. The playing out of the civil rights movement of the late 1950's and early 1960's and of the urban violence of the late 1960's has colored all subsequent discussions of the changing character of the metropolis. A focus on race can serve as an approach to a broad perspective.

By the time the civil rights movement was in full swing trying to transform race relations in the traditional deep South, the black population of the United States was already more urban and more metropolitan than the white population. By the time of the 1970 Census, 71% of the black population lived in metropolitan areas as compared to 64% of the white population. The central cities of metropolitan areas were home for more than one-half (55%) the nation's blacks as compared to one-fourth (25%) of whites. The portion of the metropolitan areas outside the central cities (I call this the suburbs) contained 16% of blacks as compared to 39% of the nation's whites.

Major population transformations tend to work themselves out over a considerable period of time. The concentration of black population in central cities has been a continuing process throughout this century and has been a particularly rapid process during the last three decades. During the early decades of this century, the white central city population was also increasing rapidly. In recent decades, the white increase slowed to a trickle and in many individual metropolitan areas became a major decrease. The

percentage that blacks compose of the total central city population increased slowly in the early decades and more rapidly in recent decades. The central city percentage black was about 6.5% in 1900, 7% in 1920, and 10% in 1940. The last three censuses showed 12% for 1950, 17% for 1960, and 21.5% for 1970.

The so-called "blackening" of the central cities is not a new process, nor is "whitening" of the suburbs. The percentage that blacks composed of the nation's total suburban population was 9% in 1900. Blacks did not participate to any great degree in the rapid suburbanization of the 1910's and the 1920's and the percentage black dropped to about 5% in 1940. It has remained close to that figure at each subsequent census.

At various times since the mid-1950's contemporary commentators have seen evidence of the beginning of a new era of black suburbanization. The fact that black suburban population increased nearly as rapidly during the last thirty years as did the white suburban population could be taken to indicate that such a new era already exists. True enough, but two cautions are in order. First, black participation in suburbanization is still a very small phenomenon numerically, compared to the large numbers involved in the white population. In 1900 there were one million blacks living outside of central cities--many of whom resided in enclaves or small towns that happened to fall within the metropolitan boundaries established at mid-century. By 1970 this figure had increased to 3.6 million. For whites the growth was from 11 million

in 1900 to more than 70 million in 1970.

Second, my definition of suburbanization is a very elementary statistical one that does not convey any necessary concomitant social overlay. By black suburbanization I simply mean an increase in black population outside of central cities but within the limits of metropolitan areas. This statistical approach does not entail notions of "suburbanization as a way of life." Nor does black suburbanization necessarily entail residential integration; indeed there is evidence it does not. For an example, consider the Chicago metropolitan area. From 1950 to 1970 the black population in Chicago's suburbs increased from 43,600 to 128,300. Of the total increase of 84,700 blacks, two-thirds went to nine older suburbs that include much industry within their boundaries and contain predominantly old housing, much of it rental units. Another one-fourth of the black suburban increase went to five small residential suburbs that are almost entirely black or that contain predominantly black residential areas. The rest of Chicago's suburbs are home for more than 3,000,000 whites but added fewer than 10,000 black residents during the 20-year period.

In several of the nation's large cities black residential areas have for many years reached out to the city limits, but until recently had not crossed them. Very high percentage increases in black suburban population are now occurring in some of these places. The number of blacks in the suburbs of Cleveland increased by 453% from 1960 to 1970, from 8,000 to 45,000 persons. A 98% increase in the Washington, D. C. suburban black population represented



an increase from 84,000 to 166,000 persons. A 55% increase in the black suburban population of the New York metropolitan area occurred because of an increase from 140,000 to 217,000. We may indeed be witnessing in these areas the beginning of a major new trend, but the numbers involved are impressive only in contrast to the very tiny numbers of suburban blacks previously. To see this as the wave of the future one must make a wild (albeit possibly correct) forecast.

To return the focus for black population to the central cities, let me cite aggregate national change data for cities and suburbs. The white suburban population increased during the last decade by 15 million persons. The black suburban population increased by 832,000 persons. In central cities there was a decline in white population of 607,000 persons and a black increase of more than 3,000,000 persons.

In recent years considerable attention has been given to cities such as Newark and Washington where blacks have become a majority. The recent election of black mayors in Atlanta and Los Angeles contributes to an impression that blacks are "taking over" in ever-more cities. Is this truly the wave of the future? Are the dynamics of population change pushing us inexorably toward an increasing geographic and political apartheid? I shall attempt two answers: one, in terms of the national aggregate, the other in terms of diversity among metropolitan areas. Both answers will be embarrassingly equivocal.

First, consider trends at the national level. Any process of rapid demographic change tends to alter the structural circumstances that gave rise to the process, even apart from changes in the underlying social and economic phenomena. The transformation of the United States from a rural to a metropolitan nation has already occurred. The non-metropolitan population that was the source of much of the increase in metropolitan population has become an ever smaller proportion of the total population. Migration from non-metropolitan areas, even if it continues at the same rates as in the past, will produce a much slower rate of increment to the metropolitan numbers.

The aggregate rate of metropolitan growth is a variable that depends not only on the rate at which non-metropolitan areas contribute people to metropolitan areas, but also on the rates of natural increase and net immigration from abroad. Immigration is controlled by law and is ordinarily projected at a relatively constant low level. Fertility in recent years has dropped way below everyone's projections. This "baby bust" has led to marked revisions in the government's projections of growth of the national population. In the mid-sixties considerable attention was given to the need to devise new methods for accommodating the rapid population growth foreseen for the United States by the turn of the century. The most common round number was that the nation would add 100,000,000 people by the year 2000 and that virtually all of this increase would go to metropolitan areas. Now we have projections at least equally reasonable that indicate the metropolitan increment may be

less than one half-that number.

The assumption that metropolitan areas will capture virtually all of the population growth of the nation during the next three decades has become subject to question and interpretation. Part of the process of metropolitan growth is artifactual--as small cities grow beyond the 50,000 population mark, the Office of Management and Budget designates additional metropolitan areas, and as larger areas spread out, additional counties are incorporated into the metropolitan category. In many of these cases there has been no sudden change in the social, economic, and territorial organization of society. In addition, the current concept of metropolitan areas may become an increasingly inadequate means for describing the territorial distribution of population. Just as the traditional concepts of rural farm, rural non-farm, and urban place have lost utility, so may the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area become inadequate for assessing future trends. Between 1960 and 1970 the non-metropolitan population grew faster than the metropolitan population in New York, New Jersey, and most of the New England states. Throughout our history this northeastern part of the nation has led the rest in the fundamental patterns of population redistribution--in initial agricultural settlement, in urbanization and diminished rural densities, in the formation of metropolitan complexes, and now, perhaps, in the spread of settlement patterns beyond the domain of the metropolis. The new megalopolis, if such it is, cannot be simply an expanded metropolis or a proliferation of metropolises. If the rest of the nation is about to

embark on a new era of greater balance between rates of non-metropolitan and metropolitan growth, as well as slower rates in each, then the dynamics of differential central city and suburban growth will also be altered.

Suppose the pattern of the 1950's and the 1960's does continue unaltered in the 1970's. Shall we expect a large number of cities to achieve black majorities? Consider the following tally, derived from a table listing all 243 metropolitan areas in rank order by size (from the 1970 Census). The tally shows the number of areas in which the central city has the specified percentage black.

	<u>Less than 30</u>	<u>30-39.9</u>	<u>40-49.9</u>	<u>50 and over</u>
Top 50	36	6	5	3
2nd 50	41	6	3	0
Bottom 143	126	13	4	0

The three central cities with a black majority were Washington, Newark, and Atlanta. (In this tally, Gary is merged with Hammond and East Chicago, Indiana, and the combined central cities do not approach a black majority.) Among the twelve cities with a black percentage between 40 and 50 most had sharp increases in that percentage during the last decade, but a few did not: from 1960 to 1970 the percentage in Birmingham and in Pine Bluff increased from 40 to 42, that in Richmond remained steady at 42, and that in Charleston, S. C. declined from 51 to 45. The likeliest candidates for early entry into the black majority ranks are the remaining eight cities that in 1970 had more than 40% blacks: Detroit, St. Louis, Baltimore, New Orleans, Wilmington, Augusta, Savannah, and Atlantic City.

Among the 25 cities with black percentages between 30 and 40, there are a number of southern cities in which the percentage has recently declined, remained stable, or increased only very slowly. Some of these southern cities are still growing and attracting additional white population; many are still experiencing a substantial black out-migration to northern cities and larger southern cities. A few of the cities with black percentages between 30 and 40 might possibly reach black majority ranks by 1980. Altogether then, if past trends continue, about 12 of the 243 metropolitan areas may by 1980 have black majorities in their central cities.

It seems paradoxical that continued rapid "blackening" of the nation's central cities is likely to leave us in 1980 with 95% of those cities having white population in the majority. The paradox is easily resolved if it is remembered that blacks are a small minority of the total population. There simply are not enough blacks in the country for them to form majorities in every central city. A few instructive numbers have been taken from the 1970 Census.

	<u>Black</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>% Black</u>
Central Cities	12,600,000	45,100,000	21.8
Suburbs	3,500,000	68,500,000	4.9
Non-Metropolitan	6,700,000	63,800,000	9.5

If all of the non-metropolitan black population moved immediately to the central cities and half of the white population in the central cities moved out, whites would still form a majority of the nation's central city population.

Certain aspects of the demographic dynamics of the three decades from 1940 to 1970 cannot be repeated. I see the 1970's as a period of winding down of the pattern established during those three decades, mingled with the emergence of a new pattern whose shape is not yet clear. That is why I equivocate concerning the dynamics of the 1970's and the situation we may expect to reach by 1980. Perhaps later scholars will tack the 1970's onto the 1940's, 1950's, and 1960's as a single period of large scale black urbanization and northward movement, concentrated on central city residential areas previously occupied by whites who were in a phase of rapid outward movement from central cities. But I think this pattern is largely played out and will diminish in intensity during this decade. In 1940, 55% of the black population lived outside of metropolitan areas and 77% lived in the South. Even in 1960 two-thirds of southern blacks lived outside of metropolitan areas. Today a majority of the black population lives outside of the South and even in the South a majority of the Blacks are already metropolitan residents.

Let us look at an even longer period, that from 1910 to 1970. During those years the black population of the United States more than doubled. The black population in South Carolina, Kentucky, Alabama, Mississippi and Arkansas declined. The black population in Georgia and West Virginia grew less than 10%. The great migrations of those six decades transferred to a few large cities in the northern and border states large numbers of young blacks who became the parents of succeeding generations. The natural increase

of black population now occurs largely within cities. Migration of blacks out of the rural South and out of many of the smaller southern cities may be expected to continue, but the rural and non-metropolitan migrants seeking a better life are no longer the dominant force in black population growth and redistribution.

Each mass migration has its own internal dynamic, first of self-reinforcement and later of self-limitation. In the early phases, expansion of channels of communication and a reciprocal flow of information tends to accelerate the movement. The black exodus from the rural South was led by youth who, as they reached adulthood, sought new opportunities. Nearly all of the young blacks reaching age 15-20 in the rural South during the last six decades moved elsewhere in search of opportunity. Many moved to small cities nearby, but others moved farther, to larger cities in the South or the North. Meanwhile, many young blacks growing up in the smaller cities of the South also moved to larger cities of the North and South, and so on in a great sequence of migrations. Each wave of young migrants quickly reached the family formation stage and produced a new generation of young blacks growing up in the new locations. In this way, large scale migration transfers future natural increase from places of origin to places of destination. The current generation of black youth is largely a product of the metropolitan system, and it is unlikely that their patterns of residential redistribution will resemble the patterns established by their parents and grandparents of moving in ever greater numbers to a small number of cities with huge black populations.

I have suggested that the dynamics of black population redistribution are subject to shifts simply as a result of the long sustained character of the black "great migrations." But the general redistribution trends of the 1940's and 1950's did continue strong through the 1960's. How quickly they will abate in the 1970's (and 1980's) remains to be seen. I see several reasons for expecting a fairly rapid shift.

The process of population redistribution during the last 25 years was accelerated by the baby boom, which produced ever increasing numbers of youth in the migration-prone ages. We are entering a period where these numbers are relatively stable and in a few more years are slated to decline.

Increasing numbers and proportions of urban blacks are obtaining jobs with considerable employment security and with income levels that place them in the middle-income brackets (or what for purposes of this brief discussion may be referred to as the income brackets where home ownership is a distinct possibility).

Several studies of urban housing patterns have shown that, although blacks are highly segregated, similar patterns operate within the black housing market as within the white housing market. That is, persons who are economically better off are continually seeking improved housing by moving farther away from the center of the city or from the center of older and more densely settled residential areas. In many social and economic trends, blacks have followed somewhat the same pattern as whites but with a gap of 10, 20, or 30 years. It is at least plausible that this may be the



case for home ownership and metropolitan decentralization. Supportive evidence is provided in data on recent black migration to some of the northern cities with large black populations. Between 1960 and 1970 there was a net migration of blacks out of Cincinnati, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis. Net in-migration to Philadelphia and Gary-Hammond-East Chicago (and also to Baltimore and Washington) was less than 10% during the decade. To date not much of the black out-migration is to the suburbs--rather it seems on balance to flow to cities with smaller black populations--but the indications of a reduced migratory influx to the traditional destinations of black migrants may portend more extensive changes in the 1970's.

In a period of slower black population increase there is increased possibility for fairly rapid decline in residential segregation. Were there to develop a fair scattering of blacks throughout a metropolitan area, the process could easily accelerate. As more areas open to blacks, the process of rapid expansion of blacks into individual narrowly circumscribed areas would diminish. At the same time the possibility for whites to escape completely having some blacks as neighbors would be diminished. The perception that any neighborhood containing some blacks is enroute to becoming solidly black would lose much of its validity.

Lest I be cast as a utopian dreamer I shall immediately call this desegregation scenario into question. Patterns of residential segregation seem to be among the most tenacious of the many forms of racial segregation. Legal efforts to counteract racial dis-

crimination in the housing market are still in their infancy and are not being vigorously pursued by federal authorities nor by state and local agencies. The nation has had difficulty producing as many new housing starts as successive reports have indicated is necessary to house new households and to provide for a modest level of replacement of existing stock. The white population is also experiencing increasing economic status and is more able than the black population to afford the newest suburban housing. High interest rates and rapidly inflating costs of new housing are limiting this market, and thus may slow down the entire filtering process through which additional vacancies are supposed to occur at all housing price levels.

There will be a continuing strong demand on the part of the black population for additional and more desirable housing within metropolitan areas. More than half of central city blacks live in housing that was built before 1940. Because there was little construction of new housing throughout the nation during the 1930's most of the pre-1940 housing is quite old indeed. To be sure, 47% of the white population in central cities also lived in housing built before 1940. And whites in 1970 occupied four times as many such units as did blacks. Central cities are likely to continue to experience considerable out-migration from areas of older housing, and blacks as well as whites will be active in the search for better housing.

I promised to give two kinds of answers to the question of the future rate of "blackening" of our central cities. The first

answer concentrated in its many parts on national trends. The second answer focuses on the diversity among metropolitan areas. I have already given away part of this answer in the discussions of migration trends and of variation among areas in the percentage that blacks comprise of central city populations. The nation's 243 metropolitan areas are not all alike. Some metropolitan areas are farther along in certain trends than are others. But the point I hope to make is stronger than these assertions of ordinary variation around the mean. A few simple tabulations demonstrate an enormous diversity of process--of population dynamics--as well as of current structure and rates of change.

Tables 1 through 4 are designed to display aspects of the diversity in racial population dynamics among the nation's metropolitan areas. The tables are tallies of the number of areas that experienced each specified pattern of change. For three of the tables, the universe is all 217 metropolitan areas with a population in 1970 of 100,000 or more. (Omitted from the tallies are the 26 metropolitan areas of less than 100,000 population.) For Table 3, the universe is restricted to the 65 metropolitan areas of at least 500,000 population, simply because the Census Bureau was unable to prepare suitable net migration estimates by race for many of the smaller areas. Even for some of the large areas the estimates are admittedly made from an inadequate data base. In Tables 1, 2, and 4 all of the data pertaining to 1960 use the 1970 Census definitions of metropolitan area boundaries. The city-suburb distinction is based on the central city boundaries

at each census date. For a full analysis of change it is essential to adjust 1970 data to reflect population within the 1960 city boundaries. No such adjustment was made with these data, and hence annexation is one factor augmenting some of the cited central city growth rates and slowing down some of the cited suburban growth rates.

Panels A and B of Table 1 document changes between 1960 and 1970 in the percentage that blacks compose of the central city populations. In both South and North, about two-thirds of the metropolitan areas remained within the same 10-percentage-point range in 1970 as in 1960. In the North, all of the areas that shifted categories moved into a higher percentage bracket. Indeed, most of the areas that started the decade with a central city population more than 10% black had shifted to a higher percentage of blacks by 1970. The main stability was for the 80 areas that were less than 10% black in 1960. In the South, some areas shifted categories into a lower percentage of blacks, although shifting to a higher percentage was more frequent.

Panels C and D of Table 1 show the quite restricted degree of change in suburban percentages black. In the South, two-thirds of metropolitan areas again are found on the main diagonal, representing no shift in categories, but all areas that shifted moved in the direction of reduced percentages black. In the North the suburbs were in 1960 and remained in 1970 a white preserve.

An increase in percentage black can arise from a decrease in white population and an increase in black population, from a

from variation in age-specific fertility and mortality rates. In much larger part these arise from areal variation in age composition and in the rate of net migration. High rates of migration early in the decade add or subtract families in the reproductive ages and otherwise alter the age structure. Rates of net migration are quite varied. From 1960 to 1970 Las Vegas had a white population gain from net migration of 76%; Washington, D. C. had a loss of 40%.

Migration rates for a ten-year period must be estimated, and the appropriate estimates separately for blacks and whites have not been made for all metropolitan areas. In Table 3 central city net migration rates for blacks are compared to those for whites for 60 of the 65 largest metropolitan areas. Even with the broad categories used for the tally, there is evidently a diversity of metropolitan experiences and little relation between rates of white migration and rates of black migration. Table 3 thus confirms and supplements Table 2, and uncovers the widespread net out-migrations that are partially concealed in low rates of white population increase in many central cities.

Table 4 is comparable to Table 2, except that it refers to suburban population change. The diversity among metropolitan areas is obvious, and there is no need to supplement this table with another showing only the migration component of population growth.

The 1970 Census is too recent for much new detailed analysis to have been completed. Many relevant studies have been published

more rapid white decrease than black decrease, or from a more rapid black increase than white increase. A decrease in percentage black can be similarly categorized into three distinct patterns. The tally in Table 2 compares the black and white changes in central city populations, 1960 to 1970. Only 12 areas experienced central city losses of both black and white population. Another 86 areas lost white central city population but gained blacks; the rate of black gain varied enormously. Of the areas that gained central city whites, seven had a loss of blacks and at least 12 more had a lower rate of gain of blacks than of whites, and hence had a decrease in percentage black. The remaining 105 areas in which both white and black population increased are spread among the full range of categories presented. The common pattern displayed in Table 1 of increasing percentage of blacks in central cities is seen from the evidence in Table 2 to have arisen from a great diversity among areas in direction and magnitude of change in white and black populations.

Change in a central city's white or black population arises from natural increase (births minus deaths), net migration (immigration minus out-migration), and in many cases from territorial annexation. There is marked variation among cities in rates of natural increase. The central cities Tampa and St. Petersburg, Florida, had a loss from natural increase of 1.2% in their white population between 1960 and 1970; Anaheim, Santa Ana, and Garden Grove, California, had a white natural increase of 23%. Areal variation in rates of natural increase arise in only small part

drawing on the 1960 Census data and other sources. I shall quote selectively from a few of these earlier studies in an attempt to widen and perhaps correct the focus.

Migration is a complex process, and it would be unfortunate if my remarks on black urbanization and white suburbanization served to reinforce the stereotype of poor blacks moving to the cities and rich whites fleeing to the suburbs. This particular stereotypical perspective is narrow and largely false. Let me quote from the abstracts of two studies that Alma Taeuber and I published in the mid-1960's. First, on black migration:

. . . During the 1955-60 period. . . Negro in-migrants to a number of large cities, despite the presence of a socioeconomically depressed group of non-metropolitan origin, were not of lower average socioeconomic status than the resident Negro population. Indeed, in educational attainment Negro in-migrants to northern cities were equal to or slightly higher than the resident white population. . . . As the Negro population has changed from a disadvantaged rural population to a metropolitan one of increasing socioeconomic levels, its patterns of migration have changed to become very much like those of the white population.

I believe these white-black similarities in migration dynamics will also be found in studies of the 1960's, and will become greater in the 1970's.

Second, on white migration:

Nearly all streams of migrants are of higher average socioeconomic status than non-migrants. Large cities contribute to their suburbs and to other metropolitan areas more high-status migrants than they receive, whereas suburban rings receive more high-status migrants than they lose. This circulation of persons of higher levels of educational attainment and occupational status has the

net effect of diminishing the socioeconomic level of central city populations and augmenting the socioeconomic level of suburban populations.

Other studies have shown that rates of out-migration from areas--both metropolitan and non-metropolitan--tend to reflect primarily the age structure rather than the economic circumstances of the population. In our society the young leave home in search of different, if not better, opportunities. Areal differences in net migration arise primarily from where migrants settle rather than where they originate. New entrants to the labor force are in the ages of extraordinary geographic mobility. To a very large extent youth will seek out jobs wherever they are, and, conversely, jobs for the younger portion of the labor force may attract workers from a large region and not simply from a local labor market.

Just as a rather orderly national system of migration can produce effects that seem quite disorderly and disparate for differing racial and socioeconomic groups, so too can the process of metropolitan growth be viewed in a more orderly perspective than the jumble of city-suburb contrasts suggests. Sub-urbanization is simply urbanization occurring beyond the limits of the core municipality, and we might be better off if the special term had never come into common usage. Whether from the sociologists' traditional source, the Burgess zonal hypothesis, or from location economics, a model of metropolitan growth can be developed that calls for an evolutionary and never-ending process of relocation of social classes and types of residential areas. Leo F. Schnore has elaborated on this theme in a number of papers, and I shall



quote briefly from three that apply this model to recent experience in the United States.

Sheer age of settlement has emerged as the best predictor of the direction of city-suburban differences in socio-economic status. Older urbanized areas tend strongly to process peripheral populations of higher socio-economic standing than found in the central cities themselves. In contrast, newer cities tend to contain populations ranking higher on education, occupation, and income than their respective suburbs.

Looking at the nonwhite data. . . such relationships do tend to appear in the North and West. . . City-suburban status differentials. . . are generally similar to those shown by the white population in both broad regions. . . . The most probable reason why the Southern nonwhites fail to show the usual city-suburban status differences is that in the South. . . the poorer and less advantaged nonwhite residents traditionally lived on the periphery of the city. . . . The Southern nonwhite population. . . may be in a state of transition between the traditional residential pattern of the Old South and the contemporary American urban pattern seen in both white and nonwhite neighborhoods in the rest of the country.

. . . The nonwhite ghettos in large northern cities still tend to display the pattern observed earlier in . . . Chicago. That is, as distance increases from the center of the city, the socio-economic status of nonwhite neighborhoods goes up. Nonwhite family income is higher, nonwhite educational levels mount, and the relative number of nonwhite males in 'whitecollar' employment increases.

A general model of population redistribution and evolving settlement patterns seems already to exist, and it does away with the centrality of distinctions between city and suburb and between black and white. The broad sweep of our demographic history may prove a simpler as well as a better guide to the dynamics of the

changing labor force in the 1970's and beyond than we can get from short-term projections using only the concepts given to us by the current problem-oriented dialogue.

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Table 1. BLACK POPULATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF  
TOTAL POPULATION, FOR CENTRAL CITIES  
AND SUBURBS, BY REGION, 1970 COMPARED TO 1960

(Figures in table are numbers of metropolitan areas)

Percentage Black in 1960	Percentage Black in 1970					
	0 to 10	10 to 20	20 to 30	30 to 40	40 to 50	50 or more
<b>A. Central Cities, South</b>						
0 to 10	12	3	-	-	-	-
10 to 20	1	11	2	-	-	-
20 to 30	-	2	16	5	1	-
30 to 40	-	-	2	11	4	1
40 to 50	-	-	-	2	2	-
50 or more	-	-	-	-	1	1
<b>B. Central Cities, North and West</b>						
0 to 10	82	24	-	-	-	-
10 to 20	-	10	12	1	-	-
20 to 30	-	-	1	6	2	-
30 to 40	-	-	-	-	1	1
40 to 50	-	-	-	-	-	-
50 or more	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>C. Suburbs, South</b>						
0 to 10	32	-	-	-	-	-
10 to 20	4	10	-	-	-	-
20 to 30	-	13	8	-	-	-
30 to 40	-	-	4	2	-	-
40 to 50	-	-	-	3	-	-
50 or more	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>D. Suburbs, North and West</b>						
0 to 10	139	-	-	-	-	-
10 to 20	-	-	-	-	-	-
20 to 30	-	-	1	-	-	-
30 to 40	-	-	-	-	-	-
40 to 50	-	-	-	-	-	-
50 or more	-	-	-	-	-	-

Note: Tally includes all metropolitan areas having a total population in 1970 greater than 100,000--140 areas in the North and West and 77 in the South. For Jacksonville, Florida, the central city is coextensive with the metropolitan area and there are no suburbs.

Table 2. CHANGE IN CENTRAL CITY POPULATION,  
1960 to 1970, BLACKS COMPARED TO WHITES

(Figures in table are numbers of central cities)

		Percent Change in Black Population					
		Gain					
Percent Change in White Population	Loss	0	10	20	30	40	50
		to 10	to 20	to 30	to 40	to 50	or more
Loss:							
-20 or less	3	1	2	1	5	1	3
-10 to -20	4	4	5	6	8	1	6
0 to -10	5	7	14	3	2	4	15
Gain:							
0 to +10	3	4	2	3	7	2	10
+10 to +20	4	3	7	3	5	3	17
+20 or more	-	2	7	4	4	3	24

Note: Tally includes all 217 metropolitan areas having a total population in 1970 greater than 100,000.

Table 3. NET MIGRATION TO CENTRAL CITIES,  
1960 TO 1970, BLACKS COMPARED TO WHITES

(Figures in table are numbers of central cities)

Net Migration Rate for Whites	Net Migration Rate for Blacks						
	Loss			Gain			
	-20 or less	-10 to -20	0 to -10	0 to +10	+10 to +20	+20 to +30	+30 or more
Loss:							
-20 or less	-	1	5	5	4	2	2
-10 to -20	-	-	1	3	2	3	7
0 to -10	-	-	-	2	5	3	1
Gain:							
0 to +10	-	-	1	2	-	1	2
+10 to +20	-	-	1	1	2	1	1
+20 to +30	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
+30 or more	1	-	-	-	-	-	-

Note: Net migration is expressed as percent of 1960 population. Rates for blacks refer to all nonwhites and not solely Negroes. Tally includes 60 of the 65 metropolitan areas having a total population in 1970 greater than 500,000. For five areas with small black population net migration estimates were not prepared. For four New England areas the estimates refer to the central cities of the State Economic Area.

Table 4. CHANGE IN SUBURBAN POPULATION,  
1960 TO 1970, BLACKS COMPARED  
TO WHITES

(Figures in table are numbers of metropolitan areas)

Percent Change in White Population	Percent Change in Black Population			
	Loss	0 to +25	+25 to +50	+50 or more
Loss	20	4	1	3
0 to +25	27	21	10	29
+25 to +50	8	17	5	38
+50 or more	2	15	7	9

Note: Tally includes 216 metropolitan areas having a total population in 1970 greater than 100,000. One area, Jacksonville, Florida, is excluded because the central city is coextensive with Duval County and there is no suburban population.