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PUBLIC POLICY AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

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Public Policy and Political Violence

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ABSTRACT

This paper, which is one chapter of a larger study, focuses on the development of a theory of the conditions of political arousal and quiescence of the poor, with particular attention to race riots in American cities. The research is intended to enlarge and refine our knowledge of the expressive meanings for particular publics of public policies, language forms, political and governmental gestures, communication media reports and the ties among these. The major difference between this study and other efforts in this area is probably its attention to symbolization as a catalyst of mass illusion and myth in political perception and its concern for probing the function of political acts and public policies as themselves shapers of group expectations and perceptions.

The general plan of the study is, first, to explore the possibility and the conditions, of change in individual political cognitions; second, to examine the processes through which common patterns of cognitive change are induced and reinforced in groups of people; and finally, to specify patterns of behavior and of cognitions that produce political quiescence, arousal and violence.

Because the purpose of this chapter is to formulate a theory of political arousal and quiescense that is generally applicable, examples and data are drawn from a range of policy areas, though special attention is paid to race relations and and racial violence. The next chapter deals specifically with political violence and quiescence in urban ghettos.

Introduction

The most casual student of history or observer of the contemporary scene quickly becomes aware that large groups of people often remain quiescent under conditions that seem noxiously oppressive and that collective violence often occurs when few expect it. Both these forms of mass behavior are manifestly extremely important, and neither is easily explained in the specific and precise terms that would be regarded as scientifically adequate by social scientists and would suggest effective methods of influence to interest groups, public officials, or social engineers.

The various studies of the genesis of collective violence published in recent years comprise an impressive range of approaches which, however, converge in their premises only in part and are rarely concrete in their accounts of the political and social interactions involved. Some of them consist essentially of the translation of particular instances of violence into an abstract schema, general enough in its denotation to cover all the instances.[1] Some reduce the concrete cases to instances of a particular form of interaction of intervening variables, usually involving some form of relative deprivation theory.[2] Some concentrate on the findings of experimental research on aggression in individuals and find or assume some isomorphism to group behavior.[3] Some look for attitudinal correlates of violent behavior through surveys in areas that have, and in others that have not, experienced collective violence, and fail to find unambiguous ones.[4] All these are useful and none definitive.

Historical studies of caste and class societies that have persisted for prolonged periods leave no doubt at all that absolute deprivation is neither a correlate nor an explanation of either mass arousal or queiscence.

Participants in mass violence have not been found to exhibit a common or unique pattern of persistent personality traits, nor do they exhibit a persistent set of cognitions.[5] Indeed, change in at least some cognitions seems to be a prerequisite of arousal to militancy.

Relative deprivation is certainly a relevant and useful concept, but it is so because it raises the pertinent questions rather than because it answers them. It is therefore only the beginning of explanation. It challenges the student to identify the conditions of change in expectations and norms and the conditions of change in perceptions of whether, and how much, deprivation or threat actually exists.

This study is an effort to respond to that challenge. Its approach reflects the assumptions of that line of social theorists, notably Mead, Cassirer, and Schutz, who recognize that human beings form and change their self-systems, their values, and their cognitions as a function of viewing contemplated action from the perspective of other persons and in the process create potent symbols for themselves and for others. This uniquely human ability to symbolize, the source of man's power to plan and achieve complex ends and also of his remarkable capacity for illusion, must be the central focus of research on social interaction that aspires to explain mass change in political and social expectation, fears, aspirations, and behavior; it constitutes a key conceptual difference between human behavior and the processes studied in the natural sciences.

It follows that the ultimate objective of research that tries to explain political quiescence and political arousal must be a full understanding of the dynamic processes that effect (1) change in cognitions; (2) the emergence and persistence of common cognitions in masses of people; (3) changes in the intensity of concomitant affect, especially fear, anger,

and empathy; (4) the precipitation either of violent behavior or of some stable pattern of coexistence between adversary groups. To understand symbolic processes one of course needs empirical observations, but their interpretation depends wholly upon the character of the dynamic processes through which people relate to each other, form cognitions, and it is harder to interpret them than to collect them.

This study therefore focuses upon these processes insofar as they form and change group behavior. Eclectically using data from historical studies, surveys, experiments, and political case studies, it tries to make a contribution to the understanding of the conditions under which masses of people are quiescent or aroused. Probably its major difference from other efforts in this area is its attention to symbolization as a catalyst of mass illusion and myth in political perception and its concern for probing the function of political acts and public policies as themselves shapers of group expectations and perceptions.

The general plan is, first, to explore the possibility and the conditions, of change in individual political cognitions; second, to examine the political and psychological processes through which common patterns of cognitive change are induced and reinforced in groups of people; and finally, to specify patterns of behavior and of cognitions that produce political quiescence, arousal, and violence. Because the purpose of this chapter is to formulate a theory of political arousal and quiescence that is generally applicable, examples and data are drawn from a range of policy areas, though special attention is paid to race relations and racial violence. The next chapter deals specifically with political violence and quiescence in the urban ghettos.

Instability and Ambivalence in Political Cognitions

Both popular and academic predilections about political wants, beliefs, demands, and attitudes have often diverted attention from fluctuation and focused attention upon stability. It is reminiscent of the celebrated observation that monkeys are placid when German psychologists observe them and active when American psychologists do. What one sees hinges in a subtle but compelling way upon the observer's interests.

Americans have been taught to look upon government as a mechanism which is responsive to their wants; and upon these in turn as rational reflections of their interests and their moral upbringing and therefore as stable and continuing. The American social scientist has been socialized to see individuals' political demands and attitudes as "inputs" of the political system; he has been conditioned, through comparative studies of civic culture, to identify different patterns of attitudes as characteristic of different countries, apparently over significant time periods; and he is even now being advised just how political socialization processes create particular cognitions and evaluations in children as they mature. The ready availability of opportunities for survey research on attitudes, moreover, places a premium upon the assumption that respondents' answers can be taken as "hard" data which have a clear continuing, and systematic meaning. For some limited research and pedagogical purposes this assumption unquestionably is useful and valid.

Yet we have compelling evidence from a variety of kinds of observation that political beliefs, demands, and attitudes, far from being

fixed and stable, are frequently sporadic in appearance, fluctuating in intensity, ambivalent in composition, and therefore logically inconsistent in pattern and structure.[6] It is central to the explanation of political quiescence, arousal, and violence both that attitudes have these unstable characteristics and that public policies and processes themselves serve as cues that evoke particular changes in the direction and intensity of political cognitions. If this is the case, public policies and processes must be recognized not only or chiefly as the resultants of individuals' demands but also as the paramount source of particular attitudes and demands, including those associated with mass violence.

The meanings to be drawn from political actions and rhetoric hinge partly upon which of these alternative models of the policy-making process a researcher accepts. The conventional assumption is that the individuals comprising the mass public hold relatively stable and fixed positions on public issues and that public policy represents a response to some aggregation of these positions. If this is a relatively accurate view, it follows that political scientists should concentrate upon how sensitively and accurately and equitably political wants are aggregated and converted into policies, and that is what they have done for the most part.

The alternative model assumes that individuals' positions on public issues are mobilizable rather than fixed; that governmental activities themselves are potent influences upon change and mobilization of public attitudes and that the significant "outputs" of political activities are not particular public policies labeled as political goals, but

rather the creation of political followings and supports: i.e., the evocation of arousal or quiescence in mass publics. If this model is a fairly accurate one, it follows that political scientists and advocates of particular policies should recognize political maneuver as itself the end-point of the game; for in the process (rather than in the content of statutes, court decisions, and administrative rules) leaders gain or lose followings, followers achieve a role and a political identity, and money and status are reallocated, often to different groups from those formally designated as the beneficiaries of the governmental activity in question. The wide acceptance of a model that generates misleading interpretations of political activity is itself a compelling legitimation of the real payoffs of the system in status, money, and role definitions.

The various propositions comprising the model of the process of politics and policy formation are now examined in turn, beginning with a review of some empirical evidence for the thesis that political beliefs and demands are unstable. The instability is readily apparent to anyone who looks at its manifestations dispassionately; and it would be self-evident if we were not cued to ignore it by (1) our socialization into the belief that enduring individual values shape the course of governmental policy; and (2) the fact that opinion surveys and other reactive research instruments themselves create opinion and commitment among many respondents who are not opinionated before they are asked to state their views.

The most telling evidence lies in the simple fact of demonstrable major change in beliefs, in opinions, and in views of desirable public

policy over both long and short time spans. Some of the dynamics of such changes in public demands and responses have been revealed in a number of research projects published relatively recently. One relevant form of research, illustrating the ambivalence and lack of cognitive definition and clarity characteristic of a high proportion of political opinions, involves the exploration in some depth of the bases of opinion responses on a particular issue. Leo Bogart cites research at Stanford in 1966 showing that a majority of the public at that time both supported the President's handling of the Vietnam situation (an escalation policy) and approved of deescalation.[7] In 1964 74 percent of the Minnesota public said it favored prayer in the public schools; but well over half of this same 74 percent of the respondents also said they approved of a Supreme Court ruling declaring it illegal to prescribe prayers for children to recite in the public schools.[8] Other research points to similar ambivalence or to inconsistency in opinion over time. Those who favor welfare programs more frequently oppose taxes to finance them than do opponents of the programs.[9]

Converse found that for most of the population below the level of elites there is little consistency among political beliefs and opinions. Opinions are inconsistent with each other, and they vary <u>randomly</u> in direction during repeated trials over time.[10]

In part at least, these findings reflect the pointlessness of trying to ascertain and measure the opinions of people about issues which have little salience or meaning for them except the salience created by the measurement effort itself. Leo Bogart made the crucial point in his presidential address to the American Association for Public

Opinion Research in May, 1967:

> We think of public opinion as polarized on great issues; we think of it as intense...Because of the identification of public opinion with the measurements of surveys, the illusion is easily conveyed of a public which is 'opinionated'--which is committed to strongly held views. The public of opinion poll results no doubt acts as a reinforcing agent in support of the public's consciousness of its own collective opinions as a definable, describable force. These published poll data may become reference points by which the individual formulates and expresses his opinions.
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> .....
>
> Often what we should be doing is measuring the degrees of apathy, indecision, or conflict on the part of the great majority with the opinionated as the residual left over.[11]

The translation of the ambivalences, uncertainties, and apathy of vast numbers of disparate individuals into patterns of widely and strongly held cognitions and common forms of political behavior is the phenomenon to be explained. The remainder of this chapter tries to identify some of the key processes involved. It explores the contribution of governmental activities themselves to the patterning of cognitions and considers the processes through which political conflicts escalate or become ritualized. It then analyzes two psychological mechanisms that help anchor individuals to a particular pattern of cognizing and behavior: the creation of a particular identity or self conception through acceptance of a widely held belief or myth; and the functions of feeling and emotion in political interaction. Finally, it analyzes the bearing of organization upon susceptibility to political violence.

One preliminary caveat is necessary. To analyze any complex transaction in discursive prose its empirical facets must be considered separately and therefore out of context. At the same time it is a fundamental proposition of the model suggested here that psychological characteristics, social interaction, and political acts are alternative

expressions of the same phenomenon and further that the conventional practice of conceiving them as separate entities is itself a support and bulwark of particular status relationships and modes of political behavior. In this sense the present formulation recognizes that the various processes here examined are facets of a single transaction, as Dewey and Bentley use the term.[12]

The Influence of Governmental Activity upon Beliefs and Perceptions

Government affects behavior chiefly by shaping the cognitions of large numbers of people in ambiguous situations. It helps create their norms, or beliefs about what is proper; their perceptions of what is fact; and their expectations of what is to come. In the shaping of expectations of the future especially, the cues from government encounter few qualifying or competing cues from other sources; and this function of political activity is therefore an especially potent influence upon behavior.

To make this point is to deny or seriously qualify what may be the most widely held assumption about political interactions: that political arousal and quiescence depend upon how much of what they want from government people get. Political actions chiefly arouse or satisfy people not by granting or withholding their stable substantive demands, but rather by changing the demands and the expectations. That central theme of this book was stated in 1935 by Harold Lasswell when he wrote that, "Sound political analysis is nothing less than correct orientation in the continuum which embraces the past, present, and future. Unless the salient features of the all-inclusive whole are discerned, details will be incorrectly located..."[13]

The implication of this view, which is manifestly in accord with Mead's postulate that by anticipating the future man creates his world, is that expectations influence perceptions and interpretations of ambiguous current facts; and that the two together determine attitudes. The range of cognitions that explain behavior therefore turns ultimately

on what people can be led to expect of the future. Supporting the fundamental insight of Mead and Cooley, it is a view that is increasingly evident in current experimental social psychology. Thus, Leonard Berkowitz, discussing aggression, notes that:

> Contrary to traditional motivational thinking and motivational concepts of Freud and Lorenz, many psychologists now insist that deprivations alone are inadequate to account for most motivated behavior. According to this newer theorizing, much greater weight must be given to anticipations of the goal than merely to the duration or magnitude of deprivation per se. The stimulus arising from these anticipations--from anticipatory goal responses--is now held to be a major determinant of the vigor and persistence of goal-seeking activity.[14]

Similarly Jervis concludes from a study of misperception that, "There is evidence from both psychology and international relations that when expectations and desires clash, expectations seem to be more important... Actors are apt to be especially sensitive to evidence of grave danger if they think they can take action to protect themselves against the menace once it has been detected."[15]

Through what mechanisms do governmental acts influence political cognitions? What is the explanation of their influence? Insofar as people's hopes and anxieties are salient to politics they turn on status in society and on security from perceived threat, including, and perhaps especially, the threat of aggression from abroad. For the great mass of political spectators cues as to group status and security, and especially as to their future status and security, can come chiefly or only from governmental acts. This is one of the few forms of activity perceived as involving all groups and individuals in society and as reflecting the range of public interests, wants, and capabilities. In an ambiguous but salient area of public affairs, therefore, political cues

serve, in Lasswell's term, as "symbols of the whole,"[16] in a way that the acts or promises of individuals or private groups rarely can. For some, religion no doubt serves this same function and did so even more powerfully in less secular times. For most, however, only government can evoke fairly confident expectations of future welfare or deprivation for large masses of people at home and of international detente or threat: can create the perceived worlds that in turn shape perceptions and interpretations of current events and therefore the behaviors with which people respond to them.

Though it is usually not approached from this perspective, some extant social science research specifies the kinds of cognitions that are regularly shaped and reshaped by political activity and publicized governmental policy. In each instance the central cognition affected is expectations; and in each instance public policy evokes cognitions in the degree that cues generated by existing social situations and role-playings are ambiguous or absent. In a long established and accepted caste society status expectations are unambiguous and are cued and reinforced by daily personal interactions that make it clear who is superior and who subordinate. Where a status system is questioned and resisted, concomitant anxieties, doubts, aspirations, and ambivalence lend salience and potency to the expectations about the future generated by public policy.

Various forms of research have demonstrated the efficacy of political activity and public policy in influencing perceptions and expectations of relative status. Gusfield, Lipset, and Hofstadter have shown that public policies such as the prohibition amendment derive

their salience and their meaning less from their instrumental effects on resource allocations than from the cues they generate that particular social groups occupy a changed status in relation to each other and will continue to do so.[17] Similarly, the present writer's studies of governmental economic regulations have shown that these policies frequently convey little in the way of instrumental resources but do reassure anxious groups of their continuing or newly achieved status as protected groups.[18] Political activity and formally proclaimed policy therefore amount to authoritative signals and assurances, in ambiguous and anxiety-producing situations, that particular group interests will be taken into account; or, alternatively, that they will be ignored or repressed.

Political activity also influences perceptions of who are adversaries and how they will behave. Legislation or administrative activity signalling that a group aspiring to a valued status has achieved it reassures that group that in the future its adversaries will be limited in their use of private bargaining tactics and other resources. In other cases, however, political action amounts to a signal that an adversary can be expected to escalate its hostile behavior: that no mutual recognition of limits has been established and that counter-escalation is appropriate.

Public activity creates and publicizes a North Atlantic Treaty Organization establishing a military defense against Russian aggression in Europe and so evokes and keeps alive an expectation that such aggression is likely and that countermeasures are justified and necessary. This action creates a perception that Russian hawks are dominant in the

Kremlin (or that all Russians are hawks). Such policies as the Berlin blockade, the airlift, and the Truman doctrine reinforce these expectations of mutual threat in political spectators, who have no other basis for perceptions of the cold war or its likely future course.

With respect to the salient issues of one's future welfare, status, and survival neither past experience nor news reports of current developments can be clear predictors of what is to come. The same experience and set of facts can be interpreted by a group of people as meaning either that their legitimate interests are being protected or that the status and benefits due them are being denied or threatened. In a caste system assumed by all its participants to be divinely sanctioned, subordination and unequal benefits mean that the world is as it should be; in a polity with a norm of social equality the same facts come to mean deprivation and an incentive to resistance. Does the large scale influx of black people into a Northern city mean that the status, the livelihood, and the lives of white residents will ultimately be threatened, or does it signal one more phase in a continuing process of cultural diversification, economic progress, and political coexistence? Do large scale troop movements in a foreign country signal an intention to attack us, an intention to protect us, or routine maneuvers? It is always the ambiguity, the uncertain and diverse possible implications of news, that creates fears, hopes, and a search for authoritative cues that public policy often satisfies.

The Political Dynamics of Escalation

That political activities create common patterns of cognitions does not in itself account for the manifest willingness of large numbers of people to sacrifice, attack, kill, or die en masse or to endure serious oppression en masse for extended periods of time. There are, however, evidences of the operation of complementary processes that coalesce groups with diverse concerns into a single political force and that infuse individual participants with the intense affect that comes from defense of one's own identity. The basic processes are most easily identified in the case of international conflict, and so we begin with a short analysis of that area.

In news accounts, histories, and almost all academic analyses of international conflict, the nation is taken as the unit of analysis. It is the nation that is presented as an entity that comes into conflict with one or more other nations; and the public accounts of international negotiations and international organizations constantly reinforce this view that one national interest opposes another one.

Obviously, however, every nation includes diverse and conflicting groups within itself that are in disagreement even about matters of foreign relationships. There are industries, workers, and consumers that benefit from restrictions on international trade and those that benefit from the absence of restrictions. There are internationalists and isolationists, hawks and doves. The terms "hawks" and "doves" are themselves names for political coalitions of groups with different reasons for the stands they take: religious, economic, professional, and so on. Each of these groupings tries to win certain instrumental

political gains in domestic politics: money, status, particular policy directions, and wide public support. Public support is manifestly critical for the other gains as well. How is such support mobilized?

One major way is through identification of the particular interest with the abstract, empirically undefinable "national interest" in terms of which we are socialized to think about international politics; and people's perceptions regularly reflect their interests quite unconsciously and sincerely as a function of a number of psychological mechanisms that will shortly be explored.[19] In doing so they mobilize large groups of people who share only mildly or not at all the various domestic concerns just listed.

We can be considerably more specific about the intriguing process through which hawks or doves widen their political support: i.e., about the escalation or deescalation of conflict. Nothing helps the hawks in the Pentagon gain support as effectively as evidence that the hawks in the Kremlin have gained support; and vice versa. Hawks in rival countries therefore have an interest in observing, publicizing, and exaggerating the other's gains; and such publicizing and exaggerating accordingly constitutes a form of tacit though unintended cooperation. The same is true for the doves in rival countries. The governmental actions and politics of each nation thus represent the manifest, and usually the only, signal of what is to come. In this way public actions evoke and control the demands, fears, and expectations of mass publics. These demands, fears, and expectations in turn produce rich benefits for particular groups, most of them not typically thought of as outcomes of political processes: status and appropriations for the armed services, contracts for manufacturers, jobs for their employees, and so on.

Notice that in this example a range of diverse group interests and anxieties in domestic politics are all perceived in terms of a single political conflict between two countries. In the polar form of this identification the countries are further reified into "national interests" pursued by monolithic planners or plotters. Notice also that regardless of the empirical verifiability of the belief about monolithic hostile plotting (The facts are typically ambiguous and unverifiable) these beliefs serve to mobilize mass publics behind particular concrete interest groupings. The conclusion is apparent that a latent political function of the translation of concrete interests into a vision of international conflict is to create real and empirically observable benefits that are conventionally not recognized as the objectives of the political transaction or even as benefits, but rather as the "costs" of preparedness or war. Ritualistic engagement in mutual escalation (or deescalation) based on mythical plots yields instrumental rewards that are conventionally defined as deprivations.[20] Our conventional language for conceptualizing such a phenomenon is inevitably simplistic and distorting. We cannot accurately speak of the "real reasons" for a militant attitude, for example; for response reflects a complex of existential economic and social ties associated with a set of cognitions, each reinforcing the other in ways explored in more detail in another chapter.

Notice further that the identification of discrete economic or other interests with international conflict creates valued self-conceptions and roles. Without international conflict there is no role for hawks, for doves, or for the specific variations in roles within each grouping and none of the status and sense of efficacy and of significance that playing the roles creates. The creation of self conceptions

through acceptance of a general belief, or myth, about the course of events is analyzed below.

In this example it is continuing international tension over long time periods and not a shooting war that is postulated as mobilizing

mass opinion. So long as the war is a "cold" one, ambiguity about intentions and plans is maximal and so is mass susceptibility to political cues about such plans. When a hot, shooting war with a major adversary begins, ambiguity about these things largely disappears, though this analysis remains pertinent in that it forces attention to the systematic links among domestic interests, the mobilizing of mass publics, and the outbreak of shooting wars. Even a shooting war, moreover, fosters ambiguity and confusion over the bases of cleavage and alliance among domestic political interests. Small wars and occasional shooting incidents associated with cold war reinforce belief in the reality of threat from a foreign adversary.

It will be easier to recognize the crucial and general function of this social psychological phenomenon if its central elements are specified before we consider other political examples. The elements listed here as analytically separate are of course mutually reinforcing facets of a single empirical process.

The identification of different concrete interests and anxieties with a general plan or plot involving farreaching change or persistence in the social order and the fate of large collectivities of people is the key feature of the paradigm. In their respective ways anthropological, psychoanalytic, and political observations all point to such identification as characteristic of anxious people. Ernst Cassirer points out in his encyclopedic study of mythical thought that in mythical thinking "every simultaneity, every spatial coexistence and contact, provide a real causal 'sequence;" and he notes Levy-Bruhl's conclusion that in the primitive myths "nothing in the world happens by accident and everything by conscious purpose."[21]

As suggested earlier, political myths fall into a small number of archtypical patterns, though in detail they vary widely. Either they define an enemy who is plotting against the national interest and may need to be exterminated; or they define a savior-hero-leader of a popularly or divinely sanctioned social order who is to be followed and obeyed and for whom deprivation, suffering, or sacrifice are gratifying. All sorts of specific political concerns are translated into these forms.

Relying upon clinical observations of patients rather than primitive myth, Harry Stack Sullivan identified as a basic cognitive process the perception of causal relations between events occurring at about the same time whether or not they are logically related; and he noted that much of our thinking does not advance beyond this mode.[22] Similarly, analyses of the "word salad" in which schizophrenics express themselves have shown that the "salads" are not random conglomerations of words but rather reflect an identification of objects with each other when they simply have some one property in common; the schizophrenic's inability to abstract leads him to see the different entities as identical, an extreme form of the type of confusion we are discussing.[23]

Political examples of the identification of a particular group issue with a more widely salient but not necessarily related issue appear constantly, and additional examples from the field of race relations are considered below.[24]

In its political manifestations the translation process exhibits some specific common features already suggested in general terms. The

protagonists in the mythical conflict are sharply personified in leaders or oligarchies, though empirical research typically reveals a high measure of drift in policy-making or unplanned incrementalization of small decisions that makes overall long-range planning minimal and the function of leadership a limited one. The top policy makers are also perceived in the myths as monolithic and resolute, even though they are empirically divided into factions or diverse group interests and are typically ambivalent and susceptible to influences for change. Finally, acceptance of the mythical formulations is associated with frustration, fear, or anger, emotions that inhibit the empathy and the sharing of the others' feelings that facilitate understanding of their problems, and their internal conflicts. This characteristic is manifestly linked to the last one, for so long as it is recognized that one's potential adversary is internally divided and not monolithic (in perceptions, aspirations, intensity of feeling, and political interests; indeed, in the whole range of affect and cognitions) political negotiation with him is possible and encouraged; for it is then apparent that he can be maneuvered. This emotional aspect of the transaction is further analyzed below.

It is therefore not the substantive nature of a particular political issue that determines whether a translation into myth will occur, but rather the mode of cognizing or of apprehending <u>any</u> issue. The polar opposite modes are: on the one hand, tentativeness in reaching conclusions and systematic care to check hypotheses against empirical observation; and, on the other hand, apprehension through social suggestion, generating unquestioned beliefs not susceptible to empirical

check or revision. What is manifest and observable is denied and repressed, often through metaphorical ambiguity, for it is not socially sanctioned. What is mythical and unobservable is publicly affirmed and believed, for it evokes social support.

In the field of race relations the talk and the affirmation of goals is in terms of liberty and equality on the one side and in terms of the prevention of social disorder or disruption of the natural or God-given social scheme on the other side. Neither of these ostensible goals, which exert a powerful emotional response, specifies a condition which is objectively definable in the sense that there can be a consensus that it has been achieved. The function of these "goals" is precisely, and only, what they observably do in the present, not what they connote for a never attained future. They evoke political support and opposition; and their semantic ambiguity, coupled with their socially supported teleological connotations, is precisely what makes them potent condensation symbols.

At the same time the maneuverings in the political battle that is ostensibly over these goals do produce contemporary and observable benefits of various kinds; but they are not the benefits about which people boast, or even consciously recognize, with equanimity. Both white supremacists and civil libertarians win political followings and money in the course of their political maneuvers. As part of the same "transaction" policemen, blacks of various political stances, white sympathizers with the civil rights cause, and white opponents of that cause all achieve a valued role and a self-conception or identity. The need to protect that identity helps explain the emotional intensity with which these roles are defended once they are assumed.

The escalation of such a political conflict wins for police forces a widely supported role as defender of law and order, increases the prestige and political influence of the police vis-a-vis other municipal agencies,evokes public support for expansion of the force, its weapons, and its wage scales, elevates the status of top police officials, and gives individual policemen greater authority over others. For policemen it thus creates a new and valued self-conception. In the same way escalation of the civil rights issue has won for Negroes and their sympathizers such partly symbolic political benefits as an antipoverty program, voting rights they had formerly not enjoyed even in legal theory, and the mayoralties of some important cities. Probably more important, it has brought these groups new roles and causes that have manifestly become major sources of self-respect and of a new self-conception, whether they take the form of black power or of identification with other ideologies. These forms of benefits, for both sides, increase as the civil rights issue escalates, though that empirical fact is incompatible with the symbolic definition of the issue and is therefore conventionally disregarded.

In an "escalating" political conflict over race relations issues, therefore, the ostensible political adversaries do observably help each other win important political benefits; and there is a clear disparity and incompatibility between the conventional definition of the issues in terms of symbolic goals and the empirically observable conflict over instrumental values that are in fact allocated. At the same time groups conventionally defined as political allies are manifestly in conflict over these same manifest political benefits of money, status, and social

support. The American Civil Liberties Union, SNCC, CORE, the Urban League, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and other groupings symbolically allied as sympathetic to Negroes and to the libertarian position manifestly compete for political support, funds, influence, status, and even the escalation or deescalation of the race conflict: over all the instrumental outcomes of the race relations issue, as distinguished from its expressive or symbolic outcomes. In the same way the oligarchies of a range of groupings symbolically aligned on the other side are in evident comflict for the instrumental benefits: the John Birch Society, the Ku Klux Klan, the White Citizens' Councils, the ideological moderates of various hues who want to preserve law and order against anarchy, the "moderates" who want Southern support in congressional log rolling, and so on.

This model is incompatible with our common sense notions of what is involved in political conflict, for the common sense notions mirror the very ambiguities and myths which serious analysis must recognize for what they are. The model is wholly compatible, however, with the empirically observable outcomes or value allocations of political conflict. The chief use of the model is to identify the function of each element in the transaction. The abstract and remote symbols conventionally cited as defining the issues and the goals can now be recognized as serving the function of eleiciting wider political support for the various groups involved in the conflict. Adversary role playing serves to bring valued benefits to the adversaries; and the most valued of these have nothing to do with the abstract symbolic goals, but rather take the form of the achievement of an identity which will be cherished

and defended. Symbolic allies, on the other hand, are observably in conflict with each other for such instrumental values as status, resources, and political support. The very escalation or deescalation of the conflict, as signalled by current public policy developments, amounts empirically and instrumentally to gains by particular political allies at the expense of others. Thus, the escalation of racial conflict means gains for black militants at the expense of the Urban League and white liberal types and for Citizens Councils at the expense of moderate conservatives, while deescalation means the converse. As emphasized above, such "gains" basically involve transfers of political support and not only material resources.

In the clearest way, then, this model makes apparent the functions served by politically communicated ambiguities and confusions regarding issues, alliances, and lines of cleavage. By focusing attention upon the occasions of shifts in political support and opposition, it clarifies the links between resource allocations, token and real, and such shifts.

Let us now examine the chief dynamic elements that contribute to quiescence or violence in this area. Each of these elements has already been introduced into this analysis; now we can observe how they interact in a particular social context.

One historically important element is a myth of a symbiotic social order in which Negroes have a subordinate role and whites a superordinate one based upon their respective abilities or legal rights or divinely ordained status or the popular will. As long as it is accepted this myth clearly contributes to quiescent acceptance of the Negro's

subordinate status by all who are involved,and belief in the myth is reinforced by Jim Crow ordinances and statutes and court decisions. In recent decades it has been attenuated through conflict with other cognitions.

Probably the central dissonant cognition has been a norm of divinely (or popularly) ordained equal rights regardless of race or color, together with perception of progress in achieving that norm. Both these cognitions have very largely been created by public policies. These include, historically, the Declaration of Independence and the Reconstruction legislation; but chiefly an unprecedented concentration of egalitarian policies beginning roughly with the World War II Fair Employment Practices Commission and including the white primary cases, the Brown decision, and the series of civil rights laws of the late fifties and sixties.

It should be emphasized that all the mythical formulations into which people translate public issues rely upon a major premise that cannot be observed or verified empirically: the public will at some past time, divine will, a dark plot of which any political opponent can arbitrarily be assumed to be a part. Crane Brinton found, for example, that opponents of revolutions consistently attribute them to conspiracies and proponents to a spontaneous public uprising.[25]

So far as the egalitarian norm is concerned, there is obviously a conflict between the myth expressed and reinforced in the civil rights laws and the myth of socially or divinely ordained inequality mentioned earlier. In acepting one or the other of these beliefs each individual accepts a self-conception,role, or identity to be cherished and defended.

We can specify some systematic reasons why individuals in particular social statuses choose one or the other view and therefore one or the other self conception. An affluent middle-class white, not threatened in his employment or his social status by Negro competition, is free to respond to the cognitive cues of egalitarian public policies. Indeed, his own social success and his self conception are the more impressive if he and others believe that opportunity is equal or growing more so; and his insulation from the Negro ghettoes screens out evidence inconsistent with that belief. This group, then, has few benchmarks to rely on other than expressive public policies, and it has considerable status incentive to accept the egalitarian myth and shape its perceptions accordingly.

Working class, low status whites live in a world of different pressures and different perceptions. They see themselves as threatened in their employment and their social status by Negro competition; the case studies of racial conflict repeatedly show an association between the emergence of economic competition from blacks and anti-Negro sentiment and behavior. This group, moreover, is less isolated from observation of living patterns in the ghettoes. It translates its economic and social anxieties into the terms of the classic myth of threat from hostile, alien, or subhuman forces, and it perceives life in the ghetto as evidence of immorality, lack of intelligence, or alien attributes in Negroes. The divinely and legally ordained social order of inequality upon which civilization depends is perceived as threatened by a plot that must be stamped out. Given this existential situation and its translation into a legitimizing myth, this group is likely to reject the egalitarian norm; though it does interpret the enactment of

egalitarian public policies as evidence of Negro social advancement, for that perception fits perfectly into its belief that a desirable social order is being threatened.

Much the same set of fears and of observations explains the dominant reaction of white policemen to Negroes and to the poor generally and their acceptance of the same cognitions as the lower class whites, of whom they are a part. Anxiety about Negro resistance to their authority and fear of physical attacks upon them further reinforce such cognitions in policemen.

For Negroes the changes in the Southern economy and social order that led to their migration to a northern city are certainly early cues that the myth of their subordinate but protected status in a stable social order is no longer believable. The enactment of civil rights laws and the proclamation of egalitarian public policies are symbols that they can expect equal treatment and that policy-makers view them as deserving equal treatment. At the same time these policies cannot convey to the typical Negro living in a city ghetto a perception of significant advancement toward that happy state of affairs. His experiences in virtually every waking moment are unambiguous evidence that he is not progressing, that he remains subordinate, and that the whites he encounters expect to exploit him and degrade him. Insofar as these whites are policemen or other local officials, their actions and policies effectively counter the largely empty rhetoric of national civil rights policy. Other local public policies furhter emphasize to the Negro his low place in the social order and his alienation from a community. Urban renewal programs, for example, uproot people from the neighborhoods they know, force them to live among strangers, and teach them

that their interests are ignored in social planning. Public assistance programs define relief recipients as potentially or actually immoral, devious, and parasitic. Such blatant conflict between the self-conceptions and expectations conveyed by different public policies inevitably generates further alienation, fear, and anger.

Some public policies therefore create for Negroes a belief in their right to equal treatment; while at the same time daily experiences and other governmental actions signal the absence of progress toward that goal. Survey data on white and Negro beliefs regarding Negro progress in the years after World War II show that Negroes in the ghettoes believe they have failed to share in progress or that their situations have grown worse in strikingly higher proportions than is true either of whites or of Negroes outside the ghettoes.[26] Actual conditions plainly incompatible with the promises of publicized policies make a major impact when they are physically experienced, but are likely to be overshadowed by those promises or screened out of perception when they are only read about. The studies also show that the higher status Negro ghetto residents are even more likely to believe in the necessity of violence to achieve civil rights objectives than are those with lower status. The former group presumably finds the egalitarian norms of the civil rights laws more salient and the unambiguous evidence of their absence in the ghettos more frustrating.

The sets of cognitions and behaviors just described comprise an explosive mixture for they create among both large groups of whites and large groups of Negroes a stake in a belief in race conflict and conflicting myths that rationalize it for militants on both sides.

Policemen and other lower class whites translate their fears of economic and social encroachment by Negroes into a myth of a black conspiracy against the established order; and in the process of acting out their own militant roles in that scenario these groups defend their cherished self-conception of a superior group defending the social order and at the same time win other benefits, such as freedom to discriminate against blacks, exploit them, and dramatize their superior social status through harassment and other such gestures. In creating and acting out the myth of a manichean confrontation between the forces of law and order and the threatening blacks, the more militant groups also bolster their own political positions vis-a-vis white groups with more moderate stances.

The mirror image of this translation of a set of fears and aspirations and interests into a myth occurs on the Negro side; and here too it creates cherished roles and self-conceptions, wins political support for militant groups, and in some measure yields other tangible benefits such as loot from plundered stores, minor concessions from frightened businessmen, and so on. As suggested earlier, perceptions that the militants on either side are gaining support evokes support for militants on the other side as well. The middle class white liberals, whose symbolic egalitarian policies without much accompanying tangible implementation fuel the militancy on both sides, are now bound in some degree to be drawn into the more militant camps themselves. Perhaps the fundamental change effected by the emergence of this pattern of cognitions is movement from perception and expectation of a stable order, with limits on role and status differences, to perception and expectation

of an uncertain state of affairs in which an outside group threatens roles and statuses outside the context of an overarching order that can limit the threat. Given this pattern, a precipitating incident can easily touch off violent action as further considered below.

It has to be emphasized that this account oversimplifies; it understates ambivalence in order to permit description of the dominant mechanisms through which cognitions are created. Certainly these mechanisms act upon individuals with varying impacts; neither increasing polarization nor deescalation could occur if ambivalence in cognitions were not a universal attribute.

Ritualization of Political Conflict

All politics involves group conflict, but not all conflict escalates. The premises of this chapter furnish a basis for specifying the conditions under which political conflicts become stabilized within fairly narrow limits, as virtually all continuing conflict does at times.

In every area of conflict involving large populations there are likely to be periods in which anticipations of unlimited oppression or suppression of legitimate demands contribute to escalation and militance and sometimes to violence. In the latter part of the nineteenth century American workers had reason to fear employer exploitation uninhibited either by empathy for workers or by governmental regulation; indeed, troops and police frequently helped suppress worker resistance and organizational efforts; and the socialist doctrine embraced by the labor leaders and movements of the day fed employer anxiety in turn. There were comparable escalating stages in the political conflict between railroads and farmers and in that between trusts and consumers; and in each case the very fact of escalation reinforced the intensity with which the actors fought against major threats to downgrade their status.

In all these areas the inability to foresee limits on the conflict and the consequent anxiety on both sides eventually led to a common interest, supported politically by concerned groups not directly involved, in establishing routines for conflict resolution. The routines did not inhibit the adversaries from using their unequal economic and other resources against each other, though they formally purported

to do that. They did, however, create an expectation that acceptable limits would be observed: that industry would not be socialized, that workers could strike to support wage demands, that consumers' interests would be protected by an official agency established for the purpose. The economic effects of the new institutions were typically minimal; their psychological effects were crucial.

The result was not the elimination of the conflict of interests, but its ritualization. Governmental procedures ostensibly established to make policy in fact produced predictable results in line with relative bargaining power: and policy-making procedures that are predictable in their outcomes amount to ritual and not to decision-making. They constitute an acting out of the underlying conflict and a legitimation of the terms on which it is currently resolved.

Like all ritual, this political form of it chiefly influences states of mind. It facilitates social interaction, mutual role taking, and a sharing of perspectives among leaders and thereby encourages cooptation. For unorganized consumer groups, the cooptation takes place between regulatory agency staff members and representatives of the regulated industry. Ritualization also encourages acceptance of a myth by the masses of political spectators: a myth of protected status and of policies based upon an objective standard of equity rather than relative bargaining resources. Given such a context of ritualized relationships, the use of bargaining weapons no longer produces escalation. What does arouse anxiety about renewed escalation is deviation from the prescribed rituals.[27]

Symbolic Conflict and Mass Immobilization

Two forms of conflict are identified in this analysis as something rather different from what they appear to be, in the sense that they chiefly influence states of minds rather than current instrumental benefits. One of these is conflict over abstract or remote objectives that lack unambiguous empirical referents. The other is ritualized conflict. The preceding discussion suggests a common political function. They immobilize large groups of people who might otherwise be expected to use their political resources in common for an instrumental objective.

Symbolic conflict between communism and free enterprise (or between reactionaries and radicals or other ambiguous labels for ideologies) makes the great mass of liberals reluctant to side with either on concrete issues for fear of helping the other. In consequence mass support for civil rights, for aid to the poor, and for effective business controls is significantly weakened and often reduced to tokens or less, as in the McCarthy years of the nineteen fifties. Labor-management conflict over wages induces consumers to accept substantial price and utility rate increases. That the wage bargaining has become largely both symbolic and ritualistic appears clearly from the inability of economists to agree on whether, and in what direction, it has an economic effect; and from the conclusion of the most careful study of the subject that, "...the impact of unionism on relative wage inequality among all workers has been small--under 6 percent. The direction of the effect, on presently available evidence, is ambiguous."[28]

Electoral conflict between political parties in a two party system offers another example. Sometimes the conflict is a ritualistic engagement between very similar adversaries who are reduced to disagreeing on how to deal with Quemoy and Matsu (an issue never heard from again) or on the wording of a pledge to do away with prohibition. Sometimes it is a symbolic engagement between clearly different, but highly ambiguous ideologies, one of which may be so unpopular that it has no chance of winning endorsement, as in the 1964 and 1936 elections; usually the conflict combines both forms. In either case it engages the interest of a large segment of the population and legitimizes the electoral result and the succeeding administration. In neither case does it offer a reliable or major means of influencing instrumental payoffs through subsequent legislative, administrative, and judicial decision-making; but it does permit group influence in these processes to operate without significant interference by mass publics who are affected by the decisions.

As a polar case, wars, cold or hot, induce mass publics to accept and support higher taxes and prices, restrictions on free expression, compulsory military drafts, and sometimes large numbers of deaths at home or abroad.

The politically significant observation in every example is that the symbolic or ritualized conflict enables specific groups in conflict over instrumental rewards to use their respective bargaining resources free from interference by mass publics who may be affected. The chief winners of instrumental payoffs are therefore those groups with the

greatest resources in money and the means of imposing economic or political sanctions. The chief losers are those who, like the poor and the enlisted men, lack either of these and are also deprived of political support from mass publics of which they are a part. This effect, as the above account should make clear, is not typically a form of deliberate manipulation. It is an unintended consequence of a change in cognitions effected by public policies, and it typically influences the cognitions of both elites and mass publics.

Myth and Identity

In the descriptions of the dynamic processes through which political conflict escalates or becomes ritualized two reinforcing psychological phenomena were noted: the creation of political identities as a function of acceptance of particular myths; and the creation of affect. Because both of these serve crucial functions that are usually not recognized in political analysis, they deserve more intensive examination.

Jerome Bruner, relying on psychoanalytic theory, has made the fundamental point that in choosing belief in a particular myth a person chooses a particular role and identity for himself.

> It is not simply society that patterns itself on the idealizing myths, but unconsciously it is the individual man as well who is able to structure his internal clamor of identities in terms of prevailing myth. Life then produces myth and finally imitates it.[29]

Erik Erikson also sees a link between myth and identity, making the further point that it comes to be perceived as self-created:

> By accepting some definition as to who he is, usually on the basis of a function in an economy, a place in the sequence of generations, and a status in the structure of society the adult is able to selectively reconstruct his past in such a way that, step for step, it seems to have planned him, or better, he seems to have planned <u>it</u>. In this sense, psychologically we <u>do</u> choose our parents, our family history, and the history of our kings, heroes, and gods.[30]

Charles Morris complements these positions:

> The general significance of mythical discourse lies in the fact that it informs the interpreter in a vivid manner of the modes of action approved and disapproved by some group (or in the extreme case, by some individual). It thus makes available to the interpreter information concerning an important body of appraisals which he may utilize in his behavior, whether by way of agreement or disagreement.[31]

Both Bruner and Erikson stress the close, direct, and necessary connection between severe anxiety and attachment to a myth that establishes a socially supported identity and suggests a collective course of action to allay the anxiety. Both the empirical world in which people feel threatened and a fantasy about causes and what to do are involved; and "the art form of the myth connects the daemonic world of reason by a verisimilitude that conforms to each."[32] For those who do feel threatened because of a gap between what they are taught to believe they deserve and what they are getting, attachment to a myth replaces gnawing uncertainty and rootlessness (what Erikson calls an "ego-chill") with a vivid account of who are friends, who are enemies, and what course of action needs to be pursued to protect the self and significant others. It channels individual anxieties and impulses into a widely shared set of expectations and a widely shared scenario to guide action. It frees the individual from responsibility for his unhappy or threatened place in society and prescribes a clear and widely supported program for protecting his identity. To consider the political examples discussed earlier is to recognize the force of Bruner's observation about myth. "Its power is that it lives on the feather line between fantasy and reality. It must be neither too good nor too bad to be true, nor must it be too true."[33]

Each of these expectations also evokes a specific political role and self-conception for those individuals who accept the myth in question: the patriotic soldier whose role it is to sacrifice, fight, and die for his country; the policeman or National Guardsman whose role it is to save the social order from subhuman or radical hordes; the

consumer whose role it is to respect the state which protects him; the slave whose role it is to accept his status with quiescence. In every instance the degree of attachment to the political myth and to the role it creates and the fervor with which the role is played depend upon: (1) the degree of anxiety the myth rationalizes; and (2) the intensity with which the particular expectation that forms the central term of the myth is held. Public policy is the key factor in creating both cognitions.

Emotion as Catalyst of Political Ritual and Political Violence

In view of the manifest association between emotion and political action and support, it is surprising that social scientists have generally offered quite limited explanations of the character of the tie between the two. Usually these have taken the form of declarations that some particular emotion, such as fear or anger or joy, has been the cause of some observed political behavior. This kind of statement, especially popular among journalists, is almost always an evasion rather than an explanation, as Arthur Bentley made clear long ago,[34] for it takes an unobservable state of mind as an independent variable and therefore conveys information only about an untestable assumption (or tautology)on the part of the observer, while avoiding systematic analysis of the relationships among actions.

If it is dubious social science to be satisfied with the assumption that an emotion is a cause, it is nonetheless vital to learn as precisely as possible what functions emotions serve in political behavior and interaction. I offer some tentative propositions on that subject, based upon pertinent studies in role analysis, studies of language and the symbolic processes, and psychoanalytic theory, which, encouragingly, point to consistent or identical conclusions. The hypotheses applying these studies to political behavior were derived by the author and cannot be blamed on the writers cited in the discussion.

It is convenient to start with an observation from role theory. People differ markedly in the range of "others" who become significant for them and whose roles they can freely take. Sarbin notes that "the

more roles in a person's behavior repertory," the better his social adjustment, other things remaining the same; and he suggests that the absence of role taking skills contributes to the development of paranoid disorders. In play a child hopefully learns to shift from role to role. Lack of the skill and the imagination to do so retards socialization; and culture myths and folk tales help the child acquire the necessary skill and imagination.[35] Similarly, in Mead's terms, the ability to be self-critical (and therefore tentative, skeptical, and curious) is a function of the number of roles ("me's") a person can take or of his internalization of a generalized other.

I have suggested elsewhere that many forms of political interaction, including most law enforcement activities, the interactions between policymakers and constituents, and the interactions among competing elites involve mutual role taking.[36] Each party observes from the other's perspective and so comes to understand, and in some measure to share, his aspirations, fears, strengths, and weaknesses. Each accordingly limits his own demands in line with a perception of what is feasible and will reassure the others. Unequal bargaining resources are expressed in behavior, and in instrumental benefits, but so are the limits evoked through mutual role-taking. The latter mechanism, in fact, functions to reassure, especially where there can be no clear and unambiguous assessment of the balance of bargaining resources and payoffs.

For those individuals who are adept and effective at the politicking such flexible role taking involves, the very exercise of their talents unquestionably brings with it a play of feeling and an exhiliration which reinforces their ability to do it well: empathetically

to take the roles of others, to understand them, and therefore to reassure them, while making demands within acceptable limits. In the operations of a resourceful and imaginative politician or labor mediator we can see such talent at work, and the memoires and statements of such people leave no doubt that gratifying affect is involved.

The psychological literature offers more general support for the hypothesis that feeling complements comprehension as an aspect of such role taking. Sarbin's references to its origin in children's play is one clue. Studies of speech disorders, language pathology, and their relation to psychosis and neurosis also point to a close linkage among affective contact and the abilities to symbolize, to abstract, and to socialize or integrate into society.[37] In his study of the emotions Plutchik declares:

> Many authors have noted that neurosis and psychosis are characterized by a decrease in affective manifestations and that there is generally a restriction or narrowing of the range of emotional responsiveness.[38]

Neurosis and psychosis are, in one sense, names for inadequacy in socializing and integrating into society.

Generalizing from such studies, Church writes:

> Feelings are the substrate and the raw material of cognition as opposed to reflexive action, and our human capacities for thought are no greater than our human capacities for feeling. It may well be that capacity for feeling, whether innate or generated out of early parent-child relations, is the essential variable in intellectual differences. It is only those with strong feelings who can resist the secondhand formulations of experience handed down from their progenitors and can work to thematize reality afresh for themselves. Certainly it is possible to be retentive without great feeling, but learning without the understanding that emotion gives is barren and perhaps even dangerous.[39]

As a concomitant of mutual role taking and the exchange of significant symbols, feeling is part of understanding: an adjunct and a

necessary condition of the very process of sharing perspectives that makes it possible for politicians and leaders of clientele groups to enter into a symbiotic pattern of action.

Cassirer makes the same point when he analyses the feeling accompanying the experiencing of a work of art. Art offers a form of understanding and not simply emotion. "Art gives us order in the apprehension of visible, tangible, and audible appearances. ...The infinite potentialities of which we had but a dim and obscure presentiment are brought to light by the lyric poet, by the novelist, and by the dramatist."[40] To be able to achieve such apprehension, we must be able to feel. For the same reason the most sensitive practitioners of the social art of developing a large repertory of roles are those who best understand the potentialities of the range of others who are significant for them. As they do so, they reassure both followers and adversaries and contribute to the ritualization of conflict. The visible, publicized process of role-taking becomes a ritual which chiefly functions to shape a myth and in this case contributes to political quiescence for masses and to political craftsmanship for leaders. The dynamics of the mass behavior involved are further considered below.

In his book on aggression in animals, Konrad Lorenz suggests that conflict may itself help generate the kind of mutual understanding and feeling that creates a bond: "Doubtless the personal bond, love, arose in many cases from intra-specific aggression, by way of ritualization of a redirected attack or threatening."[41] The observation is strikingly analogous to earlier observations about the ritualization of political conflict and resulting immobilization of affected publics. Here is one major form in which feeling is integrally involved in political behavior;

and it serves in this form not as an emotional diversion from thought or rational action, but as a necessary aid to comprehension.

This function of feeling can be distinguished from another form of emotion generated under other conditions and serving a different political and psychological function. In this second case, as in that already discussed, feeling is a concomitant of belief about relationships with others; but now it grows from, and complements, a belief that others constitute a threat that cannot be limited through political negotiation. Rather than empathetic mutual role taking which enlarges understanding of the range of viable potentialities, such emotion helps concentrate attention upon a particular myth and limits the individual to a particular self conception.

The crucial distinction is that between personal interaction involving a sharing and exchange of perspectives on the one hand, and, on the other hand, belief in a particular course of future development, where the belief is based upon cues from a remote source and lent intensity by disparate individual anxieties. In the second case there is not the constant check of direct interaction with people who might have adversary interests. On the contrary, perceived adversaries are not seen as complex social beings whose perspectives can be shared, at least in part, but rather as objects embodying a particular abstract function: aggression, evil, domination, obedience, and so on. They do not exist for mutual role taking, but to serve the function in the scenario that their inherent nature requires of them, just as the perceiver sees himself as an entity with a vital function in the same scenario; and as the belief is based upon myth and not empirical observation or interaction, it can be changed only by replacement with a new myth.

The perception of others and self as objects rather than as complicated and ambivalent and vacillating human beings involves different kinds of emotion and a different function for emotion. The political myths portray scenarios of manichean struggle or of a stratified social order in which all must play their parts and keep their place in order to be protected. Rigid expectation that a particular scenario in one of these forms will be played out seems to evoke the emotions associated with hostility and anxiety: anger, fear, hate, triumph, acceptance, acquiescence; and these contrast both in quality and in function with the feelings associated with creativity, exploration, and discovery. They inhibit exploration and flexibility, and they keep attention centered upon a particular vision of the world and the particular functions of actors specified in the myth. They catalyze banality, by encouraging people to react to unquestioned expectations of how others have to behave, and this reaction in turn signals threat (or domination or submissiveness) to the others, who are reinforced in their expectations and behavior patterns. So, as Bruner suggests, life copies myth.

By the same token the person who, by virtue of social cues, comes to perceive himself as limited to a single role also sees himself as an object rather than as a complex person of many potentialities; and so he comes to need a myth which legitimizes his role and gives him a function. He therefore accepts the myth and the self-concept inflexibly: the black or the Indian untouchable as fulfilling a cosmic design through his inferior status; personal wealth as defining the self and its value; physical beauty as defining the self and its worth (as in some apparently unhappy sex goddesses who see themselves as objects).

Thus perception of the self as an object limited to a particular role encourages self hatred and consequent attachment to a rationalizing myth.

Social psychological studies of aggression contribute some additional hypotheses regarding the dynamics and function of emotion as a component of the manichean form of myth. In these myths some group is defined as conspiring to overthrow the social order with which the perceiver identifies or as thwarting his rightful claims to a higher status, in either case there is a perception of frustration. Berkowitz makes the following insightful observation about the frustration-aggression theory that grew out of the seminal work of Dollard and Miller at Yale:

> Dollard and his collaborators had not faced the important theoretical problem of "fear." Fear-producing situations are frustrations according to their (and our) definition of this latter term, but what is there about these obstructing situations that yields stronger fear than anger reactions? The answer is, fearful events signify noxious consequences; in such circumstances the individual anticipates either physical or psychological damage to himself. It is hypothesized that fear increases more rapidly than does anger as these anticipated noxious consequences increase in magnitude. The low 'power' of the frustrated individual relative to that of the frustrating agent is another important aspect of the fearful situation. The more vulnerable or less powerful he feels, i.e., the less able he is to control or punish the frustrator for the injury he has received, the more fear predominates over anger.[42]

Berkowitz also emphasizes a related proposition in the Dollard-Miller theory. The latter declare that the stronger the thwarted drive, "the stronger the resulting instigation to aggression," and so "'threats' are more likely to produce overt hostility than are 'deprivation.'"[43] Here, again, the perceived relative power of the frustrated individual and the frustrating agent is crucial.

The experimental work of Dollard, Miller, and Berkowitz has been on individual's in laboratory situations while the political scientist

is concerned with explaining the aggressive behavior of groups and masses. The ties suggested here among public policy, mythical belief, and mass responses offer a means of doing that. The myths governmental actions evoke create perceptions of the nature and the strength of the frustrating threat for large numbers of anxious people who can have no equally persuasive cue as to what to expect from direct observation.

Where the myth evoked in this way portrays an adversary group as dominant or all-powerful and another group as rightfully subordinate, Berkowitz' formulation suggests that there will be fear and presumably acquiescence; and this observably occurs in many political relationships; though it is often tempered, as the examples cited above make clear, by another myth promising some measure of protection or a reward in an afterlife. In such cases the continuing tension between fear and reassurance typically results in quiescent acceptance of existing status relationships.

Often, however, public policy evokes a belief in broad support for the aspirations of a threatened or frustrated group for improvement of their status; or it evokes a belief that a superordinate group is maintaining and enjoying its privileges unfairly or unjustly. In this instance the Berkowitz formulation suggests that anger will predominate over fear, making overt hostility and aggression more likely. This proposition is especially useful for students of collective behavior that is either quiescent or aggressive because it focuses attention upon the dynamic reasons that deprivation may not be perceived as threat or that maintenance of a long-standing status relationship may come to be perceived as threat. In both instances, and for reasons

already discussed, the acts and the rhetoric of public officials serve to create the same perceptions or expectations in large groups of people, so that the key variables in the psychologists' frustration-anger-aggression theory are influenced in politically relevant situations by cues emanating from the government.

The emotions of anger and fear seem empirically to impede the kind of free exploration of possibilities noted above as characteristic of some political interactions. In his book on The Emotions Plutchik suggests that the primary emotion dimensions form bipolar factors or axes. He names them as, "destruction versus protection, incorporation versus rejection, reproduction versus deprivation, and orientation versus exploration."[44] This formulation thus lends support to the empirical impression that the emotions evoked by threatening situations impede the feelings associated with mutual role-taking and acceptance.

There is certainly evidence that anxious people are likely to live banal emotional lives, relatively empty of the exploring, incorporation, and protection of others, to use Plutchik's terms. The findings of Arieti and Rosenberg, noted earlier, regarding the emotional flatness, but aggressive, scornful, and resentful conduct, of neurotic and psychotic patients are also in point, as are my observations about the link of banal language to rigidity in role taking.

One political expression this syndrome takes is the personification of perceived sources of threat. This is another way of describing the phenomenon noted earlier of translation of anxieties into myth by the person who worries about displacement from his social status or his job and feels powerless to cope with impersonal economic tendencies or

countless bureaucratic decisions that add up to a threatening but unplanned trend. Hence the appeal of a conspiracy myth in which guilty leaders and their dangerous dupes are identifiable and ad hominem aggression is possible, and hence also the appeal of a hero-leader who can be perceived as knowing how to cope while most do not. Neither the enemy nor the benevolent leader in these situations can be viewed as a person, with complexities, ambivalences, and a potentiality for empathy. They are perceived as embodiments of a role; and that perception in turn creates a rigid self-conception and a banal mode of behavior on the part of the perceivers. Often there is explicit expression of a belief that such personifications are not really human: that Negroes perceived as threats to the social order are subhuman, for example, or that a leader is partially divine or receives divine inspiration. These facets of the myth facilitate and rationalize aggression without limit or subordination without limit, just as exploratory role taking informed by feeling places limits on these political behaviors and encourages tentativeness. Lorenz calls attention to a pertinent anthropological observation:

> The dark side of pseudo-speciation is that it makes us consider the members of pseudo-species other than our own as not human, as many primitive tribes are demonstrably doing, in whose language the word for their own particular tribe is synonymous with "Man." From their viewpoint it is not, strictly speaking, cannibalism if they eat fallen warriors of an enemy tribe.[45]

By virtue of the same kind of mythical pseudo-speciation it is not perceived as murder when enemies are killed or as oppression when a group defined as inferior is degraded.

Both patterns of political behavior identified here function, it should be noticed, to provide a loyal following for leaders and aspirants to leadership. Leaders therefore have an interest in encouraging acceptance of the myths and in accepting them themselves; and motivation is not irrelevant to perception.

The two patterns of myth-role identification behavior should not be understood as dichotomies, and it is unlikely that they ever occur empirically in any individual in pure form, though it is easy enough to find close approximations. Response to every political issue involves some mix of them, though the proportions vary greatly both in different individuals and for different issues. The inevitability of their concurrent appearance is one more example of the ambivalent nature of individual response to political issues.

On the civil rights issue, for example, both whites and Negroes must, in varying degrees, look at status differences, discriminatory practices, and segregation from the point of view of the other, recognize his aspirations, fears, shame, inertia, and so on for what it is, and in some degree share these attitudes. At the same time the same individuals in some measure fear and resent what these others may do to them and their future status. Empathetic feeling and sensitive exploration of possibilities coexists with anger and fear, in some mix that is relatively unstable. It is this ambivalence in people that makes the cues stemming from public policies the potent symbols they are, capable of mobilizing broad support or opposition.

On the Viet Nam war every American exposed for some time to the cold war dramatics of the fifties and sixties is likely to feel at

least some particle of threat from a world communist movement or plot and therefore at least some identification with a war to prevent its encroachment upon additional populations. Some people obviously feel such a threat as overpowering and the resulting impulse to fight as extremely strong. Concurrently, however, there is identification with Vietnamese peasants who are displaced from their homes, killed, and made to suffer other extreme hardships; and there is understanding of the temptations and economic and status motivations of the Vietnamese elite and a part of the American elite to profit personally from the fear of communist aggression in South-East Asia.

This analysis offers a basis for a clearer understanding of the interactions among personality characteristics and political cognitions and a basis for formulating more specific hypotheses regarding the conditions of stability both in personality traits and in cognitions. The dimensions usually taken to define personality include: authoritarian-submissive, extroverted-introverted, tough minded-tender minded, friendly-hostile, weak ego-strong ego. All of these denote relationships with others: tendencies to yield to others, dominate them, take them into account, ignore them, placate them, and so on. But now we recognize that in the ambiguous but highly salient area of political expectations, particular patterns of personality characteristics reflect particular patterns of cognitions: i.e., beliefs about future political outcomes and how they can be influenced and therefore particular political values or policy positions. A belief, for example, that the poor are inferior to others mentally or morally and susceptible to mobilization by outside agitators becomes associated with toughmindedness and authoritarianism and also with distaste for public policies to raise the

status of the poor. In a sense the three observations, about the cognition, about the personality traits, and about the policies, amount to the same observation reported in different vocabularies. They are usefully conceived as part of a single transaction rather than as causes and effects.

Similarly, submissiveness and a belief that others are all powerful and need to be placated are complementary and mutually reinforcing. A belief that others are subject to influence through personal understanding and sharing of perspectives and benefits fosters, and is fostered by, a strong ego and tender mindedness. Personality characteristics, belief systems, and values or policy positions are therefore interrelated through dynamic processes which we can in part identify and analyze; and if this is true, the conventional perception of them as wholly or largely independent of each other, stemming in part from ambiguities in language, can be recognized as itself a source of illusions in perception and in expectations and as a catalyst of support for mythical cognitions.

Once a pattern of cognition, self-conception, and congruent behavior becomes established, several of the social psychological processes already noticed contribute to its stability while others tend to upset it; and it is manifestly crucial both to knowledge and to control to be able to identify the respective processes and their impact. Selective perception that reinforces a self-conception and a cherished political role contributes to stability as do the feelings that accompany the enactment of the role. Political acts and public policies may reinforce such selective perception, and occasionally they

encourage the ambivalent to change their perspective radically: to define some previously ignored group as a source of threat or to recognize the possibility of accommodation with a group previously perceived as a threat.

Organization and Violence

Among people who are content with existing status and power relationships it is a common assumption that when those with lesser status organize, they represent a threat to the established order, and so long as they are not organized, they are impotent or loyal. This view is apparent in the reactions of employers to the idea of union organization among their workers and in the reaction of those who identify with established political parties to the organization of a new party appealing to a low status sector of the population. The view is also consistent with the classic myths considered above.

It is not consistent with empirical observation of the impact of the organization of low status groups, however. The relationships among continuing organization, leadership, and sharing or conflict in social goals unquestionably constitutes one of the most common and most subtle sources of confusion in the analysis of social action, and especially political action, for perception in the mythic forms is involved here too. The popular assumption seems to be that organization is the independent variable which lends power to a movement and provides a setting in which leadership can operate effectively. Frequently no distinction is made between the existence of leadership and the existence of organization.

The studies of protest movements indicate that the distribution of social support rather than the presence or absence of stable organization is the critical variable. Where support for the established order of power and status relationships is strong and the expectation

is widespread that the existing elite will continue as an elite, protest organizations serve one or both of two possible functions, neither of them consistent with the conventional view.

They serve most frequently as a channel of communication of elite perspectives and values. Labor unions, political parties, and social organizations geared to an ongoing social and political system soon arrive at a position in which their continued existence and function depend upon the maintenance of the system. They create in their members an expectation of influence in the system: an expectation that is realized to the extent of their bargaining resources and that is kept potent to the extent of their symbolic resources. Unions typically move from an ideological tie to socialism and a vision of the overthrow of private business to an ideological and economic tie to business and the existing political order; so that they come to serve partly as a channel through which wage restraint policies and production maintenance policies (especially in wartime) can be encouraged and through which consumers generally can be induced to accept higher prices. Political parties typically evolve into loyal oppositions. In the degree that organizations serve this function they facilitate the acceptance by their mass memberships and sympathizers of one form of myth discussed earlier: the belief in a benevolent established order in which they have a valued role. Selznick's analysis of cooptation represents one useful way of describing the process.[46]

The existence of a continuing organization also facilitates the maintenance of a particular and relatively uniform set of expectations in the rank and file membership by encouraging them to rely on their

leaders to find the means of achieving the abstract goal that engages them. The organization therefore makes leadership easier than otherwise; for ritualistic organizational procedures continually reinforce the confidence of the mass membership that their symbolic goals are being pursued. These procedures, moreover, become an adjunct of the larger pattern of ritualistic procedures through which the symbiotic relationship with elite organizations are expressed. Internal union procedures geared into union management bargaining illustrate the point, as do the activities of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

As of this writing S.N.C.C. represents the early phase of the process, somewhat comparable to the Knights of Labor in the 1880's. There is the significant difference, however, that we know by hindsight that the established corporate business system retained the virtually complete support of political groups as the process of ritualization of labor-management conflict evolved. It remains possible that the challenge of the poor, the blacks, and other disaffected groups in the nineteen sixties will reveal a significant absence of support for the institutions they are challenging.

Hobsbawm's account of the tie between the preindustrial mob and the ruler in Western European cities of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries furnishes the perspective for a more specific statement of the linkage between adversary use of the bargaining resources of the two groups and their symbolic alignment. The preindustrial city mob was a "permanent entity," certainly closer to a continuing organization than to an amorphous and ephemeral crowd.

> ...the "mob" was not simply a casual collection of people united for some ad hoc purpose, but in a recognized sense, a permanent entity, even though rarely permanently organized as such. It sometimes was, though the forms of permanent organization of the plebs--apart from artisan gilds--remain to be investigated...[47]

A "combination of wage-earner, small property-owners, and the unclassifiable urban poor," the city mob retained the loyalties of its members and at the same time demonstrated the extent of its bargaining resources through two forms of expression: loyalty to the king as symbolic representative of justice in society; and periodic rioting, often precipitated by rising prices or unemployment. The upper classes or nobility, and sometimes the Jews, were often regarded with hostility, but on the ground they had "betrayed the king." This pattern of behaviors reveals rather clearly the basic elements and dynamics of permanent organizations claiming to function as protests against established social institutions: loyalty to the established role structure and to the role established for the masses within that structure; anxiety and resentment that others in the structure will betray it or not play their parts; and a mechanism, such as the riot, through which the resentment is expressed and the elite reminded that they must make minor concessions in line with bargaining resources on both sides.

To this list of basic elements must be added one other. The mob sometimes engaged in real revolutions, rationalized on the ground the ruler had not done his duty to the people. It is significant, however, that rebellion was possible for the city mobs because, as Hobsbawm puts it, "living in cities and capitals, it had a far more precise conception of what 'government', 'power' and the 'seizure of power' meant than

peasants in remote villages;"[48] and the rebellions occurred "because the 'mob' was empiricist, and Church-and-King regimes were on their way out."[49] In short, the perception that social support for the established order was decaying and that power could be seized was a necessary condition for genuine revolt, an observation that supports our generalization that social support is a more critical variable than organization.

Further insight into the dynamics of protest, cooptation, and revolt is gained from examination of other cases in which the protesting group has been unorganized or very loosely organized and of cases in which support for the established order is ambivalent. As already noted, absence of organization means absence of a channel for effective communication and for establishing an accepted basis for coexistence. A group that regards itself as denied the status to which it is entitled and which has no stable organization and leadership that can be perceived as serving its interests will certainly express its anxiety in some fashion. Where the protesting group perceives weakness, ambivalence, or a falling off of support for the elite, anger is likely to predominate over fear, and over violence against the established order is likely when a suitable precipitating incident occurs. This pattern is further considered below.

When members of the protesting group perceive the established order as entrenched and generally supported and its own resources for superseding it manifestly inadequate, attacks on the symbols of its own degraded status are predictable, as are attacks on weak groups perceived to be on the margins of the elite or benefitting from the

established order without sharing in its resources for exercising power. Such activities by young people today, while ineffective in changing status relationships, represent a searching for identity, according to Erikson:

> Today this problem faces us most painfully on that frontier where leaderless and unguided youth attempts to confirm itself in sporadic riots and other excesses which offer to those who have temporarily lost, or never had, meaningful confirmation in the approved ways of their fathers, an identity based on a defiant testing of what is most marginal to the adult world. The mocking grandiosity of their game names ("Black Barons," ... "Saints"), their insignia, sometimes even tatooed into the skin, and their defiant behavior clearly indicate an attempt to emulate that which gives other people the background of a group identity: a real family, nobility, a proud history--and religion.[50]

The same searching for a role in a society which reassures Negroes they are created equal and then degrades them and, in the urban ghettos, denies them a community as well as an identity, produces other characteristic behaviors: attacks on small storekeepers and especially on Jews, and destruction of the physical ghetto environment, both of which symbolize their degradation. The ghetto fires that are frequently set by lone arsonists, even when there is no collective violence, are one manifestation as are the riots that consist of fire-setting, looting, and harassment of stray whites who happen to be caught in the middle of them. All of these represent attacks on the weak and on the self; and they flow from the frustration and fear that are channeled by lack of organization of the deprived and general support for the elite.

Consideration of the conditions that trigger mass violence once these conditions are present throws further light on the social psychological dynamics at work. The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder makes some observations that are also evident in the

news accounts. It notes that the precipitating incident is typically trivial and the response to it out of all proportion in its scale of violence.[51] Approximately 40 percent of the triggering incidents in the riots the Commission examined involved "allegedly abusive or discriminatory police actions;" about 17 percent harassment or violence by whites against blacks, and about 22 percent black demonstrations or protest meetings. After publication of the Report there occurred a wave of riots following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King in April, 1968.

Incidents similar to most of these, though of course not to the assassination of a charismatic figure, occur every day in every American black ghetto. In themselves, therefore, they cannot be regarded as decisive. I suggest, however, that a particular response to them occasionally invests them with a meaning that is decisive: that they occasionally become a signal to frustrated ghetto residents that if violent action begins, many will join it and a still wider range of people will give it moral support. The Report documents the fact that the triggering incidents occurred at times and places where large numbers of people were present or could gather quickly; and that they followed a series of similar harassing or frustrating incidents over a period of several weeks.

An individual will hesitate to initiate violence for which he can be held responsible unless he believes others will join and support him. In this context the precipitating incident serves that function, furnishing the final component to the sequence of necessary conditions. Typically somebody in the crowd hurls a rock or otherwise exhibits defiance; and if there is supportive action from others, participation

snowballs and spreads. There is no organization or generally recognized and accepted leadership to restrain it, start it, limit it, or stop it. Recognition that it cannot overturn the established order does direct it inward or toward marginal groups, as already noted. The appearance of additional police and soldiers is likely to reinforce the frustration and anger and therefore the range and intensity of participation. Thus, the National Commission found that:

> In nine disturbances--involving a wide variation in the intensity of violence--additional control forces were brought in after there had been serious violence which local police had been unable to handle alone. In every case further violence occurred, often more than once and often of equal or greater intensity than before.[52]

Consider next what we know of the occasions of violence where there <u>is</u> serious question that the elite are widely and strongly supported. For clear cases it is of course necessary to look to countries that have experienced successful revolutions. In these instances as well, the protesting groups display a lack of overall organization and of stable and generally accepted leadership in the early stages of the revolutionary process. Crane Brinton found that in the English Revolutions of the 1640's, and of 1688, and in the American, French, and Russian Revolutions the initial forays against the established order displayed much the same pattern. Here are excerpts from his description of the assault on the Bastille:

> ...there is every evidence that once the dismissal of Necker got these various groups excited, what followed was in a sense spontaneous mob action...Actually it is clear that in Paris in those days there was not one mob, but at least several dozen. People came out in the street because their neighbors were already out. They paraded up and down, shouting and singing, stopping now and then for another drink, or to hear another street-corner orator. Self-constituted leaders of

> little groups certainly supplemented any planned action. The decision to march on the Bastille seems to have been taken independently in several quarters. No one knows for sure who first had the brilliant idea of going to the Invalides Hospital to secure small arms. The rioting seems to have died out less because the Bastille fell than because the rioters were tired out. Three days is a long time to be riotous, drunk, or both.[53]

Brinton then declares that, "What holds for the taking of the Bastille holds for the general preparatory work and the first stages of revolutions as we have discussed them...". The Russian case is especially interesting. It is part of the myth of Leninist history that a small conspiratorial cadre planned events, a form of myth usually adopted by opponents rather than advocates of revolution. The record, and even Trotsky's own History, however, leave no doubt that many different groups, with diverse leadership, played upon widespread disaffection to create the incidents that initiated the revolution of October, 1917.

Effective planning and conspiratorial organization are indeed significant factors in the genesis of riot and revolution, but as myth influencing attitudes and opposition, not as behavior influencing events. The intriguing conclusion from these diverse cases is, rather, that lack of effective organization and planning is so consistently associated with the beginnings of domestic violence. It is as though the absence of a well organized resistance movement keeps the elite unaware of the seriousness of the threat it faces and also makes it impossible to negotiate a viable pattern of cooptation and concession that will maintain tensions at a nonexplosive level.

If events demonstrate wide support for the rebels, stronger organization and widely accepted leadership of course emerge; but the analyst

must recognize that these developments reflect an assessment of the relative social support for the rebels and the established order more clearly than they influence that balance. Gradually participants in the resistance see themselves as having achieved a significant role: fighter in a war for liberty and equality. It is revealing that in a survey of opinion regarding the Watts riot of 1965 Negro respondents who had favorable attitudes toward the riot called it a "rebellion" or used some other word denoting a planned movement toward a social goal and disliked the connotations of the word "riot."[54]

Police and guardsman representing the established order are tightly organized, of course. As already noted, the threat a disaffected group poses to their authority and status and sometimes to their livelihood as well, is translated into a mythic plot against a good society which it is their role to defend. The disaffected group is perceived as potentially violent and as inferior or subhuman, and so harassment, demeaning treatment, and efforts to force the low status group to act out the elite's definition of its inferior role become endemic.

For police, as for armies, violence is precipitated by a formal order to engage in it, not by a subtle anticipating of the impact of aggressive cues on potential allies. Once the order is given in a riot situation, however, police behavior leaves no doubt that more is involved psychologically than obedience to a superior officer's command. There have consistently been the clearest manifestations of intense frustration, anger, and a belief that physical punishment of the rioters is a noble deed. For the police the individual rioters symbolize the threat, and there is an eagerness to attack them, rather than the

assaults against property and against the setting of degradation that chiefly marks the behavior of the rioters. The contrast in behaviors further supports the hypothesis suggested here about the respective functions of organization and of relative support.

The next chapter considers more carefully the implications of this form of analysis for the American urban riots."

A Final Note

Because political activities evoke support through ambiguous or mythical definition of the issues, the alliances, and the lines of cleavage, it is both vital and difficult for social scientists and government officials to avoid being trapped analytically in the same ambiguities and symbolism; and it is evident that a great deal of social science research and governmental activity simply reflects the confusions and the symbolic connotations that it should be identifying and analysing. To learn the range and the incidence of attitudes or opinions about an issue is to specify the potency of a particular range of symbols in evoking a public response from an audience in a particular social setting. This is a useful undertaking if it is recognized as the beginning of political analysis of the dynamic process by which responses are generated and changed. It is misleading if it is regarded as an explanation or a justification of political outcomes and therefore the endpoint of research or policy making; for in that case the social scientist and the government official uncritically accepts the reassuring myth presented for acceptance by political spectators: that individual opinions, as independent variables, account for policy outcomes.

Such research is labeled "empirical"; but the empirical observations are interpreted in the light of frequently unrecognized nonempirical assumptions about the process of opinion formation. These assumptions discourage the researcher from making other kinds of empirical observations (such as those noted above regarding the instrumental benefits of issue escalation and the symbolic character of

formal goals) that call for a drastic reinterpretation of the meaning of his findings about attitudes and an equally farreaching reinterpretation of the functions of political activities.

Notes

[1]Examples are Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Little Brown, 1966); Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (Free Press, 1963).

[2]CF., e.g., Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (Vintage, 1956); James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review, vol. 27, (February, 1962), pp. 5-19.

[3]Cf. John Dollard et. al., Frustration and Aggression (Yale University Press, 1939); Leonard Berkowitz, Aggression (McGraw Hill, 1962).

[4]Some recent examples are: Raymond J. Murphy and James N. Watson, "The Structure of Discontent: The Relationship Between Social Structure, Grievance, and Support for the Los Angeles Riot," (UCLA, 1962 mimeo.); "Six-City Study: A Survey of Racial Attitudes in Six Northern Cities, Preliminary Findings," (Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, Brandeis University, July, 1967, mimeo); A Survey of Attitudes of Detroit Negroes after the Riot of 1967, (Detroit Urban League, 1967).

[5]See Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, (The New York Times, 1968), pp. 127-135 and studies cited or reproduced there.

[6]In addition to the studies cited below see Carl Hovland, Irving Janis, and Harold Kelley, Communication and Persuasion (Yale University Press, 1953); Samuel Eldersveld, "Experimental Propaganda Techniques and Voting Behavior," American Political Science Review, vol. 50 (March, 1956), pp. 154-165; Elihu Katz and Jacob Feldman, "The Debates in the Light of Research: A Survey of Surveys," in Sidney Kraus (ed.), The Great Debates (Indiana University Press, 1962).

[7]Leo Bogart, "No Opinion, Don't Know, and Maybe No Answer," Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. (fall, 1966), pp. 332-345, 336.

[8]Minnesota poll, 1964.

[9]V.O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (Knopf, 1961), p. 158.

[10]Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-261.

[11]Bogart, op. cit., pp. 335, 337.

[12]John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known (Beacon Press, 1960).

[13]Harold D. Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity (McGraw-Hill, 1935), p. 4.

[14]Leonard Berkowitz, "Some Implications of Laboratory Studies of Frustration and Aggression for the Study of Political Violence," paper delivered at 1967 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 5-9, 1967, p. 7 (mimeo.).

[15]Jervis, op. cit., pp. 461-2. See also Dale Wyatt and Donald Campbell, "A Study of Interviewer Bias as Related to Interviewer's Expectations of Own Opinions," International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research, vol. 4 (spring, 1950), pp. 77-83.

[16]Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Viking, reprint 1960), p. 183.

[17]Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade (University of Illinois Press, 1963); S.M. Lipset, "The Sources of the Radical Right," in Daniel Bell (ed.), The New American Right (Criterion Books, 1955), pp. 166-234; Richard Hofstadter, "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt," in Bell, ibid., pp. 33-55.

[18]Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (University of Illinois Press, 1964), chaps. 2,3.

[19]Studies and discussions of the effect of motivation upon perception include: J.S. Bruner and C. Goodman, "Value and Need as Organizing Factors in Perception," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, vol. 42 (1947), pp. 33-44; J. W. Atkinson, "Explorations Using Imaginative Thought to Assess the Strength of Human Motives," in M. R. Jones (ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (University of Nebraska Press, 1954); George S. Klein, "Perception, Motives and Personality," in J. L. McCary (ed.), Psychology of Personality (Logos Press, 1956), pp. 121-99; D. O. Sears and J. L. Freedman, "Selective Exposure to Information: A Critical Review," Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 31 (summer, 1967), pp. 194-213; Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics, vol. 20 (April, 1968), pp. 454-79.

[20]The dynamics of this process in international politics are analyzed in detail in chapter 8.

[21]Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (Yale University Press, 1955), vol. 2, pp. 45, 48.

[22]Harry Stack Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry (Norton, 1953), pp. 28n, 342-343.

[23]Silvano Arieti, "Some Aspects of Language in Schizophrenia," in H. Werner, (ed.), On Expressive Language (Clark University Press, 1955), pp. 56-7.

[24]Striking examples appear in a study of the aftermath of American political assassinations by Rita James Simon and the writer. After every major political assassination a wide range of groups with diverse concerns perceived the assassination as somehow tied to their own adversaries which included advocates of suffrage for women, Jews, Negroes, Communists, rightists, and African nationalists.

[25]Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (Vintage, 1965), pp. 77-85. Brinton also notes that Marxist writing constitutes an exception, for it is Leninist doctrine that tight planning and dedicated cadres make revolutions.

[26]See chapter 4, p. .

[27]For a more extended analysis of ritualization of conflict see The Symbolic Uses of Politics, op. cit., chapter 3.

[28]H. Gregg Lewis, Unionism and Relative Wages in the United States (University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 295.

[29]Jerome Bruner, "Myth and Identity," in Henry A. Murray (ed.), Myth and Mythmaking (Braziller, 1960), pp. 282-283.

[30]Erik Erikson, Young Man Luther (Norton, 1958), p. 111.

[31]Charles W. Morris, Signs, Language and Behavior (Braziller, 1946), p. 135.

[32]Bruner, op. cit., p. 279.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government (Principia Press, 1908, reprint 1949).

[35]Theodore Sarbin, "Role Theory," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology (Addison-Wesley, 1954), Vol. I, pp. 226-227.

[36]The Symbolic Uses of Politics, op. cit., chapter 3.

[37]Cf. Arieti, op. cit., p. 55; Joseph Church, Language and the Discovery of Reality (Vintage, 1961), p. 161.

[38]Robert Plutchik, The Emotions (Random House, 1962), p. 158. See also Silvano Arieti, Interpretation of Schizophrenia (Brunner, 1955).

[39]Church, op. cit., pp. 202-203.

[40]Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (Doubleday Anchor, 1956) pp. 213, 215.

[41]Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression (Bantam, 1967), p. 209.

[42]Berkowitz, op. cit., p. 50.

[43]Ibid., pp. 49-50. The quotes are from Berkowitz.

[44]Plutchik, op. cit., p. 108.

[45]Lorenz, op. cit., p. 45.

[46]Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (University of California Press, 1953), pp. 217-246.

[47]E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (Norton, 1959), p. 111.

[48]Ibid., p. 122.

[49]Ibid., p. 123.

[50]Erikson, op. cit., pp. 114-115.

[51]Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York Times, 1958), p. 118.

[52]Ibid., p. 126.

[53]Brinton, op. cit., p. 84.

[54]M. Tomlinson, "Negro Reaction to the Los Angeles Riot and the Development of a Riot Ideology." (mimeo.).