The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities

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This paper is a revised version of one prepared for a Seminar Panel on The Political Legacy of the Urban Protests in the 1960's at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, 1971, Chicago, Illinois. The research was supported in part by funds granted to the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin by the Office of Economic Opportunity pursuant to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. I wish to thank a number of indefatigable assistants including William Corman, Mark Ginsberg, Eugene Hahn, Freda Merritt, Robert Neis, and William Walker. I am also grateful to my colleagues Donald McCrone, Ira Sharkansky, Richard Merelman, and David Seidman for their helpful comments and suggestions. The conclusions are the author's alone.

January 1972

ABSTRACT

This paper is an exploration of various political environmental conditions associated with the incidence of political protest activities directed toward urban institutions, agencies, and officials in 43 American cities.

Two preliminary questions are considered first. One deals with making explicit the theoretical linkage between elements in the political environment and political behavior. The other is an attempt to define protest technically and to differentiate it from political violence. This effort is made necessary by the fact that violence and protest are not treated in the literature as distinct forms of behavior (but rather as similar acts at different points on a continuum of aggressiveness) and that studies of collective violence in American ghettos indicate no relation between environment and rioting.

Two alternative hypotheses are considered: protest varies negatively with indicators of an open political system (a linear model), and protest is greatest in systems characterized by a mix of open and closed factors (a curvilinear model). Data are drawn from newspaper accounts of protest incidents in 43 cities over a six month period in 1968, producing a sample of 120 protest incidents.

Both the simple incidence of protest and the intensity of protest seem to fit the curvilinear model more closely than the linear one. The incidence of protest, then, seems to signify change not only among previously quiescent or conventionally oriented groups but also in the political system itself as it becomes more open and responsive.

The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities

I.

The complex interrelationship between political environment variables on the one hand and political behavior on the other has been a persistent concern of analysts of urban politics. The purpose of this paper is to begin an exploration of various environmental conditions associated with the incidence of political protest activities directed toward urban institutions, agencies, and officials in American cities.

Political environment is a generic term used variously in the literature of political science to refer, among other things, to aspects of formal political struture, the climate of governmental responsiveness, social structure, and social stability. Scholarly efforts have generally been directed toward examination of the extent to which specific configurations of environmental variables and distinctive patterns of local politics occur together. Treating environmental elements as independent variables,[1] students have shown relationships, for example, between reformed municipal institutions and low voting turnout,[2] reform government and high spending and tax policies,[3] centralization of local power and urban renewal success,[4] and less representative councilmanic institutions and the incidence of race riots.[5]

This type of analysis has depended on the use of data on macro-level, or community, characteristics for its independent variables. The linkages between these diverse characteristics and patterns of political behavior and those among the environmental variables themselves have seldom been made explicit theoretically.

Such research efforts take on theoretical coherence, however, if it is understood in the first instance that the environmental variables are

related to one another in the sense that they establish a context within which politics takes place.[6] Furthermore, the possible linkages between this context and the patterns of political behavior become evident if the elements of the context are conceived as components of the particular structure of political opportunities of a community. That is to say, such factors as the nature of the chief executive, the mode of aldermanic election, the distribution of social skills and status, and the degree of social disintegration, taken individually or collectively, serve in various ways to obstruct or facilitate citizen activity in pursuit of political goals. Other environmental factors, such as the climate of governmental responsiveness and the level of community resources, help to establish the chances of success of citizen political activity. In short, elements in the environment impose certain constraints on political activity or open avenues for it. The manner in which individuals and groups in the political system behave, then, is not simply a function of the resources they command but of the openings, weak spots, barriers, and resources of the political system itself. There is, in this sense, interaction, or linkage, between the environment, understood in terms of the notion of a structure of political opportunities, and political behavior.

By measuring these environmental factors, the analyst develops a means to judge the nature of the biases which groups in a political system must confront. Such judgments lead to conclusions about the ease with which people can get what they want from the political system through collective action. Where the structure of government is potentially more responsive to an electorate by providing opportunities for formal representation for distinct segments of the population (blacks, for example) or where the government is demonstrably responsive to citizen needs and

demands, then the structure of opportunities is relatively open. There exist chances for diverse groups to exercise influence through delegates on representative bodies and influence appears to elicit government action.

Where formal or informal power appears to be concentrated and where government is not responsive, then the opportunities for people to get what they want or need through political action are not limited. The opportunity structure is relatively closed.

One of the most explicit efforts to understand elements of the political environment in terms of the structure of opportunities is found in the work of Lineberry and Fowler. In their exploration of the difference in policy-making between reformed and unreformed local governments, they conclude that

> The translation of social conflicts into public policy and the responsiveness of political systems to class, racial, and religious cleavages differs markedly with the kind of political structure.... (N)on-partisan elections, at-large constituencies and manager governments are associated with a lessened responsiveness of cities to the enduring conflicts of political life.[7]

Reformed local government structure, the rationale of which is to eliminate "politics" and partiality from municipal administration, restricts the opportunities which minority and out groups have for success through political action. Not only is it likely that minorities will experience difficulty in gaining representation or even access in reform systems, but their needs often cannot be met using the criterion of efficient management. Reform governments attempt to institutionalize the latter value at the expense of the recognition of particularistic and often costly interests.[8] This may lead to intense frustration on the part of excluded groups. Lieberson and Silverman find evidence to support their hypothesis that the less direct the relationship between the voter and

his alderman (measured on a continuum which ranges from large at-large electoral systems to small district ward systems), the more likely it will be that race riots will occur.[9] Small districts provide access for more people and offer the possibility of minority representation, both of which serve to enlarge or open up the structure of opportunities. Similarly, it would seem reasonable to suspect that the incidence of protest, one manifestation of political frustration or impatience, is related to the nature of the opportunity structure.

Several studies, notably those of Downes,[10] Spilerman,[11] and Palley and Palley,[12] have attempted to demostrate linkages between aspects of what I have called the opportunity structure and the incidence of mass ghetto violence. Their results have been uniformly negative. Downes and Spilerman independently found that the incidence of ghetto riots was essentially related to nothing more than the numerical size of a city's black population, while Palley and Palley discovered that objective indicators of the degree of black social and economic deprivation were unreliable predictors of ghetto violence.

If one were to follow the notion of a number of scholars that ghetto violence is simply a form of protest,[13] a more virulent extension of what is essentially the same political activity, then this inquiry could stop here. There would be little reason to believe that "peaceful" protest and ghetto "revolts" are related to substantially different sets of conditions.

I would contend, however, that protest against local government targets and collective ghetto violence are two forms of political expression which may be distinguished conceptually and empirically. The conceptual distinctions--which I believe apply to protest directed against <u>any</u> target and to most forms of collective political violence--simply suggest

that protest and violence are so different in their basic dynamics that the likelihood that the conditions associated with one will also be associated with the other is not good. Some of the empirical distinctions suggest explicitly that the more narrow categories of behavior with which we are concerned here are reactions to different stimuli. That is, protest against local government targets is likely to be related to the nature of local politics, while ghetto violence is not.

Let us examine some conceptual distinctions first.

The term "protest" may be used either generically to refer to any form of verbal or active objection or remonstrance or it may be used technically to refer to a conceptually distinctive set of behaviors. I shall use it in the latter sense.

Protest refers to a host of types of collective manifestations, disruptive in nature, designed to provide "relatively powerless people"[14] with bargaining leverage in the political process.[15] It may be distinguished from other forms of verbal objection[16] and from politically-inspired collective violence by the following characteristics.

1. Protest is a collective act, carried out by those concerned with the issue and not by their representatives. The vehement Congressman who declares that he "protests" an action is not in fact relying on the forces, or resources, which protest, understood in the technical sense, brings into play. While the solitary Congressman relies on his status to lend his objection impact, protest is a mass action which relies on the resources which groups of people can command, in this case resources involving the ability of relatively unpredictable masses to disrupt and inspire fear. Only as a mass participatory action are such forces brought into play.

2. Protest is a device by which actors making demands in the political system attempt to maximize the impact of their meager resources while at the same time they strive to minimize the costs of such demand-making which they might incur.

Efforts to control costs distinguish protest from political violence.

Those who pursue violent political strategies are also attempting to maximize the impact of relatively insubstantial resources, but by their action they are also exposing themselves to the possibility that the costs of such behavior will be maximized, if death, serious physical injury, and loss of freedom and legitimacy are taken as maximum costs. Protestors on the other hand seldom must make such expenditures.

Protest is a product, then, of a cost-benefit calculation; violent actors in contrast have essentially thrown cost considerations to the winds.

3. Political protest may also be distinguished from political violence by the fact that those who pursue the former rely for their impact largely on the implicit threat of violence,[17] while those who pursue the latter are explicit in their intention to do physical harm in that they either make open threats[18] or they actually carry out violence. What is implicitly threatening in a protest is not only the socially unconvential display by crowds of people, which offends and frightens norm-abiding observers, but the visions which by-standers and targets conjure up about what such obviously angry behavior could lead to. Participants, targets, and third-parties have come to understand that the protest confrontation provides a relatively fertile matrix for the outbreak of violence. Indeed, the society may react to protest by resorting to pre-emptive violence. That protest may lead to violence, then, is undeniable; that the latter is simply an extension of the former does not follow, however.

The implicit-explicit dividing line is crucial. Protest harnesses aggressive impulses by controlling and, to some extent, masking them, while violence gives free reign to those impulses. The strategy of controlling aggression by basing behavior on the unacknowledged threat of violence follows from the cost-benefit calculation. The advantages to the protestors of such a strategy are manifold. Fear is an important motive force, but the costs of acknowledging the manipulation of threat to produce fear are high. Once actors acknowledge the potential violence which underlies their behavior, the goals sought in the action become secondary in the conflict. Target actors--those against whom the protest is directed--may then refuse to debate the issues which gave rise to the protest. They may turn instead to the issue of the legitimacy of the means by which the demand is put.

As long as protestors do not manipulate the threat of violence explicitly, they enjoy a slim legality, even, occasionally, legitimacy. Once they employ their threat openly, however, they open the way for authorities to suppress their movement or action.

Protest, then, is a device by which groups of people manipulate fear of disorder and violence while at the same time they protect themselves from paying the potentially extreme costs of acknowledging such a strategy.

Protest and violence may also be distinguished empirically to some extent. One obvious point is that the ghetto violence of recent years mobilized primarily blacks as demand-makers, while urban protests have appealed to both races.[19] More importantly, several recent empirical efforts have suggested that the ghetto violence of the last decade can be viewed as a response to certain <u>national</u> forces which cut across or transcend city lines: Spilerman cites vacillatory federal action, the development of black consciousness, and the suggestive impact of the

national news media, particularly television.[20] Protest against local government targets on the other hand, judging from the present data, is stimulated by specific grievances related to particular local agencies or officials. Whether or not protest occurs in a city, then, is more likely to be a function to some degree of the nature of the local political system, while the likelihood of violence is not (witness the riots in the "model" cities of New Haven and Detroit).

In addition, certain correlates of one form of behavior are not present with the other. For example, while Downes, Spilerman, and the data collected for this present inquiry all show a strong relationship between the incidence of violence and the size of a city's black population, my data shows no relationship between the frequency of black protest and black population. Second, my data indicate that violence, prompted either by the police or the protestors, did not occur in the vast number of cases of protest, leading the observer to suspect that implicit threat manipulation and explicit threat manipulation are two distinct forms of political expression. And finally, a number of scholars argue that recent ghetto violence, while politically motivated, was largely expressive in nature,[21] while some preliminary survey evidence shows that most actors who engage in protest activities, conventionally defined, do so for instrumental purposes.[22]

In short, the study of protest has an integrity all its own. The lessons of the studies of mass violence in the nation's cities are not likely to be fully applicable to this enterprise.

The concern of this study is to explore the notion that the incidence of protest is in part a function of the nature of a city's political opportunity structure.

There appear to be two plausible hypotheses. One is that protest occurs most frequently in unresponsive and unrepresentative political systems--in other words, in cities in which the opportunity structure is relatively closed. Protest may be viewed in this situation primarily as a frustrated response by groups unable to gain access to decision-making councils by conventional means.[23]

Groups which find or consider themselves deprived of political representation or which cannot elicit favorable policy decisions from government will resort to the drama of protest to make it appear that some sort of felicitous response is imperative for the preservation of social peace. Protest, then, springs from the inability of certain groups to manipulate the political system to their advantage by conventional means: the incidence of protest will vary negatively with indicators of an open structure of political opportunities. This may be designated the linear model of the conditions of protest.

A second hypothesis conceives protest as much a signal of impatience as frustration. According to this model--the curvilinear model--protest occurs as a political system begins to open up.[24] Or to put the hypothesis in such a way as to allow for testing in the absence of time-series data, protest will be most prevalent in systems characterized by a mix of open and closed factors. Protest is not likely to occur in extremely closed (repressive) systems or extremely open (responsive) systems. Hence the relationship of system characteristics and the incidence of protest will be curvilinear.

Protest occurs in a mixed system because the pace of change does not keep up with expectations, <u>even though change is occurring</u>. As the political opportunity structure becomes more open, previously powerless

groups begin to acquire influence. However, the acquisition and development of influence is likely to come slowly. Conventional strategies of political influence may appear too slow and unwieldy to effect significant gratification. In a system which is opening up, the combination of the realization that the system may be vulnerable or responsive to political efforts and the persistence of inequities becomes intolerable for some groups. Hence, these groups may resort to protest to express their impatience, even when the system may be viewed in relative terms as a responsive one.

In the following sections I shall examine some data gathered on protest in American cities to determine which model best describes the conditions under which such activity occurs.

II.

Data on the incidence of protest activities were gathered from the local newspapers of 43 widely scattered cities. To reduce the possible distorting effects of size, the sample was drawn only from those cities with populations between 100,000 and one million. Of the 141 cities which fell in this category in 1968,[25] an original random sample of 56 was chosen. Newspapers in 13 of these cities were not available on microfilm. Hence, the final sample numbered 43.

Newspapers for a six-month period (May-October) in 1968 were read. Where there was more than one major newspaper, an increasingly rare circumstance in American cities, the afternoon journal was selected. This time period was deliberately chosen in order to control for seasonal variations in the likelihood of protest and to enhance the chances of obtaining a large sample of protests. I assumed that the warm spring through autumn months are most conducive to the pursuit of outdoor

political activities such as marches, picketing, or mass gatherings. Despite the relatively short time period, the effort of reading approximately 180 daily editions for each of 43 cities constituted an enormous task.

The decision to use newspapers as the source of the protest data was motivated by two considerations, one practical, the other theoretical. As for the former, there simply is no single official or non-official tabulation of protest incidents in existence. Reliance on newspaper accounts, however, has substantial justification in some theoretical writing on the dynamics of protest. According to Lipsky, protest activities create resources for protestors by activating sympathetic third-party interests, to whom the protest target is sensitive, to bring pressure to bear on behalf of the protestors.[26] The critical link between the protestors and their targets' third-party reference publics is the news media. Lipsky writes:

> To the extent that successful protest activity depends upon appealing to and/or threatening, other groups in the community, the communications media set the limits of protest action. If protest tactics are not considered significant by the media, or if newspapers and television reporters or editors decide to overlook protest tactics, protest organizations will not succeed. Like the tree falling unheard in the forest, there is no protest unless protest is perceived and projected.[27]

While this conception of protest may be unnecessarily narrow (it is possible to conceive protest incidents in which interaction occurs privately between the protestors and their target), Lipsky's formulation offers a significant rationale for the data source: Newspaper coverage, however dubious the scholar might be about its objectivity or comprehensiveness, is vital in itself to the projection of protest.

In the selection of incidents, the research was guided by conventional definitions of protest. Microfilm readers were instructed to record the details of all marches, sit-ins, demonstrations, pickets, protest meetings or rallies, and any other incidents which might possibly be construed as collective protest. Much depended on how the participants defined their actions.[28] From this collection of incidents only those which were carried out by two or more individuals and directed at local governmental agencies, officials, or institutions were finally coded. The data do not include, then, campus protests or anti-war or anti-draft protests. No instances of rioting, ambushes, shootings, assaults, looting or threatened violence were recorded, even if the perpetrators or their victims attributed such behavior to political motivations. However, if violence broke out at the site of a peaceful protest and was a direct result of it, then this was recorded.

A total of 120 protest incidents was finally selected and coded. The characteristics of these protests vary widely, providing a multi-faceted portrait of protest in American cities in the late 1960's. Table I provides a summary of the distribution of protests by region, and Table II shows the range of protest frequency.

TABLE I. Distribution of Protests by Region

Region	Number of Protests		
	0	1-2	3 or more
Northeast	--	1	3
Midwest	1	5	5
South	3	8	2
West	1	5	9
Totals	5	19	19

TABLE II. Range of Protest Frequency

Number of Protests	Number of Cities
0	5
1	11
2	8
3	6
4	4
5	4
6	2
7	1
8	-
9	1
10	-
11	1
	43

Protest against city government targets is clearly not a frequent phenomenon. Five of the cities (three of them in the South: Fort Lauderdale, Winston-Salem, and Newport News) had no protest at all during this time period. Only five cities averaged one or more protests per month.[29] In general, the cities averaged slightly fewer than three protests.

Larger cities had a greater tendency to experience protest than smaller ones: while 28 percent of the cities in the sample had populations over 500,000, 45 percent of the protests occurred in those cities. City size and incidence of protest are positively correlated ($r = .46$).[30]

Estimates of the number of participants in each protest incident were reported in 96 of the 120 cases. The size of the protests ranged from five to more than 2000 persons. Table III shows the range of protest participation.

TABLE III. Size of Protest Incidents

Number of Participants	Number of Protests
1 - 10	3
11 - 25	10
26 - 50	18
51 - 75	5
76 - 100	18
101 - 200	15
201 - 300	10
301 - 500	9
501 - 1000	3
1001 - 2000	3
2001 or more	2
undetermined	24
	120

A conservative estimate, based on a computation of the median number of protestors in each category times the number of protests, is that over 17,000 people took part in the 96 protests, an average of approximately 180 per incident.[31]

Urban protest is a strategy used predominantly by blacks,[32] a finding substantiated by this body of aggregate data. In those instances in which the race of the protestors was identified (95 out of 120 cases), 49 (52%) protests were composed entirely of blacks, 21 (22%) were mixed black and white, and 20 (21%) were exclusively white.[33]

More of the protests were directed against the city school system, particular schools, or school officials than any other target (39%; N = 47). The city council was the second most frequent target (12%; N = 14), with the police (10%; N = 12) and the welfare departments (8%; N = 9) next in order. Other city agencies, the mayor, and the city courts provided the bulk of the remaining targets.

All but seven (6%) of the 120 protest incidents were carried out peacefully. Violence was instigated in several of the instances by the protestors, according to the newspaper accounts. In the vast majority of cases, protestors probably did not explicitly threaten violence; if they had done so, the authorities would likely have taken pre-emptive steps to halt the manifestation.

As a tactic, protest appears effective largely as a means of breaching the political opportunity structure rather than manipulating it for group ends. On the one hand, protestors were successful in a majority of cases in gaining access to their targets to state their demand (Table IV), but in only a fraction of instances were concessions actually made (Table V).

TABLE IV. Nature of Target Response at Site of Protest

Met with or spoke to protestors	58% (69)
Refused to meet with or speak to protestors	35% (42)
Undetermined	7% (9)
	100% (120)

TABLE V. Outcome of the Protest

Concessions made to the protestors	15% (18)
No concessions made	54% (65)
Action deferred, postponed	24% (29)
Outcome undetermined	7% (8)
	100% (120)

In the next section the protest incidents are treated as identical units of analysis in exploring the basic conditions associated with protest. Since the intensity of individual protest incidents differs, however, depending upon the number of participants, the duration of the protest, and the number of sites at which a single incident occurred, a later section will explore the enviornmental conditions related to relatively intense protest activity.

III.

An initial look at the zero-order correlations between incidence of protest and selected environmental variables suggests that what I have called the curvilinear model is more applicable to the American case than the linear model. Protest occurs most frequently in cities in which the political opportunity structure is characterized by a mix of open and closed variables.

One standard set of variables relates to the formal structure of local government. Scholars have argued that mayor-council governments are more accountable, and hence more available, to citizens than manager-council governments. The mayor is an elected politician and must please a constituency; the manager is a professional, hired by the city council, who maintains his office at their sufferance. Similarly, ward aldermanic elections afford residentially concentrated minorities greater opportunity for representation than at-large electoral systems. In the latter the major groups in the city dominate the electoral arena. And partisan systems seem to offer groups greater access to government than non-partisan ones by virtue of the fact that parties aggregate diverse interests as a requisite of persistent viability and rely over time on identifiable blocs of voters for whom they supply cues and to whom they must account.

TABLE VI. Intercorrelations (Pearson's r) of Protest and Selected Political Environment Variables

	All Protest Incidents	Black Protest Incidents
Population of city	.46*	.50*
Percentage black	---	-.02
Number of blacks	---	.14
Model cities grant	.26**	.23
Number of black elected officials	---	.07
Percentage of managers, propriators, and officials	-.30*	-.28**
Index crime per 1000 population	.34*	.27**
Percentage of minority police[a]	.20	.03
Mayor-council government	.35*	.42*
Ward aldermanic elections	-.01	.08
Partisanship	.07	.11
Incidence of riots	.23	.22
Black representation ratio[b]	---	.30*

[a]Data for eight cities was not available

[b]This is a measure of proportional representation of blacks in the city council, computed by dividing the proportion of black aldermen by the proportion of black population.

*$p < .05$

**$p < .10$

In short, insofar as the particular institutional arrangements which characterize reform governments make access and representation more difficult for minorities to obtain, such governments offer a relatively closed structure of opportunities. Some evidence indicates, in fact, that the impact of reform institutions is cumulative in this regard: that is, the more components of reform a government has--non-partisanship, manager, and at-large elections--the less responsive it is to minority group demands.[35]

Protest, however, does not appear to be a response to a closed system of opportunities as represented by formal governmental arrangements, taking each institutional form individually. The incidence of protest is positively related to mayor-council forms ($r = .35$).[36] Black protest is even more strongly related to mayoral government ($r = .42$).[37] Protest occurs most freely, then, in political systems in which at least one aspect of formal structure--the nature of the chief executive--has been viewed as most conducive to groups seeking access.

TABLE VII. Form of Government and Frequency of Protest

	0	1-2	3 or more	Totals
mayor-council	6% (1)	29% (5)	65% (11)	100% (17)
manager	15% (4)	54% (14)	31% (8)	100% (26)

Taken as isolated variables, neither the arrangements for electing aldermen nor the fact of partisanship bears any relation to the incidence of protest. However, combining these two variables with the nature of the chief executive to get a multiple correlation (.41) affords a 40 percent increase in explained variance over the simple correlation of mayor government with protest (.35). The three variables taken together explain 17 percent of the variance, while mayor government alone explains only 12 percent.

It would be plausible to suspect that the relationships shown here are not in fact reflective of the impact of formal structure but rather are a function of the type of population found predominantly in mayor-council cities (although not at a significant level), we should find that the number of blacks is also related to black protest, if the form of government were simply an intervening variable. However, black protest and black population are not related, lending support to the finding of the association of structure and protest.

Formal institutional arrangements represent one aspect of the political opportunity structure in the sense that they seem to accord certain groups advantages in political competition and others disadvantages. The nature of the formal political structure, however, does not necessarily indicate where power lies or how it is distributed in the system.[38] If power is concentrated , then groups without membership in the circle of the select which attempt to enter political competition will neither have many points of access at which to make their case nor a great chance of acquiring significant allies. Indeed, if power is concentrated, then it is likely that the resources necessary to wield power are also concentrated, indicating that groups which seek to enter the political arena are likely to be poor in the necessary political currencies , or that there is, in Dahl's terms, little slack in the system.

In the terms of the present argument, one could claim support for the linear model of the relationship between protest and the environment if the incidence of protest rose in cities with a centralized distribution of power. Where power is concentrated, one plausible response for out-groups, low in conventional resources and cut off from regular access to the stations of power, would be to use protest.

On the other hand, if protest were found to increase with the dispersion of power, then the frustration model would be less appropriate. With the possibilities manifest for coalition-building, for acquiring allies with significant resources, groups which resort to protest do so in a relatively open system. Such behavior might be viewed in terms of Lipsky's forumlation of protest as a device to communicate the need for allies with resources.[39] This formulation presupposes a dispersion of power: some actors in the system might be favorable to the protestors and will join the conflict against those who are not. If protestors have potential allies, then the opportunity structure is not fully closed. Protest is a function of impatience in a system marked by some degree of flexibility.

One problem in testing these alternative possibilities is that summary measures of the dispersion of power in a community are difficult to come by. Nevertheless, there have been several creditable attempts, the most influential and controversial of which has been Hawley's MPO ratio, the proportion of managers, proprietors, and officials in the civilian labor force.[40] Hawley argued that a high MPO ratio indicates that power is diffused among different community subsystems, power which rests on managerial skills. Hawley wrote:

> Proceeding from the notion that system power resides in the subsystems or functional units of a community, we can infer that it must be exercised through the managerial functions of subsystems. For it is those functions that coordinate the several other functions in their respective subsystems and articulate the latter with the larger system.[41]

Hawley demonstrated successfully that the greater the proportion of such white collar occupations in a city's work force, the less effective a city was in implementing urban renewal programs. Success, he argued, is a function of the concentration of power.

The need to infer power from occupational status, however, seems to me a serious flaw in the MPO ratio as a measure of the dispersion of power. Nevertheless, the ratio is not a meaningless one. It affords a measure of the distribution of occupational status and skills, two critical resources for the exercise of power. As such it offers one means of estimating the dispersion of potential power, or the degree of slack in the system.[42] If the potential for wielding power is limited in a system, then it is still a relatively closed system.

In the cities selected for this study, the incidence of all protests and of black protests is negatively related to a high MPO ratio ($r = -.30$ and $-.28$, respectively). That is to say, protest occurs more frequently in cities with a small white collar work force, an indication that certain resources for the exercise of power are concentrated.

The MPO ratio is positively related to mayor government (but not at a significant level), but the relationship between the MPO ratio and protest is not a function of form of government: the MPO ratio is still negatively related to the incidence of protest when form of government is controlled (partial $r = -.25$).[43]

Thus, protest appears to occur in cities in which the formal political structure provides opportunities while the informal structure, as measured by the distribution of occupational and skill resources, is relatively restricted. Formal attributes of government may have little bearing on the exercise of power. Structure provides a framework within which certain groups are accorded advantages if they are able to seize them. The mayor is more vulnerable than the manager because the former must please an electorate. But this vulnerability, a consequence of formal structure, assumes that the mayor is in a position to please an electorate by being responsive and that organized segments of the electorate can make demands

on him. But the realities of the potential distribution of power, symbolized by the MPO ratio, may render the effects of structural biases important.

While this is a plausible argument, evidence indicates that blacks engage in protest especially in those cities where they have been able to gain formal proportional representation. Representation in the form of elected officials--limited here to aldermen[44]--does not guarantee blacks real power in a city, but it does indicate that certain types of political opportunities are available. Furthermore, it provides evidence that black spokesmen may speak from a legitimate and official forum. This is not a prerequisite for the exercise of power but it makes the problem of wielding power a lesser one in that access has already been achieved.

The incidence of black protest is not related to the absolute number of black elected officials, including aldermen, school board members, and judges, but it is significantly related to the black representation ratio ($r = .30$). The representation ratio was calculated by dividing the proportion of aldermen who are black by the proportion of the population which is black. When the figure equals 1.0, then blacks are, numerically speaking, perfectly proportionally represented. When the figure is under 1.0, the typical case, blacks are under-represented. In a few cases, the ratio exceeds 1.0, indicating that the black population has more than its proportional share of aldermanic representatives.

As the representation ratio approaches zero, we may conclude that the structure of opportunities is less open for blacks. In the case of the cities in our sample, however, protest increases with the degree to which blacks are represented in city government. Protest is associated here with an open structural characteristic. According to the linear model,

it would have been reasonable to expect that black protest occurred most frequently in those cities in which blacks had been denied representation. Instead, proportional representation may be viewed as either an invitation to pose demands (through protest, if that is the easiest way to mobilize support) or as a concomitant factor in a black population's coming of political age, a maturation process marked by twin developments in protest and electoral activity.

Formal political structure, the distribution of resources, and the nature of the incumbents in elected office all give indications of the potential various groups might have for wielding political influence. However, none of these indicators supplies any sense of the extent to which a political system is in fact responsive to deeply felt needs. If a government does not demonstrate a willingness to respond to a diversity of demands, then the structure of opportunities cannot be said to be a fully open one, regardless of the opportunities for gaining access and representation.

To test the responsiveness of local governments, two measures of policy outputs were chosen. One was whether a city had received Model Cities planning funds[45] and the other was the percentage of the police force composed of racial minority members.[46]

The former may serve as some indication of responsiveness to what is often the most frequently named problem facing the cities--the lack of decent housing.[47] The latter is a response to the animosities which mark the relationship between urban police forces and the black community.

Initial competition for Model Cities funds was intense. Nearly 200 cities submitted applications for the first round of planning grants of which only 75 were chosen during the winter of 1966-67.[48] Of the sample of 43 cities in this study 24 (56%) had received planning grants by the

end of 1968, and 19 had not. Because the Model Cities program was thought to offer the means for a comprehensive attack on urban ills, the city which gained such funds could be said to have acted responsively to demands that were at the very least implicit in the urban condition.

Similarly, after the ghetto riots in the last decade, one of the major prescriptions for restoring racial peace was to increase minority group representation on the uniformed police force. Most cities sought, unsuccessfully, to recruit blacks for their police departments.[49] The measure used here--the percentage of the force composed of minority group members--is necessarily a static one. Data do not exist in reliable form prior to 1969. Thus, the measure does not take account of changes in the percentage of blacks. Nevertheless, it may be assumed that simply having at a given point in time a substantial proportion of blacks on the force is an indication that the political system has at some previous time been responsive. And cities with a greater percentage may be said to be more responsive in this regard than cities with a smaller percentage.

Both the existence of a Model Cities program and the percentage of minority group policemen are positively related to the incidence of protest (.23 and .20, respectively), but only the former is statistically significant. Black protest is also slightly related to Model Cities, but the coefficient falls just short of our criterion of significance. Black protest is not at all related to the percentage of uniformed minority policemen.

These relationships, while small and in most cases not significant, lend more support to the curvilinear model than to the linear one. That is, protest increases with responsiveness.

TABLE VIII. Model Cities and Protest

	Number of Protests			
	0	1-2	3 or more	Totals
Model Cities Grant	4% (1)	42% (10)	54% (13)	100% (24)
No Model Cities Grant	21% (4)	47% (9)	32% (6)	100% (19)

TABLE IX. Minority Policemen and Protest

Percentage of Minority Policemen	Number of Protests			
	0	1-2	3 or more	Totals
0-5%	18% (3)	59% (10)	24% (4)	101% (17)
6-10%	8% (1)	25% (3)	68% (8)	100% (12)
11% or more	--	67% (4)	33% (2)	100% (6)

Note: Data for eight cities were not available.

It should be said, however, that a more detailed examination of these two variables would probably reveal that they are complex and ambiguous measures of responsiveness. Some of the cities in this sample which have Model Cities programs were more committed than others to lay involvement in planning.[50] And literature on the tensions experienced by black policemen[51] reveals that the cross-pressures felt by such men may drive them to brutal behavior against other blacks as a way of demonstrating professional loyalty in the face of race demands. Both Model Cities and the black policeman may represent mixed blessings in some sense, at least for the black community. In other words, no Model Cities grant and no black policemen would be signs of a failure to respond; but having such programs is not necessarily an unambiguous sign of responsiveness.[52] Such programs are likely, then, to represent a mix of responsive and non-responsive impulses, a mix characteristic apparently of the conditions under which protests take place.

In those cities which did not obtain Model Cities funds, protest was not a frequent occurence. Several explanations are plausible. One is that the demand for such a program did not exist. This is unlikely, however, since at least seven of the 19 cities experienced mass racial disorders in 1967 or 1968,[53] sufficient indication that conditions in those cities posed at least an implicit demand for massive governmental response.

Another explanation is that in those cities which had neither riots nor Model Cities grants, conditions were such during the time period of this study that the population felt no grievances deeply enough to participate in protests. It is also possible that the population groups from which protestors are generally drawn is simply too small to organize sustained protest actions in these cities. Neither explanation is convincing. Of the twelve cities which had neither a riot nor a Model Cities grant, seven are located in the South. They are characterized by large black populations (potential protest participants) and the usual range of urban ills.

The most plausible explanation is that the political systems in the cities which did not participate in Model Cities are so closed or so unresponsive that protest was either discouraged or felt to be futile. The data tend to support such a speculation, even in the case of those cities which experienced riots (Table X).

The degree to which political opportunity structures are open or closed is not only a function of formal governmental structure, the distribution of certain skills and status, representation, or governmental responsiveness. Opportunity is also related to the social stability of the potentially mobilizable population. Where population groups exhibit

TABLE X. Model Cities, Riots, and Average Number of Protests

	Model Cities grant	No Model Cities grant
Average Number of protests per city	3.2	2.1

	Model Cities grant and riot	No Model Cities grant and riot
Average Number of protests per city	3.6	2.7

high social disorganization, it might be expected that opportunities for elites seeking to mobilize political constituencies would be low. As a measure of social disorganization, this study employed the rate of those crimes reported in the FBI Uniform Crime Reports 1968 (so-called "index crimes," because they comprise the national crime index) per 1000 population.[54] The incidence of protest, however, is positively related at a significant level to high crime rate ($r = .34$). Black protest is related less strongly to crime rate and the correlation is just short of significance. Gurr cites evidence which indicates that during periods of protest activity, protest displaces aggressive black crime.[55] The aggregate data presented here cannot assess changes in the crime rate which might occur during periods of protest activity, but as a static relationship, crime and protest appear to occur together. Such a finding indicates that the degree of social disorganization reflected at least by crime rates does little to impair the ability of elites to organize protests.

In a similar way the incidence of protest and black protest are also related to the occurrence of ghetto riots. Cities were coded according to whether they had experienced no riots, one riot, or more than one

during the peak years of rioting, 1967 and 1968.[56] The incidence of all protest and of black protest in particular are slightly related to riot violence, but neither coefficient (r = .22 and .23, respectively) is significant. To the slight extent that protest and rioting occur together, it would be possible to conclude that the ghetto violence of 1967-68 did not displace protest activity. The time period of this study occurs after the last wave of rioting, which followed Martin Luther King's assassination in April, 1968. The impulses to protest were not exhausted either by that violence or the earlier riots of 1967, for protest continued after the major outbreaks. To the degree that the recent ghetto violence was a form of political expression, it was in all likelihood a mode of expression qualitatively different from protest and not the logical outcome of the latter.

In a speculative way, these findings on the relationship of crime, rioting, and protest are suggestive for characterizing the political system itself: insofar as crime is an individualistic response to poor social conditions and mass violence is a collective response, high crime and riot cities are those with greater problems. Substantial problems indicate relative governmental impotence, even in those cities with the most responsive administrations. Impotent government is one mark of a closed structure of political opportunities: if government is powerless to act, then political action to influence government is futile.

To summarize, this section has shown that protest occurs most frequently in cities whose structure of political opportunities reflects a mix of open and closed characteristics. Both the existence of a high crime rate and mass violence signify either a generalized governmental impotence or unresponsiveness in the face of social conditions which breed such deviance. In addition, protest is associated with a concentration

of occupational status, which may be construed as one measure of the distribution of potential power resources. The structure of political opportunities cannot be said to be open to the fullest extent under such conditions. Yet the opportunities for gaining access to and formal representation in government, characteristics of an open system, are good in cities which experience protest. And finally protest is moderately associated with certain very specific government responses in the form of Model Cities and the recruitment of minority group policemen, but these responses do not indicate unambiguously that the structure of opportunities is an open one. In short, the curvilinear model describing the conditions of protest seems more accurate than the simple linear model. In the final section an attempt is made to elaborate on this notion and to interpret the considerable gaps left by unexplained variance in the data. Before commencing this effort, however, we must consider the problem of the intensity of protest and the political environment.

IV.

Protest incidents differ in the intensity of the concerns they express and the reactions they generate. The passions of the participants and bystanders associated, for example, with the fair housing marches led by Father Groppi or Martin Luther King into working class ethnic neighborhoods represent a quantum leap in intensity over that associated with the small protest delegation which meets with the city welfare commissioner far from the public eye. As a unit of analysis, then, one protest incident is not necessarily strictly comparable to another.

This is not to say that foregoing exercise has been misguided. In one sense protests may be treated as comparable in assessing the intensity of a city's protest environment. The mere number of protests is as good

an indicator as any of the general state of tension and challenge wrought by protest behavior in any given city, as we shall see momentarily. A city which experienced five protests during the time period of this study had a more intense protest environment than the city which had only one incident. Even if the latter protest was large and passionate, it may be possible to view it as an anomaly, after which politics settles down or returns to its more conventional patterns. But five incidents bespeak a relatively consistent state of crisis, an indication that things are more often felt to be wrong and remediable by protest action by more groups of different people.

Nevertheless, the mere number of protests tells nothing of the attention any single protest incident might have engaged or the scope of its impact as a focus for mobilization. Conceivably, the conditions which give rise to one extremely intense protest, might differ from those which are associated with milder but more numerous protests.

To measure intensity, two basic scores were computed. One was an indicator of the intensity of the protest environment, and it was employed largely to test the reliability of the findings using the simple frequency of protests. The second measure was an indicator of the average intensity of individual protest incidents in a city.

Intensity was conceived for measurement purposes as a function of the number of participants in a protest action, the duration in continuous days, and the number of separate sites within the city at which the protest simultaneously occurred. The assumption was that as these factors increased, the passions of the principals and observers would grow deeper.[57] For example, a school boycott and picketing which lasted four days and affected three high schools was more intense than one which lasted four days but affected only one school. The scores are crude in that they offer no

direct measure of emotional intensity (which must be inferred). Another problem is that they assign the same values to size, duration, and number of sites. Thus no conclusion about relative intensity is possible for two protests of the same size, one of which lasted one day at two sites and the other of which lasted two days at one site.

Protests were scored in the following manner: 1) duration: one day, one point; two days, two points, three or more days, three points; 2) number of sites: one site, one point; two sites, two points; three or more sites, three points; 3) size of protest: 5-75 participants, one point; 76-200 participants, two points; 201 or more participants, three points.[58] A low intensity protest scored a minimum of three points; the maximum score of a high intensity incident was nine points.

The intensity of the protest environment score was calculated by the formula:

$$\frac{\text{(duration + sites + size)}}{\text{number of protests}} + \text{number of protests}$$

The formula for figuring the average intensity of protest incidents was as follows:

$$\frac{\text{(duration + sites + size)}}{\text{number of protests}}$$

The intensity of the protest environment score is, of course, closely related to the number of protests ($r = .90$), but it offers a somewhat finer measure. Average intensity is not so strongly related to the frequency of protests ($r = .41$). The two scores are themselves related ($r = .75$).

The intensity of protest environment correlations tend to corraborate and strengthen the conclusions reached in the previous section. Table XI

provides a comparison of the correlations between simple frequency and environment variables on the one hand and intensity of the protest environment and environment variables on the other.

TABLE XI. Comparison of Intensity and Frequency Correlations

	Simple Frequency	Intensity of Protest Environment Score
mayor-council government	.35	.33
ward aldermanic elections	-.01	-.06
partisan elections	.07	.02
MPO ratio	-.30	-.32
city size	.46	.41
Model Cities	.26	.38
riot	.23	.31
minority policemen	.20	.24
index crimes per 1000	.34	.31

Using the intensity of the protest environment score instead of frequency does not increase our understanding of the conditions associated with protest in a significant way. The average intensity of protest incidents is of greater interest, however. Whereas most of the relationships between average intensity and the political environment achieve the same levels of association as those between simple frequency and the environment variables, several are different. For example, the frequency of protest is related to population size of the city, but average intensity is not. Frequency is also related to mayor government, but, again, average intensity shows no such correlation.

On the other hand, the frequency of black protests is unrelated to the percentage or the number of blacks in the city's population, but average intensity shows slight positive relationships with both of these variables.

TABLE XII. Comparison of Selected Average Intensity and Frequency Correlations

I.	Simple Frequency of All Protests	Average Intensity of Protests
Population	.46	.14
Mayor-council government	.35	.14
II.	Simple Frequency of Black Protests	Average Intensity of Protests
Number of Blacks	.14	.25
Percentage of Blacks	-.02	.21

These figures suggest that while the size of the black population has little effect on the likelihood that protests will occur, it does affect the intensity associated with protests. Protests involving blacks are likely to last longer, be larger, and take place at more sites than those involving whites. This finding simply reinforces the notion that urban protest is a tactic more fully exploited by blacks as a major form of political activity, in which the demands for commitment of resources made on individual participants are substantial. White protest is not quite so enduring, nor so broad in its attraction as a focus for mobilization.

V.

The data support the conclusion that the incidence of protest is mildly related to the nature of a city's political opportunity structure, which I have conceived as a function of the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system. The configuration of those relationships affords a basis for some theoretical speculation concerning the nature of the environmental conditions most fertile for protest, but before turning to that task it is appropriate to sketch some additional explanations of the factors which

give rise to protest as a way of interpreting the unexplained variance in the data presented here. These factors do not operate in a mutually exclusive fashion from one another, nor from the nature of the political environment. Rather, they are probably all at work to one degree or another, enabling us to understand protest behavior, like voting, as a product of multiple complex causes and stimuli.

One major factor which undoubtedly contributes to the tendency to engage in protest has to do with the capacity of the political system to fulfill value expectations. In other words, deprivation, a condition which may exist in both open and closed structures of political opportunity, may give rise to protest.[59]

This explanation assumes that the perception of deprivation, whether objective or subjective, in relation to others in the society is likely to result in aggressive political behavior. The explanation is attractive for the fact that it suggests that the propensity to engage in protest and socio-economic status do not co-vary in a linear relationship. Middle class homeowners threatened by freeway construction may perceive themselves as deprived in relation to homeowners whose property is not threatened, just as poor blacks see themselves as deprived in the context of an affluent society.

Bowen, et. al. are able to demonstrate that those blacks who perceive the greatest gap between "the best possible life" and their own position on a Cantril Free Self-Anchoring Scale are those most likely to evince great approval for protest forms of behavior.[60] They do not show, however, that the perception of deprivation and behavior are linked. One attempt to relate relative deprivation of blacks, using objective indicators of social welfare for 49 cities, to the incidence of mass ghetto violence proved fruitless,[61] suggesting that the various causal leaps from

objective relative deprivation to the perception of that deprivation to violent behavior in politics need further and more careful charting.[62] Deprivation surely plays a role in the motivations of protestors, yet its nature remains to be explored systematically.

Another explanation which might contribute to an understanding of why groups engage in protest has to do with the particular array of organizational needs which protest can fulfill. For example, protest action is frequently successful as a strategy for mass mobilization. Protest may often be undertaken primarily as a recruiting activity for organizations, for it is a way of cutting through communal apathy and attracting membership through its sheer excitment. Protest also helps elites to manipulate constituents' understanding of issues, for such mass actions and their associated rhetoric offer participants an easily comprehended Manichean explanation of this political world.[63] The we-they dichotomy between protestors and targets is sharply drawn in protest actions, which serves to foster group identity and cohesion. Finally, protest is <u>action</u>, a means of demonstrating to group constituents that the organization can do something. By taking such action, the protest may serve to bolster morale and confidence in the ogranization itself. In short, protest may be employed by elites as a means to sustain and enlarge their organization; pressuring targets for action may be entirely secondary.

Still a third explanation of the factors leading to protest has to do with the types of demands people might make. Insofar as the issues treated in community decision-making tend to be limited by the biases and predispositions of those in powerful positions--the setters of the agenda--certain types of demands will not command routine attention.[64] Protest is a means for forcing consideration of the extraordinary, the unpopular,

or the non-routine. Demands for student power in the university or welfare client representation on policy-making boards are apt examples. Protest, then, occurs when certain demands (and indeed demanders) represent such major departures from the conventional mainstream of politics that they are not considered as a routine matter of institutionalized practice.

Discontent over deprivation, organizational needs, and extraordinary demands all occur in and are in some degree shaped by the nature of the political system. What this study has done is to provide some preliminary clues to the nature of those urban political systems most conducive to the development of persistent protest.

The data have suggested in effect that protest flourishes in a system marked by paradox. The paradox of protest is that while on the one hand it appears to be a response to certain closed system characteristics, it only takes place on a persistent basis in systems in which other characteristics are open. The incidence of protest was associated, for example, with a relatively small managerial work force, with a high crime rate, and with the ambiguous variables of Model Cities and minority uniformed police. The former two are indicative of a restricted opportunity structure, while the latter two potentially signify both open and closed characteristics.

On the other hand, protest occurred more frequently in mayor-council governments rather than manager governments, and black protest took place most frequently where blacks had gained formal representation in proportion to their population. Both of these factors characterize the system as an open one.

The data also showed that violence did not accompany most protests, and that in a majority of cases the protestors won at least the right to a hearing for their demands.

Several speculative observations can be based on these findings. Those who pursue protest as an on-going tactic must in effect gain license from the authorities in the system to do so. That is to say, protest will probably not be used in contemporary American cities where it is suppressed by violence. Violent reactions by the authorities will likely stimulate violence by the potential protest population or it will cause withdrawal from aggressively demonstrative politics. Official tolerance, signified by the unwillingness or even inability to suppress protest by force, may serve as the functional equivalent of license to protest. Such license represents an opportunity in the whole structure of opportunities: protest offers a chance to gain a hearing in public councils. The openness of the system, in other words, is conducive to protest.

In a similar way, the system which responds to protest is likely by its very responsiveness to encourage protest. Elites who attempt to mobilize people to protest will fail eventually to recruit participants if protests are never successful. Protestors must gain satisfaction through protest on occasion or they will stop using it as an instrumental tactic. Some survey data indicate that those who take part more often in protest are more likely to believe that protest works than those who take part less frequently.[65] Protest, then, feeds on the responsiveness it succeeds in eliciting. System responsiveness is an opportunity in the sense that people are more likely to get what they want in responsive political systems than in unresponsive ones. Protest is more likely to flourish in relatively open systems where it elicits responses.

If the paradox of protest is that it appears to occur in systems exhibiting both open and closed characteristics, then it is possible to argue theoretically that the incidence of protest is related to the openness of the structure of opportunities in a curvilinear fashion.

Consider the scattergram presented in Figure 1. Forms of government combining the nature of the chief executive, aldermanic electoral method, and partisanship are ranged on the left from those which offer the greatest chance for access and representation for minority and out groups to those which offer the least. The distribution of cities by frequency of protest appears to follow a curvilinear pattern. The most frequent occurrence of protest takes place in cities with mixed open and closed characteristics. The cities with the most incidents have mayors but they also have at-large electoral systems.

This finding is borne out by the partial correlation coefficients obtained when each of three governmental form variables is run against frequency of protest controlling for the other two. While protest is positively related to mayoral government, controlling for aldermanic elections and partisanship, it is negatively related to ward systems of aldermanic election, when the other two variables are controlled. Both mayor government and ward election are open characteristics.

Protest is neither a viable nor a fruitful strategy in extremely closed systems. Not only is protest likely to be an inadequate tactic for enhancing political opportunities in a closed system but it is not likely to be tolerated. Protest will not flourish where its use finds neither tolerance nor elicits favorable responses.

FIGURE I. Scattergram Distribution of Protest Frequency by Form of Government



TABLE XIII. Partial Correlations of Governmental Form and Protest

Independent variables	simple r	partial r	Dependent variable
mayor-council government	.35	.41	Frequency of protest
ward elections	-.01	-.21	
partisanship	.07	.15	

In a highly open system, on the other hand, where government is not only responsive but anticipates needs and meets them, if any such urban system exists in America, protest will be unnecessary. In an open system, groups have easy access to decision-makers without resort to the drama of protest. Using a cluster of open characteristic variables to predict the incidence of protest indicates at least that the rate of increase in predictive value tails off sharply. If those mayor governments which procured Model Cities funds and in which blacks have a substantial degree of proportional representation are run against frequency of black protest, the increase in variance explained by the multiple correlation coefficient amounts to less than four percent over that explained solely by mayor government.

TABLE XIV. Partial and Multiple Correlations of Open System Characteristics and Black Protest

Independent cluster	simple r	partial r	multiple r	Dependent variable
mayor-council government	.42	.34	.46	Frequency of black protest
Model Cities grant	.23	.06		
representation ratio	.30	.21		

The data presented here provide a strong basis for rejecting the hypothesis that protest is associated with closed structural characteristics and a moderately suggestive basis for speculating on a theory of protest. The conditions which give rise to protest are many and complex, and the nature of the structure of political opportunities, insofar as this is measurable by aggregate indicators, plays only one small part. Yet it would appear that the incidence of protest does vary with the nature of that structure in a curvilinear fashion.

To conclude, protest seems to be an activity which marks the political life of contemporary American cities at a stage when they are becoming more, not less, responsive to minority demands. Protest is a sign that the opportunity structure is flexible and vulnerable to the political assaults of excluded groups. As such, protest signifies changes not only among previously quiescent or conventionally oriented groups but also in the political system itself.

APPENDIX: City Sample with Number of Protests

Anaheim	4	Miami	2
Atlanta	1	Mobile	3
Boston	9	Newark	4
Bridgeport	1	New Orleans	3
Charlotte	1	Newport News	0
Cincinnati	3	Norfolk	1
Columbus	1	Oakland	5
Dallas	2	Oklahoma City	3
Denver	3	Phoenix	0
Des Moines	2	Raleigh	2
Elizabeth	4	Richmond	1
Evansville	2	Roanoke	2
Fort Lauderdale	0	Rockford	1
Fresno	3	San Francisco	7
Gary	5	Sacremento	6
Grand Rapids	2	Santa Ana	1
Las Vegas	2	Seattle	6
Little Rock	1	South Bend	5
Long Beach	4	Spokane	1
Milwaukee	11	Tuscon	1
Minneapolis	5	Winston-Salem	0
Madison	0		

FOOTNOTES

[1]It should be noted that a significant body of research, based on similar intellectual assumptions, has also treated governmental structure as a dependent variable. These would include John H. Kessel, "Governmental Structure and Political Environment," American Political Science Review, 56 (September 1962): 615-620; Leo Schnore and Robert Alford, "Forms of Government and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Suburbs," Administrative Science Quarterly, 8 (June 1963): 1-17; Robert Alford and Harry Scoble, "Political and Socio-Economic Characteristics of American Cities," Municipal Yearbook 1965 (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1965): 82-97; and Raymond Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," American Political Science Review, 60 (June 1966): 306-326.

[2]Robert Alford and Eugene Lee, "Voting Turnout in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 62 (September 1968): 796-813.

[3]Edgar L. Sherbenou, "Class, Participation, and the Council-Manager Plan," Public Administration Review, 21 (Summer, 1961): 131-135.

[4]Amos J. Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," American Journal of Sociology, 68 (January 1963): 422-431.

[5]Stanley Lieberson and Arnold R. Silverman, "Precipitants and Conditions of Race Riots," American Sociological Review, 30 (December 1965): 887-898.

[6]Robert Lindeberry makes a similar point in his essay, "Approaches to the Study of Community Politics," in Community Politics, Charles Bonjean, Terry N. Clark, and Robert Lineberry (eds.) (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 20.

[7]Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 61 (September 1967): 715.

[8]This view of reform government is most cogently put in Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard and MIT Presses, 1963), p. 40 ff.

[9]Lieberson and Silverman, "Precipitants and Conditions of Race Riots," p. 896.

[10]Bryan T. Downes, "Social and Political Characteristics of Riot Cities: A Comparative Study," Social Science Quarterly, 49 (December 1968): 504-520.

[11]Seymour Spilerman, "The Causes of Racial Disturbance: Tests of a Theory," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, 1969).

[12]Marian Lief Palley and Howard A. Palley, "Social Welfare Indicators as Predictors of Racial Disorders in Black Ghettos," a paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, 1969.

[13]See, for example, Robert Fogelson, Violence as Protest (New York: Doubleday, 1971); Ralph Turner, "The Public Perception of Protest," American Sociological Review, 34 (December 1969): 816-830; and Edward Banfield, The Unheavenly City (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970). Banfield speaks of "demonstrations" as a form of "rioting." See chapter 9, esp. p. 191.

[14]Michael Lipsky uses this phrase in "Protest as Political Resource," American Political Science Review, 62 (December 1968).

[15]James Q. Wilson was among the first to see protest as a form of bargaining in "The Strategy of Protest: Problems of Negro Civic Action," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3 (September 1961): 291-303.

[16]When the solitary politician rises in the legislative chamber to object to some official action, the press and public note that Congressman X protested on the floor of the House. This is to use "protest" generically to refer to vehement objection.

[17]Donald Von Eschen and his colleagues argue that the primary element leading to the success of a black protest movement in Maryland which they studied during the days of the civil rights turmoil was the exploitation of elite fear of violence and civil disorder, although the movement never intended violence. Donald Von Eschen, Jerome Kirk, and Maurice Pinard, "The Conditions of Direct Action in a Democratic Society," Western Political Quarterly, 22 (June 1969): 309. Ralph Turner also dwells on the theme of the manipulation of fear of violence as the motive force of protest in "The Public Perception of Protest," p. 816.

[18]A theory of violence and protest must somehow confront the problem of classifying verbal violence, i.e., where no physical harm is actually done. I would contend that verbal violence changes the nature of a political action and goes beyond the balance of threat and legitimate appeal struck by protestors. Thus it may be classified with active violent behavior for the purposes of understanding the dynamics of categories of actions.

[19]The analysis presented here makes an attempt to control for the racial composition of the protest incidents under examination.

[20]Spilerman, "The Causes of Racial Disturbance...," pp. 1-2.

[21]See Peter Lupsha, "On Theories of Urban Violence," Urban Affairs Quarterly, 5 (March 1969): 275; and Marian Lief Palley and Howard A. Palley, "From Expressive Disorder to Issue-Oriented Politics," a paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, 1970, p. 5-6.

[22]Peter K. Eisinger, "Protest Behavior and the Integration of Urban Political Systems," Journal of Politics, forthcoming, 1971.

[23]This hypothesis finds support in the vast literature on relative deprivation and psychological response to frustration. For a summary of relevant materials, see Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), Chapter 2, especially pp. 34-35, 38.

[24]This hypothesis represents an amalgam of several classic explanations of the causes of revolution, namely those of Soule and Brinton. As Soule has written, only after the position of desperate people "is somewhat improved and they have sensed the possibility of change, do they revolt effectively against oppression and injustice." Quoted in Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 114.

[25]The sample was drawn from the Municipal Yearbook 1968 (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1968). Population and percentage black were taken from the 1970 census, 1970 Census of Population, Advance Report, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C.

[26]Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource," p. 1146.

[27]Ibid. p. 1151. Cf. Turner's observation that protest cannot be projected as protest unless it conforms to folk-theories of what protest is. "The Public Perception of Protest," p. 818.

[28]The case of an American court-martial, held in Britian in the summer of 1971, comes to mind in which the guilt of the defendant hung on the definition of an act he had admittedly committed. The defendant, an army lawyer, had been accused of organizing a demonstration against the war (which is illegal for Americans in uniform overseas) while the lawyer argued that all he had done was to present a petition at the American embassy, which is legal for military personnel. In other words, the defendant refused to define his action as protest.

[29]These were San Francisco, Milwaukee, Sacramento, Boston, and Seattle.

[30]Unless otherwise noted, the correlations reported here are significant at the .05 level.

[31]Some participants may have taken part in more than one protest in a given city during the time span of this study, but there is no way of controlling for multiple participation.

[32]Eisinger, "Protest Behavior and the Integration of Urban Political Systems."

[33]Mexican-Americans were responsible for the remainder of those protests in which participants were identified by race or ethnicity (4%).

[34]Lineberry and Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," p. 715.

[35]Ibid,. pp. 713-714. The difference between reform and traditional components is illustrated in the present body of data by the fact that blacks are slightly more likely to have nearly proportional representation on the city council under a ward system than under either a combined at-large/ward system or an at-large system. The correlation coefficient between the degree of proportional representation and ward elections is quite small ($r = .16$) but it is in the predicted direction.

[36]This is significant at the .02 level. Form of government was treated as a dichotomized dummy variable with the one commission government in the sample grouped with the manager governments. Robert Alford and Eugene Lee found that grouping commission and manager governments for a procedure identical to the one used here did not alter the correlations in a significant way. See their "Voting Turnout in American Cities," p. 803.

[37]Significant at the .006 level.

[38]Aiken has argued that reform governments and a concentrated distribution of power are positively related, but his relationships are neither strong nor significant. "The Distribution of Community Power: Structural Bases and Social Consequences," in The Structure of Community Power, Michael Aiken and Paul Mott, eds. (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 493-500. J. David Greenstone and Paul Peterson however, have argued the exact opposite in "Reformers, Machines, and the War on Poverty," in City Politics and Public Policy, James Q. Wilson, ed. (New York: Wiley, 1968), p. 289. Their examination was based on a study of only four cities.

[39]Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource,"

[40]Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success." Aiken has run the MPO ratio against his own measures of power concentration and comes up with the exact opposite conclusion from Hawley. Aiken is not entirely sure how to explain the difference and ends up urging caution in the use of the measure. "The Distribution of Community Power..." p. 503.

[41]Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," p. 424.

[42]The distinction between potential influence and manifest influence, or influence in repose and influence in use, is germane here. See Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 28-29; and William Camson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey, 1968), Chapters 4 and 5.

[43]It could be argued that the association of protest with occupational makeup of a population is simply an indication that protest occurs where there are greater numbers of people holding low status occupations. That is, protest is not a response to the systemic characteristic of resource concentration but rather is a function of the existence of large numbers of potential protestors. (This assumes that, at least in the aggregate, protest and lower class status are related. Survey data I have collected in Milwaukee provides little support for this notion, and this will be reported elsewhere.)

Nevertheless, if this were the case using aggregate rather than survey data, we could explain Hawley's findings by arguing that the larger the percentage of MPO's, the better-off the population, and the less policies would be geared to social welfare programs designed to aid low income groups. However, the findings of Paulson and his colleagues suggest that the MPO ratio affords more than a simple indicator of the socio-economic composition of the population and implies a distinctive configuration of power.

Paulson, et. al. discovered that North Carolina counties with small percentages of MPO's--which would indicate a relatively low level of socio-economic well-being--had lower welfare expenditures than those counties with high proportions of MPO's. They conclude that a high concentration of power can block what elites feel are undesirable programs, despite demonstrable needs of the population. Wayne Paulson, Edgar W. Butler, and Hallowell Pope, "Community Power and Public Welfare," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 28 (January 1969): 17-27.

[44]Data on black elected officials was drawn from the National Roster of Black Elected Officials, compiled by Metropolitan Applied Research Center, Washington, D.C. and Voter Education Project, Southern Regional Council, Atlanta, Georgia, February, 1970.

[45]This was set up in terms of a Model Cities grant/no Model Cities grant dummy variable. The source for this information is 1968 HUD Statistical Yearbook (Washington, D.C. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Government Printing Office, 1968).

[46]Municipal Yearbook 1970 (Chicago: International City Management Association, 1970) provided the source for this data.

[47]Survey data I have collected in the city of Milwaukee indicates that housing ranks consistently first for members of both races as "the most important problem facing this city." This is a finding duplicated in other surveys. See, for example, Bernard J. Frieden, "Housing and National Urban Goals: Old Policies and New Realities," in The Metropolitan Enigma, James Q. Wilson, ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 162.

[48]The Model Cities Program: A Comparative Analysis of the Planning Process in Eleven Cities (Washington, D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban Development, Government Printing Office, n.d.), p. 7.

[49]New York Times, January 25, 1971

[50]For example, Milwaukee, Atlanta, and Gary, all cities in our sample, were less likely than some of the other cities to share power over the program with local residents. See The Model Cities Program.

[51]Nicholas Alex, Black in Blue: A Study of the Negro Policeman (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 161.

[52]Naturally, such an argument means that the open system cannot be measured by these variables: they only indicate closed and mixed systems. This is true when the variables are treated as gross indicators of responsiveness. If they could be combined with a lay participation index and a black policeman brutality index, for example, then the variables would offer greater discriminatory power.

[53]These included Phoenix, Elizabeth, Sacramento, Long Beach, Rockford, Las Vegas, and Miami.

[54]Variations in reporting practices make interjurisdictional crime rate comparisons a delicate task, yet I have used such a measure in the absence of other readily available summary measures.

[55]F. Solomon, et.al., "Civil Rights Activity and Reduction in Crime Among Negroes," Archives of General Psychiatry, 22 (March 1965): 227-236, cited in Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 310.

[56]For riots in 1967 the list on pages 158-159 of the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam Books, 1968) was used. For 1968 riots, the New York Times Index supplied the data.

[57]There is some point of diminishing returns, after which a long and large protest simply become routine, and passions settle down. The measure of intensity used here controls for this in an arbitrary sense by scoring duration of three days and over the same.

[58]The mean number of participants per protest was 180.

[59]The argument of this paper would have it that discontent over deprivation may be expressed more easily through conventional political strategies in an open system, whereas protest is often necessary to communicate discontent in a closed system.

[60]Don R. Bowen, Elinor R. Bowen, Sheldon Gawiser, and Louis H. Masotti, "Deprivation, Mobility, and Orientation Toward Protest of the Urban Poor," American Behavioral Scientist, 2 (March-April 1968): 20-24.

[61]Palley and Palley, "Social Welfare Indicators as Predictors of Racial Disorders..."

[62]Lupsha, "On Theories of Urban Violence," pp. 285, 288.

[63]Frances Fox Pivan has observed that "Social protest actions, because they offer simple and dramatic definitions of problems, may penetrate apathy and override puzzled disengagement bred of lack of information." "Participation of Residents in Neighborhood Community Action Programs," Social Work (January 1966): 78.

[64]This draws on the well-known argument of Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, 57 (December 1962): 947-952.

[65]Eisinger, "Protest Behavior and the Integration of Urban Political Systems."