THE DIVERSITY DIVIDENDS OF A NEED-BLIND AND COLOR-BLIND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICY

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A Unique Design of a Class-based AA

• In the early to mid-2000s, four Israeli selective universities incorporated an affirmative action policy into their admissions practices

• Give an edge in admission to academically borderline applicants from disadvantaged backgrounds

• The algorithm for SES eligibility emphasizes structural disadvantages
  • neighborhood’s and high school’s SES

• Theoretically attractive: need-blind and color-blind
AA Policy & Diversity

• **What are the diversity dividends**: does this policy increase geographic, economic and demographic diversity within the student population

• **Bastions of privilege**: under-representation of underprivileged pop despite the expansion

• The “Diversity Rationale“: the practice of AA in admissions is **permissible** because it is believed to yield educational benefits stemming from assembling a student body with diverse talents and perspectives
  - U.S. Justice Powell, the pivotal opinion in the Bakke case
  - rationale enacted in 2003 by the U.S. Supreme Court in the University of Michigan cases
Relevance to the US

- Need for new and creative race-neutral admission alternatives that produce wide-ranging diversity dividends at selective institutions

- Current race-conscious & race-neutral admission models
  - have shortcomings
  - fail to produce wide-ranging diversity dividends

- Rising class inequality in higher ed. in recent decades
  - solutions that will cater to the socioeconomically disadvantaged
Outline

• Alternative models to admission preferences (in the US)
• The design of the Israeli initiative
• Data
• The diversity dividends
  • Short detour: a sharp regression discontinuity design: preliminary results
• Implications for the US (and other countries)
Race-conscious Admissions

• Narrowly tailored race-conscious admissions practices serve a compelling educational interest: diversity

• Evidence demonstrating the effect of the policy on the demographic diversification of elite campuses
Race-conscious Admissions: Problems

• Criticism: adheres to a macrojustice perspective, taking into account *group* identity rather than *individual* circumstances
  • give an advantage to applicants who are “not deserving”

• Rising discontent
  • Public referenda opposing the use of race-sensitive admissions (CA, WA, MI, AZ)
  • Judicial bans on racial preferences in Texas and Florida
  • Law suits against AA practices in higher education
  • Race-conscious admission should be a temporary remedy
Percent Plans

- Texas, Florida and California have adopted various forms of percent plans
  - admit a fixed percentage of each school’s class rank distribution
  - a uniform admission regime: race-neutral

- Guaranteed admission to high school graduates in the top
  - 10% TX, inst of choice, test scores ignored
  - 4% CA, at least one inst, test scores required
  - 20% FL, at least one inst, test scores required

- Designed to broaden economic, demographic, and geographic diversity
- Shift the debate about merit and access from individual attributes to school characteristics
Percent Plans: Evidence

• TX; CA; FL
  • racial/ethnic diversity not restored at the most selective campuses

• Texas
  • restored racial/ethnic diversity: due to changes in the size and composition of high school graduation cohorts
  • fail to augment socioeconomic diversity
  • successful in broadening geographic diversity

➤ A uniform admission regime cannot increase ethno-racial diversity, even in predominantly minority and residentially segregated environments
  • w/o race-sensitive outreach and generous financial support

➤ Not an effective alternative to race-conscious admissions
Percent Plans
Additional problems: TX

- Saturation of UT-Austin with applicants eligible for automatic admission
  - limiting the institution’s ability to craft a class
  - the top ten percent bill was revised in 2009 (required to fill only 75% of freshman slots)

- Critics: the plan gives unjust advantage to applicants who are “not deserving”

- Despite the appeal of a uniform admission regime the percent plans has become as controversial as the race-conscious system they replaced
Class-based Preferences

• The appeal
  • race-neutral
  • focus on individual circumstances
  • gives an advantage to applicants who are “deserving”
  • socioeconomic diversity and social mobility
  • enjoy public support

• The idea remains theoretical, never implemented
• The evidence on its consequences is based on statistical simulations
  • not enough R/E diversity: cannot replace race-sensitive admissions
  • potential limited by the small pool of qualified applicants
Definition of Class

- Simulations: narrow definition
  - parental education and income
- The literature suggests a broader definition
  - household net worth, the quality of secondary education, neighborhood influences and family structure
  - fairest and most apt for university admissions
  - most reliable: the abundance of information provided lowers the chances of abusing the system
- Multidimensionality
  - conceptually justified
  - complicates the implementation (gather/verify info)
  - not feasible for large universities undergraduate admission
- Compelling idea; yet not practical
Class-based preferences:

Neighborhood/school

- The Israeli design proposes a different (race-neutral) route for class preferences
  - target individuals from disadvantaged neighborhoods and high schools

- The theoretical foundation: the effects of social structures, such as neighborhoods and schools, on youth achievements and educational outcomes

- Capitalizes on the overlap between spatial boundaries and categorical inequality
  - bad neighborhoods and failing schools are populated with categorically disadvantaged groups
Israel’s Higher Education System

- 6 research universities (total 75 inst in 2007-8)
- 4 selective
  - Tel-Aviv University, The Hebrew University, Ben-Gurion University and The Technion
- similar to US flagships
  - competitiveness, grad rate

- Admission Criteria: academic index score:
  - Advanced HS matriculation diploma (similar to AP grades)
  - Psychometric test score (similar to SAT/ACT)
  - Some departments have additional requirements

- Admission is major-specific
  - Within each institution there are more and less selective departments
Class-based Preferences in Israel

- Started in the early to mid-2000s
- Four most selective universities
- Comprehensive and standardized program of class-based affirmative action
Three-stage Process

Socioeconomic eligibility
- Structural and individual disadvantages
- Uniform application, centrally examined by a nonprofit org, provide docs, score to all U

Academic eligibility
- **Small edge**: borderline achievements: academic index score is 0.5-1 SD below the cutoff point (major-specific)

Admission
- **Not guaranteed**: departments have discretion whether to admit an eligible applicant
- **Ceiling**: up to 5% of the dept entering class
Socioeconomic Eligibility:
Max score 85 points; Threshold: 30 points; HS yrs

- Individual adverse circumstances max 20 points
  - student’s (orphan, disability, immigrant, divorce, single parent, death of sibling)
  - parents’ (disability, divorce, chronic illness, unemployment)
  - parental education 5-7 points for a parent with HS edu or less
  - family size 2 points for every child above 4
- Individual SES max 25 pts
- Structure max 40 pts
  - Disadvantaged place of residency 20 pts
  - Disadvantaged HS 20 points

The weighting algorithm makes it almost impossible to pass the eligibility threshold without a structural disadvantage!
A Hybrid Form

- Class-based
- Group affiliation rather than individual traits
  - feasible
  - subjects it to criticism regarding reverse discrimination and creaming ("not deserving")
- Does not rely on an ascribed trait
  - this may muffle opposition
- Targets spatial segregation and school inequality
- Admission is not guaranteed
  - discretion in crafting a class
  - ceiling circumvents the issue of institutional saturation
Practical: The Focus on Structural Inequality

- Facilitates the administration and implementation of the program
  - the applicant's place of residence and high school are easily available on public records
- Expands the pool of qualified applicants
- More reliable, reduces the likelihood of manipulation, less invasive of privacy
  - by eliminating the need to verify an applicant’s financial standing
The Overlap Between Systems Of Inequality In Israel

- Yet, feasibility is not a goal by itself; the main issue is the diversity dividends

- The diversity dividends depend on the level of the overlap between spatial boundaries and categorical inequality

- Israel: perfect setting for studying questions related to categorical inequality b/c of the ethnic and socioeconomic diversity of the pop
Israel's Demography

• There are two main demographic cleavages in Israel
  • along national lines
    • Jews (76%)
    • Arabs (20%, the majority of which are Muslims)
    • Other 4% mostly Christians
  • along ethnic lines within the Jewish population
    • Jews of European/American origin
    • Jews of Asian/African origin

• Numerous waves of immigrations during the 20th century
  • esp. in the 1940s, 1950s, the Jewish population grew several folds
  • early 1990s from the Former Soviet Union (15% of pop)
  ➢ the share of first- and second-generation immigrants is declining,
    esp. among the college age population
Stratification

- A clear hierarchy in terms of the level of educational attainment, occupational status and earnings:
  - Jews of European/American origin
  - Jews of Asian/African origin
  - Arabs

- Over the past fifty years, this basic hierarchy persisted

- Categorical inequality is coupled with spatial inequality
Spatial Stratification: Development Towns

• Demographic composition: weak populations
  • est. by the Israeli government to absorb the immigration waves from Asia and Africa (in the 1950s)
  • in 1995 more than 50% of the residents were of Asian/African origin vs. 30% in the general pop

• In the geographical periphery, far from economic centers

  ➢ In 2006 more than 90 percent of these localities ranked in the bottom half of the localities' SES index
Spatial Stratification: Arab Localities

- Deprived localities with high shares of poor, unskilled residents
- In the geo. periphery, far from the main metropolitan areas and core economic activity
  - about half of the Arabs resides in northern part of Israel

- In 2006 80% of the Arab villages and towns ranked at the bottom third of the localities' SES index
Implications for Access to PSE

• The share of university students at:
  • Affluent localities: 28%
  • Poor localities: 6%

• Spatial and school inequality: the AA plan can yield wide ranging diversity dividends

• The hypothesis is that poor, Arab, and those of Asian or African origin are overrepresented in the AA-eligible pool compared to the regular pool
  • needs to be empirically tested b/c no complete overlap
Data And Methods

• Institutional administrative records from four Israeli universities for 10-12 consecutive years (circa 1997 to 2008)

• The preferential policy started in
  • 2001 at The Hebrew University (HUJI), 8 yrs of obs. under the AA regime (after the affirmative action plan went into effect)
  • 2003 at Tel-Aviv University (TAU), 6 yrs
  • 2004 at The Technion (TEC), 5 yrs
  • 2006 at Ben-Gurion University (BGU), 3 yrs

• The analytical sample in the AA regime:
  • N applicants: 164,000
  • N students: 72,000

• I report aggregated results
Department’s Selectivity

- The basic unit: the department
- 170 departments at the 4 inst (50 different general fields of study)

- An index of selectivity: the sum of the standardized scores of two measures:
  - Competitiveness: admission rate
  - Academic rigor: mean test scores of incoming freshmen

- The selectivity measure takes into account between-major and between-institution differences

- Each department was classified into a selectivity quintile based on its score
## Characteristics of Selectivity Quintiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selectivity level</th>
<th>Average admission rate</th>
<th>Mean test scores</th>
<th>% of applicants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top quintile [34 departments]</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 quintile [33]</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 quintile [34]</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 quintile [33]</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom quintile [34]</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>637</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The national average of all test-takers in 2009 was 564
*The results underscore the selective and competitive nature of most departments composing the four Israeli flagship universities
Analytical Strategy

• **Objective:** assess the magnitude of the overall diversification effect on student body composition and its spread across different levels of selectivity

• Compare the diversity of the AA-eligible and regular pools
  - *Prevalence* of AA-eligible in the student body
  - *Dissimilarity* b/w the two pools in terms of key characteristics

• **Two statistics:**
  - *Growth rate* of under-represented groups
  - *Index of dissimilarity*

• A before-after comparison
  - theoretically attractive
  - not feasible: temporal trends in group representation (sharp decline in the share of 1st and 2nd-generation immigrants within the student body)
Table 2: First-time applicants, admits and students at four Israeli universities, by AA status, AA regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>AA Status</th>
<th>Share of AA-eligible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Regular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicants</td>
<td>163,971</td>
<td>154,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meet 30 points threshold</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admits</td>
<td>106,207</td>
<td>102,979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>72,191</td>
<td>69,540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The share of AA students is uniform across selectivity levels: b/w 3.5-4%
A Short Detour:
A Regression Discontinuity Design

• A sharp discontinuity around the 30 points threshold
• Compare applicants who seek preferential treatment around the 30 points threshold
• Assess the *causal* impact of the plan on several admission and matriculation outcomes
• Preliminary results
• In collaboration with Ofer Malamud, University of Chicago
Regression Discontinuity - preliminary results

Admission Outcomes for TAU

Panel A: Applied Selective

Panel B: Admitted

Panel C: Admitted to Selective Major

Panel D: Enrolled

Regression Discontinuity
Regression Discontinuity - preliminary results

Matriculation Outcomes for TAU

Panel A: Dropout (1st year)

Panel B: Graduated

Panel C: GPA1 (1st year)

Panel D: Mean GPA (1st year)
Regression Discontinuity - preliminary results

Specification checks for TAU

Panel A: Female

Panel B: Psychometric

Panel C: Bagrut

Panel D: Age
Table 4a: Characteristics of students at the four institutions by status of AA-eligibility, AA regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality characteristics</th>
<th>AA</th>
<th>REG</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Growth rate</th>
<th>Index of Dissimilarity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development town</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locality SES cluster</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,651</td>
<td>69,540</td>
<td>72,191</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The growth rate is the (group share in the student body – group share without AA students)/ group share without AA students) * 100
### Results: Dissimilarity

The growth rate is the (group share in the student body - group share without AA students) / group share without AA students) * 100

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>AA</th>
<th>REG</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Growth rate</th>
<th>Index of Dissimilarity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>** Entire student body**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Origin</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Africa 2nd gen</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe-America 2nd gen</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel 3rd gen</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New immigrants - Total</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Africa 1st gen</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe-America 1st gen</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miss</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The growth rate is the (group share in the student body - group share without AA students) / group share without AA students) * 100
### Table 4c: Characteristics of students at the four institutions by status of AA-eligibility, AA regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic need</th>
<th>AA</th>
<th>REG</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Growth rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Need-based financial aid recipient</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Diversification Of Selectivity Tiers

• The challenge: does the preferential treatment diversify the most selective departments?

➢ The diversity dividends are somewhat larger at the top tier than at departments with more relaxed admissions.
Conclusion

• The Israeli color- and need-blind preferential policy infuses the student body with under-represented and disadvantaged populations

• The focus on structural determinants of disadvantage yields broad diversity dividends
  • geographic
  • economic
  • demographic
Implications

• Between-country differences in pse systems
  • No straightforward duplication of this plan to other countries

• The concept is worth a serious consideration
A neighborhood/school Based Preferences

• Supplement or replace the contentious (or banned) racial preferences
  • By default, no race-neutral policy can produce the same level of racial diversity as racial preferences
• Offset the widening class gaps in access to selective inst
• Most practical and feasible alternative
• Wide-ranging diversity dividends: spatial segregation
• Less stigma effect
• Stir less antagonism than racial preferences
• Legally permissible
Implementation: Additional Tailoring

- Emphasize the non-mechanistic admission process
  - incorporating the preferences into a comprehensive full-file review process

- Augment financial aid budget
  - class-based preferences expand the share of low income admits
  - to facilitate enrollment and persistence at elite and expensive institutions

➢ The actual diversity dividends depend on the magnitude of the financial resources dedicated to it!
THANKS YOU!
# Israel’s Population, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>7,303,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thereof:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Africa</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America-Europe</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thereof:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Geographical Segregation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Jews %</th>
<th>Arabs %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The prevalence of AA-eligible, by selectivity quintiles

The share of AA students is b/w 3.5-4 % at all selectivity levels
Table 5: The diversity dividends by selectivity quintiles, AA regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality characteristics</th>
<th>Top Tier (Top quintile)</th>
<th>Departmental selectivity tiers</th>
<th>Second Tier (2+3 quintiles)</th>
<th>Bottom Tier (4+5 quintiles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Growth rate</td>
<td>Index of Dissimilarity</td>
<td>Growth rate</td>
<td>Index of Dissimilarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development town</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locality SES cluster</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-cluster</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic region</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Africa^2</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New-Immi - Asia-Africa</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic need</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results: Dissimilarity 47
The distribution of applicants, admits and students by selectivity quintile (1997-2008)

About one half of first-time applicants sent an application to the most selective majors.

Selectivity Quintile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quintile</th>
<th>Applicants</th>
<th>Admits</th>
<th>Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top</td>
<td>[22%,699]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>[35%,679]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>[37%,634]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>[53%,600]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom</td>
<td>[70%,573]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Class-based AA Policy

- Offset the widening class gaps in access to selective U.S. inst
- Less stigma effect
  - A person’s class is harder to identify than a person race or ethnicity
- Social justice
  - If diversity is the justification: why focus on one aspect of diversity?
  - race is unreliable indicator of disadvantage
- Supplement or replace the contentious (or banned) racial preferences
  - By default, no race-neutral policy can produce the same level of racial diversity as racial preferences